[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt) › 62 # 宗鏡錄 62 English (machine translation) 62 - **Language:** English ### [62.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.1) Compiled by Yanshou, Dhyāna Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery ### [62.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.2) The equal, true mind is the buddha-wisdom of all living beings. Although possessed equally, faith and understanding are difficult to generate; many harbor fox-like doubts, while few are able to realize it fully. Even with the sharp wisdom of a pratyekabuddha, the superior faculties of Śāriputra, or even the great bodhisattvas in the non-retrogressing stage, exhausting their thoughts and expending their efforts, they cannot fathom its source; with skillful eloquence and marvelous spiritual penetrations, they do not know its bounds. We hope again to clarify the teaching and principle and point them out with certainty, revealing the great purport before our eyes and severing the slightest doubt in the ground of the mind. ### [62.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.3) Answer: The extensive and abbreviated teachings, the negative and positive explications, though differing in opening and closing and distinct in their general and specific aspects, nevertheless all make manifest the tenet of mind-only; ultimately there are no texts \[admitting anything\] outside consciousness. Proofs are like the sands of the Ganges—how could there be only one or two? Therefore, a gāthā in the Lotus Sūtra says: / Knowing the foremost quiescence, / By the power of skillful means, / Although various paths are taught, / In truth they are for the Buddha vehicle. / Another gāthā says: / I now am also like this: / For the sake of pacifying sentient beings, / By means of various Dharma approaches, / I proclaim the Buddha path. / Explanation: Regarding 'knowing the foremost quiescence,' the tathatā of the one mind is originally quiescent; it is not the cessation of saṃsāric arising and ceasing, nor is it the cessation \[achieved through\] counteractive practice in contemplation. Hence it is called 'foremost.' Within the quiescence of the one mind, there is no dharma that can be propagated, nor any path that can be established. For the sake of those who have not yet comprehended, by the power of great compassion in skillful means, although various separate approaches and different paths are taught, if discussed strictly according to propriety, they solely point back to the Buddha vehicle of the one mind, and there is no other matter. Regarding 'I now am also like this,' now I and the buddhas of the ten directions have together realized this Dharma, and all are like this; by this means we bring peace and happiness to all sentient beings, revealing the various Dharma approaches of the three vehicles and five lineages, and propagating the Buddha path of mind-only. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'The Buddha told Mahāmati: The body, requisites for life, the receptacle world, and so forth, are all images of the ālayavijñāna, appearing as the two kinds of characteristics: object grasped and grasper. Because those foolish persons fall into the two views of arising, abiding, and ceasing, they falsely give rise to discriminations of existence and nonexistence therein. Mahāmati, you should diligently train in this meaning.' Furthermore, a gāthā in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: / Various things turn following the citta; / There is only citta, not other dharmas. / When citta arises, various things arise; / When citta ceases, various things cease. / Sentient beings falsely discriminate: / Where there are no entities, they see entities. / There are no referents, there is only citta; / Without discrimination, one attains liberation. / Another gāthā says: / There is no earth nor any truths, / No realms and no transformations. / The Buddha, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvakas / Are only discriminations of the citta. / Human bodies and the five aggregates, / The conditions and subtle particles, / The supreme nature and the creation by Īśvara / Are only discriminations of the citta. / Citta pervades all places; / All places are citta. / Because the citta does not contemplate skillfully, / \[It does not see that\] the nature of citta lacks all characteristics. / A gāthā in the Avataṃsakasūtra says: / In all oceans of directions, / They abide depending on the thoughts of sentient beings' citta. / It also says: 'Knowing the establishment of all dharmadhātus, all abide in the samādhi of the limit of mental thoughts.' The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'For example, a trained horse, seeing its own shadow, is not frightened. Why? It knows of itself that the shadow comes from its own body. Like a well-trained person who believes and enters the ekayāna, seeing all frightening objects, he is not frightened, knowing of himself that objects come from the citta.' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'As a sūtra states: "The three realms are mind-only." It also says that "the cognitive object is only manifested by consciousness." It also says that "all dharmas are not separate from citta." It also says that "sentient beings become defiled or purified in accordance with citta." It also says that "a bodhisattva who accomplishes the four knowledges can readily awaken and enter into consciousness-only without external objects." A verse also says: / The cognitive objects of citta, manas, and vijñāna / Are none of them separate from their own nature; / Therefore I say that all things / Are only consciousness, without remainder.' Such sacred teachings and sincere proofs are not singular. The commentary states: 'Regarding "It also says that the cognitive object is only manifested by consciousness": what you call an external cognitive object outside consciousness, I say is precisely manifested upon internal consciousness.' Vasubandhu said: 'What is called the cognitive object of consciousness is only manifested by consciousness.' Furthermore, the Buddha told Maitreya: 'There is no minor dharma capable of grasping any minor dharma, because there is no agent. But when dharmas arise, the power of dependent origination is great: upon a single substance two images arise, mutually facing each other, neither identical nor separate. All cittas and caittas, by the power of dependent origination, by the intrinsic nature of dharmas, arise in this way.' Regarding 'The cognitive objects of citta, manas, and vijñāna are none of them separate from their