[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › 33.7.2 # 宗鏡錄 33.7.2 宗鏡錄 33.7.2 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [33.7.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.33.7.2) 以知不來。 古而無今。 以知不去。 若古不至今。 今亦不至古。 事各性住。 有何物而可去來。 然則四像風馳。 旋機電卷。 得意毫微。 雖速而不轉也。 是以如來。 功流萬世而常存。 道通百劫而彌固。 成山假就於始簣。 修途託至於初步者。 果以功業不可朽故也。 功業不可朽故。 雖在昔而不化。 不化故不遷。 不遷故。 則湛然矣。 故經云。 三災彌淪而行業湛然。 信其言也。 何者。 夫果不俱因。 因因而果。 因因而果。 因昔不滅。 果不俱因。 因不來今。 不滅不來。 則不遷之致明矣。 復何惑於去留。 躊躇於動靜之間哉。 然則乾坤倒覆。 無謂不靜。 洪流滔天。 無謂其動。 若能契神於即物。 斯不遠而可知矣。 古釋云。 前言。 古今各性住於一世不相往來者。 則壯老。 不同一色。 定為嬰兒。 無匍匐時。 乃至老年。 則無相續。 失親屬法。 無父無子。 應唯嬰兒得父。 餘則匍匐老年不應有分。 則前功便失。 有斷滅過。 從此便明功流始簣。 初步。 因果等。 相續不失。 不斷不常。 不一不異。 不來不去。 故圓正不遷理也。 乘莫二之真心。 吐不一之殊教者。 諸聖依一心之正宗。 逗機演差別之教跡。 雖九流八教不等。 而不遷。 一念無虧。 故云雖千途異唱。 會歸同致矣。 而隨文迷旨者。 但執權門生滅之言。 妄見世相去來之事。 因此以為流動。 隨境輪迴。 殊不知生死去來。 畢竟無性。 所以中觀論破三時無去。 一已去無去者。 去法已謝。 二未去無去者。 去法未萌。 三去時無去者。 正去無住。 又以去者。 去法。 二事俱無。 若無去者。 即無去法。 亦無方所。 去者即是人。 以法因人致。 離人無有法。 離法無有人。 故鈔云。 觀方知彼去。 去者不至方者。 明三時無去來。 以辯不遷也。 如人初在東方。 卓立不動。 則名未去。 未去故。 未去不得名為去。 若動一步。 離本立處。 反望本立處。 名已去。 已去故。 已去不得名為去。 惑人便轉計云。 動處則有去。 此中有去時。 非已去未去。 是故去時去。 龍樹便以相待破云。 若有已去未去。 則有去時。 若無已去未去。 則無去時。 故偈云。 離已去未去。 去時亦無去。 如因兩邊短。 有中間長。 若無兩邊短。 即無中間長也。 青目即以相違破。 何者。 去時者。 謂半去半未去。 名曰去時。 則一法中有二墮相違。 去義不成。 是故去時亦無去。 故偈云。 已去無有去。 未去亦無去。 離已去未去。 去時亦無去也。 如一人從東方行至西方時。 望其從東至西。 如似有去。 故言知彼去。 然步步中三時無去。 則無去法。 既無去法。 即無去人從此至彼。 故言去者不至方也。 去者。 謂人也。 已上一經一論。 皆明三時無去。 以標宗辯不遷也。 此來去因果不遷。 即會中道八不意也。 如論偈云。 不生亦不滅。 不常亦不斷。 不一亦不異。 不來亦不去。 能說是因緣。 善滅諸戲論。 我稽首禮佛。 諸說中第一。 今以因果會釋八不義。 言不生者。 如二十時為因。 三十時為果。 若離二十有今三十。 可言有生。 若離二十。 則三十不可得。 是故不生。 故中論云。 離劫初穀。 今穀不可得。 是故不生。 不滅者。 則二十時不無。 故不滅。 若二十時滅。 今不應有三十時。 中論云。 若滅。 今應無穀。 而實有穀。 是故不滅也。 不常者。 則三十時無二十時。 是故不常。 中論云。 如穀芽時。 種則變壞。 是故不常。 不斷者。 因二十有三十相續。 是故不斷。 中論云。 如從穀有芽。 是故不斷。 若斷。 不應相續。 不一者。 二十不與三十同體。 各性而住。 故不一。 中論云。 > \[we\] know that there is no coming; \[the present\] is in antiquity and does not \[reach\] the present, by which \[we\] know that there is no going. If antiquity does not reach the present, and the present also does not reach antiquity, each phenomenon abides in its own nature—what entity could possibly come or go? Thus, even though the four forms gallop like the wind and the revolving mechanism rolls like lightning, if one grasps the minute reality \[of this\], then despite such swiftness nothing moves. For this reason, the Tathāgata's meritorious deeds flow down through ten thousand generations yet perpetually remain, and his Way penetrates hundreds of kalpas yet becomes ever firmer. That the completion of a mountain relies upon the first basketful of earth, and that the long journey depends on taking the initial step, is truly because meritorious karma cannot decay. Because meritorious karma cannot decay, even though it lies in the past it does not transform; because it does not transform, it does not pass away; because it does not pass away, it remains pristine and serene. Thus the sūtra states: 'Though the three disasters inundate \[the world\], karmic actions remain pristine.' We truly believe these words. Why so? An effect is not simultaneous with its cause; rather, it is because of the cause that there is an effect. Because of the cause there is an effect, so the cause does not perish in the past. An effect is not simultaneous with its cause, so the cause does not come into the present. Neither perishing nor coming, the principle of non-passing-away is thereby made evident. What doubt remains regarding going and staying, and why hesitate between motion and rest? Therefore, though heaven and earth were to turn upside down, do not say that there is no tranquility; though a great flood should rise to the sky, do not say that it moves. If one can unite one's spirit with the phenomena themselves, this can be understood without looking far. An ancient commentary states: 'The preceding statement that antiquity and the present each abide in their own nature within a single period and do not interact between each other would imply that youth and old age do not share the same physical form. If one is fixed as an infant, there would be no crawling stage, and going all the way to old age there would be no continuity, thus losing the Dharma of kinship: there would be neither father nor son. Only the infant would have a father, while crawling and old age would have no share in it. Then the former meritorious deeds would be lost, incurring the fault of annihilationism. From this it is made clear that the flow of meritorious deed relies upon the first basketful of earth, the first step, and the continuity of cause and effect without loss: neither annihilated nor eternal, neither identical nor different, neither coming nor going. Hence the principle of non-passing-away is perfectly correct.' To ride upon the non-dual true mind and utter distinct teachings that are not identical means that the holy sages, relying on the correct source of the one mind, accommodate dispositions and expound diverse traces of teaching. Although the nine schools and eight teachings differ, non-passing-away is not deficient in a single thought-moment. Thus it is said that although a thousand paths sing differing songs, they converge into the same import. Yet those who follow the words and lose sight of the purport merely cling to the provisional door's statements of arising and ceasing, falsely seeing phenomena of the world as coming and going. Due to this, they assume there is flux, and samsara follows the conditions. They completely fail to know that birth, death, coming, and going are ultimately devoid of intrinsic nature. Therefore, the Madhyamakaśāstra refutes the three times as having no going: first, there is no going in what has already gone, because the act of going has already passed