[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › 59.27 # 宗鏡錄 59.27 宗鏡錄 59.27 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [59.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.59.27) 答。識論云。遍計所執。妄安立故。可說為假。無體相故。非假非實。依他起性。有實有假。聚集相續。分位性故。說為假。有心心所色。從緣生故。說為實有。若無實法。假法亦無。假法依實因而施設故。圓成實性。唯是實有。不依他緣而施設故。釋云。遍計。有名無體。妄情安立。可說為假。談其法體。既無有相。非假非實。非兔角等。可說假實。必依有體總別法上。立為假實故。依他。假有三種。一聚集假者。如瓶盆有情等。是。聚集法。多法一時所集成故。能成雖實。所成是假。二相續假者。如過未等世。唯有因果。是相續性。多法多時上。立一假法。如佛說言。昔者鹿王。今我身是。所依五蘊剎那滅者。雖體是實。於此多法相續假。立一有情。至今猶在故。三分位假者。如不相應行。是。分位性。故皆是假。一時一法上立。如一色上。名有漏。可見。有對。亦名色等。並是於一法上。假施設故。若彼實者。應有多體。其忿恨等。皆此假攝。心心所色。從因緣種生。故說為實。又三性者。即是一性。一性即無性。何者。遍計無相。依他無生。圓成無性。解深密經云。瞖眼人。如遍計。現青黃。如依他。淨眼。如圓成。攝論云。分別性如蛇。依他性如藤。若人緣四塵相。分析此藤。但見四相。不見別藤。但是色香味觸相故。藤非實有。以離四塵外。無別有藤。所以論偈云。於藤起蛇知。見藤則無境。若知藤分已。藤知如蛇知。若知藤之性分是空。則例如藤上妄生蛇想。攝論云。菩薩不見外塵。但見意言分別。即了依他性。云何了別。此法。若離因緣。自不得生。根塵為因緣。根塵既不成。此法無因緣。云何得生。依初真觀。入依他性。由第二真觀。除依他性。則唯識想息。意言分別顯現。似所聞思一切義。乃至似唯有識想。皆不得生。生緣有二。謂分別性。及依他性。分別性已滅。依他性又不得生。既無二境。故一切義。乃至似唯識想。皆不得生。唯識想尚不得起。何況餘意言分別而當得生。菩薩住何處。唯住無分別。一切名義中平等平等。又依二種平等。謂能緣所緣。能緣即無分別智。以智無分別。故稱平等。所緣即真如境。境亦無分別。故稱平等。又此境智。不住能取所取義中。譬如虛空。故說平等。平等。由此義故。菩薩得入真實性。此位不可言說。以自所詮故。證時離覺觀思惟分別故。 > Answer: The \*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra\* states: "Because the imagined nature (\*parikalpita\*) is falsely posited, it can be said to be nominal (prajñapti). Because it lacks substance and characteristics, it is neither nominal nor real. The other-dependent nature (\*paratantra\*) has both the real and the nominal: because of its nature as agglomeration, continuity, and states, it is said to be nominal; because citta, caittas, and rūpa are produced from conditions, it is said to be really existent. If there were no real phenomena, nominal phenomena would also not exist, for nominal phenomena are designated based on real causes. The consummate nature (\*pariniṣpanna\*) is exclusively really existent, because it is designated without relying on other conditions." > > An explanation states: In the imagined nature, there is a name but no substance; posited by deluded sentiment, it can be said to be nominal. But speaking of its phenomenal substance, since it has no characteristics at all, it is neither nominal nor real. It is not like a rabbit's horns and the like, which can be spoken of as nominal or real; nominal and real must be established based on general and specific phenomena that possess substance. > > In the other-dependent, the nominal has three kinds: > First, the nominality of agglomeration (\*saṃghātaprajñapti\*): such as vases, basins, sentient beings, and so forth. These are agglomerated phenomena; because they are formed together by multiple phenomena at one time, though what forms them is real, what is formed is nominal. > Second, the nominality of continuity (\*prabandhaprajñapti\*): such as past, future, and other time periods, where there are only causes and effects, which is a continuous nature; on multiple phenomena across multiple times, a single nominal phenomenon is established. As the Buddha said: 'The deer king of long ago was my present body.' Although the underlying five skandhas that perish in each kṣaṇa are real in substance, upon this continuity of multiple phenomena, a single sentient being is nominally established as remaining present to this day. > Third, the nominality of states (\*avasthāprajñapti\*): such as the conditioned factors not associated with mind (\*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra\*). Being natures of states, they are all nominal. They are established upon a single phenomenon at a single time: just as upon a single piece of matter (rūpa), it is called defiled (sāsrava), visible (sanidarśana), possessing resistance (sapratigha), and also called rūpa, and so on; all these are nominal designations upon a single phenomenon. If they were real, they would entail multiple substances. Indignation, resentment, and so on are all subsumed under this nominality. Citta, caittas, and