[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › 62.31 # 宗鏡錄 62.31 宗鏡錄 62.31 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [62.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.31) 答。且如緣空華等一切假境之時。心亦起故。何言緣無不生慮。故知緣無體假境時。不無內心實相分能牽生心。望見分。亦成所緣緣義。未有無心境。曾無無境心。又不違護法四分成唯識義。若離却內心實相分外。其構畫遍計執心之境即無。唐三藏云。應言境非真。慮起。證知唯有識。所以唯識論云。二無所緣識智。謂緣過未夢鏡像等。非實有境。識現可得。彼境既無。餘亦應爾。既若菩薩觀諸異生遍計所執之境。皆不離異生心者。明知餘一切實境。皆悉如是。第三自應無倒智者。即十地菩薩起智。觀察一切眾生妄執自身為常樂我淨。菩薩云。此但是凡夫執心倒見。離却妄執心外。其凡夫身上實無常樂我淨之境。必若有者。應異生不假修行而得解脫。既不爾者。明知唯有妄識。故唯識論云。三自應無倒智。謂愚夫智。若得實境。彼應自然成無顛倒。不由功用。應得解脫。第四隨三智轉智者。一隨自在者智轉智。即是菩薩起智。觀自所變之境。皆不離我能變之心。是其唯識。為八地已去菩薩。能任運變大地為黃金。攪長河為酥酪。此是境隨真智轉。所變事皆成。轉者。改換舊質義。即改轉大地山河舊質成金銀等。眾生實得受用。鍛鍊作諸器具皆得。若離心有外實境者。如何山河等。能隨菩薩心。便變為金銀等物。以相分本質。皆悉轉故。故知一切諸境。皆不離菩薩能變之心。乃至異生亦能變火為水。變晝為夜。點鐵成金等。此皆是境隨事智轉。所變事皆成。亦是唯識。若是迦多演那所變宮殿金銀等。皆不成就。故知離心更無實境。論云。凡變金銀宮殿者。是實定果色。從初地已去方能變。若約自在。八地已上菩薩。於相及土。皆得自在。以上品定心有大勢力。所變金銀宮殿等。皆得成就。如變金銀鍛鍊作諸器具。實得受用。其所變金銀。是實定果色。皆不離菩薩內心。是其唯識。心外無境。若諸聲聞及地前小菩薩。若變金銀宮殿時。即託菩薩所變金銀宮殿。以為本質。第六識所變金銀等。皆不成就。無實作用。然所變金銀。是假定果色。不離聲聞諸小菩薩內心。是其唯識。心外無境。今迦多演那緣是聲聞。未得上品定故。所變金銀雖無實作用。然不離內識。心外無境。所以唯識論云。一隨自在者智轉智。謂已證得心自在者。隨欲轉變。地等皆成。境。若是實。如何可變。又古德云。色自在心生故。心能變色。所以移山覆海。倒地翻天。攪長河為酥酪。變大地為黃金。悉無難事。二隨觀察者智轉智者。無性菩薩云。謂諸聲聞獨覺菩薩等。若修苦空等觀得相應者。或作四諦觀時。隨觀一法之上。唯有無常苦空無我等眾相顯然。非是諸法體上有此眾多苦空等義。但是苦空等眾相。即是諸法之體。既若無常相。於聖人觀心上有者。故知一切諸法。皆不離觀心而有。所以唯識論云。二隨觀察者智轉智。謂得勝定修法觀者。隨觀一境。眾相現前。境若是真寧隨心轉。三隨無分別智轉智者。為菩薩根本智證真如時。真如境與智冥合。能所一般。更無分別。離本智外。更無別境。即境隨真智轉。是故說唯心。汝小乘若執有心外實境者。即證真如時。一切境相何不現前。故唯識論云。三隨無分別。智轉智。謂現證實無分別智。一切境相。皆不現前。境若是實。何容不現。第二世事乖宗難。此是經部師難云。論主若言唯有內識無心外境者。如何現見世間。情與非情等物。有處定。時定。身不定。作用不定等。就此中自有四難。一處定難。二時定難。三身不定難。四作用不定難。初難云。論主若言一切皆是唯識無心外境者。且如世人將現量識。正緣南山處。其識與山俱在其南。山不離識。可言唯識。忽若將現量識緣比之時。其山定在南。且不隨緣者心轉來向北。既若緣北之時緣南山心不生者。明知離識之外有實南山之境。此何成唯識。第二時定難者。難云。若正緣南山時。識現起。山亦隨心起。即可成唯識義。且如不緣南山時。其緣山心即不生。然山且在。不隨心滅。即是離心有境。何成唯識義。此上二難。皆是難現量識。亦難比量。若約比量心者。即山相分。亦於餘處心上現故。第三有情身不定難者。難云。若言一切皆是唯識者。且如有眾多有情。同在一處。於中一半眼有患眩瞖者。或十或五。或有見空華。或有見頭髮。或有見蒼蠅。或有全不見物者。此等皆是病眼人自識變起。所變髮蠅等相分。皆不離患眩瞖者之心。可是唯識。且如一半不患眩瞖者。或十或五共在一處。所見一般。物皆同境。既是一者。明知離心有境。何成唯識。 > Answer: Take, for example, the time when one grasps all nominal objects such as flowers in the sky; the mind still arises. Why say that grasping nothing, thought does not arise? Hence we know that when grasping nominal objects that lack substance, it is not that there is no real nimittabhāga of the internal mind capable of inducing the arising of mind. In relation to the darśanabhāga, it also fulfills the meaning of an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). There has never been an object without a mind, nor has there ever been a mind without an object. Furthermore, it does not contradict Dharmapāla's four divisions establishing the meaning of consciousness-only. If one sets aside the real nimittabhāga of the internal mind, the object of that conceptualizing, fully conceptualized grasping mind would simply not exist. The Tang Tripiṭaka Master said: 'One should say that the object is not real, yet thought arises; this proves that there is only consciousness.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Second, the cognition of consciousness without an objective referent: grasping the past, future, dreams, mirror images, and so forth, which are not really existent objects, consciousness is seen to be obtainable. Since those objects do not exist, the rest should also be like this.' Since the bodhisattva observes that the fully conceptualized objects grasped by all ordinary beings are all not separate from the ordinary beings' minds, one clearly knows that all other real objects are all completely like this. Third, the cognition that \[ordinary beings\] should naturally be non-deluded (svayam-aviparyāsa-jñāna): this refers to a bodhisattva of the ten grounds giving rise to cognition to observe that all sentient beings falsely grasp their own bodies as permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure. The bodhisattva says: 'This is merely the grasping mind and inverted views of ordinary beings; setting aside the falsely grasping mind, there is truly no object of permanence, pleasure, self, and purity upon an ordinary being's body. If it were truly there, then ordinary beings should attain liberation without relying on cultivation. Since that is not so, one clearly knows there is only false consciousness.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Third, the cognition that \[ordinary beings\] should naturally be non-deluded: if the cognition of fools were to obtain real objects, they should naturally become free of inversion without relying on effort, and should attain liberation.' Fourth, the cognition of conforming to the transformation of the three cognitions (trijñāna-parivṛtti-jñāna): First, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the master of sovereignty: this refers to a bodhisattva giving rise to cognition to observe that the objects transformed by oneself are all not separate from one's own transforming mind; this is their consciousness-only. For bodhisattvas from the eighth ground onward, they are able spontaneously to transform the great earth into yellow gold and churn the long rivers into clarified butter. This is the object conforming to the transformation of true cognition; the transformed phenomena all succeed. 