[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › 62.21 # 宗鏡錄 62.21 宗鏡錄 62.21 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [62.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.21) 答。餘四識是喻依。各有不親緣離自識法。是喻體。今取喻體。不取喻依。亦如聲。無常宗。同喻如瓶。不應分別聲瓶有異。但取聲瓶各有無常義。相似。為因等也。第二以理成立第六。兼闇成立七八二識者。量云。極成餘識是有法。亦不親緣離自識法。宗因云。是識性故。同喻如極成五識。釋云。宗前陳言極成。亦簡不極成。若不言極成。犯自他一分所別不極成過。若言六七八識為有法。他不許七八二識。即犯他一分所別不極成過。若但立意識為有法。因中便犯不定過。被他將七八二識為異喻。量犯共中自不定過。今但總言餘。別取第六。意兼七八。即闇成立。攝取七八。於餘識之中。後陳言。亦不親緣離自識法者。亦者。同也。同前極成五識。不親緣離自識諸法。因云。是識性故者。即同五識是識性。故喻如極成五識者。即同五識。亦不親緣離自識故。明知即親緣不離自識法。既成立已。故知一切親所緣緣境。皆不離心。是唯識義。所以唯識論云。餘識。識故。如眼識等。亦不親緣離自諸法。第三以理成立前六識親所緣緣相分。皆歸心體。所言心體者。即自證分也。然雖見分。亦依自證而轉。今但立相分者。以見分共許故。量云。六識親所緣緣。是有法。定不離六識體。宗因云。見相二分中隨一攝故。如彼能緣見分。小乘許見分不離心體故。取為同喻。所以唯識論云。此親所緣緣。定非離此。二隨一故。如彼能緣。第四道理成立一切疎所緣緣境。皆不離心。是其唯識。即第八識相分。望前六名疎所緣緣。以小乘不許第八故。但云疎所緣緣也。量云。一切隨自識所緣。是有法。決定。不離我之能緣心及心所。宗因云。以是所緣法故。同喻如相應法。釋曰。此量後陳言。定不離我之能緣者。謂一切有為無為。但所緣之法。定不離我之能緣識。若後陳不言我之能緣者。便犯一分相扶之失。謂小乘。亦許他心智所緣之境。不離能緣心故。為簡此相扶過。遂言我之能緣。即簡他之能緣也。同喻如相應法者。即是前來已成立親相分是也。皆所緣法故。所以唯識論云。所緣。法故。如相應法。決定不離心及心所。是以我法非有。空識非無。離有離無。正契中道。由此慈尊。說中道二頌云。虛妄分別有。於此二都無。此中唯有空。於彼亦有此。故說一切法。非空非不空。有無及有故。是則契中道。言虛妄分別有者。即有三界虛妄分別心。言於此二都無者。謂無能取所取我法二執之相。於此妄心之上都無。言此中唯有空者。謂此妄心中。唯有真如。此是空性。依空所顯故。言於彼亦有此者。彼者。彼空性中。亦有此者。亦有此妄分別識。即虛妄分別。是世俗諦故。於此俗諦中。亦有真諦之空性也。言故說一切法者。即有為無為二法。是一切法也。言非空非不空者。非空。謂虛妄分別心。及空性。即依圓是有。故名非空。以二諦有故。非不空者。謂能取所取我法二執之相是空。即遍計性也。言有無及有故者。有。謂虛妄分別有故。無。謂二取我法無故。及有故者。謂於妄分別中有真空故。於真空中亦有妄分別故。言是則契中道者。謂非一向空。如清辯等。非一向有。如小乘等。故名中道。謂二諦有。不同清辯。二取我法無。不同小乘。故名中道。又阿毘達磨經說。菩薩成就四智。能隨悟入唯識無境。即是地前小菩薩。雖未證唯識之理。而依佛說。及見地上菩薩。成就四般唯識之智。遂入有漏觀。觀彼十地菩薩所變大地為黃。金攪長河為酥酪。化肉山魚米等事。此小菩薩入觀觀已。即云。如是所變實金銀等。皆不離十地菩薩能變之心。更無外境。既作觀已。亦能隨順悟入真唯識理。又如勝論祖師。為守六句義故。變身為大石。此有實用。若定實境者。不應隨心變身境為石。 > Answer: The other four consciousnesses are the basis of the example (dṛṣṭāntāśraya). That each does not directly cognize things separate from its own consciousness is the substance of the example (dṛṣṭānta-svabhāva). Here we take the substance of the example, not the basis of the example. It is also like the thesis 'sound is impermanent', where the concordant example is 'like a pot': one should not distinguish between sound and pot as different, but merely take the fact that sound and pot each have the meaning of impermanence as being similar, which serves as the reason, and so forth. > > Second, establishing the sixth consciousness through reasoning while implicitly establishing the seventh and eighth consciousnesses: The syllogism runs: 'Widely accepted other consciousnesses (subject/pakṣa) also do not directly cognize things separate from their own consciousness (predicate/sādhya); because of being of the nature of consciousness (reason/hetu); like the widely accepted five consciousnesses (concordant example/dṛṣṭānta).' > > Explanation: In the subject term of the thesis, stating 'widely accepted' also excludes what is not widely accepted. If one did not say 'widely accepted', it would commit the fallacy of a partially unaccepted subject for oneself or the opponent. If one stated the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses as the subject, since the opponent does not accept the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, it would commit the fallacy of a partially unaccepted subject for the opponent. If one only established the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) as the subject, the reason would then commit the fallacy of being inconclusive (aniyata), for the opponent would take the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as contrary examples, and the inference would commit the fallacy of being inconclusive in common to oneself. Now, by merely stating 'other' in general, one specifically takes the sixth while intending to include the seventh and eighth, thus implicitly establishing and subsuming the seventh and eighth within 'other consciousnesses'. > > In the predicate term, stating 'also do not directly cognize things separate from their own consciousness': 'also' means 'the same'—the same as the aforementioned widely accepted five consciousnesses not directly cognizing things separate from their own consciousness. In the reason, stating 