[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [遊心安樂道](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965) › 1.25 # 遊心安樂道 1.25 遊心安樂道 1.25 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965.1.25) 第二疑者，謂疑妙觀察智所觀之境。經中讚佛智云：「妙觀察智，諸法非有無，遠離二邊，不著中道。」由不了故，生疑而言：「如今現見稱量，物重則低，物輕必舉。若言輕而不舉，重而不低，如是說者，有言無義。因緣生法，當知亦爾，若實非無，便隨於有；如其非有，則當於無。若言非無而不得有，非有而不墮無，則同重而不低，輕而不舉，故知是說有言無實。」如是稱量，則墮諸邊；或執依他實有，墮增益邊；或執緣生、空無，墮損減邊；或計俗有、真空，雙負二邊，墮相違論；或計非有、非無，著一中邊，墮愚癡論。如釋論云：「非有、非無是愚癡論故」。為治此等邪稱量執，是故安立不可稱智，欲顯諸法甚深，離言、絕慮，不可尋思稱量、如言取義。如《瑜伽論》說：「云何甚深難見之法，謂一切法。何以故？第一甚深難見法者，所謂諸法自性，絕諸戲論，過言說道。然由言說為依正故，方乃可取、可觀、可覺，是故諸法甚深難見。」是為對治第二疑也。 > The second doubt is doubting the object observed by the marvelous observing wisdom. In the sūtra, praising the Buddha's wisdom, it says: 'The marvelous observing wisdom \[sees that\] all phenomena are neither existent nor nonexistent, far removed from the two extremes, not clinging to the middle way.' Because of not understanding, they arouse doubt and say: 'As seen today in weighing objects, if an object is heavy it goes down, and if an object is light it must go up. If one says that what is light does not go up and what is heavy does not go down, such words have speech but no meaning. Phenomena arisen from causes and conditions should be understood to be likewise: if they are truly not nonexistent, then they conform to existence; if they are not existent, then they correspond to nonexistence. If one says they are not nonexistent yet cannot be existent, not existent yet do not fall into nonexistence, this is identical to being heavy yet not going down, and light yet not going up; therefore we know such speech has words but no reality.' Weighing things in this way, one falls into various extremes: either grasping at dependent origination as truly existent and falling into the extreme of superimposition; or grasping at conditioned arising as empty and nonexistent and falling into the extreme of deprecation; or postulating conventional existence and ultimate emptiness, thus bearing both extremes and falling into the theory of contradiction; or postulating neither existence nor nonexistence, clinging to an extreme of the middle, and falling into the theory of foolishness. As the explanatory commentary says: 'Because neither existence nor nonexistence is the theory of foolishness.' In order to cure these clinging views based on improper estimation, the ineffable wisdom is established, intending to show that phenomena are profound, beyond words, and severed from thought, and cannot be investigated, estimated, or taken literally according to words. As the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 'What are the profound and hard-to-see phenomena? They are all phenomena. Why? The most profound and hard-to-see phenomenon is the intrinsic nature of all phenomena, which cuts off all conceptual proliferation and transcends the path of speech. Yet relying on speech as the standard, they can then be grasped, observed, and realized; therefore phenomena are profound and hard to see.' This is the antidote to the second doubt. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965.1.24) - [Next: 1.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965.1.26) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965~en-mt.1.25) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965.1.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1965.1.25) · Pramāṇa