'Transformation' means the sense of changing the old substance; that is, altering and transforming the old substance of the great earth, mountains, and rivers into gold, silver, and the like, so that sentient beings truly obtain their use, and forging them into various utensils is fully possible. If there were real external objects separate from the mind, how could mountains, rivers, and the like conform to the bodhisattva's mind and immediately transform into things like gold and silver? Because the nimittabhāga and the underlying substance (vastu) are all transformed. Hence we know that all objects are not separate from the bodhisattva's transforming mind. Even ordinary beings can also transform fire into water, transform day into night, touch iron to make gold, and so forth; these are all objects conforming to the transformation of phenomenal cognition, and the transformed phenomena all succeed; this is also consciousness-only. If it were the palaces, gold, and silver transformed by Kātyāyana, none of them succeed; therefore we know that separate from the mind there are no real objects. The treatise says: 'Generally, transformed gold, silver, and palaces are real matter resulting from samādhi (samādhija-rūpa); only from the first ground onward can one transform them. In terms of sovereignty, bodhisattvas from the eighth ground and above attain sovereignty over both characteristics and lands. Because the superior samādhi mind possesses great power, the transformed gold, silver, palaces, and the like all succeed. Just like transforming gold and silver and forging them into various utensils, one truly obtains their use. The transformed gold and silver are real matter resulting from samādhi, and none are separate from the bodhisattva's internal mind; this is their consciousness-only, and there are no objects outside the mind. If the śrāvakas and lesser bodhisattvas before the grounds transform gold, silver, and palaces, they rely on the gold, silver, and palaces transformed by bodhisattvas as the underlying substance; the gold, silver, and so forth transformed by their sixth consciousness do not succeed and have no real function. However, the transformed gold and silver are nominal matter resulting from samādhi, not separate from the internal minds of the śrāvakas and lesser bodhisattvas; this is their consciousness-only, and there are no objects outside the mind. Now, because Kātyāyana is a śrāvaka and has not attained superior samādhi, the gold and silver he transforms, though lacking real function, are nevertheless not separate from internal consciousness; there are no objects outside the mind.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'First, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the master of sovereignty: those who have already realized sovereignty of mind, whatever they wish to transform—earth and so forth—all succeeds. If the objects were real, how could they be transformed?' Also, an ancient virtuous one said: 'Because matter is born from the sovereign mind, the mind can transform matter. Therefore, moving mountains and overturning oceans, upending the earth and flipping heaven, churning long rivers into clarified butter, and transforming the great earth into yellow gold are all without difficulty.' Second, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the observer: Bodhisattva Asvabhāva said: 'This means that when śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and the like cultivate the contemplations of suffering, emptiness, and so on and attain correspondence, or when cultivating the contemplation of the four truths, in conforming to the contemplation of any single dharma, only numerous characteristics such as impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self are distinctly manifest. It is not that upon the substance of dharmas there exist these numerous meanings of suffering, emptiness, and so forth; rather, the numerous characteristics of suffering, emptiness, and so on are simply the substance of the dharmas. Since the characteristic of impermanence exists upon the holy person's contemplating mind, we therefore know that all dharmas exist not separate from the contemplating mind.