宗鏡錄 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.4 — 4 parts

7.1

Compiled by Chan Master Zhijue, Yanshou, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.

Now, water is used as an analogy for the true citta because water possesses ten meanings that correspond to the true nature. First, the substance of water is pure and clear, illustrating the intrinsically pure mind. Second, acquiring mud, it becomes turbid, illustrating how the pure mind is defiled without being defiled. Third, though turbid, it does not lose its pure nature, illustrating how the pure mind is defiled yet undefiled. Fourth, when the mud settles, its clarity appears, illustrating how when the delusions of the true citta are exhausted, its nature appears. Fifth, encountering cold, it turns to ice and acquires a hard function, illustrating how the tathāgatagarbha combines with avidyā to form the functions of the fundamental consciousness. Sixth, though it acquires a hard function, it does not lose its moist nature, illustrating that phenomena are constantly the real. Seventh, warmth melts it into moisture, illustrating the fundamental consciousness returning to purity. Eighth, following the wind, waves surge, yet its tranquil nature does not change, illustrating how the tathāgatagarbha follows the wind of avidyā: waves arise and cease, yet its own nature of non-arising and non-ceasing remains invariant. Ninth, following the high and low of the terrain, it is channeled and flows, yet its own nature is not moved, illustrating how the true citta follows conditions in its flow, while its nature is eternally serene. Tenth, it conforms to the square or round shape of vessels without losing its own nature, illustrating how the true nature is omnipresent in all conditioned phenomena without losing its own nature. Moreover, an ancient book says: "Highest virtue is like water; it conforms to square or round as the vessel dictates, bending or straightening along with the shape." As the Hīnayāna Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya also states that all conditioned phenomena have momentary exhaustion: how do we know they have it? Because subsequent existences are exhausted. Since subsequent existences are exhausted, we know that prior existences have perished. Hence the treatise says: "If it arises in this place, it perishes in this very place; it is impossible for it to transition from here to another location." If arising here and perishing here without reaching another location, this aligns with the meaning of non-movement; yet there is a real substance of phenomena that arises and perishes, and so it is not Mahāyāna. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, arising from conditions is devoid of nature: arising is non-arising, perishing is non-perishing; hence movement is itself non-movement, so the principle is worlds apart. Furthermore, the Commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: "Regarding the gate of permanence and impermanence: permanence means the stations of humans and gods are fixed, so there is no going and coming; impermanence means each of the six destinies exhausts a single bodily form, so there is also no going and coming. Furthermore, permanence is motionless and undisturbed, while impermanence changes from thought to thought—who then could be caused to go and come? Thus the phenomena of permanence and impermanence alike do not reach each other; neither has any going and coming." Zhao's Treatise states: "What people call movement is because former things do not arrive at the present; therefore they say movement and not stillness. What I call stillness is also because former things do not arrive at the present; therefore I say stillness and not movement. Movement and not stillness is because they do not arrive; stillness and not movement is because they do not depart. Thus, what is arrived at has never differed, yet what is seen has never been the same. Opposing it is what is called blocked; according with it is what is called penetrating. If one truly grasps its principle, what obstruction could there be? Alas! The delusion of human sentiment has lasted long; facing the real with their eyes, they fail to awaken. Knowing already that past things do not come, they yet claim that present things can go. Since past things do not come, how could present things go? Why is this? Seek past things in the past, and in the past they were never absent; seek past things in the present, and in the present they have never existed. Having never existed in the present shows that things do not come; having never been absent in the past shows that things do not depart. Conversely seeking the present, the present also does not go. This means former things abide of themselves in the past and do not reach the past from the present; present things abide of themselves in the present and do not arrive at the present from the past. Thus Zhongni (Confucius) said: 'Yan Hui perceives the new; as shoulders pass, it is no longer the old.' Thus it is clear that things do not go and come to one another. Since there is not the slightest sign of coming and going, what thing could possibly move?" Commentary: "'Yan Hui perceives the new; as shoulders pass, it is no longer the old' means that Confucius said to Yan Hui: 'Between me and you, in the span of passing shoulders through our whole lives, it has already passed away; how could one wait for white hair and only then change?' The meaning clarifies that each thing is constantly new of itself, and thought to thought they do not reach each other. In the brief moment of passing shoulders, they do not even wait for one another; the former person is already lost—how could one allow that change happens only upon reaching old age? Furthermore, the former thought is already old, and the subsequent thought is constantly new. Meeting all day long, one is constantly seeing a new person; hence it says 