'because of being of the nature of consciousness' means being the same as the five consciousnesses in having the nature of consciousness. In the example, stating 'like the widely accepted five consciousnesses' means being the same as the five consciousnesses in likewise not directly cognizing \[things\] separate from themselves. Thus we clearly know that they directly cognize things not separate from their own consciousness. Since this has been established, we know that all objects as direct objective conditions (pratyakṣālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta; this is the meaning of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā). Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Other consciousnesses, because of being consciousness, like the eye consciousness and so forth, also do not directly cognize things separate from themselves.' > > Third, establishing through reasoning that the nimittabhāgas of the direct objective conditions of the first six consciousnesses all resolve into the substance of citta: What is called the substance of citta is the self-verifying division (svasaṃvittibhāga). Although the darśanabhāga also operates in dependence on the self-verifying division, here we establish only the nimittabhāga because the darśanabhāga is mutually accepted. The syllogism runs: 'The direct objective conditions of the six consciousnesses (subject) definitely are not separate from the substance of the six consciousnesses (predicate); because of being subsumed under either one between the darśana and nimitta divisions (reason); like that cognizing darśanabhāga (concordant example).' > > Since the Hīnayāna accepts that the darśanabhāga is not separate from the substance of citta, it is taken as the concordant example. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'This direct objective condition is definitely not separate from this \[citta\], because of being one of the two, like that cognizer.' > > Fourth, establishing through principle that all objects as remote objective conditions (adhipaty-ālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta, which is consciousness-only: namely, the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, in relation to the first six, is called a remote objective condition. Because the Hīnayāna does not accept the eighth consciousness, it is simply called a remote objective condition. The syllogism runs: 'All objects cognized in accordance with one's own consciousness (subject) definitely are not separate from my cognizing citta and caittas (predicate); because of being an objectified phenomenon (reason); like associated phenomena (concordant example).' > > Explanation: In this syllogism's predicate term, stating 'definitely are not separate from my cognizing \[citta\]' means that all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, as long as they are objectified phenomena, definitely are not separate from my cognizing consciousness. If the predicate did not say 'my cognizing \[citta\]', it would commit the flaw of partial triviality (siddhasādhana), because the Hīnayāna also accepts that the object cognized by the knowledge of others' minds (paracittajñāna) is not separate from the cognizing citta. To eliminate this fallacy of triviality, one therefore says 'my cognizing \[citta\]', which excludes the cognizing \[citta\] of others. Stating 'like associated phenomena' as the concordant example refers to the direct nimittabhāgas already established previously, because they are all objectified phenomena. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Being an objectified phenomenon, like associated phenomena, it is definitely not separate from citta and caittas.' > > Therefore, self and dharmas are not existent, while emptiness and consciousness are not non-existent. Being free from existence and free from non-existence precisely accords with the Middle Way. Hence the Benevolent Lord \[Maitreya\] spoke two verses on the Middle Way: > > 'False discrimination exists; > In it, both do not exist at all. > Herein there is only emptiness; > In that, this also exists. > > Therefore all phenomena are said to be > Neither empty nor non-empty; > Because of existence, non-existence, and existence, > This accords with the Middle Way.' > > 'False discrimination exists' means that there is the false discriminating citta of the three realms. 