[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 2.12.4 # 能顯中邊慧日論 2.12.4 能顯中邊慧日論 2.12.4 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.12.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.12.4) 」准此文意，因即福智，果通智斷，故因通三世，果世非世。 若說真如為遠因者，因亦通世非世，如何但言三世？ 三十三云「眾生佛性猶如虛空，非三世故、佛性常故，非三世攝。 」又佛自答：「我因無常，果是常。 因中有遠近，因通三世。 」今有將自凡心翻覆佛教，云：遠因常無常。 妄以近遠因果相對分常無常。 又復自許真如生法，何故但能遠生為遠因，因不能近生為近因？ 如理既常住，近不為因，遠亦非空。 性體凝然，遠能為因，近亦爾，以體前後無差別故。 佛說生因是無常，乖佛說為常。 佛有無性，違聖說有性。 此乃執自智見為是，將佛菩薩為非。 何異待兔角而觸妙高、拔龜毛以填渤澥，豈可得乎？ 寧不思乎！ > According to the intention of this passage, the cause is merit and wisdom, and the fruit encompasses wisdom and cessation; therefore, the cause spans the three periods of time, while the fruit is both temporal and non-temporal. If you say that tathatā is the remote cause, then the cause would also span the temporal and non-temporal; how could it only say 'the three periods of time'? The thirty-third chapter says: 'The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is like empty space; because it does not belong to the three periods of time, and because the buddhadhātu is permanent, it is not included in the three periods of time.' Furthermore, the Buddha himself answered: 'My cause is impermanent, and the fruit is permanent. Within the cause there are remote and proximate, and the cause spans the three periods of time.' Now someone takes their own ordinary mind to overturn the Buddha's teaching, saying that the remote cause is permanent and \[the proximate is\] impermanent, falsely contrasting proximate and remote causes and fruits to divide permanence and impermanence. Moreover, since you yourself maintain that tathatā produces dharmas, why can it only produce remotely as a remote cause, but cannot produce proximately as a proximate cause? Since the principle of tathatā is permanent, if it cannot act as a proximate cause, its remote operation would also be void. Its essential nature is unmoving; if it could remotely act as a cause, it would also do so proximately, because its substance has no difference before and after. The Buddha stated that the janaka-hetu is impermanent, yet you contradict the Buddha's statement by calling it permanent. The Buddha taught the non-existence of gotra \[in some\], yet you violate the Ārya's teaching by asserting gotra \[in all\]. This is taking one's own intellectual view as correct while treating the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as mistaken. How is this different from waiting for rabbit horns to strike Mount Meru, or plucking turtle hairs to fill the Bohai Sea? How could that ever be achieved? How can you not reflect on this! > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.12.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.12.3) - [Next: 2.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.13) - [Up: 2.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.12) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.2.12.4) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.12.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.12.4) · Pramāṇa