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The first objection says: 'What is the cause that what is seen by those afflicted with cataract, such as hairs and flies, lacks the actual function of hairs, flies, and so forth, while what is seen by others not afflicted with cataract, such objects as hairs and flies, possesses actual function and is not nonexistent? Since you of the Mahāyāna maintain that all are consciousness-only, then all must simultaneously possess actual function, or else all must simultaneously lack actual function. Now, since they are not alike, we do not know which of them is consciousness-only.' The second objection says: 'What is the cause that what sentient beings obtain in dreams, such as food and drink, knives and staves, poisons, and clothing, lacks actual function, whereas upon awakening, if obtained, it possesses actual function?' The third objection says: 'What is the cause that a gandharva city and the like lack actual function, whereas other cities of brick and earth possess actual function?' The Master of the Treatise responds to the preceding four objections by citing a verse from the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā: 'Spatial and temporal determination are like in a dream; indetermination of stream is like in ghosts, / Who together see rivers of pus and the like; as in a dream, an emission has function.' If one relies on this verse, responding to the preceding four objections is sufficient. First, to respond to the preceding objection concerning spatial determination: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you also concede that when a sentient being in a dream sometimes sees a village, a garden, or men and women in one place, it is fixed, yet that sentient being's dreaming citta sometimes directs itself toward another place, and in that other place does not see the former village, garden, and so forth, so that the dreaming citta is indeterminate? Do you generally concede that this is consciousness-only, or not?' The Sautrāntika answers: 'In my school, although in a dream the place of the dream object is fixed while the dreaming citta is indeterminate, nevertheless it is not separate from the dreaming citta of the sentient being; it is entirely consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The objective forms of my waking state are also like this. Although the place of a mountain is permanently fixed, the grasping citta of sentient beings is indeterminate; yet none of them are separate from the present citta; all are consciousness-only.' He sets up a formal syllogism (prayoga): 'The objective forms seen in the waking state of our school are the subject (pakṣa / dharmin); they are necessarily consciousness-only is the proposition (pratijñā / sādhya); the reason (hetu) is: "because the place of the object is fixed while the citta is indeterminate"; the example (dṛṣṭānta) is: "like the objects in a dream in your school, which are all consciousness-only."' Second, to respond to the preceding objection concerning temporal determination: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Take, for instance, when a sentient being in a dream sees such things as a village or garden: if the dreaming citta is directing itself toward them, it may be consciousness-only; if it is not directing itself toward them, it should not be consciousness-only.' The Sautrāntika answers: 'Regarding the objects in my dream, if the dreaming citta directs itself toward them, they are consciousness-only; if there are times when the dreaming citta does not direct itself toward them, yet they are not separate from the dreaming citta, they are also consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The objective forms of my waking state are also like this. Now, when I direct myself toward the Southern Mountain for a long time, the mountain is not separate from the citta and is consciousness-only; when there are times I do not direct toward the mountain and the citta does not arise, yet it is not separate from the present citta, it is also consciousness-only.' The verse says: 'Spatial and temporal determination are like in a dream.' This single line answers the preceding two objections. Third, to respond to the objection concerning the indetermination of stream: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you, Sautrāntika, also concede that among numerous hungry ghosts together in one place, three or five among them whose karma is identical will together see a river of pus definitely, while another three or five, following their own karmic power, will have indeterminate perceptions, so that in the very same place some see raging fire, some see excrement and filth, or some see men holding clubs barring the way? Among such hungry ghosts together in one place, half see a fixed object, while half see diverse objects. Do you generally concede that this is the consciousness-only of the hungry ghosts, or not?' The answer is: 'Although what is seen has identity and difference, nevertheless they are not separate from the transformations of the hungry ghosts' own karmic consciousness; all are consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The consciousness-only of my school is also like this. Although one class, all of whom are afflicted with cataract, see differently, and another class, who are not afflicted with cataract, see identically, nevertheless they are not separate from the transformations of consciousness of these two classes of sentient beings; all are consciousness-only.' The verse says: 'Indetermination of stream is like in ghosts, / Who together see rivers of pus and the like.' These two lines of verse answer this single objection. As the verse in the Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā says: '"Indetermination of stream is like in ghosts": in reality it is a clear river, without an external distinct object. Yet the hungry ghosts all together see it as full of pus and flowing; it is not seen by only one. Yet in this place there is actually not the slightest bit of pus or blood to be found; how could there be an overflowing of the banks? Although there is no real object, that it should definitely belong to only one \[person\] is logically impossible. From this it should be known that the citta observing form and so forth, although without an external object, does not have indetermination regarding the stream. If one rejects the nonexistence of objects, then the reason establishing the existence of objects has the fallacy of indetermination (anaikāntika). In a place where there is no object, many streams also collectively observe without determination. How is it that, although there is really no flowing pus, the hungry ghosts do not observe it differently? Because of their shared karma, they are brought to this state and together see flowing pus; their stingy karma ripening, they together see this suffering. Because former shared karma separately perfumed their own substances, at this time the maturation of both appears before them. Those many sentient beings together see this phenomenon; there is really no external object, for it is due to memory. In accord with its principle, for you, noble one, it is also like this. When the perfuming of what was collectively created ripens, there is no distinct characteristic; the nimittabhāga of form and so forth arises from consciousness. Therefore it is definitely known that consciousness does not arise by relying on external objects. Is it not conceded that beings born in this same destiny do not have determinately identical karma? Since one sees differences such as highborn and lowborn families, rich and poor, in this way the forms seen should have differences, just