'perceives the new.' Such a new person, seen only in the brief moment of passing shoulders, is already the new person of the subsequent thought, not of the time of the former thought. Hence it is said to be 'no longer the old.' If the former thought is already old and the subsequent thought is already new, the new does not arrive at the old, and the old does not await the new; before and after do not reach each other, and so there is no movement. Furthermore, even when two people first meet, in just the brief moment of raising a hand and passing shoulders, it has already passed away; this captures the rapid speed. Hence it is said: 'Former things abide of themselves in the past; present things abide of themselves in the present.' Just as a youthful complexion abides of itself in the body of a youth, while white hair resides of itself in the physical frame of old age. Therefore it says: 'People consider youth and old age to be the same body, a single frame across a hundred years; they merely know that years pass, unaware that physical form follows.' Therefore, when the brahmacārin left home and returned with white hair, his neighbors saw him and asked: 'Is that former person still alive?' The brahmacārin said: 'I resemble the former person, but am not the former person.' The neighbors were all astonished and rejected his words. As is said, 'The strong one carries it on his back and runs off, while the benighted are unaware'—does it not refer to this? 'I resemble the former person': 'resemble' means to be similar. Although my body here is similar to the former person, the youthful complexion abided of itself in the past, and the signs of decline and old age abide of themselves in the present; thus I am not the former person. Hence it says: 'They merely know that years pass, unaware that physical form follows.' Although worldly people know that the months and years belong to the past, how do they realize that the appearance of that time also remained in the past along with the years? Thus youth does not reach old age, and old age does not reach youth; moment to moment they do not know each other, and thought to thought they do not wait for one another. How could youth and prime be the same body, a single frame across a hundred years? Furthermore, the passing of years and the passing of physical form is the meaning of movement; within this very movement is non-movement. Past years reside in past times; past forms reside in past days—this is called non-movement. Yet people claim that the person of past days has moved to the present day; this is called delusion. Furthermore, the past abides of itself in the past, so why must it move to the present? The present abides of itself in the present, so why must it move to the past? Thus the treatise says: 'Therefore, saying they pass does not necessarily mean they pass: past and present constantly abide, because they do not move. Calling it departure does not necessarily mean they depart: it means not arriving at the past from the present, because they do not come.' When the sūtras speak of movement, it is not necessarily moving, because the past resides in the past and the present resides in the present. The reason impermanence is spoken of is to guard against people's clinging to permanence; the reason eternal abiding is spoken of is to guard against people's clinging to annihilation. Although the words differ, the principle is not distinct; though the expressions are contrary, the real does not move. One must not follow the words of expedient existence and nonexistence and become confused about the non-moving nature of the one mind. Another explanation states: like the brahmacārin returning with white hair, whose neighbors considered youth and old age to be the same body and therefore asked, 'Is that former person still alive?' What is called 'the strong one' refers to the three hidings and such matters: impermanence moves secretly, carrying them on its back by force in the dark night; as shoulders pass, things are constantly new, abandoning the old from thought to thought; yet the view of permanence obscures it, deeming it to be fixed. The neighbors were unaware—does it not refer to this? Furthermore, the 'strong one' is the great power of impermanence. In the world there is not a single phenomenon that is not swallowed by impermanence. Thus it says: 'Therefore, Zhuangzi's hiding of the mountain and Zhongni's standing beside the river were both moved by the difficulty of retaining what has passed away; how could they say that present things can be pushed into the past?' Zhuangzi's original intent was to expound the teaching of non-abiding: thought to thought is constantly new; each thing abides individually. Abiding individually, they are mutually dependent yet do not reach each other; this is non-movement. To the confused, it is impermanent and non-abiding, arising and perishing anew with every thought, and they call it movement. If one is wise, one understands that nature is empty and devoid of cognition, and from thought to thought there is no arising; this is called non-movement. Zhuangzi speaks of three hidings: hiding a mountain in a marsh, hiding a boat in a ravine, and hiding the world in the world. To call this 'secure' is not so, for impermanence carries it on its back at midnight and runs off, while the benighted are unaware. As for the three hidings: hiding a person in a house and hiding an object in a vessel—this is the small hiding. Hiding a boat in a ravine and hiding a mountain in a marsh—this is the great hiding. Hiding the world in the world—this is having nowhere to hide. Although large and small differ, each hiding is suitable; yet from thought to thought they flow and shift, altering anew at every moment. From this we know that in the way of transformation, there is nowhere to escape. Now, as for hiding the world in the world: how could it be hidden? It simply means having nowhere