[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt) › 57.39 # 宗鏡錄 57.39 English (machine translation) 57.39 - **Language:** English ### [57.39](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.57.39) Answer: It is capable of alerting the citta while in the seed state. Because the self-nature of attention (manaskāra) is lucid and acute, even while in the seed state, if an object arrives, it can alert the seeds of citta and caitta, causing them to arise into manifestation. To give an analogy: it is like many people lodging together in a single room. When a thief comes outside, among the crowd there is one person whose nature is to sleep lightly, and thus he can alert the other people. Although this person himself has not yet gotten up, he can alert the other people, causing them to arise. It is also like the internal nimittabhāga of the citta: although it arises simultaneously with the darśanabhāga, by the very nature of things it possesses the functional capacity to pull the citta. Here, attention is also like this. Its seed of attention, having alerted the seeds of those cittas and caittas to produce manifestation, the manifest attention can then also lead the manifest citta to direct itself toward the object in front. Thus this attention has two functional capacities: first, when citta has not yet arisen, it can alert it, causing it to arise; second, once it has arisen, it can lead it, causing it to direct itself toward the object. The former is its substance and nature; the latter is its activity and function. Second, contact (sparśa): meaning the harmonious union of the three things—indriya, viṣaya, and vijñāna—taking discrimination as its substance and serving as the support for feeling (vedanā) as its activity. Moreover, the harmonious union of the three is the cause, and contact is its fruit. Causing the citta and caittas to touch the object is its nature; serving as the support for feeling, conception (saṃjñā), volition (cetanā), and so on, is its activity. If contact does not arise, the other caitta of feeling also cannot arise. Bringing together into harmony all citta and caittas, causing them to touch the object before them simultaneously, is the self-nature of contact. Thus, when the various caittas grasp an object, it is all the functional capacity and self-nature of contact. Thus this contact resembles that harmonious union of the three, serving as the support for feeling and so on; this is the activity and function of contact. Third, feeling (vedanā): taking experiencing as its substance, and serving as the condition for craving (tṛṣṇā) as its activity. Fourth, conception (saṃjñā): meaning taking the perfuming of nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyañjanakāya as condition, taking the grasping of marks as substance, and producing speech and discourse as its activity. Moreover, conception can establish the boundaries and limits of its own object. If this conception were not present when citta arises, one would not be able to grasp the marks of the boundaries and limits of the object. Taking the grasping of an image of the object as its nature, and setting up various names and speech as its activity; various names and speech all depend on conception—this is the functional capacity of conception. Fifth, volition (cetanā): meaning the mind of intentional action, taking the fabrication of all general and specific retributions of good and bad as the substance of volition, and directing the citta toward wholesome states and so on as its activity. These five dharmas of contact and the rest are necessarily present whenever citta arises; therefore they are omnipresent (sarvatraga). The others are not omnipresent. There are five object-determined \[factors\] (viniyata), because desire and the rest do not pervade all citta. Because of the distinction of the four objects, they are named object-determined. First, desire (chanda): meaning, with respect to a desired object, taking longing as its substance and serving as the support for diligence as its activity. Moreover, in all matters where one desires to observe, because there is longing; if one does not desire to observe, and spontaneously grasps according to the momentum of the causal condition and object, then there is entirely no desire. Due to this reasoning, desire is not omnipresent. Second, resolve (adhimokṣa): meaning, with respect to a determined object, according to what is appropriate, taking decisive apprehension as its substance and being unshakeable as its activity. Moreover, it means that by the force of right or wrong teaching, reasoning, and realization, one carefully determines and decisively holds to the object grasped; because of this, other conditions cannot shake it. Thus, toward an ambiguous object, resolve is entirely absent; in a mind that is not carefully decisive, there is also no resolve; \[hence\] it is not included among the omnipresent. Third, mindfulness (smṛti): meaning, with respect to a habituated object, taking causing the citta to clearly remember without forgetting as its substance, and serving as the support for samādhi as its activity. Moreover, toward objects whose substances or types were never previously experienced, one does not cause mindfulness to arise; even if previously experienced, if one cannot clearly remember, mindfulness also does not arise. Therefore, mindfulness is definitely not included among the omnipresent. Mindfulness serves as the support and as the activity and function for samādhi, being able to produce correct samādhi; therefore it is said that serving as the support for samādhi is its activity. Fourth, concentration (samādhi), also called samādhi (děngtí): meaning, with respect to the observed object, taking focused attention on a single condition as its substance, causing the citta not to be distracted, and serving as the support for wisdom (jñāna) as its activity. Moreover, because concentration causes the citta to be focused and undistracted, relying on this, discriminating wisdom arises. If one does not tie the citta to focus on the stage of the object, then concentration does not arise; therefore it is not omnipresent. Fifth, discernment (prajñā/mati): meaning, with respect to the observed object, taking selection and evaluation as its substance, and severing doubt as its activity. Moreover, with respect to non-observed objects and in an ignorant and benighted citta, because there is no selection and evaluation, it is not included among the omnipresent. These five object-determined \[factors\] exist or not depending on the state, and the perceived object and perceiving \[subject\] are not definitely concomitant. There are eleven wholesome \[factors\] (kuśala). First, faith (śraddhā): meaning, toward what has reality, what has virtue, and what has capability, taking