own nature': 'own nature' is the dharma of one's own citta, or the ontological substance—that is, the foundational entity relied upon by the referent. That is to say, the cognitive objects of the eighth citta, the seventh manas, and the remaining six consciousnesses all have one's own citta as their object. The Buddha said: 'Due to such a principle, I say that all conditioned and unconditioned \[dharmas\] are only consciousness, without remainder.' In truth, there are no objects outside the mind. From this, one knows that whatever is seen or heard is entirely born from one's own mind; in truth, there is not a single dharma confronting the mind that possesses an independent substantial entity. All arise from dependent origination, and all are formed in pursuit of thoughts. Birth-and-death and nirvāṇa are both like an illusion or a dream. Therefore, the Anivartikadharmacakrasūtra says: 'At that time, Ānanda went to the Buddha's place and said: "World-Honored One, the monks were not able to come. Why? They saw that the Jetavana was entirely flooded with great water, pure and without defilement, nor did they see the monastery or the trees. For this reason, none could come." The Buddha told Ānanda: "Those monks, where there was no water, gave rise to the notion of water; where there was no form, they gave rise to the notion of form; where there were no sensation, conception, volition, or consciousness, they gave rise to the notions of sensation, conception, volition, and consciousness; where there were no śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas, they formed the notions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas."' The Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'O son of the Buddha, what is the supernatural samādhi of the bodhisattva mahāsattva's sequentially visiting all buddha lands? O son of the Buddha, this bodhisattva mahāsattva passes beyond countless worlds in the eastern direction, and further passes beyond worlds as numerous as the dust particles in that many worlds; within those worlds, he enters this samādhi, up to and including revering, honoring, paying homage with bowed head, prostrating his entire body on the ground, inquiring about the Buddhadharma, praising the equality of the buddhas, extolling the vast virtues of the buddhas, entering the great compassion entered by the buddhas, and attaining the equal, unimpeded power of the buddhas at the place of each and every tathāgata. In a single thought-moment, he diligently seeks the marvelous Dharma at the place of all buddhas. Yet, regarding such characteristics as the buddhas' appearing in the world or entering into parinirvāṇa, none are apprehended. Just as a distracted and agitated mind discerns cognitive objects, when the mind arises it does not know by what cognitive object it arises, and when the mind ceases it does not know by what cognitive object it ceases; this bodhisattva mahāsattva is also like this, ultimately not discriminating the characteristics of the Tathāgata's appearance in the world or nirvāṇa. O son of the Buddha, just as a midday mirage does not arise from clouds, does not arise from ponds, does not dwell on dry land, does not stay in water, is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither good nor bad, neither clear nor turbid, cannot be drunk or rinsed with, cannot be defiled, has no substance, has no lack of substance, has no flavor, has no lack of flavor, yet due to causes and conditions appears as the characteristic of water, being cognized by consciousness: seen from afar it resembles water and stimulates the notion of water, but when approached it is absent and the notion of water ceases of itself; this bodhisattva mahāsattva is also like this: he does not apprehend the characteristics of the Tathāgata's appearing in the world and of his nirvāṇa. The conditioned characteristics and unconditioned characteristics of all buddhas are both discriminated by the conceiving mind. O son of the Buddha, this samādhi is called the practice of the pure deep mind. After entering this samādhi, the bodhisattva mahāsattva emerges, and having emerged, does not lose it.' Thus one knows that not only does the Buddha's teaching take mind as its source, but that to which the three teachings return all say that turning back to oneself is paramount. As in the School Sayings of Confucius: 'Duke Ling of Wei asked Confucius, saying: "Someone told me: 'For one who governs the state, if he is cautious within the ancestral temple and court, the government will be well-ordered.' How is that?" The Master said: "That may be so. Those who love others, then others love them; those who hate others, then others hate them. What is meant by 'knowing the world without going outside a room of ten square feet' refers to knowing how to turn back to oneself."' Thus one knows that if one measures oneself to comply with things, then there is nothing that will not be brought home; naturally, grasping and rejecting are forgotten, and beauty and ugliness are equal in purport. Thus one knows that if one merely understands the one mind, the signless manifests naturally, and one then naturally transcends the dusty prison of the six destinies. 'Going out must be through the door; none can fail to follow this way.' As an ancient master said: 'The confused multitude of the six destinies went out from this gate, and having passed through a thousand kalpas have not returned—how painful!' Therefore, the buddhas were alarmed into entering the burning house, the ancestral master purposely came from the West, and even the thousand sages sighed with grief—all because beings do not reach the essential path of mind-only for liberation. Hence one knows that if one does not comprehend that all dharmas are precisely the tathatā of the one mind, they all become the imagined nature (parikalpita). Because tathatā is without characteristics, seeing characteristics is entirely due to emotional attachment. The Awakening of Faith says: 'All realms exist with distinctions only relying on false thoughts; if one is free from mental thoughts, there are no characteristics of any realms.' ### [62.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.4) Question: Are the intrinsic natures, mental operations, and functions of the eight consciousnesses one, or are they each different? ### [62.