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Second, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the observer: those who have attained superior samādhi and cultivate the contemplation of dharmas, in conforming to the contemplation of a single object, numerous characteristics present themselves. If the object were real, how could it conform to the mind's transformation?' Third, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpaka-jñāna): when the bodhisattva's fundamental cognition realizes tathatā, the object of tathatā and the cognition merge in unison; subject and object are identical, and there is no further differentiation. Separate from the fundamental cognition, there is no distinct object; that is, the object conforms to the transformation of true cognition, and therefore it is said to be citta-only. If you of the Hīnayāna grasp that there are real objects outside the mind, then when realizing tathatā, why do all objective characteristics not present themselves? Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Third, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by non-conceptual cognition: when directly realizing the real non-conceptual cognition, all objective characteristics do not present themselves. If the objects were real, how could they fail to appear?' Second, the objection regarding worldly matters contradicting the doctrine: this is the Sautrāntika master's objection, which says: 'If the treatise master says that there is only internal consciousness and no objects outside the mind, how is it that we directly see in the world that sentient and insentient things have determination of place, determination of time, indeterminacy of person, and indeterminacy of function, and so forth?' Within this, there are naturally four objections: first, the objection regarding determination of place; second, the objection regarding determination of time; third, the objection regarding indeterminacy of person; fourth, the objection regarding indeterminacy of function. The first objection says: 'If the treatise master says that everything is consciousness-only and there are no objects outside the mind, consider how when a worldly person uses direct perception consciousness to directly grasp the Southern Mountain, that consciousness and the mountain are together in the south; the mountain is not separate from consciousness, and one could say it is consciousness-only. But if one suddenly uses direct perception consciousness to grasp the north, that mountain remains determined in the south, and certainly does not conform to the grasper's mind to turn and face north. Since when one grasps the north, the mind grasping the Southern Mountain does not arise, one clearly knows that separate from consciousness there is a real object of the Southern Mountain. How does this constitute consciousness-only?' The second objection regarding determination of time: the objection says: 'If when directly grasping the Southern Mountain, consciousness manifests and the mountain also arises in accordance with the mind, then that could establish the meaning of consciousness-only. But when one is not grasping the Southern Mountain, that mind grasping the mountain does not arise, yet the mountain still exists and does not perish along with the mind. That means there is an object separate from the mind; how does this establish the meaning of consciousness-only?' These two objections above both challenge direct perception consciousness, and also challenge inference. If evaluated by the inferential mind, the nimittabhāga of the mountain also manifests upon the mind elsewhere. The third objection regarding the indeterminacy of sentient beings' persons: the objection says: 'If it is said that everything is consciousness-only, suppose there are many sentient beings together in one place, among whom half suffer from cataracts or eye disease—say, ten or five of them—some seeing flowers in the sky, some seeing hairs, some seeing flies, and some seeing nothing at all. These are all transformed and arisen from the diseased-eyed persons' own consciousness; the nimittabhāgas of hairs, flies, and so forth that are transformed are all not separate from the minds of those suffering from cataracts, and this could be consciousness-only. But consider the other half who do not suffer from cataracts—say, ten or five together in the same place—what they see is identical, and things all share the same objective realm. Since it is singular, we clearly know there is an object separate from the mind; how does this establish consciousness-only?' > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 62.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.30) - [Next: 62.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.32) - [Up: 62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.31) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.31) · Pramāṇa