[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 2.7 # 能顯中邊慧日論 2.7 能顯中邊慧日論 2.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.7) 有義：以法界真如及第八識為佛正因。真如八識無生不有，說一分無性隨轉理門，非大乘義，故《涅槃》、《楞伽》、《密嚴》皆雙說藏識及如來藏為諸法因。《涅槃》復說第一義空能生善法為種子也。亦《善戒經》等說其本性。唯說法性不說心者，由理有恒沙性功德故，順即成淨、違即成染，由此修得名為密性，心即不爾。又理雖亦與染法為依能生善不善法，而無恒沙性塵勞也。此亦不然。《成唯識論》及餘大乘，何處不許真如及心不遍有情，云一分無是隨轉門？又若以理心為佛正因，即菩薩性，如何自引《優婆塞戒經》云「菩薩種性亦復如是，善業因緣發菩提心名菩薩性。」豈彼理心因發心有方名菩薩性？若云但名佛性非菩薩性者，尚非菩薩性，如何名佛性？若云發心名菩薩性者，據客性說，豈彼本性不得名為菩薩性耶？又准《涅槃經》二十六云「有二種，一生因、二了因。能生法者是名生因，燈能了物故名了因。望果生者，生因是正，了因是緣。」如理既是緣正因，下文自許生物。諸修行者在見道前，既順如修理，何不生有為無漏？即取有漏為無漏種，若如不能生，何名正因？設若許生，心何所用？如已生故。又若真如為因親生，即違《涅槃》及《佛性論》，如前已引，下亦有文。設有處說真如為種，如說塵勞之輩為如來種，豈彼種言為佛為正因？故知假說由依如起。如四大種望所造色，亦五種名正種子者。《瑜伽》七義非常法為因，不悟熏習之義與種子義殊。將熏習義來，雖於種子能所熏習解熏習義，非釋種子。又《佛性論》第二「問曰：此三性，幾性無體能生有體？答曰：唯分別一性無體能生有體。問曰：此幾性有體能生有體？答曰：唯此依他一性。問曰：此三性幾有體能生無體？答曰：真實一性能滅依他令其無體。」若如為正是諸法種，何不能生，言唯是依他一？又若第八體為諸法正因，亦違《瑜伽》、《攝大乘》等種子之義。心體是一許親生，云何名引自果及以性決定？復又一因何能通生善不善等。若許爾者，因一論成不平等。《涅槃》二十二云「一切諸法異因異果，亦非一因生一切果，非一切果從一因生。」以此故知，因果名別。由阿賴耶具三相義，因相之中具種種界，雖非離第八，亦不即賴耶，體用因果理應爾故。故《阿毘達磨經》云「諸法於識藏，識於法亦然。更互為果性，亦常名因性。」又云「由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，故名阿賴耶，勝者我開示。」以此知藏識中有種種界，非即第八。然《華嚴》、《楞伽》說心染淨能生一切者，攝用歸體、攝餘從識，故不相違。又云：理心雖俱生因，多說理者，以順如成淨、違如成染。心則不爾，故不說者。此亦不爾。心若不能通生染淨，可同如心；既通生，如何不說？又悟識成淨、迷識成染，何義不同，多偏說理？又若說心不生恒沙相功德，真如與誰為恒沙性功德？又云：無恒沙性塵勞也者。此亦不爾。既有八萬四千諸塵勞門，翻有八萬四千諸功德門。既說恒沙功德，還有恒沙過失。若真如不遍，無恒沙性塵勞；許真如遍，何無恒沙塵勞性？又云：如來藏性及第八識，如末尼珠隨緣出，故《密嚴經》下卷云「如末尼珠置於日月光中，隨其所應各雨其物。阿賴耶識亦復如是，與習氣合，變似眾色周於世間。若無漏相應，即雨一切諸功德法」者。則自所執第八識藏為佛正因，其義有失。何者？經云與無漏相應即雨功德，明第八識非為正因，他性相應非自性故。准此即知，至初地時，第八由無漏相應生無漏智，非是有漏親生無漏。准此經文，無漏先有，不由新熏。何得說言第八為正？又此相應無漏之法亦是功德，從第八雨，第八未有無漏俱時，此如何起？不可說有無漏種生，以自不許三乘見道前有無漏法故。又云：帶迷即賴耶無常，悟理如第八常住。故《密嚴經》中「云何阿賴耶識是意等諸法習氣所依，為分別心之所擾濁。若離分別即成無漏，無漏即常猶如虛空。」《金光明經》云「法身是常，應化無常。」《涅槃》亦說「若至佛果，即非三世。」又云「佛不同諸行是有為也，亦不可說非業煩惱為，故名為無為。」一切無漏皆非所為，何獨說佛智名非有為耶？故《唯識論》三因證佛是無常者，限己見聞為妄說也者。此亦不然。若云報佛是相續常，立已成失。若凝然常，即有四失：一違教失。且報佛菩提為是本有？為是今有？若是本有，非從因生，則菩提涅槃俱但有了因、不有生因者名，何故《涅槃》二十六云「復有生因，謂六波羅蜜菩提等。」又若是常，云何因生？《涅槃》第十三云「若有諸法從緣生者，則知無常。」又云「以是義故，從因生法不名為常。」下文云「善男子！虛空非生非出、非作非造、非有為法。如來亦爾，非生非出、非作非造、非有為法。如如來性，佛性亦爾，非生非出、非造、非有為法者。」此說真如法身，非報身也。不爾，如何報佛名修得？又《維摩經》「從諸功德生」等。又《涅槃》第十九云「如是光明名為智慧，智慧者即是常住，常住之法無有因緣。」有多番釋常法無因。又云「涅槃之體非本無今有。若涅槃體本無今有，則非無漏常住之法。」又高貴德菩薩云：「凡因莊嚴而得成者，悉名無常。此大菩提莊嚴成故，因修方有，名本無今有，云何是常？」又云「涅槃之體非如是等五因所成。」六波羅蜜等既為了非生，或本因故常。菩提之體五因所得，六波羅蜜等既為生因，故是無常。 > There is an opinion: Tathatā of the dharmadhātu and the eighth consciousness are the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood. Because tathatā and the eighth consciousness are present in all sentient beings without exception, the teaching of a portion lacking the gotra is an expedient doctrine accommodated to capacity, not the definitive Mahāyāna teaching. Thus the Nirvāṇa, Laṅkāvatāra, and Ghanavyūha all teach both the storehouse consciousness and the tathāgatagarbha as the cause of all phenomena. The Nirvāṇa further says that the ultimate emptiness, capable of giving birth to wholesome phenomena, is the bīja. The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra and others also speak of this original nature. That only the dharmatā and not the mind is spoken of is because the principle possesses merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; conforming to it results in purity, while opposing it results in defilement. Hence, what is acquired through cultivation is called the secret nature, whereas the mind is not like this. Furthermore, although the principle also serves as the support for defiled phenomena and can give birth to wholesome and unwholesome phenomena, it does not possess passions numerous as the sands of the Ganges. This is also not correct. Where in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi or other Mahāyāna texts is it not accepted that tathatā and the mind pervade sentient beings, such that one would say that the absence \[of gotra\] in a portion \[of sentient beings\] is an accommodated doctrine? Moreover, if principle and mind are taken as the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood—namely, the bodhisattva gotra—why do you yourself cite the Upāsakaśīlasūtra: "The bodhisattva gotra is likewise: through the condition of wholesome karma one