clarity of citta as its substance, and severing the obstacle of non-faith, being able to obtain the fulfillment of the provisions for bodhi, as its activity. Moreover, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Faith takes clarity of citta as its nature. This nature is clear and pure, and can purify citta and so on. Because citta is superior, it is given the name "clarity of citta", just as a water-clearing jewel can clear muddy water.' The commentary explains: 'Only faith is that which can purify; the other wholesome \[factors\] and so on are that which is purified. Therefore, taking the citta-king as principal, it only speaks of "clarity of citta" and does not speak of caittas. Water is an analogy for citta and so on; the clearing jewel is an analogy for the substance of faith. Because the jewel is thrown in, the muddy water becomes clear; because faith is present, that citta consequently becomes pure.' Second, shame (hrī): meaning, relying on the dominance of oneself and the dominance of the Dharma, taking feeling shame at faults and evils as its substance, and severing the obstacle of shamelessness as its activity. Third, bashfulness (apatrāpya): meaning, relying on the dominance of the world, taking feeling bashful at faults and evils as its substance, and severing the obstacle of unbashfulness as its activity. Fourth, non-attachment (alobha): meaning, toward existence and the requisites for existence, taking disgust and detachment without grasping, not hoarding and not loving, and being without attachment as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of rāga as its activity. Fifth, non-hatred (adveṣa): meaning, toward all sentient beings, taking a citta free of harm and filled with benevolence and pity as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of dveṣa as its activity. Sixth, non-delusion (amoha): meaning taking the correct understanding of reality as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of moha as its activity. Seventh, diligence (vīrya): meaning taking the citta being courageous and free of laxity, not looking down on oneself, as its substance, and severing the obstacle of indolence as its activity. Eighth, pliancy (praśrabdhi): meaning, being free from coarse heaviness (dauṣṭhulya), taking the body and mind being harmonious and smooth as its substance, and severing the obstacle of coarse heaviness as its activity. Ninth, non-heedlessness (apramāda): meaning, taking non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-delusion along with diligence as its substance, and severing the obstacle of heedlessness as its activity. Tenth, equanimity (upekṣā): meaning taking non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-delusion as its substance; relying on this equanimity, one attains impartiality of citta, attains uprightness of citta, and citta without stirring; taking severing the obstacle of stirring as its activity. Eleventh, non-harming (ahiṃsā): meaning, by not distressing and harming sentient beings, taking grief, sorrow, and pity for creatures as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of harm as its activity. There are six root kleśas (mūlakleśa). First, attachment (rāga): meaning, toward the five grasping aggregates, taking loving, concealing, cherishing, and clinging as its substance, and harming oneself and others and being able to direct one toward the bad destinies as its activity. Second, anger (dveṣa): meaning, toward sentient beings, taking the desire to cause harm as its substance, and being able to obstruct non-hatred as its activity. Third, pride (māna): meaning, considering others inferior to oneself and reckoning oneself superior, taking causing the citta to be haughty as its substance, and being able to obstruct non-pride as its activity. Fourth, ignorance (avidyā): meaning taking not correctly understanding reality as its substance, and being able to obstruct correct understanding as its activity. Fifth, corrupt views (dṛṣṭi): meaning taking the five views as its substance. 1. The satkāyadṛṣṭi: meaning, toward the five grasping aggregates, reckoning a self and what belongs to a self, taking defiled discernment as its substance, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding of no-self as its activity. 2. The view of extreme grasping (antagrāhadṛṣṭi): meaning, toward the five grasping aggregates, clinging and reckoning annihilation or permanence, taking defiled discernment as its substance, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding of impermanence as its activity. 3. Corrupt view (mithyādṛṣṭi): meaning slandering cause and effect, taking defiled discernment as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct right view as its activity. 4. Attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa): meaning, toward the previous three views and the aggregates on which the views rely, reckoning them as supreme and foremost, taking defiled discernment as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding of suffering and impurity as its activity. 5. Attachment to precepts and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa): meaning, toward the previous views and the aggregates on which the views rely, reckoning them as purification, liberation, and transcendence, taking defiled discernment as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding as before as its activity. The commentary explains: 'Satkāyadṛṣṭi is translated here as "view of the body" (shēnjiàn). As for attachment to views, the treatise also says: "Taking serving as the support for all dispute as its activity." This grasps views and the aggregates on which they rely as supreme and as able to attain the pure dharma of nirvāṇa; this is attachment to views. Because of these mutual clingings to the superiority of various views and so on, all disputes of the non-Buddhists arise from this. As for attachment to precepts and vows, it also says: "Taking serving as the support for useless arduous toil as its activity." It means that relying on the precepts received under these views, one speaks of these precepts as supreme and as able to attain nirvāṇa; due to these precepts, all non-Buddhists undertake useless arduous toil such as plucking out hair.' Sixth, doubt (vicikitsā): meaning, toward the truths, taking indecisive hesitation as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct non-doubt as its activity. - [Previous: 57.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.57.38) - [Next: 57.40](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.57.40) - [Up: 57](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.57) ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.57.39) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.57.39](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.57.39) · Pramāṇa