rūpa are produced from seeds that are causes and conditions; hence they are said to be real. > > Furthermore, the three natures are precisely one nature, and the one nature is precisely no-nature. Why? The imagined is without characteristic; the other-dependent is without arising; the consummate is without nature. The \*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra\* says: 'A person with cataracts is like the imagined; appearing as blue or yellow is like the other-dependent; a pure eye is like the consummate.' The \*Mahāyānasaṃgraha\* says: 'The discriminated nature is like a snake; the other-dependent nature is like a vine. If someone attends to the characteristics of the four particles and analyzes this vine, they see only four characteristics and see no separate vine, because there are only the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and touch. The vine is not really existent, for apart from the four particles, there is no other vine.' Therefore, the śāstra verse says: > 'Upon a vine, the cognition of a snake arises; > Seeing the vine, the object is gone. > If one already knows the parts of the vine, > The cognition of the vine is like the cognition of the snake.' > If one knows that the nature and parts of the vine are empty, it is just like falsely giving rise to the idea of a snake on a vine. > > The \*Mahāyānasaṃgraha\* says: 'A bodhisattva does not see external particles; seeing only the discrimination of mental discourse, they immediately comprehend the other-dependent nature. How do they comprehend it? If this phenomenon were apart from causes and conditions, it could not arise by itself. Sense organs and sense objects are its causes and conditions; since sense organs and sense objects are not established, this phenomenon has no causes and conditions—how could it arise? Relying on the first true contemplation, one enters the other-dependent nature. By means of the second true contemplation, one removes the other-dependent nature; then the idea of consciousness-only ceases, and the manifestations of mental discourse and discrimination—resembling all objects heard and contemplated, up to resembling the very idea of consciousness-only—are all unable to arise. The conditions for arising are two: namely, the discriminated nature and the other-dependent nature. The discriminated nature having already ceased, the other-dependent nature again cannot arise. Since both objects are absent, all objects, up to the resemblance of the idea of consciousness-only, cannot arise. If even the idea of consciousness-only cannot arise, how much less could the remaining mental discourse and discrimination arise! Where does the bodhisattva abide? They abide solely in non-discrimination, equal and impartial among all names and referents. Furthermore, relying on two kinds of equality: namely, the grasper and the grasped. The grasper is non-discriminative cognition; because cognition is non-discriminative, it is called equal. The grasped is the realm of tathatā; the realm is also non-discriminative, so it is called equal. Furthermore, this realm and cognition do not abide in the sense of grasper and grasped, just like empty space; therefore it is said to be equal and impartial.' Because of this principle, the bodhisattva is able to enter the true nature. This stage cannot be spoken of, for it is self-signified, and at the time of realization it is free from vitarka, vicāra, reflective thought, and discrimination. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 59.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.59.26) - [Next: 59.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.59.28) - [Up: 59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.59) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.59.27) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.59.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.59.27) · Pramāṇa