[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 4.15 # 能顯中邊慧日論 4.15 能顯中邊慧日論 4.15 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.15) 諸佛功德離分別、絕四句，不可說言三身差別常與無常，而寄詮顯。三身功德，能所智證、心色理智，性相不同，常無常別，廣如《攝論》智斷殊勝中明，及《大莊嚴論》、《瑜伽》、《佛地》、《解深密經》等說，煩不能引。今但略引餘少文證，如《楞伽經》第七云「大慧白佛言：世尊！如來、應、正遍知，為是常耶？為無常耶？佛告聖者大慧：如來、應、正遍知，非常非無常。何以故？二邊有過故。」此遮分別，離四句故。故下云「大慧！譬如虛空非常非無常。何以故？離常無常故。以不墮一、異；俱、不俱；有、無、非有非無；常、無常、非常非無常，是故離於一切諸過，不得證說」乃至云「是故我遮一切凡夫，不得分別常與無常。以得真實寂靜法者得盡分別，不生分別。」第六〈法身品〉大意亦同。若寄詮顯，報佛可是無常，修因成故。自性法身體是常住，不由修生因修顯故。《楞伽》第七云「大慧！如來非常。何以故？虛空之性亦無修行諸功德故。」此意反顯報化有修行諸功德，故知無常。故第六云「大慧！若如來法身非作法者，則是無身。言有修行無量功德一切行者，則是虛妄。大慧！若不作者，應同兔角、石女兒，以無作因亦無身故。」此說報身，以功德法所集成故亦名法身。又云「如來法身與五蘊不一。若言一者，應是無常，以五陰所作法身故。」此說自性，法身不爾。《涅槃經》說「捨無常色，獲得常色。受想行識亦復如是。」即是五陰，豈言不一非是作法？若報身佛非自性常，從如說常，故《楞伽》第七云「若言常者，同於兔馬駝驢龜蛇蠅魚等角，是故不得言如來常。」若從所證所依常故得言為常，又云「復次大慧！更有餘法，依彼法故得言如來世尊是常。何以故？依內證智證常法，是故得言如來是常。大慧！諸佛如來內證智法，常恒清涼不變。大慧！諸佛、如來、應、正遍知，若出於世、不出於世，法性常如是，法體常如是。」准此，正名所證理常；能證智者依所證常故名為常，非自性常。亦同《涅槃經》說無明等常，又正同《攝論》、《大莊嚴論》等。《金光明經》第一云「如是三身以有義故而說於常，以有義故說於無常。化身者，恒轉法輪處處如如，方便相續不斷絕故，是故說常；非是本故、具足大用不顯現故，說為無常。應身者，從無始來相續不斷，一切諸佛不共之法能攝持故，眾生未盡、用亦未斷盡，是故說常；非是本故、具足用不顯現故，說為無常。法身者，非是行，法無有異，異無有故，是本故，猶如虛空，是故說常。」《無上依經》云「阿難！何者無上菩提常住法？而此常住有二種法為作因緣：一者不生不滅、二者無窮無盡，是名菩提常住法。」准此二因，初是法身、後是應化。《佛性論》第四云「此三身者，恒能生起世間利益事，故說常住。常住者，依十種因緣：一因緣無邊、二眾生界無邊、三大悲無邊、四如意足無邊、五無分別智無邊、六恒在禪定無散，乃至十本性法然無生無滅。無量劫來捨身命財，為攝正法。正法既無邊際、無窮無盡，以無窮之因感無窮之果，即是三身故得是常。眾生不盡，弘願無盡，是故化身常在世間教導眾生，無有窮盡。菩薩少分有大悲，尚能恒救眾生、不入涅槃。何況如來，眾德圓滿常在大悲，救拔恒思，豈有邊際？是故言常。世間得四神足者，尚能住壽四十小劫。豈況如來而當不住壽自在億百千劫？是故名常。」乃至云「性無生滅故是常者，法身非本無今有、本有今無，雖行三世、非三世法。何以故？此是本有，非始今有，過三世法，是故名常。」准此，所明性無生滅故是常者，唯說法身非本無今有、本有今無。應化既是本無今有，復不說是性無生滅，故是常住，明有生滅相續名常。《寶性論》第四亦同此說十因緣常，彼頌云「世尊體常住，以修無量因，眾生界無盡，慈悲心如意，智成就相應，法中得自在，降伏諸魔怨，體寂靜故常。」下六頌釋，但廣略異，繁故不舉。准諸經論，皆言應化非自性常，不無生滅因緣生法，故是無常。故《楞伽》第七云「凡作法者皆是無常，如瓶衣車屋及疊席等皆是作法，是故無常。」准此，因修方成應化，即是作法，是本無今有，故是常。自性法身是自性常，無生無滅、非因緣法、非本無今有故，是本有故。又《涅槃》說「凡因生者皆是無常，常住之法即非因生。」廣如前引。問：若應化身是有生滅五蘊作法，何故《楞伽》第七云「若言一切皆無常者，一切智一切智人一切功德亦應無常，以同一切作法相故。」准此經文，雖修因得而是常住。經文復云「又復有過。若云一切皆無常者，諸佛如來應是作法。而佛如來非是作法。」准此經文，應化常性，非作法故，何得說言應化無常？答：准彼經文，以應化身因圓果滿更無可修，名非作法。既無勝因，果即無異，前後相似故名為常，非不由因令彼果起。故經自云「以無更說有勝因故」。准此文意，不遮因生，但更無勝因可修作，令勝因同餘類故。 > The merits of all buddhas are free from conceptual proliferation and cut off the four propositions; one cannot speak of the distinctions of the three bodies as either permanent or impermanent. Yet, relying on conventional expression, they are revealed. In the merits of the three bodies, subject and object in wisdom and realization, mind and form, principle and wisdom, nature and characteristics are not the same, and their distinction into permanent and impermanent is expounded extensively in the explanation of the excellence of wisdom and abandonment in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as well as stated in texts such as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, Yogācāra\[bhūmi\], Buddhabhūmi\[sūtraśāstra\], and Saṃdhinirmocana\[sūtra\], which are too cumbersome to cite here. Now I shall merely cite briefly a few passages as evidence from other sources. As the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states: 'Mahāmati addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, is the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One permanent, or is he impermanent?" The Buddha told the noble Mahāmati: "The Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One is neither permanent nor impermanent. Why is this? Because both extremes contain errors."' This refutes conceptual proliferation because it transcends the four propositions. Hence it says below: 'Mahāmati, it is like space, which is neither permanent nor impermanent. Why is this? Because it is free from permanence and impermanence. Because it does not fall into identity or difference; both or neither; existence, non-existence, or neither existence nor non-existence; permanence, impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence, therefore it is free from all faults, and cannot be realized or described.' And it continues up to: 'Therefore I prevent all ordinary persons from conceptually differentiating permanence and impermanence. Because one who has attained