generates the bodhicitta, which is called the bodhisattva nature"? Could that principle and mind be called the bodhisattva gotra only after bodhicitta has been generated? If it is said that it is only called the buddhadhātu and not the bodhisattva gotra: if it is not even the bodhisattva gotra, how could it be called the buddhadhātu? If it is said that generating bodhicitta is called the bodhisattva gotra on the basis of adventitious nature, could its original nature not be called the bodhisattva gotra? Furthermore, according to fascicle twenty-six of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: "There are two kinds: first, the janaka-hetu; second, the jñāpaka-hetu. That which can give birth to phenomena is called the janaka-hetu; a lamp can reveal objects, hence it is called a jñāpaka-hetu. In relation to the arising of the fruit, the janaka-hetu is primary (pradhāna), while the jñāpaka-hetu is auxiliary (pratyaya)." Since principle is \[held by you to be\] the pradhāna-hetu as janaka-hetu, the subsequent text itself admits that it gives birth to things. When practitioners before the path of seeing cultivate the principle in conformity with tathatā, why does it not produce conditioned anāsrava \[dharmas\]? You then take sāsrava \[dharmas\] as anāsrava seeds. If tathatā cannot produce \[them\], how can it be called the pradhāna-hetu? Even if it were admitted to produce \[them\], what would be the use of the mind, since tathatā would already have produced \[them\]? Furthermore, if tathatā directly gives birth \[to them\] as a cause, this contradicts the Nirvāṇa and the Buddhagotraśāstra, as cited above and as shown in passages below. Even if in some places tathatā is spoken of as a seed, just as defilements are spoken of as the tathāgata seed, how could that word "seed" mean that it is the pradhāna-hetu for Buddhahood? Therefore we know it is a figurative expression based on tathatā. As the four great elements in relation to the matter derived from them, or the five seeds are called the true seeds. The seven characteristics in the Yogācārabhūmi exclude permanent dharmas from being causes; you do not realize that the meaning of vāsanā differs from that of bīja. Bringing in the meaning of vāsanā, although you understand the meaning of vāsanā in terms of the perfumer and the perfumed regarding seeds, you have not explained the seeds themselves. Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra asks: "Among these three natures, how many natures lack intrinsic nature yet can produce intrinsic nature? Answer: Only the imagined nature lacks intrinsic nature yet can produce intrinsic nature. Question: How many among these have intrinsic nature and can produce intrinsic nature? Answer: Only this single other-dependent nature. Question: How many among these three natures have intrinsic nature yet can produce non-existence? Answer: The true and actual nature alone can eliminate the other-dependent nature, making it non-existent." If tathatā were the pradhāna\[-hetu\] and the seed of all phenomena, why could it not produce, and why say it is only the other-dependent nature alone? Furthermore, if the substance of the eighth consciousness were the pradhāna-hetu of all phenomena, this would also contradict the meaning of seed in the Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and so on. The substance of the mind is one; if admitted to directly produce, how could it be said to lead to its own distinct fruit and to have a determinate nature? Moreover, how could a single cause universally give birth to wholesome, unwholesome, and other phenomena? If that were accepted, a single cause would lead to an unequal \[creation\]. Fascicle twenty-two of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "All phenomena have different causes and different fruits; neither does one cause produce all fruits, nor do all fruits arise from one cause." From this we know that cause and fruit have distinct designations. Because the ālayavijñāna possesses the three aspects, in its causal aspect it contains diverse dhātus; although