to hide. Confucius, standing beside the river, said: 'What passes away is like this, never ceasing day or night!' What passes away departs: surging rapidly, it has never paused for an instant, constant through day and night. This too was a lament over the unawareness of worldly people. Hence it says: 'They were both moved by the difficulty of retaining what has passed away; how could they say that present things can be pushed into the past?' Both Zhuangzi and Confucius lamented the passing away as difficult to retain; both spoke of impermanence departing. How could one push today's things to yesterday? If today does not reach yesterday, then today abides of itself in the present, and yesterday abided of itself in the past; then present and past are distinct, and neither moves. Hence it says: 'Why? People seek the past in the present and claim it does not abide; I seek the present in the past and know that it does not depart. If the present reached the past, the past should have the present; if the past reached the present, the present should have the past. Since the present lacks the past, we know it does not come; since the past lacks the present, we know it does not depart.' If the past does not reach the present and the present does not reach the past, each phenomenon abides in its nature; what thing could there be that comes and goes? The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: 'Human life does not stop, flowing faster than mountain streams.' Now, impermanence has two aspects: first, the impermanence of decay and destruction; second, the impermanence of moment to moment. People only know the impermanence of destruction and perishing, but are unaware of the impermanence of moment to moment. The treatise states: 'It seems moving yet still, resembling departure yet remaining.' The sūtras state that impermanence is swift, resembling flowing movement; yet according to principle, though it is impermanent, before and after do not come and go to each other, so it is like stillness. Though thoughts pass away from moment to moment, past and present abide in their respective natures and are quiet of themselves in their very place, so it is like remaining. Furthermore, though it is said that past and present abide in their respective natures and are quiet of themselves in their very place, yet manifestly from thought to thought they do not abide, continuing before and after. Thus it is neither permanent nor annihilated, neither moving nor still; one perceives the source of the nature of things.

7.3

An ancient master asked: "Abiding in their respective natures seems like the Hīnayāna clinging to all phenomena each possessing its own nature. How does this differ from the patch-robed brahmacārin saying that all sentient beings each have distinct natures?"

7.4.1

Answer: It is spoken in order to dismantle coming and going and make clear that there is no coming and going; hence it speaks based on substance, and thus says that "each abides in its own nature." It is not a doctrine of fixity, for it takes naturelessness as nature. It is not like the non-Buddhists and the two vehicles, who grasp at having a determinate self-nature that moves from this to that. If one does not grasp at there being a determinate nature that comes and goes, neither does one speak of "each abiding in its own nature." Therefore the treatise says: "To speak of going does not necessarily mean going—it puts an end to ordinary people's habitual thoughts; to call it abiding does not necessarily mean abiding—it unpacks that in which people abide, that is all." Furthermore, Liu Zhan's commentary says: "Zhuangzi speaks of hiding the mountain, and Confucius stands by the stream: Zhuangzi's intention was to clarify that the former mountain is not the later mountain; Confucius's intention was to clarify that the former water is not the later water. That which has the strength at midnight to carry it on its back and hasten away is precisely the four periods of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, shifting and flowing uninterruptedly from moment to moment." Therefore, if one apprehends dharmas outside the mind, what is seen in a delusive dream, and in one's sentiments posits coming and going, then from moment to moment one transmigrates, the mind turning along with objects; failing even to perceive the coarse characteristic of impermanence, how could one awaken to the esoteric import of non-shifting? If one is able to see that dharmas are the mind and discern their nature in accordance with conditions, then not a single dharma enters from without, not a single dharma arises from within, not a single dharma exists through combination, and not a single dharma is formed spontaneously. In this way, when one does not even see the slightest hair-tip of an abiding characteristic, how could one view ten thousand dharmas coming and going? This is thoroughly illuminating the source and penetrating the summit to see the nature: thought after thought constantly accords with the Way, and moment to moment never deviates from the source. Going and abiding are simultaneous; past and present are a single thread. Therefore the Lotus Sūtra says: "I view the distant past as if it were today." The Vimalakīrti Sūtra says: "Dharmas have no coming and going, because they constantly do not abide." If one understands this true mind that has nowhere to abide and this wondrous nature that does not alter, only then does one definitively clarify non-shifting. In the treatises cited above, the internal and external scriptures invoked borrow the past and present of worldly characteristics to express and clarify non-shifting, entering together into the real truth. Thus, time is established based on dharmas, while dharmas are originally nonexistent. The substance of the dharmas on which it relies is already empty; how could the past and present that rely upon it exist? If one relies on spatial designations to discern dharmas, pointing to the moon is unobjectionable; but if one conforms to expedients and loses sight of the true, clinging to conceptual understanding and deviating from the source, one errs instead. Thus the Inscription on Faith in Mind says: "Faith and mind are not two; non-duality is faith in mind. The path of words is cut off; it is not past, future, or present." Second, the meaning within the simile of the arising and ceasing of the flame of fire is the same as above. First, 'the flame alone' means that the arising and ceasing of the flame has two meanings: 1. The former flame wanes and ceases, inducing the later flame; the later flame has no substance and can know the former, while the former flame has already ceased and again has nothing to be known; therefore, each does not know the other. 