[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › 20.3 # 宗鏡錄 20.3 宗鏡錄 20.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [20.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.20.3) 答。智論云。眾生心性。猶如利刀。唯用割泥。泥無所成。刀日就損。理體常妙。眾生自麁。能善用之。即合本妙。又譬如一器中水淡味恒然。若著甘草則甜。下黃連則苦。眾生心水。亦復如是。起妄染則凡。冥真空則聖。其心之性。未嘗變異。如華嚴經偈云。譬如淨日月。皎鏡在虛空。影現於眾水。不為水所雜。菩薩淨法輪。當知亦如是。現世間心水。不為世所雜。如華嚴疏云。一切法有二。一是所迷。謂緣起不實。故如幻。緣成。故無性。二是能迷。遍計無物。故如空。妄計。故無相。又以不覺。故不知有。以不信。故不承當。但起無明。空成倒想。如夜繩不動。疑之為蛇。闇室本空。怖之有鬼。故知本無迷悟。妄有昇沈。昔迷悟而似迷。今悟迷而非悟。但以內見自隔。客塵所遮。於體上分遠近之情。向性中立凡聖之量。如勝思惟梵天所問經云。梵天問文殊師利。比丘云何親近於佛。答言。梵天。若比丘於諸法中。不見有法。若近若遠。是則名為親近於佛。大集經云。不覺一法。微相者。乃能了知如來出世。無出之出。即是佛出。是以若不見一法。常見諸佛。則千里同風。若見一法。不見諸佛。則對面胡越。故知背心合境。頓起塵勞。背境合心。圓照法界。何者。心是所依。法是能依。能依從所依起。如水是所依。波是能依。離水無波。離心無法。又心是能生。法是所生。如木能生火。木是能生。火是所生。離木無火。離心無法。故知不即心為道者。如千人排門。無一得入。若了心頓入者。猶一人拔關。能通萬彙。得宗鏡之要者。其斯謂乎。是以妙性無虧。迷悟自得。一法不動。向背俄分。如首楞嚴經云。佛言。富樓那。又汝問言。地水火風。本性圓融。周遍法界。疑水火性。不相陵滅。又徵虛空。及諸大地。俱遍法界。不合相容。富樓那。譬如虛空體非群相。而不拒彼諸相發揮。所以者何。富樓那。彼太虛空。日照則明。雲屯則暗。風搖則動。霽澄則清。氣凝則濁。土積成霾。水澄成映。於意云何。如是殊方諸有為相。為因彼生。為復空有。若彼所生。富樓那。且日照時。既是日明。十方世界同為日色。云何空中更見圓日。若是空明。空應自照。云何中宵雲霧之時。不生光曜。當知是明。非日非空。不異空日。觀相元妄。無可指陳。猶邀空華。結為空果。云何詰其相陵滅義。觀性元真。唯妙覺明。妙覺明心。先非水火。云何復問不相容者。真妙覺明。亦復如是。汝以空明。則有空現。地水火風各各發明。則各各現。若俱發明。則有俱現。云何俱現。富樓那。如一水中。現於日影。兩人同觀水中之日。東西各行。則各有日隨二人去。一東一西。先無準的。不應難言。此日是一。云何各行。各曰既雙。云何現一。宛轉虛妄。無可憑據。富樓那。汝以色空相傾相奪。於如來藏。而如來藏。隨為色空。周遍法界。是故於中。風動空澄。日明雲暗。眾生迷悶。背覺合塵。故發塵勞。有世間相。我以妙明不生不滅。合如來藏。而如來藏。唯妙覺明。圓照法界。故知妙覺明心。湛然不動。因業發現。隨為色空。周遍法界。眾生背其本覺。妄執情塵。翻於平等一真覺中。認所現差別之境界。隨發明處強說是非。如於虛空體中。定其差別。實謂虛妄顛倒。無理可憑。凡挂聖智真詮。悉為破其顛倒。若知顛倒不實。自然無法可論。如華嚴經云。以智入於一切佛法。為眾生說。令除顛倒。然知不離眾生有顛倒。不離顛倒有眾生。不於顛倒內有眾生。不於眾生內有顛倒。亦非顛倒是眾生。亦非眾生是顛倒。顛倒非內法。顛倒非外法。眾生非內法。眾生非外法。一切諸法。虛妄不實。速起速滅。無有堅固。如夢如影。如幻如化。誑惑愚夫。如疏釋云。經文有四對。前三對二互相望。後一對當體以辯。前三對中。前二不離。後一不即。即顯生之與倒。非即離也。眾生即能起顛倒之人。乃染分依他。顛倒即所起之妄。是遍計所執。初對明不離者。謂依似執實。故。離生無倒。依執似起。離倒無生。第二對明不相在。重釋前義。言不離者。明因果相待緣成。非先有體。二物相在。因中無果。故倒內無生。若必有者。則應遍計是依他起。果中無因。故生內無到若要令有者。則應無有不倒眾生。第三對明不即。不壞因果。能所遍計之二相故。由前三對。則知生倒非一非異。非即非離。第四對當體以辯。倒心託境方生。故非內法。若是內者。無境應有境。由情計。故非外法。若是外者。智者於境。不應不染。既非內外。寧在中間。則當體自虛。將何對他。以明即離。眾生亦爾。即蘊求無。故非內法。離蘊亦無。故非外法。既非內外。亦絕中間。本性自空。何能起倒。將何對他。明非即離。既如是知。則自無倒。為物說此倒惑自除。因謂由不達緣成不堅。妄生遍計。故云誑惑愚夫。實則愚夫自誑。若獼猴執月。非月執獼猴。又中觀論偈云。有倒不生倒。無倒不生倒。倒者不生倒。不倒亦不倒。若於顛倒時。亦不生顛倒。汝可自觀察。誰生於顛倒。已顛倒者。則更不生顛倒。已顛倒故。不顛倒者。亦不顛倒。無有顛倒。故顛倒時。亦無顛倒。有二過故。汝今除憍慢心。善自觀察。誰為顛倒者。復次諸顛倒不生。云何有此義。無有顛倒故。何有顛倒者。顛倒種種因緣破故。墮在不生。彼貪著不生。謂不生是顛倒實相。是故偈說。云。何名不生為顛倒。乃至無漏法。尚不名為不生相。何況顛倒是不生相。無顛倒何有顛倒者。因倒者有倒故。 > Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "The mind-nature of sentient beings is like a sharp blade. If it is only used to cut mud, nothing is made of the mud, while the blade daily suffers damage. The principle-substance is ever wondrous, yet sentient beings themselves are coarse. If one can employ it skillfully, one immediately accords with the original wonder." Furthermore, it is like water in a single vessel: its bland flavor is constant; if liquorice is added, it becomes sweet, and if coptis is introduced, it becomes bitter. The mind-water of sentient beings is just like this: when false defilements arise, one is an ordinary being; when one coincides with true emptiness, one is a sage. The nature of this mind has never undergone change or alteration. As a verse in the Avataṃsakasūtra says: > > “Just like the pure sun and moon, > Shining brightly in empty space, > Their reflections appear in diverse waters, > Yet are not commingled with the water; > The pure Dharma-wheel of the bodhisattva, > One should know, is also like this: > Appearing in the mind-water of the world, > It is not commingled with the world.” > > As the Commentary on the Avataṃsakasūtra says: "All phenomena have two aspects. The first is that which is deluded about: namely, conditioned arising is unreal, hence like an illusion; because it is formed through conditions, it is without nature. The second is that which is capable of delusion: the imagined has no entity, hence is like empty space; because it is falsely conceptualized, it is devoid of characteristics." Furthermore, because of non-awakening, they do not know it exists; because of lack of faith, they do not undertake it. They merely give rise to avidyā and vainly form inverted conceptions. It is like an immobile rope in the night suspected of being a snake, or a dark room, originally empty, feared to contain a ghost. Therefore, know that originally there is neither delusion nor awakening; vainly do rising