[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [止觀輔行傳弘決](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912) › 5.56.3 # 止觀輔行傳弘決 5.56.3 止觀輔行傳弘決 5.56.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.56.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.56.3) 次末劫末見四十四句者，初四四句中，第一有想四句，一我此終後生有色有想、二生無色有想、三生有色無色有想、四非有色非無色有想（廣如初句）。 第二四句者，以有邊無邊對有想作四句。 第三四句者，以有樂無樂對有想作四句，第四四句者，一有想、二若干想、三少想、四無量想。 第二有二四句。 初四句者，以有色無色對無想作四句。 如初四句，唯以無想替有想。 次四句者，以有邊無邊對無想為四句，如初文中次四句說，但改無想以替有想。 第三有二四句，初四句者，有色無色對非有想非無想為四。 次四句者，有邊無邊對非有想非無想為四句。 此兩二四并前四四，合三十二句。 復有斷見七句，一若沙門婆羅門作是論：我身從父母乳哺衣食長養而生，終歸磨滅； 二者欲界諸天生，具足斷滅； 三者色界諸天生，具足斷滅； 四者空處； 五者識處； 六者不用處； 七者非想非非想處（廣如欲界句說）。 次常見有五句，計一切眾生現在涅槃，一計現在五欲自恣得涅槃、二初禪、三二禪、四三禪、五四禪（並計得涅槃）。 合十二句，并前三十二句，合四十四句。 』」經釋甚廣，數雖六十二，不出單四句見也。 「捉頭拔髮」者，即六十二見中有無等見互相是非。 如《大經》十八，耆婆為闍王作外道譬中云「見二小兒相牽鬪諍，捉頭拔髮。 」章安釋云：「二小兒者，斷常有無互相是非，如捉頭拔髮。 」因既不善，果苦無邊，故生死浩然。 「如長爪」等者，次舉長爪亦不出四句。 《大論》第一云「有外道梵志名長爪，亦名先尼、亦名婆蹉、亦名薩遮迦、亦名摩楗提，是大論師，計一切論可破、一切語可壞、一切執可轉，故無實法可信可敬。 」如《舍利弗本末經》中說。 舍利弗母，即是其姊。 姊夢見一人，具如《法華疏》舍利弗緣中（云云）。 學訖還國，覓甥不見，往難世尊云：「一切論可破」等。 佛以一句責云：「汝見，是忍不？ 」思惟於久，不得一法入心，乃云：「沙門瞿曇著我置二負門中。 若我答忍，是負門麁，眾人皆知。 云何自言不忍而今言忍？ 現見妄語。 若答言我見不忍，是負門細，無人知者。 」即便答言：「是見亦不忍。 」佛言：「不忍是見，將何破他？ 眾人無異，何用自高而生慢為？ 」長爪於是不能答佛，自知墮負：「世尊不彰我過、不言是非。 」心調柔軟，得法眼淨。 即屬單四句中非有非無見攝。 若準下文并此中意，長爪義當單四見中後之三見及無言見。 若言一切不受，即似無見。 「高著」下，舉況釋也。 即指長爪為外道中高流上輩，所學已著尚未出單，況餘暗鈍隨時問答者耶？ 「今判」下，今家判前本末見等並不出單。 次明複見。 句別具二，故名為複。 一一並緣法塵而起（云云）。 「於一一」下，明複見生惑。 「具足」下，明具足句。 句法至四，今一中具四，故名具足。 雖復單複不同，並以四為句法，故並云四。 但三四中單複具異，得三四句名耳。 單則四人，複則八人，具十六人。 複中一往列句雖似單四句上各加有無，然有有同單有、無無同單無，但於有上加無、無上加有。 第三第四各加兩句，句法應云亦有亦無有、亦有亦無無、非有非無有、非有非無無。 今文開於兩亦雙非，合有無也。 此開合者，或寫誤、或別有意，第二本中都不列句，但直標云複具而已。 此乃修補時添，應是元聽具聞列釋，今加不云私謂故也。 是則四單之上，更加六句以為複句。 具足四句，一往亦似於單四上各加四句，然亦有有同單有、無無同單無。 兩亦之上雖加兩亦，同單兩亦。 雙非之上雖加雙非，同單雙非。 是則於前單上成加一十二句，於前複上但更加六，并前單複則成十六。 是則於一四句之上，離之乃為二十八人，計但成於十六句耳。 故六十二中並無複具。 次「一句」下，具所生惑。 次明絕言見。 > Next, regarding the forty-four propositions of views on the future limit (the final kalpa): in the first four sets of tetralemmas, the first is the tetralemma of having perception: 1. After I end here, I will be reborn with form and with perception; 2. I will be reborn without form and with perception; 3. I will be reborn both with form and without form and with perception; 4. I will be reborn neither with form nor without form and with perception (explained at length like the first proposition). The second tetralemma pairs having an edge and being edgeless against having perception to make a tetralemma. The third tetralemma pairs having pleasure and not having pleasure against having perception to make a tetralemma. The fourth tetralemma is: 1. having perception; 2. having multiple perceptions; 3. having limited perception; 4. having immeasurable perception. The second \[category\] has two tetralemmas. The first tetralemma pairs having form and being formless against lacking perception to make a tetralemma—just as in the first tetralemma, only substituting 'lacking perception' for 'having perception'. The next tetralemma pairs having an edge and being edgeless against lacking perception to make a tetralemma, as described in the second tetralemma of the first text, only replacing 'having perception' with 'lacking perception'. The third \[category\] has two tetralemmas. The first tetralemma pairs having form and being formless against neither having perception nor lacking perception to make four. The next tetralemma pairs having an edge and being edgeless against neither having perception nor lacking perception to make a tetralemma. These two pairs of tetralemmas together with the previous four tetralemmas make thirty-two propositions in total. Furthermore, there are seven propositions of annihilationist views: 1. If a recluse or brāhmaṇa asserts the proposition: 'My body is born and nurtured through my parents' milk, food, and clothing, and ultimately returns to destruction'; 2. Rebirth among the devas of the desire realm, being completely annihilated; 3. Rebirth among the devas of the form realm, being completely annihilated; 4. The sphere of empty space; 5. The sphere of consciousness; 6. The sphere