the real and peaceful Dharma puts an end to conceptual discrimination and does not produce conceptual differentiation.' The general drift of the sixth fascicle, the 'Dharmakāya Chapter', is also the same. If relying on conventional expression to reveal them, the saṃbhogabuddha can be said to be impermanent, because it is accomplished through the cultivation of causes. The intrinsic-nature dharmakāya is in its substance permanently abiding, because it is not brought about through the production of causes by cultivation, but is revealed through cultivation. The seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'Mahāmati, the Tathāgata is not permanent. Why is this? Because the nature of space also lacks the cultivation of all merits.' The intent of this is conversely to reveal that the saṃbhoga\[kāya\] and nirmāṇa\[kāya\] possess the cultivation of all merits; thus we know they are impermanent. Hence the sixth fascicle says: 'Mahāmati, if the Tathāgata's dharmakāya were not a conditioned phenomenon, then it would be devoid of a body. To say that there are all practices of cultivating immeasurable merits would then be false. Mahāmati, if it were not produced, it would be identical to a hare's horn or the child of a barren woman, for without a producing cause there is also no body.' This refers to the saṃbhogakāya, which is also called the dharmakāya because it is an aggregation of dharmas of merit. It also says: 'The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is not identical with the five aggregates. If one says it is identical, it would be impermanent, because the dharmakāya would be produced by the five aggregates.' This refers to the intrinsic nature; the dharmakāya is not like that. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Relinquishing impermanent form, one attains permanent form. Sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this.' These are precisely the five aggregates; how could one say they are not identical and are not conditioned phenomena? If the saṃbhogakāya Buddha is not intrinsically permanent, it is spoken of as permanent on the basis of \[its accord with\] Suchness (tathatā). Therefore the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'If one says it is permanent, it would be identical to the horns of hares, horses, camels, donkeys, turtles, snakes, flies, fish, and the like; therefore one cannot say the Tathāgata is permanent.' If it is from the permanence of what is realized and what it relies upon that it can be called permanent, it also says: 'Furthermore, Mahāmati, there are other dharmas, relying upon which one can say that the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, is permanent. Why is this? Relying on the wisdom of inner realization that realizes the permanent Dharma, therefore one can say the Tathāgata is permanent. Mahāmati, the Dharma of the wisdom of inner realization of all buddhas, the Tathāgatas, is constantly and eternally cool and changeless. Mahāmati, whether buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Fully and Perfectly Awakened Ones appear in the world or do not appear in the world, the nature of dharmas is constantly thus, the substance of dharmas is constantly thus.' Following this, it is properly named permanent by virtue of the principle that is realized; the wisdom that realizes it is called permanent because it relies on what is realized that is permanent, not because it is intrinsically permanent. This is also like the Nirvāṇa Sūtra's statement that ignorance and the like are permanent, and it precisely accords with the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, and so forth. The first fascicle of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says: 'These three bodies are spoken of as permanent because of a certain meaning, and are spoken of as impermanent because of a certain meaning. The nirmāṇakāya constantly turns the wheel of the Dharma everywhere as suchness, and because its skillful means are continuous and uninterrupted, it is therefore