and sinking occur. Formerly one was deluded about awakening, so it resembled delusion; now one awakens to delusion, yet it is not awakening. It is merely that internal views separate oneself, and adventitious defilements obscure \[one\], dividing sentiments of distance and proximity upon the substance, and establishing measures of the ordinary and the sagely within the nature. As the Viśeṣacintabrahmaparipṛcchāsūtra says: "Brahmā asked Mañjuśrī: 'How does a bhikṣu draw near to the Buddha?' He replied: 'Brahmā, if in phenomena a bhikṣu does not see any phenomenon as either near or far, this is called drawing near to the Buddha.'" The Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra says: "One who is not conscious of even a subtle characteristic of a single phenomenon can understand the Tathāgata's arising in the world. An arising that is non-arising is precisely the Buddha's arising." Thus, if one does not see a single phenomenon, one constantly sees all Buddhas; then across a thousand miles there is the same wind. If one sees a single phenomenon, one does not see all Buddhas; then facing each other they are as alien as the Hu and Yue. Therefore, know that when one turns one's back on citta and accords with objects, defilements instantly arise; when one turns one's back on objects and accords with citta, one completely illumines the dharmadhātu. Why so? Citta is that on which things depend; phenomena are that which depends. That which depends arises from that on which it depends: just as water is that on which things depend and waves are that which depends. Apart from water there are no waves; apart from citta there are no phenomena. Furthermore, citta is that which produces; phenomena are that which is produced. Just as wood can produce fire—wood is that which produces and fire is that which is produced—apart from wood there is no fire; apart from citta there are no phenomena. Therefore, know that for those who do not take citta as the Way, it is like a thousand people pushing against a gate, not one of whom manages to enter. If one understands citta and enters abruptly, it is like one person pulling the latch, thereby opening the way for all ten thousand things. Is this not what is meant by grasping the essential of the Mirror of the Source? Therefore, the wondrous nature suffers no deficiency; delusion and awakening are gained by oneself. Not a single phenomenon moves, yet turning toward or turning away are suddenly divided. As the Śūraṅgamasūtra says: "The Buddha said: 'Pūrṇa, you also asked: "Earth, water, fire, and wind are inherently consummate and completely pervade the dharmadhātu; yet I doubt why the natures of water and fire do not overwhelm and destroy each other. You also asked how empty space and the great earth can both pervade the dharmadhātu and yet not be incompatible." Pūrṇa, just as empty space in its substance is not the multitude of characteristics, yet it does not reject the manifestation of those characteristics. Why is this? Pūrṇa, that great empty space becomes bright when the sun shines; it becomes dark when clouds gather; it moves when the wind stirs; it becomes clear when the sky clears; it becomes murky when vapors condense; dust accumulating makes it hazy; clear water reflecting makes it brilliant. What do you think? Do these conditioned characteristics of distinct places arise caused by those things, or do they exist from empty space? If they are produced by those things, Pūrṇa, at the time of sunlight, since it is the sun's brightness, the worlds of the ten directions are uniformly of the sun's color; why then does one still see the round sun in the sky? If it is the brightness of empty space, empty space should shine of itself; why then, in the middle of the night or at times of clouds and mist, does no radiance arise? You should know that this brightness is neither the sun nor empty space, nor is it different from empty space and the sun. Contemplating characteristics, they are originally false, with nothing to point to—like expecting flowers in the sky to bear sky-fruit. Why cross-examine the meaning of their mutually overwhelming and destroying each other? Contemplating the nature, it is originally true, solely