2. If the former flame has not yet ceased, it also relies on what went before to be induced; having no substance, it has no capacity to know, while the later flame has not yet arrived, so there is nothing to be known; therefore, they also do not know each other. Delusive dharmas are also like this: arising and ceasing moment to moment, they cannot establish themselves. That which has already ceased and that which has not yet arisen have no object that can be known; once arisen, they immediately cease, having no substance that can be known. Therefore, they are entirely nonexistent. This is precisely [what is meant by] "melting gold and cracking stone, yet it is not hot." Second, 'relying on what is relied upon' means that because that flame of fire has no substance, no function, and lacks mutual knowledge, it has the false characteristics of arising and ceasing. This is grasping the nonexistent to make it existent. Delusive dharmas are also like this: relying on this true principle that has nothing to rely upon, they are then delusive dharmas; this too is taking the nonexistent to be existent. Third, 'what is relied upon alone' means: inquiring into the arising and ceasing flame, substance and function are both absent; the principle of the non-flame stands forth and manifests prominently. This is having no existence of delusive dharmas, while the nonexistence of delusive dharmas is serenely manifest. Consequently, it causes the characteristics of dependent origination to have no characteristic that is not exhausted, and the principle of naturelessness to have no principle that is not manifest. Furthermore, fire exists in reliance on fuel: fuel is the combustible, and fire is the burning. Since burning depends on the combustible, burning has no substance; since the combustible depends on burning, the combustible has no substance. Moreover, the former flame has already ceased, the later flame has not yet arisen, and in the middle there is no abiding. Just as on a single thought there are three times: having ceased is having already arisen; not yet arisen is not yet arisen; once arisen, it immediately diminishes—this is the time of arising. Therefore the Vimalakīrti Sūtra says: "If it is past arising, past arising has already ceased; if it is future arising, future arising has not yet arrived; if it is present arising, present arising does not abide." A sūtra says: "Monk, you right at this moment also arise, also age, and also cease." Therefore, the three times have no substance and have nothing that can know each other. Third, relying on the wind having movement similes delusive functions arising in reliance on the real; the three meanings are the same as above. First, 'movement alone' means that apart from the object moved, the moving characteristic of the wind is completely ungraspable; there is nothing that can know the other. Delusive dharmas are also like this: because they cannot be found apart from the real substance upon which they rely, there is nothing that can know the other. This is precisely [what is meant by] "swirling gales toppling mountains, yet it is constantly still." Second, 'relying on what is relied upon' means that the wind cannot move of itself; it must rely on objects to manifest movement. Movement has no self-substance that could know the object; the object does not move of itself, and following the wind it has no substance and cannot know. Among dharmas, the reliant delusive dharmas must rely on the real to be established; lacking substance, they know the real; the real follows the delusive into concealment, and having no characteristic, it knows the delusive. Third, 'what is relied upon alone' means that when the wind stirs an object, the movement is solely the object's movement; the characteristics of the wind are completely exhausted, and there is nothing that can know the other. The functioning of delusive dharmas is originally empty of own-nature; only the real that is relied upon stands forth and manifests prominently. Therefore, delusive dharmas are completely exhausted yet do not cease; the true nature is completely concealed yet constantly exposed. The perfumer and the perfumed, and so forth, are naturally so in the dharmas themselves; contemplate this and it can be seen. Fourth, relying on the earth having the capacity to uphold similes the delusive being upheld by the real; the three meanings are the same as above. First, the earth-element's causal reliance has two meanings: 1. In terms of its own kind; 2. In terms of different kinds. In the former, from the vajra-stratum up to the surface of the earth, all above rely on below, and below upholds above, reciprocally serving as cause and reliance so that they achieve stable abiding. Yet the upper that relies has no substance apart from that which it relies upon to be able to know the lower; and the lower that upholds also has no substance apart from that which it upholds to be able to know the upper. Furthermore, the highest that rely reach all the way down to the lower without any lower that can know each other; the lowest that uphold...

