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# 十不二門指要鈔 2.44

十不二門指要鈔 2.44

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [2.44](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1928.2.44)

二、所以下，高廣無減明不二。大乘因果皆是實相，三千皆實相相宛然，實相在理為染作因，縱具佛法以未顯故同名無明。三千離障、八倒不生，一一法門皆成四德，故咸常樂。三千實相皆不變性，迷悟理一，如演若多失頭得頭，頭未嘗異，故云無明即明。三千世間一一常住，理具三千俱名為體，變造三千俱名為用，故云俱體俱用。此四句中，初二明因果各具三千，三明因果三千秖一三千，以無改故，四明因果三千之體俱能起用，則因中三千起於染用，果上三千起於淨用，此第四句明圓最顯。何者？夫體用之名本相即之義，故凡言諸法即理者，全用即體方可言即。《輔行》云，即者，《廣雅》云合也。若依此釋，仍似二物相合，其理猶疎。今以義求，體不二故，故名為即（上皆《輔行》文也）。今謂全體之用方名不二。他宗明一理隨緣作差別法，差別是無明之相，淳一是真如之相，隨緣時則有差別，不隨緣時則無差別，故知一性與無明合方有差別，正是合義，非體不二，以除無明無差別故。今家明三千之體隨緣起三千之用，不隨緣時三千宛爾，故差別法與體不二，以除無明有差別故。驗他宗明即，即義不成，以彼佛果唯一真如，須破九界差別歸佛界一性故。今家以即離分於圓別，不易研詳，應知不談理具、單說真如隨緣，仍是離義。故第一記云，以別教中無性德九，故自他俱斷九也。若三千世間是性德者，九界無所破，即佛法故，即義方成、圓理始顯。故《金錍》云「變義唯二，即是唯圓」，故知具變雙明方名即是，若隨闕一皆非圓極。荊谿云，他家不明修性。若以真如一理名性，隨緣差別為修，則荊谿出時甚有人說也。故知他宗極圓，秖云性起，不云性具。深可思量。又不談性具百界，但論變造諸法，何名無作邪？世人見予立別教理有隨緣義，惑耳驚心，蓋由不能深究荊谿之意也。且如《記》文釋阿若文中云，別教亦得云從無住本立一切法，無明覆理，能覆所覆俱名無住，但即不即異而分教殊。既許所覆無住，真如安不隨緣，隨緣仍未即者，為非理具隨緣故也。又云，真如在迷能生九界。若不隨緣，何能生九？又《輔行》釋別教根塵一念為迷解本，引《楞伽》云：「如來為善不善因。」自釋云，即理性如來也。《楞伽》此句，乃他宗隨緣之所據也。《輔行》為釋此義，引大論云，如大池水，象入則濁，珠入則清。當知水為清濁本，珠象為清濁之緣，據此諸文別理豈不隨緣邪？故知若不談體具者，隨緣與不隨緣皆屬別教。何者？如云梨邪生一切法，或云法性生一切法，豈非別教有二義邪？