spoken of as permanent; because it is not fundamental and its full, great functions are not manifest, it is spoken of as impermanent. The saṃbhogakāya has been continuous and uninterrupted since beginningless time, and because it is able to uphold the uncommon dharmas of all buddhas, and as long as sentient beings are not exhausted its function is also not exhausted or terminated, it is therefore spoken of as permanent; because it is not fundamental and its complete functions are not manifest, it is spoken of as impermanent. The dharmakāya is not an action, the Dharma is devoid of difference, and because difference is absent and it is fundamental, like space, it is therefore spoken of as permanent.' The Anuttarāśraya Sūtra says: 'Ānanda, what is the permanently abiding Dharma of unsurpassed bodhi? Yet this permanent abiding has two kinds of dharmas that serve as its causes and conditions: first, being unproduced and unceasing; second, being boundless and inexhaustible. These are called the permanently abiding dharmas of bodhi.' Following these two causes, the first is the dharmakāya, and the second is the saṃbhoga\[kāya\] and nirmāṇa\[kāya\]. The fourth fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra says: 'These three bodies are able constantly to give rise to beneficial activities for the world, and are therefore spoken of as permanently abiding. Permanently abiding relies on ten kinds of causes and conditions: first, the boundlessness of causes and conditions; second, the boundlessness of the realm of sentient beings; third, the boundlessness of great compassion; fourth, the boundlessness of the bases of psychic power (ṛddhipāda); fifth, the boundlessness of non-conceptual wisdom; sixth, being constantly in meditative absorption without distraction... up to tenth, the original nature being naturally devoid of arising and ceasing. For immeasurable kalpas they have relinquished body, life, and wealth in order to embrace the true Dharma. Since the true Dharma is boundless, endless, and inexhaustible, producing an inexhaustible fruit through an inexhaustible cause is precisely the three bodies, and thus they can be permanent. Sentient beings are not exhausted and vast vows are inexhaustible; therefore the nirmāṇakāya constantly abides in the world to instruct sentient beings without exhaustion. If a bodhisattva with a partial degree of great compassion is still able constantly to save sentient beings without entering nirvāṇa, how much more so the Tathāgata, in whom all merits are perfected and who constantly abides in great compassion, constantly thinking of rescuing and delivering—how could there be any boundary? Therefore it is called permanent. If one in the world who has attained the four bases of psychic power is still able to remain alive for forty minor kalpas, how could the Tathāgata not remain alive with sovereignty for hundred thousands of koṭis of kalpas? Therefore it is called permanent.' Up to saying: 'It is permanent because its nature is devoid of arising and ceasing: the dharmakāya is not non-existent originally and existent now, nor existent originally and non-existent now; although it moves through the three periods of time, it is not a dharma of the three periods of time. Why is this? Because this exists originally and is not newly existent now, transcending the dharmas of the three periods of time; therefore it is called permanent.' Following this, what is explained as permanent because its nature is devoid of arising and ceasing refers solely to the dharmakāya not being non-existent originally and existent now, nor existent originally and non-existent now. Since the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are non-existent originally and existent now, and furthermore are not said to have a nature devoid of arising and ceasing, yet they are permanently abiding, this clarifies that their continuity having arising and ceasing is called permanent. The fourth fascicle of the Ratnagotravibhāga also speaks similarly of permanence