7.4.2

penetrating completely to the top, with nothing above to know one another. Therefore, whether relying or holding, the characteristics are entirely exhausted. One should know that the manifested false phenomena are also like this: the coarse necessarily relies on the subtle. That is to say, bitter retribution relies on karma; karma relies on being created by ignorance; ignorance relies on what is created—mutually without substance, with no entity that can know another. This, then, is to bear the myriad things heavily without benevolence. Master Zhao also said: 'Even if heaven and earth were overturned, do not say that there is no stillness.' Laozi said: 'Heaven and earth are not benevolent; they treat the myriad things as straw dogs.' A sūtra says: 'Just like the great earth bearing four heavy loads without weariness.' 'Not benevolent' means not relying on benevolent virtue. Just like straw dogs, how could they have the ability to bark and keep watch? Therefore it is said: 'Only the Way is without mind, and the myriad things are completely equipped.'
Second, in terms of different categories: as a sūtra says, 'The earth circle relies on the water circle; the water circle relies on the wind circle; the wind circle relies on space; space has nothing on which it relies.' In accordance with this, false objects rely on the false mind; the false mind relies on the fundamental consciousness; the fundamental consciousness relies on the tathāgatagarbha; and the tathāgatagarbha has nothing on which it relies. Therefore, apart from the tathāgatagarbha, all other false phenomena rely mutually on each other, having no substance capable of knowing one another. This being so, none of the false phenomena fail to be completely exhausted.
Second, regarding relying on that which is relied upon: it is precisely because each lacks self-nature that the earth realm can be established. If they previously had a substance, they would not rely on each other. Because they would not rely on each other, phenomena could not exist. Therefore, grasping this absence of nature to form those phenomena, the phenomena are united and can be known.
Third, regarding being solely that which is relied upon: this means that in grasping the absence of nature to form those phenomena, those phenomena are entirely exhausted without ever not ceasing, and only the principle of the absence of nature uniquely manifests before one.
Question: Furthermore, since they do not know one another, due to what conditions are there varieties?
Answer: There are four causes for this: first, due to false discrimination; second, the perfuming of the consciousnesses; third, due to the absence of nature not knowing one another; fourth, tathatā following conditions. However, these four causes are merely of one accord: namely, due to false discrimination serving as a condition, tathatā is made not to maintain its own nature, but to follow conditions and become existence. The perfuming of the consciousnesses continues mutually without end. If one reaches the source of falsehood, it forms pure dependent origination.
Regarding the previous doubt: 'Is it varieties, or is it one nature?' Now the answer is: 'It is constantly varieties, and constantly one nature.'
Moreover, the objection says: 'If the one nature follows varieties, then the ultimate truth is lost; if varieties follow the one nature, then the conventional truth is destroyed.'
Now the answer is: these two mutually establish each other; how could they oppose each other? Nature is not outside of phenomena; how has it ever opposed varieties? Varieties are empty of nature; how have they ever opposed the one nature? Because of the absence of nature, there is existence: the one nature can form varieties. Because of arising through conditions, there is emptiness: varieties can form the one nature.
Therefore, the phenomena of dependent origination have, in general, four meanings: first, existence because of arising through conditions—namely, the existence of the discrimination of the false mind and the perfuming of the consciousnesses; second, emptiness because of arising through conditions—namely, that all phenomena have no function and also have no substance or nature; third, existence because of the absence of nature—because of the meaning of emptiness, all phenomena can be established; fourth, emptiness because of the absence of nature—namely, that everything is empty and without nature.