not separate from the eighth consciousness, they are also not identical with the ālayavijñāna. By principle, substance and function, cause and fruit must be like this. Therefore the Abhidharmasūtra says: "All phenomena reside in the consciousness, and the consciousness likewise resides in phenomena; / they serve reciprocally as the nature of fruits, and are constantly called the nature of causes." It also says: "Because it gathers and stores all phenomena, it is the all-seed consciousness; / hence it is called ālayavijñāna; I have revealed it to the superior ones." From this we know that within the storehouse consciousness there are diverse dhātus, which are not identical with the eighth \[consciousness\] itself. As for the Avataṃsaka and Laṅkāvatāra speaking of the mind's defilement and purity being able to produce all things, this gathers function back into substance and subsumes the rest under consciousness, so there is no contradiction. Further, \[they say\]: "Although principle and mind are both janaka-hetus, principle is mostly spoken of because conforming to tathatā leads to purity, while opposing tathatā leads to defilement. The mind is not like this, hence it is not spoken of." This is also not correct. If the mind could not universally produce defilement and purity, it might be compared to tathatā and mind; since it universally produces them, why not speak of it? Moreover, awakening to consciousness results in purity, while being confused about consciousness results in defilement. How do their meanings differ, that one should speak mostly and one-sidedly of principle? Furthermore, if it is said that the mind does not give birth to merits resembling the sands of the Ganges, to what would tathatā serve as merits possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges? Further, \[they say\] that it lacks passions possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges. This is also not correct. Since there are eighty-four thousand gates of passion, conversely there are eighty-four thousand gates of merit. Since merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges are spoken of, there are also faults as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. If tathatā is not all-pervading, it would lack passions possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges; but if you accept that tathatā is all-pervading, why would it lack the nature of passions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges? Further, \[they say\]: "The nature of the tathāgatagarbha and the eighth consciousness are like a mani jewel, which yields \[things\] according to conditions. Thus the lower fascicle of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: 'Just as a mani jewel placed in the light of the sun or moon rains down respective objects according to suitability, so too the ālayavijñāna, joining with karmic impressions, manifests resembling various colors and pervades the world; if associated with anāsrava, it rains down all phenomena of merit.'" Then your own position that the eighth storehouse consciousness is the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood collapses. Why? The sūtra says that associated with anāsrava it rains down merits, clarifying that the eighth consciousness is not the pradhāna-hetu, because association with another nature is not its own nature. Following this, we know that upon reaching the first stage, the eighth consciousness gives birth to anāsrava wisdom through association with anāsrava, rather than sāsrava directly producing anāsrava. According to this sūtra passage, anāsrava exists originally and does not depend on abhinava-vāsanā. How can you say that the eighth consciousness is the pradhāna? Moreover, these associated anāsrava dharmas are also merits rained down from the eighth; before the eighth is simultaneous with anāsrava, how could these arise? One cannot say they arise from anāsrava seeds, because you yourself do not accept that before the path of seeing of the triyāna there are anāsrava dharmas. Further, \[they say\]: "Possessing