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.5) Answer: They are neither one nor different. The treatise says: 'The intrinsic natures of the eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be definitively one, because their mental operations, bases, cognitive objects, and associated \[factors\] are different; furthermore, when one ceases, the others do not cease; and because the characteristics of perfumer and perfumed, and so forth, are each different. Nor are they definitively different, because the sūtras state that the eight consciousnesses are like water and waves, without distinction; because if they were definitively different, they should not possess the nature of cause and effect; and because, like illusory matters, they lack a definitive nature. As stated before, the distinguished characteristics of the consciousnesses rely on rational conventional truth, not true ultimate truth. Within true ultimate truth, mind and speech are severed.' As a gāthā says: / The eight kinds of citta, manas, and vijñāna / Conventionally have distinct characteristics; / Ultimately their characteristics are not distinct, / Because characteristics and that which is characterized are nonexistent. / The commentary states: 'The phrase "cannot be definitive" is explained through three meanings: first, mental operations, meaning the darśanabhāga; second, the support, meaning the faculties; third, cognitive objects, meaning the perceived objects. Because according to these three meanings their associations are different: for instance, the eye consciousness taking visual form as its mental operation, up to the eighth transforming into visual form and so forth as its mental operation. If one consciousness ceases, the other seven and so forth do not necessarily cease: the seven are the perfumers, and the eighth is that which is perfumed; furthermore, the seven are causes, and the eighth is the fruit. Regarding "nor are they definitively different": the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states that the consciousnesses are like the waves of the great ocean, having no differentiated characteristics. Furthermore, if they were definitively different, they should not be cause and effect, because they mutually serve as cause and effect. Causality in the nature of dharmas is not definitively different, just as barley does not produce bean sprouts, and so forth. Furthermore, all dharmas are like illusions, so we know they lack a definitively different nature.' ### [62.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.6) Question: If so, what are the characteristics of the three transformations previously spoken of? ### [62.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.7) Answer: This relies on the second conventional truth of reason among the four conventional truths to speak of differences in eight consciousnesses and so forth according to phenomena, not the fourth true ultimate truth among the fourfold ultimate truths. In the ultimate truth, regarding the principle of the eight consciousnesses, the discriminating mind and speech are both severed. Therefore, they are neither one nor different. Regarding 'Because characteristics and that which is characterized are nonexistent': characteristics are the active, and that which is characterized is the passive. What are the active characteristics and the characterized upon consciousness? Namely, function is the active characteristic, and substance is that which is characterized. Or, the darśanabhāga is taken as the active characteristic, and the nimittabhāga as that which is characterized. Again, the seven consciousnesses are taken as the active characteristics, and the eighth as that which is characterized. Since that which is characterized does not exist, the active characteristics are not existent either. If one enters the gate of truth, the principle has no distinction at all. The gate of truth merely negates distinction and says there is no distinction; yet 'no distinction' is also neither without distinction nor not without distinction. Explanation: It is merely that from the initial karmic consciousness, the two gates of seeing and appearance arise; due to seeing, the subject (grasper) is established, and due to appearance, the object (grasped) is established. As soon as subject and object are complete, self and dharmas mutually arise. From this, due to the conditioned, the unconditioned is established; in contrast to the provisional, the real is discussed. None have a fixed substance; appearing to exist, they are not real. Therefore, grasping at mutually arising names, one sees that form has indication and grasps that emptiness has no indication; confronting relative substrates, one sees that ox horns exist and grasps that rabbit horns do not exist. One does not know that using existence to negate nonexistence means existence is not definitively existent; using nonexistence to negate existence means nonexistence is not definitively nonexistent. If one comprehends the true mind of the eight consciousnesses, it is naturally beyond relativity; doubts melt away in grasper and grasped, and the vine and the snake are thereupon simultaneously emptied; views cease concerning counteragents, and forms and names thereby become doubly quiescent. ### [62.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.8) Question: That there are no dharmas outside the mind is the orthodox source of the buddhas and ancestors. Now, seeing the myriad phenomena before our eyes, beginners find it difficult to understand. Without detailed explanation, how can doubts be severed? We must rely on examination and interrogation to break attachments to emotional defilements. ### [62.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.9) Answer: This was already explained in detail earlier, and now citations are brought forward once more as proof. The \*Trimśikā\* says: ‘These dharmas are transformations of consciousness. / Discriminated and discriminating: / because of this, both of those are non-existent; / therefore all is consciousness-only.’ ‘Transformations’ means that the eight consciousnesses, from their self-verifying part (svasaṃvittibhāga), transform and manifest in the semblance of two parts. That is, the transformed darśanabhāga has an active functioning capacity, and so is termed ‘seeing’; the transformed nimittabhāga is the object of functioning, and so is termed ‘objective image.’ Both evolve in dependence upon the self-verifying part. Since the two parts, seeing and objective image, subsume all dharmas entirely, and these two parts arise through transformation upon the substance of citta, one knows therefore that all dharmas are not separate from citta. ‘Discriminated and discriminating’: the darśanabhāga is that which discriminates; the nimittabhāga is that which is discriminated. ‘Because of this, both of those are non-existent’: upon these two parts of seeing and objective image, through false grasping, those two graspings at self and dharmas are non-existent. That is, outside these two parts of seeing and objective image, objects of self and dharmas that are grasped as existent by deluded sentiment are all non-existent. Therefore it says, ‘because of this, both of those are non-existent.’ ‘Therefore all is consciousness-only’: ‘only’ negates the existence of external objects; ‘consciousness’ sets aside the emptiness of citta. Eliminating grasping at the two extremes, it dwells directly in the Middle Way. That is, using the word ‘only’, it negates the Sarvāstivādins’ grasping that outside citta there are real objects. Using the word ‘consciousness’, it sets aside Bhāviveka and others' grasping and pernicious clinging to emptiness. It thereby refutes the two extremes of emptiness and existence and dwells directly in the Middle Way. Hence the commentary says: ‘Externally, it encompasses the myriad phenomena; internally, both subject and object are established. It can well be said that the four parts are of one citta, and no principle surpasses this.’ Furthermore, the Hīnayāna poses nine objections, challenging the purport that there are no dharmas outside citta and that all is mind-only. The first is the objection regarding the rationale for consciousness-only: The various Hīnayāna masters say, ‘Apart from citta, matter (rūpa) is visibly seen, and it is a real object that is conditions as object (ālambanapratyaya). Why does the author of the treatise encompass it and reduce it to citta, collectively designating it as consciousness-only? First, matter and citta are distinct. Second, subject and object are different.’ The challenge says, ‘External material objects do not draw the cognizing citta along. If matter followed citta, consciousness-only would be acceptable. When, facing sentiments, external material objects outwardly delude citta, and citta is deluded by objects, that is not the meaning of consciousness-only.’ The author of the treatise says: ‘It is simply that these external material objects, first, are transformed by the cognizing citta of all sentient beings, and second, are sustained by the citta of all sentient beings. Fundamentally, they all stem from citta. Therefore they are subsumed into consciousness-only.’ The \*Daśabhūmikasūtra\* and the \*Avataṃsakasūtra\* state that the three realms are mind-only. The meaning is: the dharmas of the three realms are solely transformations of citta; apart from citta, there is not a single thing more. This is also to negate the two graspings at self and dharmas. They are merely held to exist by deluded sentiment; their entire substance is completely non-existent. There is only inner citta, hence it is said that all is mind-only. ### [62.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.10) Question: In the desire and form realms, there are external material objects of the receptacle realm, and because these are said to be transformations of citta, one speaks of mind-only. But in the case of the gods of the formless realm, there is only inner citta and no external material objects. Why is it necessary to speak of mind-only there as well? Would that not commit the fallacy of proving what is already established (siddhasādhana)? ### [62.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.11) Answer: It is not merely when material objects are spoken of as not being separate from citta that it is called mind-only. This is also to negate the citta of grasping and that which grasps, such as craving, among the gods of the formless realm. Because sentient beings in the formless realm also crave objects such as space and arouse their deluded minds, the formless realm is also called mind-only. If the untainted state is attained, that supramundane untainted matter and so forth is consciousness-only of supramundane untainted citta and caittas, and is likewise mind-only. Therefore it says that the three realms are mind-only. The \*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra\* also says: ‘It is taught, moreover, that the cognized object is only what is manifested by consciousness.’ That is, all cognized objects are solely transformations of consciousness, and there are no external dharmas at all. Therefore the Buddha said to Maitreya Bodhisattva: ‘There is no slightest dharma that can grasp any slightest dharma, because there is no active agency.’ The \*Laṅkāvatārasūtra\* also says: ‘Dharmas are all not separate from citta.’ The \*Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra\* also says: ‘Sentient beings are defiled or pure according to their citta.’ Furthermore, the commentary explains the rationale for consciousness-only by establishing four kinds of logical principles, which are four formal inferences (anumāna). The first formal inference establishes that the nimittabhāga of matter of the five sense-objects are all the immediate conditions as object (pratyakṣālambanapratyaya) of the five consciousnesses, establishing the meaning of consciousness-only. The second establishes that the sixth consciousness, and implicitly establishes that the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, all take their own immediate nimittabhāga as object and are not separate from consciousness, which is the meaning of consciousness-only. The third establishes generally that all immediate nimittabhāgas are not separate from the substance of citta, succeeding in establishing consciousness-only. The fourth establishes that all mediate conditions as object (vyavahitālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta, succeeding in establishing consciousness-only. As for the first, establishing that the nimittabhāga of the five sense-objects are all not separate from the five consciousnesses: here we only establish that the nimittabhāga of one consciousness is not separate from that consciousness, and the remaining four consciousnesses should be formulated accordingly. The inference states: Subject (pakṣa / dharmin): The well-established visual consciousness; Thesis predicate (sādhya / dharma): Definitely does not directly cognize matter that is separate from its own consciousness; Reason (hetu): Because it is subsumed under any one of the well-established five consciousnesses; Example (dṛṣṭānta): Just like the other well-established four consciousnesses. In explaining this inference, it is divided into two: first, explaining the terms and setting aside fallacies; second, briefly setting forth questions and answers. As for the first: stating ‘well-established’ (prasiddha) before the thesis subject sets aside visual consciousness that is not well-established for both schools. For instance, the Mahāyāna school accepts that there is visual consciousness of Buddhas of other worlds, and the untainted visual consciousness of a Buddha; since the Hīnayāna does not accept this, it is also set aside and not taken up. If the Hīnayāna school asserts that a Buddha's visual consciousness is tainted, or the defiled visual consciousness of a bodhisattva in his final lifetime, the Mahāyāna does not accept this, so it must also be set aside. That is, what is mutually rejected by both schools is a dharma that is not well-established. Now, taking only the visual consciousness that is mutually accepted and well-established by both schools, it is then established as the thesis subject. Therefore the subject statement says ‘well-established visual consciousness’. ### [62.