[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [能顯中邊慧日論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863) › 4.7 # 能顯中邊慧日論 4.7 能顯中邊慧日論 4.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.7) 若論理性，無二不生。如《涅槃》第二十六，斷善闡提亦皆具故。彼經云「若菩提心是佛性者，一闡提輩則不得名一闡提也，菩提之心亦不得名為無常。」此意以菩提心非理佛性，若是理性，闡提不斷。處處誠說，不勞廣引。若論行性，復有二種，謂有漏、無漏，此二種性有無不定。若有漏性，一切有情種子定有，現行之者或成不成。若無漏者，據現行說，凡夫不成。若據種子，有成不成。如《瑜伽論》五十七云「生那落迦，八根種子現行定成就。除餘三，八根現行或成或不成，種子定成三根，現行定不成。種子或成不成，謂般涅槃法者成就，不般涅槃法者不成就。」此據現有。若約當說，當亦現行。何言定不定？《無上依經》、《佛性論》及《寶性論》俱云：眾生有三。一著有，著有復二：一者背涅槃道、無涅槃性，不求涅槃、願樂生死。梁《攝大乘》第十四云「若眾生無涅槃性，名因不具。諸佛於此位中，不能令彼般涅槃，神通亦無自在。」無涅槃性，謂貪著生死、不信樂大乘，不同作業受果決定，非此二時即可化故。無涅槃性，云於此位不得自在，即永無涅槃性。又《佛性論》云「由淨分為緣、淨性為因，故成此觀，非無因緣。若不由於此二事成，觀無因緣，如闡提人無涅槃性，應得此觀。而一闡提既無此觀，故知定須因緣，觀方可現。」《寶性論》同。又《寶性論》三云「佛性正因，於不定聚眾生能作二種業：一見世間厭苦故、二見涅槃悕寂樂故。」不言邪定聚能作二業，《佛性論》亦同。《涅槃經》亦云「不能立闡提人菩提之心，喻如金剛不能得壞白羊角」等，廣如前引。第九云「又佛言：善男子！除一闡提，其餘眾生聞是經已，悉皆能作善根因緣，法聲光明入毛孔者，必定當得阿耨菩提。」既闡提人不言當得，明無佛性。又《涅槃》第三十三，明生死河有七種人中「若善男子！是七種人，或有一人具七、或有七人各一」，既言各一，常沒之者即是無性。不爾，與一人具七何別？《善戒經》、《地持論》、《瑜伽．菩薩地》俱云：無性人無種性故等。〈聲聞地〉及〈決擇分〉、《顯揚》、《佛地論》等，皆立有無性，廣如彼辨，略不具引。《涅槃》二十六云「善男子！我雖說云一切眾生悉有佛性，眾生不解佛如是等隨自意語。善男子，如是語者，後身菩薩尚不能解，況於二乘其餘菩薩。」又云「若言眾生悉有佛性，是名如來隨自意語。如來如是隨自意語，眾生云何一向作解？」三十二云「如香山中有忍辱草，非一切牛皆能得食。佛性亦爾，是名分別答。」既問佛性，不為定答，為分別答，如忍辱草有得不得，明知行性有無不同。理性如何？眾生皆入。由此道理，彌勒、無著諸菩薩等皆引經證，明諸眾生或有有性、或有無性。《佛性論》及《寶性論》皆云闡提無涅槃性。此無行性，非無理性。釋難中云有清淨性，即是理性。不爾，論文前後相反，亦違多教。 > If we speak of the nature of principle, it is not twofold and not born. As \[stated in\] the twenty-sixth \[fascicle of the\] \*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra\*, even icchantikas who have severed roots of goodness are endowed with it. That sūtra states: "If the bodhicitta were the buddhadhātu, icchantikas would not be called icchantikas, and the bodhicitta could not be called impermanent." The meaning of this is that the bodhicitta is not the buddhadhātu of principle; if it were the nature of principle, icchantikas would not sever it. Since there are true statements everywhere, there is no need to cite extensively. If we speak of the nature of practice, there are again two kinds: sāsrava and anāsrava. The existence or non-existence of these two kinds of nature is variable. Regarding the sāsrava nature, the seeds exist definitively in all sentient beings, while their actual manifestations are either achieved or not achieved. Regarding the anāsrava \[nature\], according to actual manifestation, ordinary persons do not achieve it. According to seeds, some achieve it and some do not. As the fifty-seventh \[fascicle of the\] \*Yogācārabhūmi\* states: "For one born in naraka, the seeds and actual manifestations of eight faculties are definitely achieved. Excluding the remaining three, the actual manifestations of the eight faculties are either achieved or not achieved, while their seeds are definitely achieved. For three faculties, their actual manifestations are definitely not achieved. Their seeds are either achieved or not achieved: that is, those who have the phenomenon of attaining parinirvāṇa achieve them, while those who do not have the phenomenon of attaining parinirvāṇa do not achieve them." This is based on present existence. If we speak regarding the future, in the future they will also be actually manifested. Why say definite and indefinite? The \*Anuttarāśraya-sūtra\*, the \*Buddhagotraśāstra\*, and the \*Ratnagotravibhāga\* all state: Sentient beings are of three kinds. First are those attached to existence. Those attached to existence are again of two kinds: first, those who turn their backs on the path to nirvāṇa, have no nirvāṇa-nature, do not seek nirvāṇa, and desire and delight in saṃsāra. The fourteenth \[fascicle of the\] Liang \*Mahāyānasaṃgraha\* states: "If sentient beings lack the nirvāṇa-nature, this is called being deficient in causes. In this stage, the Buddhas cannot cause them to attain parinirvāṇa, and their spiritual penetrations also have no mastery." Lacking the nirvāṇa-nature means being greedily attached to saṃsāra and not having faith in and delighting in the Mahāyāna; it is not like the determination of performing karma and receiving its retribution, for it is not the case that they can be transformed at these two times. Saying that one lacks the nirvāṇa-nature and that in this stage \[the Buddhas\] do not obtain mastery means that they perpetually lack the nirvāṇa-nature. Furthermore, the \*Buddhagotraśāstra\* states: "Because the pure portion serves as the condition and the pure nature serves as the cause, this contemplation is accomplished; it is not without causes and conditions. If it were not accomplished by means of these two things, and contemplation were without causes and conditions, then just as icchantika persons lack the nirvāṇa-nature, they should attain this contemplation. Yet since icchantikas do not have this contemplation, we know that causes and conditions are definitely