Furthermore, nature has two meanings: first, existence; second, emptiness. Again, there are two meanings: first, unchanging; second, following conditions. Because of the meaning of existence, it is said to be revealed by the two emptinesses, which is the original non-arising of dharmatā. Because of the meaning of emptiness, other-dependent nature is said to be without nature, which is the thoroughly established nature; that is, they do not know each other. Because of the meaning of existence, it is said to be unchanging. Because of the meaning of emptiness, it is said to follow conditions. These two are not two: following conditions is precisely unchanging; because it is unchanging, it can follow conditions. If it were solely the unchanging nature, what would it have to do with phenomena? If it merely followed conditions, how could it be called the true nature?
Moreover, if nature were separated from phenomena, it would result in annihilation; if phenomena were separated from nature, then what originally did not exist would now exist. Furthermore, if phenomena were identical with nature, since nature is permanent, [phenomena] should be permanent; if nature were identical with phenomena, since phenomena cease, [nature] should cease. These two mutually complete each other, being neither permanent nor annihilated; these two mutually cancel each other, being neither existent nor empty. This constitutes the meaning of the Middle Way.
A sūtra verse says:
'Eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body,
Citta, manas, and all the sense faculties:
Through these there is constant transmigration,
Yet there is no one who can transmigrate.'
Because the eight consciousnesses, such as the eyes and so on, act as the active and passive perfumers, mutually serving as causes, there is constant transmigration; there is no separate self or person, which is why it says 'yet there is no one who can transmigrate.' Therefore, it is only when the entire substance is empty of nature that transmigration is established. Precisely because these eight consciousnesses each lack a substance or nature, there is no real self or phenomenon to serve as their master. If they previously had a nature, they could not be perfumed or transformed; how could there be transmigration? Therefore, one knows that the similarities and differences among destinies and births, and the beauty or ugliness of received retributions, all stem from consciousness seeds and all rely on citta—like a flow relying on water, like fire relying on firewood. Continuously without knowing, freshly renewing without abiding. The good destinies and bad destinies are the general retribution: due to karma perfuming citta, one receives the retribution that is to be received, just as water drifts and flows without interruption. Although there is transmigration, there is no transmigrator; hence it says: 'Through these there is constant transmigration, / Yet there is no one who can transmigrate.'
An explanatory treatise says: 'Like a torrential waterfall, neither annihilated nor permanent, continuing for a long time, having that which it drifts and drowns. This consciousness is also like this: from beginningless time, moment to moment, fruits arise as causes cease. Because fruits arise, it is not annihilated; because causes cease, it is not permanent. It drifts and drowns sentient beings, causing them not to escape.'
The Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'All sentient beings are submerged by the waves of a great torrent.'
The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'The ocean of the storehouse consciousness is constantly abiding, moved by the winds of objects.'
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Constantly turning like a torrential flow.'
The Awakening of Faith says: 'Like the water of the great ocean having waves moving due to the wind,' and so forth.
Furthermore, within falsity there are two meanings: first, false turning; second, absence of turning. Therefore, it is constantly varieties and constantly one nature. Because of false turning, the conventional is not different from the ultimate, and conventional characteristics are established. Because of the absence of turning, the ultimate is not different from the conventional, and the ultimate substance is preserved. Therefore, they do not contradict each other.
Regarding 'the dharmatā is originally unarisen': as for 'dharmatā', 'dharma' refers to distinct phenomena such as dependent and proper [retribution], and 'nature' refers to the essential nature upon which those phenomena rely—that is, the nature of phenomena.