confusion, the ālaya is impermanent; awakening to principle, the eighth is permanent like tathatā. Thus in the Ghanavyūhasūtra: 'Why is the ālayavijñāna the support for the vāsanās of phenomena such as manas, disturbed and muddied by the discriminating mind? If separated from discrimination, it becomes anāsrava, and anāsrava is permanent just like empty space.' The Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra says: 'The dharmakāya is permanent, while the nirmāṇakāya is impermanent.' The Nirvāṇa also says: 'When reaching the fruit of Buddhahood, it does not belong to the three times.' And further: 'The Buddha is not like conditioned formations which are saṃskṛta; nor can he be said to be asaṃskṛta on the grounds of not being made by karma and afflictions.' All anāsrava dharmas are unmade; why specifically say the Buddha's wisdom is not saṃskṛta? Therefore, when the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi cites three reasons to prove that the Buddha is impermanent, it is a false claim limited to one's own見聞." This is also not correct. If you say that the saṃbhogabuddha is permanent in continuum, what you have established already collapses. If it is immutable permanence, then there are four errors: First, the error of contradicting scriptural teachings. Now, is the bodhi of the saṃbhogabuddha originally existent or newly existent? If it is originally existent and not produced from causes, then both bodhi and nirvāṇa would only possess jñāpaka-hetus and not possess the name of janaka-hetus; why then does fascicle twenty-six of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra state: "There are further janaka-hetus, namely the six pāramitās, bodhi, and so forth"? Moreover, if it is permanent, how can it arise from causes? Fascicle thirteen of the Nirvāṇa says: "If there are dharmas that arise from conditions, know that they are impermanent." It also says: "For this reason, a dharma arising from a cause is not called permanent." A later passage says: "Good son! Space is neither produced nor emerged, neither done nor made, and not a saṃskṛta dharma. The Tathāgata is likewise: neither produced nor emerged, neither done nor made, not a saṃskṛta dharma. Just like the Tathāgata's nature, the buddhadhātu is likewise: neither produced nor emerged, not made, not a saṃskṛta dharma." This refers to the dharmakāya of tathatā, not the saṃbhogakāya. Otherwise, how could the saṃbhogabuddha be called acquired through cultivation? Moreover, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says "born from all merits," and so on. Furthermore, fascicle nineteen of the Nirvāṇa says: "Such light is called wisdom; wisdom is permanently abiding, and a permanently abiding dharma has no causes or conditions." There are multiple explanations that permanent dharmas have no causes. It also says: "The substance of nirvāṇa is not originally non-existent and now existent. If the substance of nirvāṇa were originally non-existent and now existent, it would not be an anāsrava, permanently abiding dharma." Moreover, Bodhisattva Gauravadatta says: "Whatever is accomplished through causal adornment is called impermanent. Since this great bodhi is accomplished through adornment and exists only through cultivation, it is called originally non-existent and now existent; how can it be permanent?" It also says: "The substance of nirvāṇa is not accomplished by these five causes." Since the six pāramitās and so forth are jñāpaka and not janaka, or because of the original cause, it is permanent. The substance of bodhi is obtained through the five causes; since the six pāramitās and so forth are janaka-hetus, it is impermanent. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.6) - [Next: 2.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.8) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.2.7) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-t375.13.37) — Classical Chinese - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-dharmaksema.14.16) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.2.7) · Pramāṇa