wondrous, enlightened, and bright. The wondrously enlightened, bright mind is primarily neither water nor fire; why do you further ask about their incompatibility? The true, wondrously enlightened brightness is also like this: if you manifest empty space, empty space appears; if earth, water, fire, and wind are each manifested, each appears. If they are simultaneously manifested, they simultaneously appear. How do they simultaneously appear? Pūrṇa, just as in a single body of water the reflection of the sun appears: two people view the sun in the water together, and walk east and west respectively; then each has a sun following the two people, one east and one west, with no fixed standard from the start. One should not pose the difficulty: "This sun is one; why does it go separately? Since each has a sun, making a pair, why did only one appear \[before\]?" It is shifting and false, with nothing to rely upon. Pūrṇa, you use form and emptiness to overthrow and wrest from each other within the tathāgatagarbha, yet the tathāgatagarbha accordingly becomes form and emptiness, pervading the dharmadhātu. Therefore within it, wind moves and space clears, the sun is bright and clouds are dark. Sentient beings are deluded and confused; turning their backs on awakening and according with defilement, they give rise to defilements, and worldly characteristics exist. I, by means of wondrous brightness that is unarisen and unceasing, accord with the tathāgatagarbha; and the tathāgatagarbha is solely wondrous, enlightened, and bright, completely illumining the dharmadhātu.'" Therefore, know that the wondrously enlightened, bright mind is serene and unmoving. Manifesting in accordance with karma, it accordingly becomes form and emptiness, pervading the dharmadhātu. Sentient beings turn their backs on their fundamental awakening and falsely grasp at emotional defilements; contrary \[to truth\], within the equal, one true awakening, they recognize the differentiated realms that appear. Following wherever manifestations occur, they arbitrarily assert right and wrong—just like determining differences within the substance of empty space. Truly this is false and inverted, with no principle to rely upon. Whenever the true teachings of the holy wisdom are set forth, they are all to shatter these inversions. If one knows that inversions are unreal, naturally there are no phenomena to be discussed. As the Avataṃsakasūtra says: "Using wisdom, enter into all Buddha-dharmas, and expound them for sentient beings so that they may eliminate inversions. Yet know that apart from sentient beings there are no inversions, and apart from inversions there are no sentient beings. Not inside inversions are there sentient beings, nor inside sentient beings are there inversions. Inversions are not sentient beings, nor are sentient beings inversions. Inversions are not internal phenomena; inversions are not external phenomena. Sentient beings are not internal phenomena; sentient beings are not external phenomena. All phenomena are false and unreal, quickly arising and quickly ceasing, devoid of stability; like dreams, like shadows, like illusions, like apparitions, they deceive and delude foolish people." As the Commentary explains: "The sūtra text has four pairs. The first three pairs look at the two mutually; the last pair distinguishes them in their very substance. Among the first three pairs, the first two concern non-separation, and the latter one concerns non-identity; this reveals that sentient beings and inversions are neither identical nor separate. Sentient beings are the persons capable of giving rise to inversions, belonging to the defiled aspect of the other-dependent \[nature\] (paratantra). Inversions are the falsities produced, which are the fully imagined \[nature\] (parikalpita). The first pair clarifies non-separation: because they grasp the real based on the apparent, apart from sentient beings there are no inversions; because the apparent arises based on grasping, apart from inversions there are no sentient beings. The second pair clarifies that they do not reside within each other, re-explaining the previous meaning. Saying that they are not separate clarifies that cause and effect mutually depend