> Second, from "Therefore..." downward, explaining nonduality through height and breadth without diminution. Cause and effect of the Mahāyāna are both the true mark; the three thousand realms are all clearly the characteristics of the true mark. When the true mark resides in principle, it serves as the cause for defilement; even though it possesses the Buddha-dharmas, because they are not yet manifest, they are collectively called ignorance. When the three thousand realms are free from obstacles and the eight inversions do not arise, each and every dharma-gate becomes the four virtues; hence all are permanent and blissful. The three thousand realms of the true mark are all of unchanging nature; principle is one in delusion and enlightenment, just as Yajñadatta's losing his head and finding his head—his head was never different; hence it is said, 'ignorance is illumination.' The three thousand realms of the world are each and every one eternally abiding; the three thousand realms inherent in principle are all called essence, and the three thousand realms transformed and created are all called function; hence it says 'both essence and both function.' Among these four lines, the first two clarify that cause and effect each possess the three thousand realms; the third clarifies that the three thousand realms of cause and effect are just one single three thousand realms, because there is no alteration; the fourth clarifies that the essence of the three thousand realms of both cause and effect can give rise to function: then the three thousand in the cause give rise to defiled function, and the three thousand upon the effect give rise to pure function. This fourth line clarifies the perfect \[teaching\] most clearly. Why? The terms 'essence' and 'function' are fundamentally the meaning of mutual identity; therefore, whenever it is said that all dharmas are identical to principle, only when function in its entirety is identical to essence can it be called identical. The Fuxing states: 'As for "identical" (ji), the Guangya says it means "conjoined" (he). If one relies on this explanation, it still resembles two things coming together, and its principle is still crude. Now seeking it through meaning, because their essence is nondual, it is called identical' (all the above is text from the Fuxing). Now I say that only the function of the whole essence is called nondual. Other schools explain that one principle accords with conditions to produce differentiated dharmas: differentiation is the characteristic of ignorance, while pure unity is the characteristic of tathatā; when according with conditions there is differentiation, and when not according with conditions there is no differentiation. Hence one knows that only when one nature conjoins with ignorance is there differentiation—this is precisely the meaning of 'conjoining,' not the nonduality of essence, because once ignorance is eliminated there is no differentiation. Our school explains that the essence of the three thousand realms accords with conditions to give rise to the function of the three thousand realms; when not according with conditions, the three thousand realms are clearly present. Thus the differentiated dharmas and the essence are nondual, because even when ignorance is eliminated, differentiation exists. Examining the other schools' explanation of identity, the meaning of identity is not established, because their Buddha-effect is solely one tathatā, requiring the destruction of the differentiation of the nine realms to return to the single nature of the Buddha realm. Our school distinguishes the perfect and distinct \[teachings\] by identity and separation, which is not easy to investigate thoroughly. One should know that not speaking of inherent principle and merely speaking of tathatā according with conditions is still the meaning of separation. Therefore, the first fascicle of the Notes states: 'Because in the distinct teaching there are no nine realms of natural virtue, both oneself and others sever the nine.' If the three thousand realms of the world are natural virtue, then the nine realms have nothing to be destroyed, being directly the Buddha-dharma; only then is the meaning of identity established and the perfect principle revealed. Therefore, the Jinbi states: 'The meaning of transformation is twofold, which is precisely solely perfect.' Hence one knows that only when inherence and transformation are both clarified is it called 'identical'; if either is lacking, it is not the ultimate of the perfect. Jingxi said: 'Other traditions do not clarify cultivation and nature.' If one took the single principle of tathatā as nature, and differentiation according with conditions as cultivation, then when Jingxi appeared, there were many who spoke thus. Hence one knows that what other schools consider the ultimate perfect teaching merely speaks of 'arising from nature' (xingqi), and does not speak of 'inherent in nature' (xingju). This is deeply worth pondering! Furthermore, without speaking of the hundred realms inherent in nature, and only discussing transforming and creating all dharmas, how could it be called 'uncreated'? When people of the world see that I establish that the principle of the distinct teaching has the meaning of according with conditions, their ears are deluded and their minds startled, simply because they are unable to deeply fathom Jingxi's intent. Take, for instance, when the text of the Notes explains the Ājñāta passage, it says: 'The distinct teaching may also be said to establish all dharmas based on non-abiding root; ignorance veiling principle, both the veiler and the veiled are called non-abiding, yet the teachings are distinguished as different based on identity and non-identity.' Since it allows that the veiled is non-abiding, how could tathatā not accord with conditions? That according with conditions is still not identical is because it is not according with conditions of what is inherent in principle. It also says: 'Tathatā in delusion can produce the nine realms.' If it did not accord with conditions, how could it produce the nine? Moreover, when the Fuxing explains that a single thought-moment of sense-faculties and sense-objects in the distinct teaching is the root of delusion and liberation, it cites the Laṅkāvatāra: 'The Tathāgata is the cause of good and non-good.' It comments itself: 'That is the Tathāgata of principle-nature.' This sentence of the Laṅkāvatāra is precisely the authority for other schools' according with conditions. To explain this meaning, the Fuxing cites the Dazhidulun: 'Like the water of a great pond, when an elephant enters it becomes turbid, and when a jewel enters it becomes clear. One should know that the water is the basis of purity and turbidity, and the jewel and elephant are the conditions for purity and turbidity.' According to these various passages, how could the principle of the distinct teaching not accord with conditions? Therefore one knows that if one does not speak of inherent essence, both according with conditions and not according with conditions belong to the distinct teaching. Why? As when it is said that the ālaya produces all dharmas, or it is said that the Dharma-nature produces all dharmas—are these not two meanings of the distinct teaching?  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1928~en-mt.2.44) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1928.2.44](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1928.2.44) · Pramāṇa