away; second, there is no going in what has not yet gone, because the act of going has not yet arisen; third, there is no going in the time of going, because in the midst of going there is no abiding. Furthermore, the goer and the act of going—both things are non-existent. If there is no goer, then there is no act of going, nor is there a spatial location. The goer is the person; since the dharma is brought about by the person, apart from the person there is no dharma, and apart from the dharma there is no person. Thus the commentary says: 'By observing the direction, one knows of his going, but the goer does not arrive at the direction.' This clarifies that within the three times there is neither going nor coming, so as to expound non-passing-away. For instance, when a person first stands upright in the east without moving, he is said to have 'not yet gone.' Because he has not yet gone, 'not yet gone' cannot be called 'going.' If he takes one step and leaves the place where he originally stood, looking back at the original place is called 'having already gone.' Because he has already gone, 'having already gone' cannot be called 'going.' A confused person then shifts his view and asserts: 'Where there is movement, there is going; in this there is the time of going, which is neither already gone nor not yet gone. Therefore, in the time of going one goes.' Nāgārjuna then refutes this through mutual dependence, stating: 'If there were already gone and not yet gone, then there would be a time of going; if there were no already gone and not yet gone, there would be no time of going.' Hence the verse says: 'Apart from already gone and not yet gone, / There is also no going at the time of going.' Just as because of two short ends there is an intermediate long one, if there are not two short ends, then there is no intermediate long one. Piṅgala then refutes this through contradiction, saying: 'Why so? The time of going refers to half-gone and half-not-yet-gone, which is called the time of going; then within a single dharma there would be two contradictory extremes, and the meaning of going would not be established. Therefore, there is also no going at the time of going.' Hence the verse says: 'What has already gone has no going, / What has not yet gone also has no going; / Apart from already gone and not yet gone, / There is also no going at the time of going.' For example, when a person walks from the east to the west, observing his path from east to west appears as though there were going; thus it is said 'one knows of his going.' However, in step after step, within the three times there is no going, and so there is no act of going. Since there is no act of going, there is no going person who goes from here to there. Thus it is said: 'The goer does not arrive at the direction.' 'The goer' refers to the person. The one sūtra and one treatise cited above both clarify that within the three times there is no going, thereby indicating the source and expounding non-passing-away. This non-passing-away of coming, going, cause, and effect accords with the intention of the Eightfold Negation of the Middle Way. As the treatise verse says: 'Neither arising nor ceasing, / Neither eternal nor annihilated, / Neither identical nor different, / Neither coming nor going; / Being able to expound these causes and conditions, / He skillfully extinguishes all conceptual proliferation; / I bow my head and pay homage to the Buddha, / Supreme among all teachers.' Now, through cause and effect, we correlate and interpret the meaning of the Eightfold Negation. As for 'neither arising': taking the age of twenty as the cause and the age of thirty as the effect, if the present thirty could exist apart from twenty, one might say there is arising; but if one is apart from twenty, thirty cannot be obtained—therefore, there is no arising. Thus the Madhyamakaśāstra states: 'Apart from the grain at the beginning of the kalpa, present-day grain cannot be obtained; therefore, there is no arising.' As for 'not ceasing': the time of twenty is not non-existent \[in its result\], hence it does not cease. If the time of twenty ceased, the present time of thirty should not exist. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: 'If it ceased, there should now be no grain; yet grain truly exists; therefore, it does not cease.' As for 'not eternal': at the time of thirty there is no time of twenty; therefore, it is not eternal. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: 'Just as when grain sprouts the seed decays, therefore it is not eternal.' As for 'not annihilated': due to twenty, thirty exists in continuous succession; therefore, it is not annihilated. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: 'Just as from grain there is a sprout, therefore it is not annihilated; if it were annihilated, there should be no succession.' As for 'not identical': twenty and thirty do not share the same substance, but abide in their respective natures; therefore, they are not identical. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 33.7.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.33.7.1) - [Next: 33.7.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.33.7.3) - [Up: 33.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.33.7) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.33.7.2) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [中論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.madhyamaka.mmk!pingala*zh-kumarajiva.1.67) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.33.7.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.33.7.2) · Pramāṇa