[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [止觀輔行傳弘決](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912) › 5.30 # 止觀輔行傳弘決 5.30 止觀輔行傳弘決 5.30 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.30) 次約竪破。初之橫破但約黎耶、法性以為內外，已異藏通。藏通但約心境等生滅，乃至非生非滅相望名竪；此中則以三千四計為生，以四句推三千叵得為滅。故此生滅尚異於別，豈況藏通？故知若計黎耶及法性等乃成別義，今欲明圓，是故須破。此之四句亦是為防轉計故說。推亦生亦滅者，單生單滅被破不生，故轉計雙共生諸法，故須破之。各既不生，二不生合，云何能生？故云「其性相違猶如水火」，水火和合二俱損壞，何能生法？破第四句者，滅為能生、不滅為所，既云雙非即無能所，云何更生三千法耶？亦橫亦竪者，前兩四句單約橫竪既被推破，又恐雙計橫竪能生，故復更推。言亦橫亦竪者，於竪四句一一計橫。初句計四，即初文是。滅句計四者，云自滅生、他滅生、共滅生、無因滅生。第三第四准此可解。計相既爾，破亦準知。此是以橫織竪而為計相。若總論者，謂橫及竪方生諸法，破亦準知。言非橫非竪者，單約雙計既皆被破，便謂俱離生三千法。俱合尚不能生三千，俱離云何能生法耶？問：雙非心性其相如何？答：橫既是生、竪是生滅，雙是秖是是生是滅，雙非秖是雙非生滅。心體其實未契雙非，但是計此謂為能生，是故須破。既不可以橫竪等生，生即無生。「言語」下，結成不思議境。前雖結成理性境竟，若不推檢，何殊鳥空？此即結成修德境也。「大經」下，引證也。此生生等四不可說，義意含故，故總引證前兩四句皆不生也。生生等文已成竪竟。若證橫者，生生秖是自、生不生秖是他、不生生秖是共、不生不生秖是離，第三秖是俱計橫竪，第四秖是雙非橫竪，但證初二即證三四。問：前理性境及前章安料簡文中，皆云一心任運具足。今此何得對緣推耶？答：今此正推一念起心已具三千，故推此具為心為緣。若推此起起不可得，念與三千並不可得，不得而得三諦宛然。 > Next is the vertical refutation. The initial horizontal refutation merely took the ālaya and dharma-nature as internal and external, already differing from the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings. The Tripiṭaka and shared teachings only consider the arising and ceasing, up to the neither-arising nor non-ceasing, of mind and objects as they face each other to be "vertical"; whereas here, the four clinging views of the three thousand are taken as arising, and the impossibility of finding the three thousand when examined through the four propositions is taken as ceasing. Thus this arising and ceasing is still different from the distinctive teaching, let alone the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings! Hence we know that if one clings to the ālaya and dharma-nature, it amounts to the distinctive teaching; now, wishing to elucidate the perfect, it must be refuted. These four propositions are also expounded to prevent shifted clinging. When examining "both arising and ceasing": when isolated arising and isolated ceasing are refuted and shown not to produce, one shifts to clinging to both together producing all dharmas; hence this must be refuted. Since each does not produce on its own, when the two non-producing \[factors\] combine, how could they produce? Thus it is said, "Their natures are mutually opposed, just like fire and water." When fire and water combine, both are ruined; how could they produce dharmas? In refuting the fourth proposition: ceasing is that which produces, and non-ceasing is that which is produced; since both are negated, there is neither producer nor produced—how could they further produce the three thousand dharmas? Regarding "both horizontal and vertical": the preceding two sets of four propositions, solely in terms of the horizontal and the vertical, having been scrutinized and refuted, one might fear a joint clinging that the horizontal and vertical together can produce, and therefore they are scrutinized once more. As for "both horizontal and vertical," in each of the four vertical propositions, the horizontal is grasped. Grasping the four in the first proposition is precisely the initial passage. Grasping the four in the proposition of ceasing refers to asserting production from self-ceasing, production from other-ceasing, production from both ceasing, and production from causeless ceasing. The third and fourth can be understood by analogy to this. Since the characteristics of clinging are like this, the refutation can also be known accordingly. This is taking the horizontal to weave the vertical as the characteristic of clinging. If discussed in general, it means asserting that only the horizontal and vertical together produce all dharmas; the refutation can also be known accordingly. Regarding "neither horizontal nor vertical": since single and dual clingings have all been refuted, one then claims that freedom from both produces the three thousand dharmas. When combining both still cannot produce the three thousand, how could freedom from both produce dharmas? Question: What is the characteristic of the mind-nature that is free from both? Answer: Since the horizontal is arising and the vertical is arising and ceasing, "both are" is simply being both arising and ceasing, and "neither is" is simply being free from both arising and ceasing. The substance of the mind in reality has not yet accorded with freedom from both; this is merely clinging to this and asserting it to be capable of producing, and therefore it must be refuted. Since production cannot occur through the horizontal, the vertical, and so forth, arising is non-arisal. From "Words and language..." onwards, it concludes with the inconceivable object. Although the object of the nature of principle was concluded before, if not scrutinized and examined, how would it differ from the "emptiness of a bird's flight"? This concludes the object of cultivated virtue. From "The Great Sūtra..." onwards, this is citing proof. The four \[modes\]—"arising-arising" and so forth—are ineffable, and because their meaning and purport embrace this, they are cited collectively to prove that the preceding two sets of four propositions are all non-arising. The passage on "arising-arising" and so forth has already established the vertical. If proving the horizontal: "arising-arising" is simply self, "arising-non-arising" is simply other, "non-arising-arising" is simply both, and "non-arising-non-arising" is simply apart from both; the third is simply jointly clinging to the horizontal and vertical, and the fourth is simply neither horizontal nor vertical. Proving just the first two proves the third and fourth. Question: Both in the preceding object of the nature of principle and in Zhang'an's critical appraisal passage, it is said that the single mind naturally and spontaneously possesses \[all things\]. Why does the present text scrutinize it in relation to conditions? Answer: The present text precisely scrutinizes the three thousand already possessed in a single thought of an arisen mind, and therefore examines whether this possession is mind or conditions. If one scrutinizes this arisal, arisal cannot be found; thought and the three thousand are both impossible to find; yet without finding, they are found, and the three truths are vividly present. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.29) - [Next: 5.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.31) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912~en-mt.5.30) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.30) · Pramāṇa