[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 1.21 # 能顯中邊慧日論 1.21 能顯中邊慧日論 1.21 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.21) 有義：事性亦有二種，一正因、二緣因。《涅槃》二十八云「正因者眾生，緣因者謂六波羅蜜。」此說報佛正因也。或說中道觀智及善五陰無明結等以為佛性。若說一切因性，三十六云「佛性不名一法，乃至不名萬法。未得阿耨菩提時，一切善不善無記法悉名佛性。」此與報佛為緣生二因。彼說不然，不了緣因、正因別故。若以經言正因歸眾生，即說眾生為報佛正因。六波羅蜜為緣因者，未知言眾生，為即取第八識？為總五陰？若取八識，第八識有漏無漏種。若取有漏，有漏非無漏正因；若取無漏，此即佛性。如何但言眾生為正因而無差別？若云漏無漏皆是正因，何須簡別者。眾生即五陰，六波羅蜜亦五陰，總正因攝，經中何故別說六度？今准經意，以本有性無漏種隱妙難知，故寄眾生說名為佛性。不爾，何故第二十六師子吼云：「若一切眾生無佛性者，云何而得阿耨菩提？以正因故，故令眾生得阿耨菩提。何等正因？所謂佛性。」若云：即佛說心名為佛性者，餘豈非耶？若爾，即違第三十文。彼云「色受想行識、慈悲喜捨等，并名佛性故。十二因緣亦名佛性。」又三十三云「佛性不名一法，乃至善不善法名佛性故。」若云：雖總云佛性為佛正因，意取第八者。以何為證？如何不說？又《攝大乘》云「不見毒藥得為甘露」等。又《阿毘達磨經》但云「為流轉還滅依」，不說為還滅正因。又但總相明善不善法為報佛緣正因。而云顯佛性同異，何曾顯佛性同異？若以有漏即為正因，此但誠異。諸有智者，誰肯與同？所餘門義，准此知非。顯正因異，下〈示正〉中廣為開示。 > Another opinion states: The phenomenal nature also has two kinds: first, the pradhāna-hetu; second, the pratyaya-hetu. The twenty-eighth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The pradhāna-hetu is sentient beings; the pratyaya-hetu refers to the six pāramitās.' This explains the pradhāna-hetu of the saṃbhogabuddha. Or it is stated that the wisdom observing the Middle Way, as well as the wholesome five skandhas, the fetters of ignorance, and so forth, are taken to be the buddhadhātu. If one explains all causal natures, the thirty-sixth fascicle says: 'Buddhadhātu is not called a single phenomenon, up to not being called ten thousand phenomena. When anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi has not yet been attained, all wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate phenomena are all called buddhadhātu.' These serve as the two causes for the saṃbhogabuddha, namely the condition and the production. That explanation is incorrect, because it fails to understand the difference between the pratyaya-hetu and the pradhāna-hetu. If, taking the scripture's statement that the pradhāna-hetu belongs to sentient beings, one thereby asserts that sentient beings are the pradhāna-hetu of the saṃbhogabuddha and that the six pāramitās are the pratyaya-hetu, one does not know whether, in speaking of 'sentient beings', it takes precisely the eighth consciousness, or all five skandhas in general. If it takes the eighth consciousness, the eighth consciousness has sāsrava and anāsrava bījas. If it takes the sāsrava, the sāsrava is not the pradhāna-hetu of the anāsrava; if it takes the anāsrava, this is precisely the buddhadhātu. Why, then, does it merely say that sentient beings are the pradhāna-hetu without any distinction? If it is said that both sāsrava and anāsrava are the pradhāna-hetu, why would any distinction be necessary? Sentient beings are just the five skandhas, and the six pāramitās are also the five skandhas, all subsumed under the pradhāna-hetu; why, then, does the scripture distinguish the six pāramitās separately? Now, in accordance with the intent of the scriptures, because the fundamentally existent nature of the anāsrava bījas is hidden, subtle, and difficult to know, the scripture provisionally refers to sentient beings and names them buddhadhātu. If this were not so, why would Siṃhanāda say in the twenty-sixth fascicle: 'If all sentient beings lacked the buddhadhātu, how could they attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi? It is because of the pradhāna-hetu that sentient beings are enabled to attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi. What is the pradhāna-hetu? It is the so-called buddhadhātu.' If one says that the Buddha was directly stating that the mind is called buddhadhātu, would the rest not also be so? If so, this would contradict the text of the thirtieth fascicle, which says: 'Form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy, equanimity, and so forth are collectively called buddhadhātu. The twelve links of dependent origination are also called buddhadhātu.' Furthermore, the thirty-third fascicle says: 'Buddhadhātu is not called a single phenomenon, up to: wholesome and unwholesome phenomena are called buddhadhātu.' If one says that although it generally states that buddhadhātu is the pradhāna-hetu of a Buddha, the underlying intent takes the eighth consciousness: what evidence is there for this, and why was it not stated? Moreover, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Poison is not seen to become amṛta,' and so forth. Furthermore, the Abhidharmasūtra merely says: 'It is the support for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa'; it does not say that it is the pradhāna-hetu for nirvāṇa. Moreover, they only explain in general terms that wholesome and unwholesome phenomena are the pratyaya-hetu and pradhāna-hetu of the saṃbhogabuddha, yet claim that this clarifies the identity and difference of the buddhadhātu. When did it ever clarify the identity and difference of the buddhadhātu? If the sāsrava is taken directly as the pradhāna-hetu, this is truly heterodox. Who among the wise would agree with it? The remaining points of doctrine may be known as erroneous by analogy with this. Clarifying the difference of the pradhāna-hetu will be expounded extensively below in the section 'Demonstrating the Correct'. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.20) - [Next: 1.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.22) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.1.21) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.1.21) · Pramāṇa