[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › 84.2 # 宗鏡錄 84.2 宗鏡錄 84.2 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [84.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84.2) 夫妄心虛假。諸聖同推。此執堅牢。故須具引。又約經論。有三種假。一因成假。因前境對。方乃生心。二相續假。初心因境。後起分別。念念相續。乃至成事。三相待假。如待虛空無生。說心有生。又計於有心待於無心。如短待長。似近待遠。此三非實。故稱為假。所以異相互無。如中觀論偈云。異中無異相。不異中亦無。無有異相故。則無彼此異。如長與短異。長中無短相。長無可對。故無有長。短中無長相。短無可對。故無有短。長中無長相。短無可對。故無有短。短中無短相。長無可對。故無有長。既無長短。孰言異耶。又百論云。若實有長相。若長中有。若短中有。若共中有。是皆不可得。何以故。長中無長相。以因他故。因短為長故。短中亦無長相。性相違故。若短中有長。不名為短。共中亦無長。二俱過故。長相既無。短相亦爾。若無長短。云何相待。故遮異言不異。非謂有無異。此雙絕以契性。若約雙顯者。謂上但顯實。則唯性而非異。今性相皆具。故云雙顯。謂由體一故非異。相差別故非不異。此舉雙是以顯雙非。斯乃非一非異。而一而異。遮照無礙。性相融通。長短既然。萬法皆爾。若以初心破此三假。一念無生。得入空觀。夫空觀者。乃一切觀之根本。從此次入假觀。因不得假而入空。復不得空而入假。以非空非假。後入中觀。乃至絕觀。所以止觀廣破。四句檢而不得。橫竪推而無生。性相俱空。名字亦寂。若一念心起即具三假。當觀此一念心。若心自生者。前念為根。後念為識。為從根生心。為從識生心。若根能生識。根為有識故生識。根為無識故生識。根若有識。根識則並。又無能生所生。根。若無識而能生識。諸無識物。不能生識。根既無識。何能生識。根雖無識而有識性。故能生識者。此之識性。是有是無。有已是識。並在於根。何謂為性。根無識性。不能生識。又識性與識。為一為異。若一性即是識。無能無所。若異。還是他生。非心自生。若言心不自生。塵來發心故有心生。引經云。有緣思生。無緣思不生。若爾。塵在意外來發內識。則心由他生。今推此塵。為是心故生心。為非心故生心。塵若是心。則不名塵。亦非意外。則同自生。又二心並。則無能所。塵若非心。那能生心。如前破。若塵中有生性。是故生心。此性為有為無。性若是有。性與塵並。亦無。能所。若無。無不能生。若根塵合故有心生者。根塵各各有心故合生心。各各無心故合生。心若各各有。有合則兩心生。墮在他性中。若各各無。合時亦無。又根塵各有心性。合則心生者。當檢此性。為有為無。如前破。若根塵各離而有心者。此是無因緣生。為有此離。為無此離。若有此離。還從緣生。何謂為離。若無此離。無何能生。若言此離有生性。為有為無。若性是有。還從緣生。不名為離。若性是無。無何能生。如是四句推求知心畢竟不生。是名從假入空觀。若不悟者。轉入相續假破之。何以故。雖因成假。四破不得心生。今現見心。念念生滅。相續不斷。何謂不生。此之念念。為當前念滅後念生。為前念不滅後念生。為前念亦滅亦不滅後念生。為前念非滅非不滅後念生。若前念不滅後念生。此則念自生念。兩生相並。亦無能所。若前念有生性生於後念。此性為有為無。有則非性。無則不生。如前破。若前念滅後念生者。前不滅生。名為自性。今由滅生。不滅。望滅豈非他性。他性滅中。有生故生。無生故生。有生是生。生滅相違。乃至生生何謂滅生。若滅無生。無何能生。若滅有生性性。破如前。若前念亦滅亦不滅後念生者。若滅已屬滅。若不滅已屬不滅。若不滅合滅能生。即是共生。共自相違。相違何能生。又若各有生。即有二過。各各無生。合亦不生。若滅不滅中有生性者。為有為無。若性定有。何謂滅不滅。若性定無。亦何為謂滅不滅。此不免斷常之失。還墮共過。若前念非滅非不滅而後念生者。為有此非滅非不滅。為無此非滅非不滅。若有。則非無因。若無。無因不能生。若無因有生性。此性即因。何謂無因。若無。無不能生。如是四句推相續假求心不得。無四實性。但有心名字。是字不住內外兩中間。不常自有。相續無性。即世諦破性。名為性空。相續無名。即真諦破假。名為相空。性相俱空。乃至作十八空。若不得入者。猶計有心待於無心。相待惑起。此與上異。因成假。取根塵兩法和合為因。相續假。竪取意根前後為相續。竪望生滅。此是別滅。別滅則狹。今相待假待於通滅。此義則寬。通滅者。如三無為。不併是滅。而得是無生。待虛空無生而說心生。即是相待假。今檢此心。為待無生心生。為待有心生。為待亦生亦無生而心生。為待非生非無生而心生。若待無生而生心者。有此無生。無此無生。若有生可待。還是待有。何謂待無。有有相待。即是自生。若無此無生。無何所待。若只待此無無而生心者。一切無無亦應生心。無望於有。無即是他生。又無生雖無。而有生性。待此性故而知有心。此性為已生。為未生。若已生。生即是於生。何謂為性。性若未生。未生何能生。若待生而心生者。生還待生。長應待長。既無此義。何待心生。若待生無生故有心生。如待短得有於長。此墮二過。各有。則二生並。各無。生全不可得。如前破。若待非生非無生而有心生者。論云。從因緣生尚不可得。何況無因緣。又此無因。為有為無。若有還是待有。若無還是待無。何謂無因。若言有性。性為有為無。性若是有。為生非生。若生已是生。何謂為性。若無生云何能生。如是四句推相待假求心不得。不起性實。但有名字。名字之生。生則無生。復次性相中求陰入界不可得。即是法空。性相求人我知見不可得。名眾生空。乃至十八空等。輔行記釋。因成假。初破自生中云。前念為根。後念為識者。根無別體。還指無間滅意為體。根名能生。由前意滅。生後意識。故俱舍論云。由即六識身無間滅為意。身者。體也。無間滅時。為意根體。爾時五識。亦依無間滅意以為親緣。用五色根以為疎緣。而生五識。五識無間。分別生時。即名意識。今此文意。不是五識。是第六識。緣於。有見以為法塵。即名為識。即以此識對根研責。故云根為有識故生識。根為無識故生識。 > Now, that the deluded mind is illusory and provisional is equally deduced by all the sages. Because this attachment is stubborn and solid, one must cite \[the teachings\] in detail. Furthermore, according to the sūtras and treatises, there are three kinds of provisionality: First is the provisionality of causal formation: depending on confrontation with an objective realm beforehand, the mind then arises. Second is the provisionality of continuity: the initial thought arises dependent on the realm, subsequent discriminations arise, thought-moment by thought-moment in unbroken succession, until an affair is accomplished. Third is the provisionality of relativity: as in speaking of the mind having arising in contrast to the unarisen nature of empty space; or positing an existent mind in contrast to a non-existent mind, like short relative to long, or near relative to far. These three are not real, hence they are called provisional. Therefore, mutually different characteristics do not exist in one another. As a verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "In difference there is no characteristic of difference; nor is there one in non-difference. Because there is no characteristic of difference, there is no difference between this and that." For instance, long differs from short: within long there is no characteristic of short; long has nothing to contrast with, so there is no long. Within short there is no characteristic of long; short has nothing to contrast with, so there is no short. Within long there is no characteristic of long; short has nothing to contrast with, so there is no short. Within short there is no characteristic of short; long has nothing to contrast with, so there is no long. Since neither long nor short exists, who speaks of difference? Furthermore, the Śataśāstra says: "If there were really a characteristic of long, it would either exist in the long, or exist in the short, or exist in both together; all of these are unfindable. Why? Within the long there is no characteristic of long, because it is caused by the other—because it is long caused by the short. Within the short there is also no characteristic of long, because their natures are mutually contradictory. If there were long within the short, it would not