required for the contemplation to appear." The \*Ratnagotravibhāga\* is the same. Furthermore, the third \[fascicle of the\] \*Ratnagotravibhāga\* states: "The pradhāna-hetu of buddhadhātu can perform two kinds of activities for sentient beings of the indefinite group: first, seeing the world and revulsing against suffering; second, seeing nirvāṇa and hoping for the bliss of quiescent cessation." It does not state that the definitely wrong group can perform the two activities; the \*Buddhagotraśāstra\* is also the same. The \*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra\* also states: "One cannot establish the bodhicitta in icchantika persons, just as a diamond cannot break a white ram's horn," and so on, as cited extensively before. The ninth \[fascicle\] states: "The Buddha further said: 'Good son! Except for icchantikas, when all other sentient beings have heard this sūtra, they are all able to make it the cause and condition for roots of goodness. Those into whose pores the light of the voice of the Dharma enters will definitely attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.'" Since it is not said that icchantika persons will attain it in the future, it is clear that they lack buddhadhātu. Furthermore, the thirty-third \[fascicle of the\] \*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra\*, in explaining that there are seven kinds of persons in the river of saṃsāra, states: "Good son! Among these seven kinds of persons, either one person possesses all seven, or there are seven persons who each have one." Since it says each has one, the ever-drowned one is precisely one lacking the nature. Were it not so, what distinction would there be from one person possessing all seven? The \*Bodhicaryā-sūtra\*, the \*Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra\*, and the \*Yogācārabhūmi\*'s \*Bodhisattvabhūmi\* all state: persons lacking the nature are without gotra, and so forth. The \*Śrāvakabhūmi\*, the \*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī\*, the \*Prakaraṇāryavācā\*, the \*Buddhabhūmiśāstra\*, and so forth, all establish the existence and non-existence of the nature, as discriminated extensively in those texts and not cited here in full. The twenty-sixth \[fascicle of the\] \*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra\* states: "Good son! Although I have stated that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu, sentient beings do not understand such words spoken according to \[the Buddha's\] own intent. Good son, even bodhisattvas in their final rebirth cannot understand such words, much less the dviyāna and other bodhisattvas." It also states: "If one says that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu, this is called the Tathāgata's speech according to his own intent. How could sentient beings interpret such speech according to the Tathāgata's own intent in only one unilateral way?" The thirty-second \[fascicle\] states: "Just as there is grass of forbearance in the Gandhamādana Mountain, which not all cattle are able to eat; buddhadhātu is also like this; this is called a differentiated answer." Since the question was about buddhadhātu, he did not give a definitive answer, but gave a differentiated answer, just as with the grass of forbearance there are those who obtain it and those who do not; thus we clearly know that the existence and non-existence of the nature of practice are different. What of the nature of principle? All sentient beings enter it. Based on this principle, Maitreya, Asaṅga, and other bodhisattvas all cited sūtra evidence to clarify that sentient beings either have the nature or do not have the nature. The \*Buddhagotraśāstra\* and the \*Ratnagotravibhāga\* both state that icchantikas lack the nirvāṇa-nature. This means lacking the nature of practice, not lacking the nature of principle. In resolving objections, they say there is a pure nature, which is precisely the nature of principle. Were it not so, the preceding and following parts of the treatise text would contradict each other, and it would also contravene many teachings. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.6) - [Next: 4.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.8) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863~en-mt.4.7) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (4) - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-t375.32.49) — Classical Chinese - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-dharmaksema.36.4) — Classical Chinese - [成唯識論掌中樞要](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1831.1.44) — Classical Chinese - [佛性論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.buddhagotrasastra-t1610*zh-paramartha.2.29) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1863.4.7) · Pramāṇa