'In it, both do not exist at all' means that the characteristics of the dual grasping at subject and object—self and dharmas—do not exist at all upon this false citta. 'Herein there is only emptiness' means that within this false citta there is only tathatā; this is the nature of emptiness, because it is revealed based on emptiness. 'In that, this also exists' means that in that nature of emptiness, this also exists—there is also this false discriminating consciousness; for false discrimination is conventional truth, and within this conventional truth there is also the nature of emptiness of the ultimate truth. 'Therefore all phenomena are said to be' refers to the two kinds of phenomena, conditioned and unconditioned, which constitute all phenomena. 'Neither empty nor non-empty': 'neither empty' refers to the false discriminating citta and the nature of emptiness—that is, the dependent (paratantra) and consummate (pariniṣpanna) natures are existent, hence termed 'neither empty', because both truths exist. 'Nor non-empty' means that the characteristics of the dual grasping at subject and object—self and dharmas—are empty, which is the imaginary nature (parikalpita). 'Because of existence, non-existence, and existence': 'existence' is because false discrimination exists; 'non-existence' is because the dual grasping at self and dharmas does not exist; 'and existence' means that within false discrimination there is true emptiness, and within true emptiness there is also false discrimination. 'This accords with the Middle Way' means that it is not solely empty like Bhāviveka and others, nor solely existent like the Hīnayāna and others; hence it is called the Middle Way. That both truths exist is unlike Bhāviveka; that the dual grasping at self and dharmas is non-existent is unlike the Hīnayāna; hence it is called the Middle Way. > > Furthermore, the Abhidharmasūtra states that when a bodhisattva accomplishes four kinds of knowledge, he can accordingly awaken to and enter consciousness-only without external objects. That is, a minor bodhisattva before the bhūmis, though he has not yet realized the principle of consciousness-only, relies on the Buddha's teaching and observes the bodhisattvas on the bhūmis accomplishing four kinds of consciousness-only knowledge, and thereupon enters an impure (sāsrava) contemplation. He contemplates the deeds of those bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis transforming the great earth into gold, churning great rivers into ghee, and manifesting mountains of meat, fish, and rice. Having entered contemplation and observed this, this minor bodhisattva says: 'These transformed real gold, silver, and so forth are none of them separate from the transforming minds of the bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis; there are no external objects besides them.' Having performed this contemplation, he is also able accordingly to awaken to and enter the true principle of consciousness-only. Again, for example, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika, in order to preserve the six categories (padārtha), transformed his body into a great stone; this had real utility. If objects were definitely real, he should not have been able to transform his body and objects into stone in accordance with his mind. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 62.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.20) - [Next: 62.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.22) - [Up: 62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.21) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.7.493) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.21) · Pramāṇa