of nothingness; 7. The sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (explained at length like the desire-realm proposition). Next, there are five propositions of eternalist views, positing that all sentient beings attain nirvāṇa in the present: 1. Positing that one attains nirvāṇa by indulging in the five desires in the present; 2. The first dhyāna; 3. The second dhyāna; 4. The third dhyāna; 5. The fourth dhyāna (all positing the attainment of nirvāṇa). These make twelve propositions, which together with the previous thirty-two propositions make forty-four propositions in all.' The sūtra's explanation is very broad; although their number is sixty-two, they do not go beyond the simple tetralemma of views. 'Grabbing by the head and pulling the hair' refers to the mutual disputes between views such as existence and nonexistence among the sixty-two views. As chapter eighteen of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says in Jīvaka's parable of non-Buddhists told to King Ajātaśatru: 'One sees two small children dragging each other and fighting, grabbing by the head and pulling the hair.' Zhang'an explained: 'The two small children are annihilationism and eternalism, existence and nonexistence, mutually condemning one another, like grabbing by the head and pulling the hair.' Because the cause is unwholesome, the painful fruit is boundless, and thus birth and death are vast and unending. 'Like Dīrghanakha,' and so forth: next, Dīrghanakha is cited, who also did not go beyond the tetralemma. Fascicle 1 of the Dazhidulun says: 'There was a non-Buddhist brāhmaṇa named Dīrghanakha (Long-Nails), also named Śreṇika, also named Vātsa, also named Saccaka, also named Māgandiya. He was a great dialectician who posited that all treatises can be refuted, all speech can be broken, and all attachments can be overturned; therefore, there is no real dharma to be trusted or venerated.' As recounted in the Sūtra on the Origins of Śāriputra, Śāriputra's mother was his elder sister. The sister had a dream in which she saw a person, fully related in the Lotus Commentary under the conditions regarding Śāriputra (and so on). Having completed his studies, he returned to his home country, but when searching for his nephew could not find him, so he went to challenge the World-Honoured One, saying: 'All treatises can be refuted,' and so forth. The Buddha rebuked him with a single sentence, saying: 'Do you accept this view of yours or not?' Having pondered for a long time without finding a single dharma that could stand in his mind, he thought: 'The recluse Gautama has placed me between two horns of defeat. If I answer that I accept it, this is a coarse horn of defeat, which everyone will know: why did I claim myself not to accept anything, yet now say that I accept? A falsehood would be plainly seen. If I answer that I do not accept my own view, this is a subtle horn of defeat that no one will know.' He immediately answered: 'I do not accept even this view.' The Buddha said: 'If you do not accept this view, with what will you refute others? You are no different from the crowd; why puff yourself up with conceit?' Dīrghanakha was thereupon unable to answer the Buddha and realized he had suffered defeat: 'The World-Honoured One did not expose my fault, nor did he declare right or wrong.' His mind was tamed and softened, and he obtained the purity of the Dharma eye. This belongs to the purview of the view of neither existence nor nonexistence within the simple tetralemma. If evaluated according to the text below and the meaning here, Dīrghanakha's purport corresponds to the latter three views within the simple four views, as well as the view of wordlessness. If he says he accepts nothing at all, it resembles the view of nonexistence. 'Highly attached' and what follows explains this by analogy. That is, it points to Dīrghanakha as someone among the high ranks and upper class of non-Buddhists: what he studied was already deeply attached, yet had not even surpassed the simple \[tetralemma\]; how much less could the remaining dull-witted people who merely answer questions from moment to moment? 