[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [止觀輔行傳弘決](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912) › 5.62 # 止觀輔行傳弘決 5.62 止觀輔行傳弘決 5.62 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.62) 次破亦有亦無見。亦先牒前見為此見體，「或進」下辨此見相。「如長爪」下，引例也。一切能破是亦無見，計有此見是亦有見。又見心謂無，破他成有。言「得悟」者，示計是見，因示得悟。若非見者，云何被破？「發見」下，指同。「云何」下，廣示見心是苦集之相。言「五不受」者，第三〈行相品〉云「菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜時，行亦不受、不行亦不受、亦行亦不行亦不受、非行非不行亦不受、不受亦不受。舍利弗問須菩提：『何故不受？』答：『般若波羅蜜空故，自性不受。不受尚不受，汝受是亦有亦無。』」即受第三句也。「汝云何」下，示見心中苦，即污穢五陰。「又我」下，示見心中集。「又此」下，點示此亦有亦無見心中三假。「今破」下，正破也。「如是」下，亦結成二空等。「即是」下，結成眼智。「若不入者」下，別明六十四番。此見初文，亦應有總，文無者略。「亦有」下，見度計轉。「次破」下，略示見由。「所以者何」下，略釋見由。由惑不破，故成此見。「若不定」下，正示見體。「何以故」下，見者引論以證己執。法正人邪，名同義異。「堅著」下，見成起計，即見相也。亦是責過，略以四德證法責之。世人誰不自云常等，咸計所得起愛恚癡，雖非六師定屬見計，若不云證麁免夷愆，自謂高深真為上慢。「我心生故」下，示見所生苦集之過。言「寧起」等者，《楞伽》第四〈無常品〉云「寧起我見如須彌山，不惡取見懷增上慢。」此乃少分與而言之，乃至應云寧起我見遍於法界，不惡取空如微塵許。「不識此見毒草藥王」者，毒草譬苦集，藥王譬道滅。世有草木可治病者，於中為最，稱為藥王。如《耆婆經》云「耆婆童子於貨柴人所大柴束中，見有一木光明徹照，名為藥王。倚病人身，照見身中一切諸病。」道滅亦爾，能照眾生煩惱諸病。「略過有十」者，如向所列十使是也。「廣不可盡」，謂由十使生一切過。「又一一」等者，此一切過各具三假，用觀如文。「復次」下，結示向文不出四諦。「夫一切」下，明示四諦所以。「如來」下，引證，謂初轉法輪正在破見。初轉雖未盡具四含，四含並是生滅四諦，義同初轉，故云阿含四諦之力。如《中含》云「舍利子問拘絺羅言：『頗有事因此得見諦耶？』拘絺羅言：『有。謂知食、知食集、知食滅、知食滅道迹』」等，具如《釋籤》中引。生滅尚爾，況後三番三種四諦，何所不破。「若非有」下，例破諸惑，兼結成眼智，故云「發正智慧」。「名從假」下，結成空觀。「若不」下，六十四番別破。「此見」下，見度計轉。「所以」下，結勸。言「不雜」者，見見之中俱云三假，所計不同，一一假異皆四句破。破體各別，四句之後並結二空。所空義殊，復皆各修六十四番。番番顯異，一往似雜，章節自分。「能了」等者，深勸深誡。若能了者，則可與論觀行之道。不識一句，如何能識真諦之乳，況橫竪不二一心諸番？ > Next is the refutation of the view of both existence and non-existence. It also first cites the previous view as the substance of this view. From "or proceeding" onward, it distinguishes the marks of this view. From "like Dīrghanakha" onward, it cites an analogy. Being able to refute everything is the view of "also non-existence"; grasping this view as existing is the view of "also existence." Furthermore, the mind of this view asserts non-existence, refuting others to establish existence. When it says "attaining awakening," it shows that the grasping is a view, and on that basis shows the attainment of awakening. If it were not a view, how could it be refuted? From "arousing the view" onward, it points out their identity. From "how is it that" onward, it broadly shows that the mind of this view is the mark of suffering and origination. Regarding the "five non-acceptances," the third \[chapter\], the "Chapter on the Marks of Practice," states: "When a bodhisattva mahāsattva practices the perfection of wisdom, he does not accept practicing, nor does he accept not practicing, nor does he accept both practicing and not practicing, nor does he accept neither practicing nor not practicing, nor does he accept non-acceptance. Śāriputra asked Subhūti, 'Why does he not accept them?' He replied, 'Because the perfection of wisdom is empty, its own-nature does not accept them. Even non-acceptance is not accepted, yet your acceptance is both existence and non-existence.'" That is, he accepts the third proposition. From "how do you" onward, it shows the suffering within the mind of this view—namely, the defiled five aggregates. From "furthermore, I" onward, it shows origination within the mind of this view. From "furthermore, this" onward, it points out the three provisionalities within the mind of this view of both existence and non-existence. From "now refuting" onward, it is the actual refutation. From "thus" onward, it also concludes with the two emptinesses and so forth. From "that is" onward, it concludes with eye and wisdom. From "if one does not enter" onward, it separately explains the sixty-four iterations. In the opening text of this view, there should also be a general \[refutation\]; that the text lacks it is due to abbreviation. From "both existence" onward, the view transforms and the grasping shifts. From "next refuting" onward, it briefly indicates the source of the view. From "why is this" onward, it briefly explains the source of the view: because affliction is not refuted, this view is formed. From "if not fixed" onward, it directly shows the substance of the view. From "why is this" onward, the holder of the view cites a treatise to corroborate his own attachment. The Dharma is correct, but the person is errant; the names are the same, but the meanings differ. From "firmly attached" onward, the view is formed and grasping arises, which is the mark of the view. It also reproves the fault, briefly reproving it by means of the four virtues attesting to the Dharma. Who among worldly people does not himself claim to be permanent and so forth, all grasping what they have attained and giving rise to craving, anger, and delusion? Although they are not the six masters, they definitely pertain to the graspings of views. If they do not claim attainment, they are merely