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.12) Question: If one does not set it aside by adding ‘well-established’ for both schools, what fallacy would there be? ### [62.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.13) Answer: The subject statement would then have the fallacy of an unestablished qualificand (viśeṣyāsiddha) for one part of oneself or the other. In the reason, it would also commit the fallacy of an unestablished substratum (āśrayāsiddha) for one part of oneself or the other, because the subject statement would lack a well-established visual consciousness to serve as the substratum. Therefore, the two characters ‘well-established’ are placed. Setting aside: the predicate statement says, as thesis, ‘definitely does not directly cognize matter that is separate from its own consciousness.’ That is, all external archetype matter (bimbadharmarūpa) outside the nimittabhāga of visual consciousness, as well as the other four sense-objects—whatever is separate from visual consciousness—is not directly cognized. If the proponent and the opponent argue together, they only dispute over the archetype. In Mahāyāna's own school, it establishes the immediate nimittabhāga matter of visual consciousness. ### [62.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.14) Question: Why does one not say ‘definitely directly cognizes matter that is not separate from its own consciousness’? ### [62.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.15) Answer: For fear of committing the fallacy of an unestablished qualifier (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), because the Hīnayāna does not accept that matter is not separate from visual consciousness. Next, regarding the reason, ‘because it is subsumed under any one of the well-established five consciousnesses’: stating ‘well-established’ in the reason also sets aside the five consciousnesses that are not well-established. If one does not set them aside by stating ‘well-established’ and merely says ‘subsumed under any one of the five consciousnesses’, this reason would commit the fallacy of being unestablished in part for oneself or the other (anyatarāsiddha). Therefore, the reason places the word ‘well-established’ to set it aside. Regarding the example, ‘just like the other well-established four consciousnesses’: stating ‘well-established’ in the example also sets aside unestablished dharmas. If one does not place ‘well-established’, it commits the fallacy of an unestablished probans or probandum in part. Therefore, the word ‘well-established’ is placed to set it aside. Since the nimittabhāga of matter is established as not separate from visual consciousness, the remaining sounds, odors, tastes, and tangibles are all established by analogy with this, as they are all not separate from the other four consciousnesses. Therefore, the verse of the \*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra\* says: ‘The well-established visual and other consciousnesses, / because they are subsumed under any one of the five, / like the others, do not directly cognize / matter and so forth separate from their own consciousness.’ Next, questions and answers are presented. ### [62.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.16) First question: The basis of the thesis must be mutually accepted by both parties. Now, the one setting up \[the thesis\] states that it does not directly cognize matter separate from its own consciousness, while the opponent accepts that it directly cognizes archetype matter separate from its own consciousness. Why say it is well-established? ### [62.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.17) Answer: The Hīnayāna also accepts that visual consciousness does not directly cognize the other four sense-objects, because they are separate from visual consciousness. As long as the other school accepts that there is ‘not directly cognizing matter separate from its own consciousness’, then the basis of the thesis is well-established. ### [62.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.18) Second question: Since the other school already accepts that visual consciousness does not directly cognize the other four sense-objects, when this is subsequently combined into the thesis, it is proving what is already agreed upon. How can it constitute a dispute over the thesis? ### [62.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.19) Answer: What is disputed now takes only the archetype of the sense-object of matter as not directly cognized by the eye. Distinguishing them from one another conforms with oneself and contradicts the other, properly constituting the substance of the thesis. Because, although the Hīnayāna accepts that the archetype of matter is separate from visual consciousness, it nonetheless maintains that it is directly cognized. Now stating that it is not directly cognized, how is this not a dispute over the thesis? ### [62.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.20) Third question: What is disputed in the thesis is that visual consciousness does not directly cognize archetype matter. The homogeneous example is ‘like the other four consciousnesses’. The other four consciousnesses merely do not directly cognize the other four sense-objects; how could they be similar? ### [62.