'Now determining' and what follows: our school determines that the aforementioned fundamental and derivative views and the like do not go beyond the simple \[tetralemma\]. Next, the compound views are explained. Since each proposition possesses two \[features\], they are named 'compound'. Each and every one arises in reliance upon dharma-dust (and so forth). 'In each and every' and what follows explains how compound views produce afflictions. 'Complete' and what follows explains the complete propositions. The formula of propositions reaches four; here, one \[proposition\] possesses all four, so it is called 'complete'. Although simple and compound are different, they both take four as the propositional formula, and so both are called 'four'. It is only that within the three sets of four, the simple, compound, and complete differ, and they receive the name of three sets of tetralemmas. The simple involves four persons, the compound eight persons, and the complete sixteen persons. In the compound, though listing the propositions at first glance seems like adding existence and nonexistence to each of the simple four propositions, existence-existence is the same as simple existence, and nonexistence-nonexistence is the same as simple nonexistence; one merely adds nonexistence to existence, and existence to nonexistence. To the third and fourth, two propositions are added each; the propositional formula should run: 'both existence and nonexistence \[with\] existence', 'both existence and nonexistence \[with\] nonexistence', 'neither existence nor nonexistence \[with\] existence', 'neither existence nor nonexistence \[with\] nonexistence'. The present text opens up the two 'both' and the two 'neither', combining existence and nonexistence. This opening and combining is either a scribal error or has another intended meaning; the second manuscript does not list the propositions at all, but merely marks them as 'compound' and 'complete'. This was added during later revision, and must have been what was heard in full from the original lecture when listing the explanation; now it was added without stating 'I personally consider'. Thus, six propositions are added on top of the four simple ones to make the compound propositions. As for the complete four propositions, at first glance it also seems like adding four propositions to each of the simple four; however, existence-existence is the same as simple existence, and nonexistence-nonexistence is the same as simple nonexistence. Although adding both-both on top of both-both, it is the same as the simple both-both. Although adding neither-neither on top of neither-neither, it is the same as the simple neither-neither. Thus, on top of the previous simple ones, twelve propositions are added in all, and on top of the previous compound ones, only six more are added, which together with the previous simple and compound make sixteen. Thus, on top of a single tetralemma, separating them yields twenty-eight persons, but calculated they merely make sixteen propositions. Therefore, among the sixty-two, there are neither compound nor complete \[views\]. Next, 'a single proposition' and what follows explains the afflictions produced by the complete \[views\]. Next, the view of ineffability (severing words) is explained. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.56.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.56.2) - [Next: 5.56.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.56.4) - [Up: 5.56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.56) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912~en-mt.5.56.3) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [維摩經略疏垂裕記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.3.44) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.56.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.56.3) · Pramāṇa