excused from gross transgression; but regarding themselves as lofty and profound is truly superior arrogance. From "because of the arising of my mind" onward, it shows the fault of suffering and origination produced by this view. Regarding "it is better to give rise to," the fourth \[chapter\] of the \*Laṅkāvatāra\*, the "Chapter on Impermanence," says: "It is better to give rise to a view of self as vast as Mount Sumeru than to hold an ill-conceived view of emptiness harboring superior arrogance." This is said merely as a partial concession; in fact, one should say that it is better to give rise to a view of self pervading the entire dharma-dhātu than to entertain an ill-conceived view of emptiness the size of a fine speck of dust. "Not recognizing that this view is a poisonous herb or a medicinal king": the poisonous herb is an analogy for suffering and origination, while the medicinal king is an analogy for the path and cessation. There are herbs and trees in the world that can cure illness, among which the supreme is called the medicinal king. As the \*Jīvaka-sūtra\* says: "The youth Jīvaka saw, within a large bundle of firewood carried by a firewood seller, a piece of wood whose brilliant light shone through, named the medicinal king. When held against a sick person's body, it illuminated and showed all the illnesses within the body." The path and cessation are also like this: they are able to illuminate all the illnesses of sentient beings' afflictions. Regarding "in brief, there are ten faults," they are the ten emissaries listed earlier. "In extensive terms they cannot be exhausted" means that all faults arise from the ten emissaries. Regarding "furthermore, each and every," all these faults each possess the three provisionalities; one applies contemplation as in the text. From "furthermore" onward, it concludes by showing that the preceding text does not go beyond the four noble truths. From "now, all" onward, it clearly shows the reason for the four noble truths. From "the Tathāgata" onward, it cites proof, meaning that the initial turning of the wheel of the Dharma was specifically aimed at refuting views. Although the initial turning did not yet fully contain the four Āgamas, the four Āgamas are all the four noble truths of arising and cessation, and their meaning is identical to the initial turning; hence it speaks of the power of the four noble truths of the Āgamas. As the \*Madhyama-āgama\* says: "Śāriputra asked Kauṣṭhila, 'Is there anything by which one comes to see the truths?' Kauṣṭhila replied, 'There is: it is knowing nutriment, knowing the origination of nutriment, knowing the cessation of nutriment, and knowing the path leading to the cessation of nutriment,'" and so forth, fully cited as in the \*Shigian\*. If the arising and cessation \[truths\] are already like this, how much more so the three sets of the other three kinds of four noble truths—what would they not refute? From "if neither existence" onward, it refutes the various afflictions by analogy, and also concludes with eye and wisdom; hence it says "giving rise to correct wisdom." From "called from provisionality" onward, it concludes with the contemplation of emptiness. From "if not" onward, it separately refutes through sixty-four iterations. From "this view" onward, the view transforms and the grasping shifts. From "therefore" onward, it concludes with an exhortation. Regarding "unconfused": within view after view it speaks throughout of the three provisionalities; what they grasp is different, and every single provisionality differs, all being refuted through the four propositions. The substances refuted are each distinct, and after the four propositions, both emptinesses are uniformly concluded. The meanings of what is emptied are diverse, and each is further cultivated through sixty-four iterations. Iteration by iteration, differences are revealed; at first glance it seems confused, but the sections and passages are clearly distinguished. Regarding "those who are able to understand," it is a profound exhortation and an earnest warning. If one can understand this, one can discuss with him the path of contemplative practice. If one does not recognize even a single proposition, how can one recognize the milk of the truth of the real, let alone the various iterations of horizontal and vertical non-duality in a single mind? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.61.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.61.4) - [Next: 5.63](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.63) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912~en-mt.5.62) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1912.5.62) · Pramāṇa