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.21) Answer: The other four consciousnesses are the basis of the example (dṛṣṭāntāśraya). That each does not directly cognize things separate from its own consciousness is the substance of the example (dṛṣṭānta-svabhāva). Here we take the substance of the example, not the basis of the example. It is also like the thesis 'sound is impermanent', where the concordant example is 'like a pot': one should not distinguish between sound and pot as different, but merely take the fact that sound and pot each have the meaning of impermanence as being similar, which serves as the reason, and so forth. Second, establishing the sixth consciousness through reasoning while implicitly establishing the seventh and eighth consciousnesses: The syllogism runs: 'Widely accepted other consciousnesses (subject/pakṣa) also do not directly cognize things separate from their own consciousness (predicate/sādhya); because of being of the nature of consciousness (reason/hetu); like the widely accepted five consciousnesses (concordant example/dṛṣṭānta).' Explanation: In the subject term of the thesis, stating 'widely accepted' also excludes what is not widely accepted. If one did not say 'widely accepted', it would commit the fallacy of a partially unaccepted subject for oneself or the opponent. If one stated the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses as the subject, since the opponent does not accept the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, it would commit the fallacy of a partially unaccepted subject for the opponent. If one only established the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) as the subject, the reason would then commit the fallacy of being inconclusive (aniyata), for the opponent would take the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as contrary examples, and the inference would commit the fallacy of being inconclusive in common to oneself. Now, by merely stating 'other' in general, one specifically takes the sixth while intending to include the seventh and eighth, thus implicitly establishing and subsuming the seventh and eighth within 'other consciousnesses'. In the predicate term, stating 'also do not directly cognize things separate from their own consciousness': 'also' means 'the same'—the same as the aforementioned widely accepted five consciousnesses not directly cognizing things separate from their own consciousness. In the reason, stating 'because of being of the nature of consciousness' means being the same as the five consciousnesses in having the nature of consciousness. In the example, stating 'like the widely accepted five consciousnesses' means being the same as the five consciousnesses in likewise not directly cognizing \[things\] separate from themselves. Thus we clearly know that they directly cognize things not separate from their own consciousness. Since this has been established, we know that all objects as direct objective conditions (pratyakṣālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta; this is the meaning of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā). Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Other consciousnesses, because of being consciousness, like the eye consciousness and so forth, also do not directly cognize things separate from themselves.' Third, establishing through reasoning that the nimittabhāgas of the direct objective conditions of the first six consciousnesses all resolve into the substance of citta: What is called the substance of citta is the self-verifying division (svasaṃvittibhāga). Although the darśanabhāga also operates in dependence on the self-verifying division, here we establish only the nimittabhāga because the darśanabhāga is mutually accepted. The syllogism runs: 'The direct objective conditions of the six consciousnesses (subject) definitely are not separate from the substance of the six consciousnesses (predicate); because of being subsumed under either one between the darśana and nimitta divisions (reason); like that cognizing darśanabhāga (concordant example).' Since the Hīnayāna accepts that the darśanabhāga is not separate from the substance of citta, it is taken as the concordant example. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'This direct objective condition is definitely not separate from this \[citta\], because of being one of the two, like that cognizer.' Fourth, establishing through principle that all objects as remote objective conditions (adhipaty-ālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta, which is consciousness-only: namely, the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, in relation to the first six, is called a remote objective condition. Because the Hīnayāna does not accept the eighth consciousness, it is simply called a remote objective condition. The syllogism runs: 'All objects cognized in accordance with one's own consciousness (subject) definitely are not separate from my cognizing citta and caittas (predicate); because of being an objectified phenomenon (reason); like associated phenomena (concordant example).' Explanation: In this syllogism's predicate term, stating 'definitely are not separate from my cognizing \[citta\]' means that all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, as long as they are objectified phenomena, definitely are not separate from my cognizing consciousness. If the predicate did not say 'my cognizing \[citta\]', it would commit the flaw of partial triviality (siddhasādhana), because the Hīnayāna also accepts that the object cognized by the knowledge of others' minds (paracittajñāna) is not separate from the cognizing citta. To eliminate this fallacy of triviality, one therefore says 'my cognizing \[citta\]', which excludes the cognizing \[citta\] of others. Stating 'like associated phenomena' as the concordant example refers to the direct nimittabhāgas already established previously, because they are all objectified phenomena. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Being an objectified phenomenon, like associated phenomena, it is definitely not separate from citta and caittas.' Therefore, self and dharmas are not existent, while emptiness and consciousness are not non-existent. Being free from existence and free from non-existence precisely accords with the Middle Way. Hence the Benevolent Lord \[Maitreya\] spoke two verses on the Middle Way: 'False discrimination exists; In it, both do not exist at all. Herein there is only emptiness; In that, this also exists. Therefore all phenomena are said to be Neither empty nor non-empty; Because of existence, non-existence, and existence, This accords with the Middle Way.' 'False discrimination exists' means that there is the false discriminating citta of the three realms. 'In it, both do not exist at all' means that the characteristics of the dual grasping at subject and object—self and dharmas—do not exist at all upon this false citta. 'Herein there is only emptiness' means that within this false citta there is only tathatā; this is the nature of emptiness, because it is revealed based on emptiness. 