be called short. Nor is there long within both together, because both have faults. Since the characteristic of long does not exist, the characteristic of short is likewise. If there is neither long nor short, how can they be relative to one another?" Therefore, refuting difference is called "non-difference"; it does not mean there is difference or non-difference. This doubly extinguishes \[extremes\] to tally with nature. If analyzed in terms of "dual manifestation": the above merely manifested reality, which is purely nature and not difference; now both nature and characteristics are complete, hence it is called "dual manifestation." That is, because substance is one, it is not different; because characteristics are differentiated, it is not non-different. This raises both affirmations to manifest both negations. This is precisely neither one nor different, yet both one and different; refutation and illumination are unhindered, nature and characteristics interpenetrate. Long and short being so, the myriad phenomena are all likewise. If one uses the initial mind to refute these three provisionalities, a single thought is unarisen, and one gains entry into the contemplation of emptiness. Contemplation of emptiness is the root of all contemplations. From this, one next enters the contemplation of the provisional: through being unable to grasp the provisional, one enters emptiness; again, through being unable to grasp emptiness, one enters the provisional. Being neither empty nor provisional, one subsequently enters the contemplation of the middle, up to transcending contemplation. Therefore, the Śamatha-vipaśyanā broadly refutes \[it\]: examining by the four propositions, it is unfindable; deducing horizontally and vertically, there is no arising; nature and characteristics are both empty, and names and words are also tranquil. If an arising thought-moment contains these three provisionalities, one should contemplate this single thought-moment: If the mind arises from itself: the preceding thought-moment is the faculty, and the subsequent thought-moment is consciousness; does the mind arise from the faculty, or does the mind arise from consciousness? If the faculty can produce consciousness: does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness, or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness? If the faculty had consciousness, then faculty and consciousness would coexist simultaneously, and furthermore there would be no producer and produced. If the faculty lacked consciousness yet could produce consciousness, all things without consciousness cannot produce consciousness; since the faculty lacks consciousness, how could it produce consciousness? If \[one argues that\] although the faculty lacks consciousness, it possesses the nature of consciousness and thus can produce consciousness: does this nature of consciousness exist or not exist? If it exists, it is already consciousness, coexisting in the faculty; why call it a nature? If the faculty lacks the nature of consciousness, it cannot produce consciousness. Furthermore, are the nature of consciousness and consciousness one or different? If one, the nature is consciousness itself, without producer or produced. If different, it is still arising from another, not the mind arising from itself. If one says that the mind does not arise from itself, but that dust arrives to arouse the mind and thus the mind arises, citing the sūtra: "With conditions, thought arises; without conditions, thought does not arise"—if so, the dust is outside the mind and comes to arouse internal consciousness, then the mind arises from another. Now deduce this dust: does it produce mind because it is mind, or does it produce mind because it is not mind? If the dust were mind, it would not be called dust, nor would it be outside the mind, and so it would be the same as arising from self; moreover, two minds would coexist, so there would be no producer and produced. If the dust is not mind, how could it produce mind? As refuted above. If there is a productive nature within dust and therefore it produces mind: does this nature exist or not exist? If the nature exists, the nature and dust coexist, and likewise there is no producer and produced. If it does not exist, non-existence cannot produce. If mind arises because faculty and dust combine: does the combination produce mind because faculty and dust each have mind, or does the combination produce mind because they each lack mind? If they each had mind, then when combined two minds would arise, falling into "nature of another." If they each lacked it, when combined it would also not exist. Furthermore, if faculty and dust each have the nature of mind and upon combining the mind arises: one should examine this nature, whether it exists or not, as refuted before. If mind