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# 八識規矩補註 1.30

八識規矩補註 1.30

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [1.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1865.1.30)

此八識中，唯此第六心所俱全、互不違故。其遍行、別境、善所并根惑、三隨惑中大共十解，見上文；唯根惑慢、疑、惡見三并小隨十、不定四，共十七法，此方釋義。言慢者，恃己於他高舉為性，能障不慢生苦為業，蓋有慢於德有德心不謙下，由此生死輪轉無窮，受諸苦故。疑者，於諸諦理猶豫為性，能障不疑、善品為業，蓋猶豫者善不生故。惡見者，於諸諦理顛倒推度染慧為性，能障善見招苦為業，蓋惡見者多受苦故；此見總有五，謂身、邊、邪、見、戒也。言小隨忿者，謂依對現前不饒益境憤發為性，能障不忿執仗為業——仗，謂器仗，懷忿者多發暴惡身表業故。言恨者，由忿為先懷，惡不捨結冤為性，能障不恨熱惱為業，蓋結恨者不能含忍、恒熱惱故，忿、恨俱嗔一分也。覆者，於自作罪恐失利譽隱藏為性，能障不覆悔惱為業，謂覆罪者後必悔惱不安隱故，貪、癡二分也。惱者，由忿、恨為先，追觸暴惡恨戾為性，能障不惱䖧螫為業，亦嗔分也。嫉者，殉自名利，不耐他榮妬忌為性，能障不嫉憂戚為業，謂嫉者聞見他榮深懷憂戚、不安隱故，亦是瞋分。言慳者，耽著法財，不能惠捨祕悋為性，能障不慳鄙畜為業，謂慳悋者心多鄙澁，畜積財法不能捨故，此屬貪分。誑者，為獲利譽，矯現有德詭詐為性，能障不誑邪命為業，謂矯誑者心懷異謀，多現不實邪命事故，此貪、癡分。諂者，為罔他故，矯設異儀諂曲為性，能障不諂教誨為業，謂諂曲者為罔冐他，曲順時宜、矯設方便以取他意，或藏己失、不任師友正教誨故，亦貪、癡分。害者，於諸有情，心無悲愍損惱為性，能障不害逼惱為業，謂有害者逼惱他故，瞋一分攝。言憍者，於自盛事，深生染著醉傲為性，能障不憍染依為業，蓋憍醉者生長一切雜染法故，此貪分也。謂不憍者，即無貪也。隨惑二十，則忿等十法并失念、不正知、放逸三法，乃根本家差別分位，餘七即等流性也。言不定四者，頌云：「不定謂悔眠，尋伺二各二。」此不同前五位心所，定遍八識、三性、時、地，此之四法皆不定。故《瑜伽》復以「四一切」辨五差別，云：「遍行具四，別境唯有初二一切，善唯有一，謂一切地，染四皆無，不定唯一謂一切性。」言悔者，長行屬云：「悔謂惡作，蓋惡作是因，悔是其體，以體即因，故《論》云悔謂惡作，乃因果之義也。」謂惡所作業追悔為性，障止為業。奢麼他能止住心故，名為止。眠者，令身不自在、心極暗昧輕略為性，障觀為業。謂毘鉢舍那攝境從心，名之為觀，取體即慧也。此眠能令身心等者其無心眠，如何能令謂從有心眠？其實無心不名睡眠，蓋眠是心所有能令用，彼既無體，豈有令用？故不名眠。尋者，尋求令心怱遽於意言境，麁轉為性；伺，謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境，細轉為性。二法業用俱以安不安身心分位所依為業，言意言境者，意所取境多依名言，故云意言境。此二並用思、慧一分為體，若令心安即是思分，令心不安即是慧分。蓋思者，徐而細故，慧者，急而麁故。若然，則令安則用思無慧，不安則用慧無思。何云並用？通照大師釋有兼、正：若正用思，急慧隨思能令心安，若正用慧，徐思隨慧，亦令不安；是說不違並用。此相應之義有五，謂時、依、行、緣、事也；王、所同時起，同所依根，見分行相各同，同一所緣，同一體事，故得相應也。