'In that, this also exists' means that in that nature of emptiness, this also exists—there is also this false discriminating consciousness; for false discrimination is conventional truth, and within this conventional truth there is also the nature of emptiness of the ultimate truth. 'Therefore all phenomena are said to be' refers to the two kinds of phenomena, conditioned and unconditioned, which constitute all phenomena. 'Neither empty nor non-empty': 'neither empty' refers to the false discriminating citta and the nature of emptiness—that is, the dependent (paratantra) and consummate (pariniṣpanna) natures are existent, hence termed 'neither empty', because both truths exist. 'Nor non-empty' means that the characteristics of the dual grasping at subject and object—self and dharmas—are empty, which is the imaginary nature (parikalpita). 'Because of existence, non-existence, and existence': 'existence' is because false discrimination exists; 'non-existence' is because the dual grasping at self and dharmas does not exist; 'and existence' means that within false discrimination there is true emptiness, and within true emptiness there is also false discrimination. 'This accords with the Middle Way' means that it is not solely empty like Bhāviveka and others, nor solely existent like the Hīnayāna and others; hence it is called the Middle Way. That both truths exist is unlike Bhāviveka; that the dual grasping at self and dharmas is non-existent is unlike the Hīnayāna; hence it is called the Middle Way. Furthermore, the Abhidharmasūtra states that when a bodhisattva accomplishes four kinds of knowledge, he can accordingly awaken to and enter consciousness-only without external objects. That is, a minor bodhisattva before the bhūmis, though he has not yet realized the principle of consciousness-only, relies on the Buddha's teaching and observes the bodhisattvas on the bhūmis accomplishing four kinds of consciousness-only knowledge, and thereupon enters an impure (sāsrava) contemplation. He contemplates the deeds of those bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis transforming the great earth into gold, churning great rivers into ghee, and manifesting mountains of meat, fish, and rice. Having entered contemplation and observed this, this minor bodhisattva says: 'These transformed real gold, silver, and so forth are none of them separate from the transforming minds of the bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis; there are no external objects besides them.' Having performed this contemplation, he is also able accordingly to awaken to and enter the true principle of consciousness-only. Again, for example, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika, in order to preserve the six categories (padārtha), transformed his body into a great stone; this had real utility. If objects were definitely real, he should not have been able to transform his body and objects into stone in accordance with his mind. ### [62.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.22) Question: Now, as when transforming the great earth into gold, does one extinguish the earth to make the seeds of gold arise separately, or does one transform that earth so that it immediately becomes gold? ### [62.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.23) Answer: The Weishi jing says: 'When Buddhas and bodhisattvas, through the wondrously observing wisdom, bind the great round mirror wisdom and the ripening consciousness (vipākavijñāna), they prevent the seeds of earth from arising and cause the seeds of gold to arise and manifest. Taking this as an empowering condition (adhipatipratyaya), they are able to make the earth of sentient beings cease and gold arise; this is called transformation. It is not that they directly transform earth into gold.' Therefore the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Due to the practice of contemplation serving as an empowering condition, the consciousnesses of other persons transform.' In the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, the Buddha says: 'Good sons, when a bodhisattva mahāsattva practices such a Great Nirvāṇa, he contemplates soil as gold, contemplates gold as soil; causes earth to assume the characteristic of water, and water to assume the characteristic of earth; all are accomplished in accordance with his intention without any falsehood. He contemplates real sentient beings as non-sentient beings, and contemplates non-sentient beings as real sentient beings; all are accomplished in accordance with his intention without any falsehood.' Tiāntái teachings say: 'Among all things, in everything there is the principle of transformability. Like Saṅgharakṣita seeing bodies as beds, pots, and so forth, one should know that material phenomena all manifest in accordance with response. Matter has no fixed substance; it transforms in accordance with the mind. This principle is fundamentally an inconceivable phenomenon within the tathāgatagarbha. If one clings to it according to one's mind, one becomes non-Buddhist or Hīnayāna. What you practice is the Bodhisattva Path: in the impartial dharmadhātu, the mind is not deficient in the least.' Regarding the four kinds of consciousness-only knowledge: The first is the knowledge of contradictory appearances of consciousness (viparyāsa-vijñāna-ākāra-jñāna). That is, the respective cognizing consciousnesses of the four classes of sentient beings differ; since their consciousnesses are mutually contradictory, their transformed nimittabhāgas are also mutually contradictory. Thus, devas see it as jeweled ground; fish see it as a cave and dwelling; humans see it as clear, cold water; and pretas see it as a river of pus and raging fire. Because the transforming consciousnesses of these four classes of sentient beings are mutually contradictory, the transformed objects they cause to appear are also contradictory. What is called 'appearance' (ākāra/nimitta) is not the parikalpita characteristic, but merely the appearance of the nimittabhāga. Due to the power of the past karma of the four classes of sentient beings, at one and the same place they each transform distinct nimittabhāgas; hence it is called 'contradictory appearances of consciousness'. What is called 'knowledge' is the cognizing knowledge of the bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmis. Knowledge can clearly comprehend that the nimittabhāgas transformed by the karma-consciousness of those four classes of sentient beings are distinct, and that there are no other four external objects outside of citta. The old saying that 'one object responds to four minds' is incorrect. ### [62.