exists through faculty and dust being separate: this is arising without cause and condition; does this separation exist, or does this separation not exist? If this separation exists, it still arises from conditions; how can it be called separation? If this separation does not exist, how can non-existence produce? If one says that this separation has a productive nature: does it exist or not exist? If the nature exists, it still arises from conditions and is not called separation. If the nature does not exist, how can non-existence produce? Deductions through such four propositions reveal that mind is ultimately unarisen. This is called the contemplation of entering emptiness from the provisional. If one does not awaken, one turns to enter the provisionality of continuity to refute it. Why? Although through the provisionality of causal formation the mind's arising is unfindable under the fourfold refutation, now one manifestly sees the mind arising and ceasing thought-moment by thought-moment in unbroken succession; how could it be unarisen? Regarding these thought-moments: does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment ceases, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment does not cease, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment both ceases and does not cease, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment neither ceases nor does not cease? If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment does not cease, then a thought-moment produces a thought-moment by itself, two arisings coexist, and there is also no producer and produced. If the preceding thought-moment has a productive nature that produces the subsequent thought-moment: does this nature exist or not exist? If it exists, it is not a nature; if it does not exist, it does not produce, as refuted before. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment ceases: non-ceasing producing is called self-nature; now, producing due to cessation—when non-ceasing is viewed in contrast to cessation, is it not the nature of another? Within the cessation of the nature of another, does it arise because there is arising, or does it arise because there is no arising? If there is arising, that is arising; arising and cessation are mutually contradictory, and furthermore if arising produces arising, why speak of cessation producing? If cessation has no arising, how can non-existence produce? If cessation has a productive nature, this nature is refuted as before. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment both ceases and does not cease: what ceases already belongs to cessation, and what does not cease already belongs to non-cessation. If non-cessation combined with cessation can produce, that is production from both; both are mutually contradictory, and how can contradictory things produce? Furthermore, if each has production, there are two faults; if each has no production, combined they also do not produce. If there is a productive nature within both cessation and non-cessation: does it exist or not exist? If the nature definitely exists, why speak of cessation and non-cessation? If the nature definitely does not exist, why speak of cessation and non-cessation? This does not avoid the fault of annihilation or permanence, and falls back into the fault of both. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment neither ceases nor does not cease: does this neither-cessation-nor-non-cessation exist or not exist? If it exists, it is not causeless. If it does not exist, a causeless non-existence cannot produce. If causelessness has a productive nature, this nature is itself a cause; why call it causeless? If it does not exist, non-existence cannot produce. Deductions through such four propositions in search of the mind in the provisionality of continuity find nothing; there are no four real natures, but merely the name "mind." This word abides neither inside, outside, nor between the two; it does not eternally exist by itself. Continuity lacking nature is the refutation of nature in conventional truth, called emptiness of nature. Continuity lacking name is the refutation of the provisional in ultimate truth, called emptiness of characteristics. Nature and characteristics are both empty, extending to the formation of the eighteen emptinesses. If one cannot enter, one still posits an existent mind in contrast to a non-existent mind, and the delusion of relativity arises. This differs from the above. The provisionality of causal formation takes the two dharmas of faculty and dust combining as the cause. The provisionality of continuity vertically takes the mental faculty's before and after as continuity, vertically contemplating arising and cessation; this is distinct cessation, and distinct cessation is narrow. Now, the provisionality of