> Among the eight consciousnesses, only this sixth \[consciousness\] possesses all \[fifty-one\] caittas without mutual conflict. Its sarvatraga, viniyata, kuśala, and mūlakleśa \[factors\], together with the ten great secondary afflictions among the three \[types of\] upakleśas, have been explained above. Here we explain only the three mūlakleśas—arrogance (māna), doubt (vicikitsā), and wrong view (kudṛṣṭi)—along with the ten minor secondary afflictions and the four aniyata \[factors\], making seventeen dharmas in all. Arrogance has as its nature relying on oneself to hold oneself haughty toward others, and has as its activity obstructing non-arrogance and producing suffering; for when one is arrogant, one's mind is not humble toward virtue and the virtuous, and from this, saṃsāric transmigration is endless and one undergoes various sufferings. Doubt has as its nature vacillation regarding the truths and principles, and has as its activity obstructing non-doubt and the kuśala dharmas; for when one vacillates, goodness is not produced. Wrong view has as its nature defiled prajñā that inverts inferences regarding the truths and principles, and has as its activity obstructing right view and bringing about suffering; for those with wrong view mostly undergo suffering. In general, there are five such views: the view of identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi), extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), false view (mithyādṛṣṭi), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and attachment to precepts and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa). As for wrath (krodha) among the minor secondary afflictions, it has as its nature flaring up in anger against disadvantageous objects present before oneself, and has as its activity obstructing non-wrath and taking up weapons—weapons refers to arms, for those harboring wrath mostly produce violent bodily actions. Resentment (upanāha) has as its nature keeping enmity without letting it go by harboring malice preceded by wrath, and has as its activity obstructing non-resentment and causing vexation; for one who harbors resentment cannot endure and is constantly vexed. Wrath and resentment are both parts of ill will (dveṣa). Concealment (mrakṣa) has as its nature hiding one's own committed transgressions out of fear of losing profit and reputation, and has as its activity obstructing non-concealment and causing remorseful vexation; for one who conceals transgressions must later suffer remorse and lack peace; it belongs to parts of greed (rāga) and delusion (moha). Affliction (pradāsa) has as its nature pursuing and contacting vicious, hostile stubbornness preceded by wrath and resentment, and has as its activity obstructing non-affliction and stinging biting speech; it is also a part of ill will. Jealousy (īrṣyā) has as its nature being unwilling to bear another's prosperity and being envious out of dedication to one's own reputation and profit, and has as its activity obstructing non-jealousy and causing grief; for when a jealous person hears or sees another's prosperity, they deeply harbor grief and lack peace; it is also a part of ill will. Parsimony (mātsarya) has as its nature hoarding stingily through clinging to the Dharma and wealth, unable to give them away, and has as its activity obstructing non-parsimony and accumulating meanly; for a parsimonious person's mind is largely mean and grasping, accumulating wealth and the Dharma without letting go; this belongs to a part of greed. Deceit (māyā) has as its nature fraudulence through pretending to possess virtue in order to obtain profit and reputation, and has as its activity obstructing non-deceit and engaging in wrong livelihood; for a deceitful person harbors ulterior motives and mostly displays untrue matters of wrong livelihood; this belongs to parts of greed and delusion. Flattery (śāṭhya) has as its nature crookedness through fabricating deceptive conduct in order to mislead others, and has as its activity obstructing non-flattery and resisting instruction; for a crooked person bends to the times and contrives skillful means to cater to another's will so as to mislead them, or conceals their own faults and is unreceptive to the correct teachings of teachers and friends; it also belongs to parts of greed and delusion. Harmfulness (vihiṃsā) has as its nature injuring without compassion for sentient beings, and has as its activity obstructing non-harmfulness and tormenting; for one who is harmful torments others; it is subsumed under a part of ill will. Pride (mada) has as its nature infatuated haughtiness through deep defiled attachment to one's own flourishing circumstances, and has as its activity obstructing non-pride and serving as a basis for defilement; for one intoxicated by pride generates and increases all defiled dharmas; this is a part of greed. Non-pride is precisely non-greed. Among the twenty upakleśas, the ten dharmas beginning with wrath, together with forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛti), incorrect comprehension (asaṃprajanya), and heedlessness (pramāda), are distinctive phases of the mūlakleśas, whereas the remaining seven are their outflows. Regarding the four aniyatas, the verse states: 'The aniyatas are remorse and drowsiness, with investigation and scrutiny making two pairs.' These differ from the preceding five categories of caittas, which definitively pervade the eight consciousnesses, three natures, times, or bhūmis; these four dharmas are all indefinite. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi further differentiates the five categories by the 'four all-pervasives', stating: 'The sarvatraga factors have all four; the viniyata factors have only the first two; the kuśala factors have only one, namely all bhūmis; the defiled factors lack all four; and the aniyata factors have only one, namely all natures.' Regarding remorse, the prose commentary states: 'Remorse is called kaukṛtya; for bad deed is the cause and remorse is its essence. Since the essence is the cause, the treatise says that remorse is called bad deed, which expresses the relation of cause and effect.' That is, it has as its nature regretting an action that has been done with evil intent, and has as its activity obstructing calming (śamatha). Śamatha is called calming because it can calm and halt the mind. Drowsiness (middha) has as its nature rendering the body unfree and the mind utterly dark, dull, and faint, and has as its activity obstructing discernment (vipaśyanā). Discernment brings the object back to the mind, and its essence is prajñā. If this drowsiness can render the body and mind thus, how could a mind-lacking drowsiness render it so? Does it proceed from a minded drowsiness? In truth, lack of mind is not called drowsiness, for drowsiness is a caitta possessing the function of rendering \[the mind so\]; since that \[mind-lacking state\] has no essence, how could it have this function? Hence it is not called drowsiness. Investigation (vitarka) has as its nature coarse operation in seeking, making the mind hurried regarding objects of mental expression; scrutiny (vicāra) means examining, having as its nature subtle operation that makes the mind hurried regarding objects of mental expression. The activity and function of both dharmas are to serve as the basis for the states of ease or unease of body and mind. 'Objects of mental expression' refers to the fact that the objects grasped by the mind mostly rely on names and words; hence they are called objects of mental expression. Both of these share parts of intention (cetanā) and prajñā as their essence: if they cause the mind to be at ease, that is the part of cetanā; if they cause the mind to be uneasy, that is the part of prajñā. This is because cetanā is gradual and subtle, while prajñā is abrupt and coarse. If so, then when causing ease, cetanā is used without prajñā; and when causing unease, prajñā is used without cetanā. Why then is it said that they use both together? Great Master Tongzhao explains this with primary and secondary roles: if cetanā is primarily used, the abrupt prajñā follows cetanā and can cause the mind to be at ease; if prajñā is primarily used, the gradual cetanā follows prajñā and also causes unease. This explanation does not contradict their using both together. This meaning of association has five aspects: time, basis, form, object, and essence. Mind-king and caittas arise at the same time, share the same supporting sense-faculty, have identical forms in their darśanabhāga, share the same perceptual object, and have the same singular essence; therefore they attain association.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1865~en-mt.1.30) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1865.1.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1865.1.30) · Pramāṇa