as different kinds of beings see unequally. Therefore one knows this class is different from that; neither do they generate objects like form by the power of external objects. However, although hungry ghosts belong to the same destiny, what they see also differs; because of the different characteristics of their karma, what they see is also like this. Some among them see large, red-hot iron balls boiling and bursting; or at times they see feces and urine overflowing, which are not alike. Although belonging to the human destiny, when a gold belt appears to a person of meager merit, he sees it as an iron shackle, blazing hot and unapproachable, or sees it as a serpent vomiting poisonous fire. Therefore it is definitely known that even within the human destiny they do not see alike. If such classes had no distinct visual nature, it would be because they all have the same kind of karma. However, because those classes have common-share karma, they are born into a common destiny, and because they have individual karma, they see individually. This single capacity, following its power, causes those persons to have identical and different perceptions. Furthermore, by this principle one also answers other assertions: Some say that sentient beings of different destinies, such as ghosts and animals, should not have non-distinct perceptions in the same place, because of the ripening nature of their individually created karma. Although they form different destinies and their karma has differences, the karma of collective observation is still not different. That is, within the personal continuity of sentient beings, individual distinct karmic seeds accompany them; when they encounter their conditions, each arises.' Fourth, to generally answer the three objections within the indetermination of function: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you, Sautrāntika and others, concede that what sentient beings obtain in dreams, such as knives, staves, food, and drink, lacking actual function, is consciousness-only, or not?' The answer is: 'Yes.' He asks again: 'Just as when a sentient being in a dream sometimes emits impurities or discharges urine, having actual function, do you also concede that this is consciousness-only, or not?' The answer is: 'Yes.' The Master of the Treatise answers by analogy: 'Since you concede that in a dream both having actual function and lacking actual function are consciousness-only, then you should know that in my school the afflicted with cataract and the unafflicted, waking and dreaming, as well as an illusory city and a real city—these three pairs all possess actual function, just as in your dream both possessing and lacking actual function are consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise establishes it by a syllogism, saying: 'The waking objective forms of my school are the subject; they are necessarily consciousness-only is the proposition; the reason is: "because they possess actual function"; like the objective forms in your dreams. Otherwise, the objective forms in your dreams are the subject; they should not be consciousness-only is the proposition; the reason is: "because they possess and lack actual function"; like the objective forms in your waking state.' The Triṃśikā verse says: 'As in a dream, an emission has function.' This single line answers the objection regarding objects above. Furthermore, using a single analogy, he generally answers the four objections. The Triṃśikā verse says: 'All is like in hell, / Where they together see the wardens and the like, / Which are able to inflict torment; / Therefore all four points are established.' Take, for instance, mundane spatial determination, temporal determination, indetermination of stream, and indetermination of function: they are also like the punishment seen by suffering sentient beings in hell, which also have spatial determination, temporal determination, indetermination of stream, and indetermination of function. All these are consciousness-only. It is merely that by the predominance of sentient beings' evil karma, although they are in the same hell, when undergoing suffering, the copper dogs, iron serpents, ox-headed hell wardens, and instruments of punishment seen by them may be identical or different. Such instruments of suffering oppress and torment the sinners; these are entirely manifested by the sinners' own citta of evil karma, and there are no real copper dogs and the like outside citta. Mundane phenomena of today are also like this: if sinners share the same hell, it is by the power of collective retribution karma; if they undergo suffering individually, it is by the power of individual retribution karma. The Zhujing yaoji says: 'Regarding sinful conduct: falsely perceiving objects, defiled grasping firmly to self and person, and grasping at agreeable and disagreeable cause both self and others to accomplish evil karma. Therefore a sūtra verse says: "Desire does not arise or cease; / It cannot afflict the citta. / If a person has the idea of a self / And possesses graspings and views, / This person, on account of desire, / Will enter into hell." Therefore, although outside citta there is no distinct object, conforming to that deluded sentiment, they forcefully perceive and generate defilement. It is like seeing objects in a dream, generating greed and anger; conforming to that dreamer, he deems them real and not false, but in true principle there are no objects, and they are only falsely seen by sentiment. Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Like in a dream, where without good things one feels good, without angry things one is angry, and without frightening things one is frightened, sentient beings of the three realms are also like this: because of the slumber of avidyā, where they should not be angry they are angry, and so forth." Therefore one knows that although outside citta there is no distinct object, conforming to that deluded sentiment, false seeing generates defilement. Although outside citta there are no characteristics of hell and the like, when evil karma is accomplished, they falsely see and undergo suffering. As the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra says: "The men of Yama are not sentient beings; sinners see them and deem them sentient beings, holding blazing iron pincers in their hands. When the evil karma of those hell dwellers is exhausted, after their life ends they no longer see the hell wardens of Yama. Why? Because they do not belong to the category of sentient beings. Just as when oil and wick are exhausted there is no lamp, when karma is exhausted it is also like this: they no longer see the hell wardens of Yama. Just as in Jambudvīpa when the light of the sun appears there is no darkness, when evil karma is exhausted, the hell wardens of Yama are also like this: their evil eyes and evil mouths, appearing like sentient beings, their terrifying forms, are all wiped out. Just as when a painted wall is broken, the painting is also destroyed along with it, the painted wall of evil karma is also like this: they no longer see the terrifying forms of the hell wardens of Yama." Corroborated by this text, when the evil karma of sentient beings is such that they should undergo suffering, naturally therein they falsely see hell.' - [Previous: 63.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.63.1) - [Next: 63.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.63.3) - [Up: 63](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.63) ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.63.2) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.63.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.63.2) · Pramāṇa