relativity contrasts with universal cessation, so this meaning is broad. As for universal cessation: like the three unconditioned states, they are not altogether cessation, yet they can be unarisen. Speaking of the arising of mind in contrast to the unarisen state of empty space is precisely the provisionality of relativity. Now examine this mind: does the mind arise in contrast to the unarisen, does the mind arise in contrast to the existent, does the mind arise in contrast to both arising and unarisen, or does the mind arise in contrast to neither arising nor unarisen? If the mind arises in contrast to the unarisen: does this unarisen exist, or does this unarisen not exist? If there is an arising to be contrasted with, it is still contrasting with existence; why speak of contrasting with non-existence? Existence contrasting with existence is arising from self. If this unarisen does not exist, what does non-existence contrast with? If the mind arises merely by contrasting with this non-existent non-existence, all non-existent non-existences should also produce mind; non-existence viewed in contrast to existence means non-existence is arising from another. Furthermore, although the unarisen does not exist, if there is a productive nature, and through contrasting with this nature one knows there is mind: is this nature already arisen or not yet arisen? If already arisen, arising is just arising; why call it a nature? If the nature has not yet arisen, how can what has not yet arisen produce? If the mind arises in contrast to arising: arising again contrasts with arising, just as long should contrast with long; since there is no such principle, why contrast with arising to produce mind? If mind arises because of contrasting with both arising and the unarisen, like obtaining long by contrasting with short: this falls into two faults; if each exists, two arisings coexist; if each lacks it, arising is completely unfindable, as refuted before. If mind arises in contrast to neither arising nor the unarisen: the treatise says, arising from causes and conditions is still unfindable, how much more so without causes and conditions? Furthermore, does this causelessness exist or not exist? If it exists, it still contrasts with existence; if it does not exist, it still contrasts with non-existence; why call it causeless? If one says there is a nature: does the nature exist or not exist? If the nature exists, is it arisen or not arisen? If arisen, it is already arising; why call it a nature? If not arisen, how can it produce? Deductions through such four propositions in search of mind in the provisionality of relativity find nothing; no real nature arises, there is merely a name. The arising of a name, as soon as it arises, is unarisen. Furthermore, seeking aggregates, sense bases, and elements within nature and characteristics is unfindable, which is emptiness of dharmas. Seeking person, self, knower, and seer within nature and characteristics is unfindable, which is called emptiness of sentient beings, extending to the eighteen emptinesses and so forth. The Fuxing ji explains the refutation of arising from self under the provisionality of causal formation, saying: 'The preceding thought-moment is the faculty, and the subsequent thought-moment is consciousness': the faculty has no separate substance, but still refers to the immediately preceding cessation of mind as its substance. The faculty is called the producer; due to the cessation of the preceding mind, the subsequent mental consciousness is produced. Thus the Kośa says: 'Because the collection of the six consciousnesses immediately ceasing constitutes the mind.' 'Collection' means substance. At the moment of immediately preceding cessation, it serves as the substance of the mental faculty. At that time, the five consciousnesses also rely on the immediately ceasing mind as their immediate condition, and employ the five material faculties as their remote conditions, thus producing the five consciousnesses. When the five consciousnesses are immediate and discrimination arises, that is called mental consciousness. Now, the meaning of this text is not the five consciousnesses, but the sixth consciousness, which, taking existent views as mental objects, is then called consciousness. It is precisely this consciousness that is examined and interrogated against the faculty; hence it says: 'Does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness, or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness?' > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 84.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84.1) - [Next: 84.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84.3) - [Up: 84](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.2) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84.2) · Pramāṇa