and are conditioned; there is no prior substance wherein two things reside in each other. In the cause there is no effect, hence inside inversions there are no sentient beings; if they necessarily existed, then the fully imagined would be the other-dependent. In the effect there is no cause, hence inside sentient beings there are no inversions; if one insisted they must exist, then there would be no non-inverted sentient beings. The third pair clarifies non-identity: because it does not destroy cause and effect, or the two characteristics of that which imagines and that which is imagined. From the first three pairs, one knows that sentient beings and inversions are neither one nor different, neither identical nor separate. The fourth pair distinguishes them in their very substance. The inverted mind arises only by depending on objects, hence it is not an internal phenomenon; if it were internal, it should exist without an object. Because it is calculated by emotion, it is not an external phenomenon; if it were external, the wise should not be undefiled by objects. Since it is neither internal nor external, how could it be in between? Thus its very substance is naturally empty; by what could it be contrasted with the other to clarify identity or separation? Sentient beings are also like this: sought within the aggregates, they are non-existent, hence not an internal phenomenon; apart from the aggregates they are also non-existent, hence not an external phenomenon. Since they are neither internal nor external, the intermediate is also cut off. Their fundamental nature is inherently empty; how could they give rise to inversions? By what could they be contrasted with the other to clarify that they are not identical or separate? Knowing this, one is naturally free from inversion. Expounding this to beings, inverted delusion is naturally eliminated." The reason \[it says\] that, through failure to comprehend that what is conditionally formed is not solid, one falsely gives rise to imagination, is why it says, 'they deceive and delude foolish people.' In reality, foolish people deceive themselves—like a monkey grasping at the moon, not the moon grasping at the monkey. Furthermore, a verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra says: > > “Where there is inversion, inversion does not arise; > Where there is no inversion, inversion does not arise; > One who is inverted does not give rise to inversion; > One not inverted does not invert either. > If at the time of inverting, > Inversion does not arise either; > You may observe for yourself: > Who gives rise to inversion?” > > For one who is already inverted, inversion does not arise further, because they are already inverted; one who is not inverted does not invert either, because there is no inversion; hence at the time of inverting, there is also no inversion, because there would be two faults. Now, abandon arrogance and carefully observe for yourself: who is the inverted one? Furthermore, all inversions do not arise: how can this meaning stand? Because there is no inversion, how could there be an inverted one? Because inversions are broken through various causes and conditions, one falls into non-arising. If one becomes attached to non-arising, claiming that non-arising is the true characteristic of inversion, therefore the verse says: > > “How could non-arising be called inversion?” > > Even untainted phenomena are not yet called the characteristic of non-arising, how much less could inversion be the characteristic of non-arising! If there is no inversion, how could there be an inverted one? Because only on account of the inverted one is there inversion. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 20.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.20.2) - [Next: 20.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.20.4) - [Up: 20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.20) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.20.3) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大方廣佛華嚴經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.22.13) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.20.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.20.3) · Pramāṇa