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.24) Question: Why is it incorrect? ### [62.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.25) Answer: If one says there is 'one object', it is not known what object it definitely is. If, apart from the nimittabhāgas transformed by the four classes of sentient beings, there were separately another object, that would mean there are phenomena outside of citta. ### [62.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.26) Question: Do those four classes of sentient beings each transform their own nimittabhāga, or are their fundamental substances (benshi/dharmin) also distinct? ### [62.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.27) Answer: By the predominant power of karma of the four classes of sentient beings, the nimittabhāgas transformed by their eighth consciousnesses are also distinct. If we speak of this nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness in relation to the first six consciousnesses of the four classes of sentient beings, it constitutes the fundamental substance (benshi). Therefore, both appearance (nimitta) and substance (benshi) are distinct, so we know that there are no external objects whatsoever, but only consciousness. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'First is the knowledge of contradictory appearances of consciousness: namely, in one place, pretas, humans, devas, and so forth, in accordance with the differences of karma, see differently. If the object were real, how could this be accomplished?' Master Xuanzang of the Tang said: 'Objects are not fixedly one; therefore, they are the nimittabhāgas transformed by the four classes of sentient beings. In accordance with the transforming minds of the four classes of sentient beings, the objects also become four. In one place, understanding develops discrepancies, proving that there is only consciousness.' The treatise states: 'Just as a place humans see as filled with excrement and filth is seen by animals as pure and wonderful food and drink, while the pure and wonderful food and drink seen by humans is seen by the devas as foul, filthy, and impure.' Thus we know that seeing differs according to merit; defilement and purity are only mind. Karma itself is differentiated; food has neither coarse nor subtle \[in itself\]. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: 'When the Buddha was on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa, he entered the city of Rājagṛha together with the saṅgha of bhikṣus. On the way he saw a large tree trunk. The Buddha spread his niṣīdana upon the wood and sat, telling the bhikṣus: "If a bhikṣu enters dhyāna and attains mastery of mind, he can cause this large piece of wood to become earth, and it immediately becomes real earth. Why is this? Because within this wood there is the earth element. Likewise with water, fire, wind, gold, silver, and various treasures: they immediately all become real. Why is this? Because within this wood there are all their portions."' Furthermore, for example, regarding a beautiful woman: a lustful person seeing her considers her pure and wonderful, and his mind gives rise to attachment; a person practicing the contemplation of impurity contemplates her, and sees various foul discharges with not a single pure spot; a co-wife seeing her feels jealousy, anger, hatred, and revulsion, not wanting her eyes to see her, considering her impure. A lustful person contemplates her as pleasure; a jealous person contemplates her as suffering; a person of pure practice contemplates her and attains the Way; a person with no involvement contemplates her without favor or bias, like seeing soil or wood. If this beautiful woman were truly pure, all four kinds of persons contemplating her should see her as pure. If she were truly impure, all four kinds of persons contemplating her should see her as impure. Therefore we know that beauty and ugliness reside in the mind; externally there is nothing fixed. ### [62.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.28) Question again: Are the transformed affairs produced by the power of samādhi real or unreal? If real, how can stone become gold, and earth become water? If unreal, how could sages perform what is not real? ### [62.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62.29) Answer: They are all real. For holy persons there is no falsity, because the three poisons have already been uprooted. Because all dharmas lack a fixed characteristic individually, therefore the earth \[characteristic\] can be transformed into or made into the characteristic of water. Just as butter, glue, and wax belong to the earth category, yet on receiving fire they melt into water and take on the characteristic of wetness; water on meeting cold freezes into ice and takes on the characteristic of hardness; stone mineral juice turns into gold, and gold corrodes into copper or returns to stone. Sentient beings are also like this: bad can become good, and good can become bad. By this reason it is known that all dharmas have no fixed characteristic. Second, the cognition of consciousness without an objective referent (anālambanavijñāna-jñāna): consciousness without an objective referent refers to all ordinary beings taking their own sixth, individually arisen discursive mental consciousness (manovijñāna) to grasp the past, the future, the moon in water, an image in a mirror, and so forth, transforming and giving rise to a nominal nimittabhāga. These nimittabhāgas are merely the falsely constructed, fully conceptualized objects of sentient beings' sixth consciousness, transformed and arisen according to sentiment; there is no real external object outside the mind at all. This is called 'consciousness without an objective referent.' As for 'cognition,' this refers to the apprehending mind of bodhisattvas of the ten grounds. A bodhisattva says: 'The nominal nimittabhāgas transformed by these ordinary beings are all not separate from the transforming mind of all ordinary beings; this is their consciousness-only.' Thus by using this analogy for all real objects, they too are not separate from the apprehending mind of all sentient beings. Outside of the mind, there is not a single thing further. The old saying, 'Grasping nothing, thought does not arise,' is incorrect. _First 29 of 34 passages. [Read on](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62)_ ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.62.1) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.62) · Pramāṇa