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# 宗鏡錄 51.51

宗鏡錄 51.51

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [51.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.51.51)

答。謂三藏量有法中。言雖不帶。意許。諳含。緣大乘宗有兩般色。有離眼識本質色。有不離眼識相分色。若離眼識色。小乘即許。若不離眼識色。小乘不許。今三藏量云。真故極成色。是有法。若望言陳自相。是立敵共許色。及舉初三攝眼所不攝因。亦但成立共許色不離於眼識。若望三藏意中所許。但立相分色。不離眼識。將初三攝眼所不攝因。成立有法上意之差別相分色。定不離眼識故。因明疏云。謂真故極成色。是有法自相。定不離眼識色。是法自相。定離眼識色。非定。離眼識色。是有法差別。立者意許。是不離眼識色。

> Answer: This means that within the subject of the Tripiṭaka Master's inference, although the words do not express it, what is intended contains an implicit meaning. For in the Mahāyāna school there are two kinds of matter: there is essential matter (maula-rūpa / bimbaphala) separate from visual consciousness, and there is matter as an objective aspect (nimittabhāga) not separate from visual consciousness. If it is matter separate from visual consciousness, the Hīnayāna accepts it; if it is matter not separate from visual consciousness, the Hīnayāna does not accept it. Now the Tripiṭaka Master's inference says: "In ultimate truth, universally established matter is the subject." From the perspective of the intrinsic nature expressed in words, it is matter jointly accepted by proponent and opponent; and adducing the reason "because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye" also merely establishes that jointly accepted matter is not separate from visual consciousness. But from the perspective of what is intended by the Tripiṭaka Master, he establishes only that matter as an objective aspect is not separate from visual consciousness, using the reason "subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye" to establish that the intentional distinction on the subject—matter as an objective aspect—is definitely not separate from visual consciousness. Therefore, the commentary on Hetuvidyā states: '"In ultimate truth, universally established matter" is the intrinsic nature of the subject. "Matter definitely not separate from visual consciousness" is the intrinsic nature of the predicate. "Matter definitely separate from visual consciousness" and "matter not definitely separate from visual consciousness" are the qualifications of the subject. What is intended by the proponent is matter not separate from visual consciousness.'  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.51.51) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.51.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.51.51) · Pramāṇa
