[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [華嚴一乘教義分齊章](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866) › 4.60 # 華嚴一乘教義分齊章 4.60 華嚴一乘教義分齊章 4.60 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866.4.60) 第二別相者，椽等諸緣別於總故。若不別者，總義不成，由無別時即無總故。此義云何？本以別成總，由無別故總不成也，是故別者即以總成別也。問：「若總即別者，應不成總耶？」答：「由總即別故，是故得成總。如椽即是舍，故名總相；即是椽，故名別相。若不即舍，不是椽；若不即椽，不是舍。總別相即此可思之。」問：「若相即者，云何說別？」答：「秖由相即，是故成別。若不相即者，總在別外，故非總也；別在總外，故非別也。思之可解。」問：「若不別者，有何過耶？」答：「有斷常過。若無別者，即無別椽瓦，無別椽瓦故，即不成總舍，故此斷也。若無別椽瓦等而有總舍者，無因有舍，是常過也。」 > Second, the particular characteristic: because the various conditions, such as the rafters, are distinct from the universal. If they were not distinct, the meaning of the universal would not be established, since when there are no particulars there is no universal. What does this mean? Originally, the universal is established through particulars; because there are no particulars, the universal is not established. Therefore, the particular establishes itself as particular through the universal. Question: "If the universal is identical with the particular, should it not fail to be established as the universal?" Answer: "Because the universal is identical with the particular, it is therefore able to be established as the universal. Just as the rafter is identical with the house, it is therefore called the universal characteristic; being identical with the rafter, it is called the particular characteristic. If it were not identical with the house, it would not be a rafter; if it were not identical with the rafter, it would not be a house. The mutual identity of universal and particular can be reflected upon in this way." Question: "If they are mutually identical, how can one speak of particulars?" Answer: "Precisely because of mutual identity, particulars are established. If they were not mutually identical, the universal would exist outside the particulars and thus would not be the universal; the particulars would exist outside the universal and thus would not be particulars. Reflecting on this, it can be understood." Question: "If there were no particulars, what flaw would there be?" Answer: "There would be the flaws of annihilationism and eternalism. If there were no particulars, there would be no distinct rafters and tiles; because there would be no distinct rafters and tiles, the universal house would not be established—hence this is annihilationism. If, without distinct rafters and tiles, there were a universal house, a house would exist without a cause—this is the flaw of eternalism." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866.4.59) - [Next: 4.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866.4.61) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866~en-mt.4.60) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866.4.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1866.4.60) · Pramāṇa