[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [止觀輔行傳弘決](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912) › 3.5 # 止觀輔行傳弘決 3.5 止觀輔行傳弘決 3.5 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.3.5) 「今言」下，正釋絕待。先明所絕。所絕即上橫竪諸待。煩惱秖是四性計耳，由性計故有業有果，稟教修觀次第證得，如是皆成可思議等，是故須破。「悉皆」下，次明能絕，即是止觀。雖云能絕，能稱於所。何者？既云絕待，即待名絕，故名為止。止亦自亡，名不可得。觀亦如是，非所觀外能稱於所，故云「觀冥如境」。觀亦自亡，故云「何得有觀」。「止觀尚無」等者，斥於相待。絕待尚無，豈立相待？故此止觀非但無於所除暗散，亦乃止觀體自本亡。何者？有所破故說有能破，所即能故無能可論，不得如彼相待名中，待能說所、待所說能。又第三止觀待於無明說於法性，名之為止。待於法性說於無明，名為不止。法性不當止與不止，故約法性明第三止待前為異，故云「待止不止說非止非不止」。即是待前二止說第三止，二止皆對不止而說，故云止不止。若約竪說者，今絕待止觀尚無絕待，何得待生生之不止說生不生之止觀，乃至待不生生之不止說不生不生之止觀？「何得」二字冠下三句。「故知」下，結釋絕意。先止中言「皆不可得」者，待即是絕，無待可論，故云止不至非止非不止皆不可得。橫竪並然，細思方見。「待對既絕」下，總結橫竪悉皆絕故，斥彼橫竪俱有為故，今既絕彼故非有為。「不可思」等者，不可以前橫竪四句思之能見。「非言說」等，明絕待不可說。既無橫竪四句名相，故前橫竪四句之中所生結惑等一切皆滅。滅却絕待，故云「滅絕」。能滅亦無，故云「絕滅」。次結觀中，「顛倒」等者，橫竪四句皆名為想。「亦是絕有為」等者，結得名異也。能絕體一，隨所絕處得名不同。 > Below 'now, speaking of', it directly explains the absolute. First, it clarifies that which is made absolute. That which is made absolute refers to the aforementioned horizontal and vertical relativities. Affliction is simply reckoning the four natures; due to reckoning natures, there are karma and fruit; receiving the teachings and cultivating contemplation, one realizes attainments in sequence—such as these all form the conceivable and so forth, and therefore must be refuted. Below 'all are', next it clarifies that which can make absolute, which is calming and contemplation. Although it speaks of that which can make absolute, the subject matches the object. Why is this? Since it says making relativity absolute, then relativity is called absolute, hence it is called calming. Calming also self-annihilates; its name cannot be obtained. Contemplation is also like this: not outside what is contemplated, the subject matches the object, hence it says 'contemplation merges with the object like reality'. Contemplation also self-annihilates, hence it says 'how could there be contemplation?' 'Calming and contemplation are not even present' and so on reproves mutual relativity. If even the absolute is absent, how could mutual relativity be established? Therefore, this calming and contemplation not only lacks the darkness and distraction to be removed, but the essence of calming and contemplation itself is originally annihilated. Why is this? Because there is what is refuted, one speaks of that which can refute; what is refuted is precisely that which can refute, so there is no subject that can be discussed. One cannot, as in those names of mutual relativity, speak of the object relative to the subject, or speak of the subject relative to the object. Furthermore, the third calming and contemplation speaks of dharma-nature relative to ignorance, naming it calming; it speaks of ignorance relative to dharma-nature, naming it non-calming. Dharma-nature is not equivalent to calming or non-calming; hence, in terms of dharma-nature, explaining the third calming is different relative to the preceding, which is why it says 'relative to calming and non-calming, it speaks of neither calming nor non-calming'. That is, relative to the preceding two calmings, it speaks of the third calming; both calmings are spoken of in opposition to non-calming, hence it says 'calming and non-calming'. If speaking vertically, the present absolute calming and contemplation does not even have the absolute, so how could it speak of the calming and contemplation of the non-production of production relative to the non-calming of the production of production, up to speaking of the calming and contemplation of the non-production of non-production relative to the non-calming of the production of non-production? The two words 'how could' govern the three sentences below. Below 'therefore know', it concludes and explains the meaning of the absolute. First, in calming, stating 'none can be obtained' means relativity is precisely the absolute, and there is no relativity that can be discussed; hence it says calming, non-calming, up to neither calming nor non-calming all cannot be obtained. Both horizontal and vertical are like this; only with careful reflection can this be seen. Below 'oppositional relativity being severed', it generally concludes that the horizontal and vertical are all severed; it reproves that both horizontal and vertical are conditioned, and now since they are severed, it is not conditioned. 'Inconceivable' and so forth means that it cannot be seen through thinking with the previous horizontal and vertical four propositions. 'Not expressed by words' and so forth clarifies that the absolute is inexpressible. Since there are no names and characteristics of the horizontal and vertical four propositions, all bound defilements and so forth generated within the previous horizontal and vertical four propositions are extinguished. Extinguishing the absolute, it is therefore called 'extinguishing and absolute'. That which can extinguish is also absent, hence it says 'absolute and extinguished'. Next, in concluding contemplation, 'inverted' and so forth means that the horizontal and vertical four propositions are all called conceptions. 'It also cuts off the conditioned' and so forth concludes the difference in receiving names. The essence that can make absolute is one, but receives different names in accordance with the places where things are made absolute. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.3.4) - [Next: 3.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.3.6) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912~en-mt.3.5) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.3.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.3.5) · Pramāṇa