through ten causes and conditions. Its verse says: 'The World-Honoured One's substance permanently abides, / Because he cultivated immeasurable causes, / The realm of sentient beings is inexhaustible, / His compassionate mind conforms to his wishes, / He has accomplished and is endowed with wisdom, / He has attained mastery among dharmas, / He subdues all the māras and adversaries, / And because his substance is peaceful, he is permanent.' The six verses below explain this, differing only in extent of detail, and are not cited because of their prolixity. Relying on all the sūtras and treatises, they all state that the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are not intrinsically permanent; they are not devoid of arising and ceasing as dharmas born of causes and conditions, and therefore they are impermanent. Hence the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'All conditioned dharmas are impermanent. Just as pots, garments, carts, houses, mats, rugs, and the like are all conditioned dharmas, they are therefore impermanent.' Following this, being accomplished only through cultivation, the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are conditioned dharmas, originally non-existent and now existent, and therefore \[they are not unconditioned\] permanent \[in nature\]. The intrinsic-nature dharmakāya is intrinsically permanent, devoid of arising and ceasing, not a dharma of causes and conditions, and not originally non-existent and now existent, because it exists originally. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa \[Sūtra\] says: 'All that is born of causes is impermanent; that which is permanently abiding is not born of causes.' This is extensively as cited above. Question: If the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa bodies are conditioned dharmas of the five aggregates that have arising and ceasing, why does the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra say: 'If one says that all are impermanent, then all-knowledge, the all-knowing person, and all merits would also be impermanent, because they share the characteristics of all conditioned dharmas'? Following this passage of the sūtra, although attained through cultivating causes, they are permanently abiding. The sūtra text further says: 'Moreover, there is another fault. If one says that all are impermanent, all buddhas, Tathāgatas, would be conditioned dharmas. But the Buddha, the Tathāgata, is not a conditioned dharma.' Following this passage of the sūtra, the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are of permanent nature because they are not conditioned dharmas; how then can one say that the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are impermanent? Answer: Relying on that sūtra text, because the cause is perfected and the fruit is fulfilled in the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa bodies and there is nothing further to cultivate, they are termed 'not conditioned dharmas'. Since there is no further superior cause, the fruit is without difference; because before and after are similar, they are called permanent, not because the fruit is brought about without causes. Hence the sūtra itself says: 'Because there is no further explanation of having a superior cause.' Following the intent of this text, it does not deny arising from causes; it merely means there is no further superior cause that can be cultivated or made, which would make the superior cause equivalent to other kinds. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.14) - [Next: 4.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.16) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.4.15) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [佛性論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.buddhagotrasastra-t1610*zh-paramartha.4.18) — Classical Chinese - [佛說無上依經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.dharma.anuttarasrayasutra*zh-paramartha.1.42) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.15) · Pramāṇa