7.4.3

Therefore it is called dharmatā. Furthermore, 'nature' has the meaning of being unvarying; being that which can serve as a standard (guǐ), it is also called 'dharma'. In this case, nature is dharma, so it is called 'dharmatā'. Both of these meanings are explained in terms of being unvarying. Furthermore, since all phenomena (dharma) lack their own nature, it is called dharmatā. That is, the nature that conforms to conditions: dharma is nature. As for 'originally unproduced', 'originally' has two senses. First, in terms of being unvarying: 'original' means the primary origin; it is originally unproduced, yet produced because it accords with conditions. Second, in terms of according with conditions: ever since this dharma arose, it is fundamentally of itself unproduced, not waiting for cessation to become non-existent. That is, when manifested as arising, it is fundamentally unproduced. Therefore it is said: 'Herein there is no agent that manifests, nor is there any object manifested.' Then, through the discrimination of the false mind, affective reckoning deems it to exist. However, existence is non-existence; therefore it is said: 'All is empty and without nature.' It is constantly existing and constantly empty. This is precisely the self-emptiness of all things—how could one wait for cutting and dissection to achieve penetration? Furthermore, in terms of mutual dependence and mutual negation, 'not knowing one another' is explained. As for 'mutual dependence': without the seed of consciousness, karma cannot directly produce the substance; without the seed of karma, consciousness cannot incur suffering or pleasure. Since they depend on each other, they each lack an intrinsic nature. As for 'mutual negation': when karma negates the cause, [the result] is incurred solely by karma, so the cause is like empty space; when the cause negates the condition, citta alone constitutes the substance, so karma is like empty space. Negating each other and standing independently, they cannot know each other either; when they negate each other and both perish, there is nothing that can know. Furthermore, by being unproduced, they do not know each other. Because conditions negate the cause, it is not produced from itself; because the cause negates conditions, it is not produced from another. When cause and conditions are examined together, being mutually dependent they lack nature, so they are not produced from both. When they negate each other and both perish, how could it be produced without a cause? By taking this non-production as analogous to unknowing, it is obviously easy to understand: taking the cause as self, the condition as other, their combination as both, and departing from these as without cause. When they mutually exist, they still do not know each other; when they mutually do not exist, how could they know each other? Therefore we know that all phenomena are mutually dependent and all lack intrinsic nature. As stated in the 'Examination of Mutual Dependence' in the Madhyamakaśāstra, when the non-empty is refuted, empty phenomena also perish. The verse says: / 'If there were any unreal dharma, / Then there would be a real dharma. / In reality, there is no unreal dharma; / How could there be a real dharma?' / It is also like speaking of purity because of defilement: the nature of defilement is fundamentally non-existent; how could the characteristic of purity exist? This single approach of mutual dependence completely refutes all phenomena, because all phenomena exist dependently; never has there been a single dharma that could stand independently. Therefore the *Hetupratyayanirātmaśāstra* says: 'Ānanda and Devadatta were both the World-Honoured One's cousins; Rāhula and Sunakkhatta were likewise both descendants of the Tathāgata. Yet Ānanda constantly served him closely, whereas Devadatta repeatedly caused harm and rebellion; Rāhula protected the jewel and never violated it, while Sunakkhatta was like a broken vessel that could not be restored. Viewing it from this, it may surely be known.' If one says that each has an intrinsic nature that cannot be transformed or exchanged, this is completely wrong. As when a hawk turns into a dove, its original mind completely vanishes; when a mandarin orange becomes a bitter orange, its former taste is gone forever. Therefore we know that both sentient and insentient things lack a fixed nature; they only transform in accordance with the mind and arise solely following karma. Consequently, there is the gate of entering the noble from the ordinary, and the matter of transforming evil into good. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* says: 'Realising that the lack of nature of all phenomena is their nature, being completely and ultimately fulfilled—only this is called Buddha.' Therefore we know that the establishment of the Three Jewels and the gates of performing Buddha-deeds all arise and become manifest from causes and conditions devoid of intrinsic nature. For this reason, the *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra* says: 'At that time, the Elder Mahākāśyapa addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, I think that the Youth Mañjuśrī in past ages already performed Buddha-deeds, manifested sitting at the bodhimanda, turned the wheel of Dharma, and showed all sentient beings entering great parinirvāṇa." The Buddha said: "So it is, so it is. […] Even to, Kāśyapa, you should now observe the power of the śūraṅgamasamādhi: by virtue of this power, all great bodhisattvas manifest entering the womb, initial birth, leaving home, going to the bodhi tree, sitting at the bodhimanda, turning the wondrous wheel of Dharma, entering parinirvāṇa, and distributing relics, yet without relinquishing the dharmas of a bodhisattva, not being utterly extinguished in parinirvāṇa." At that time, the Elder Mahākāśyapa spoke to Mañjuśrī, saying: "Virtuous one, you are able to perform such rare and difficult feats, manifesting them to sentient beings!" Mañjuśrī said: "Kāśyapa, what do you think? By whom was this Gṛdhrakūṭa Mountain made? From where did this world emerge?" Kāśyapa answered, saying: "Mañjuśrī, all worlds are formed of water foam, and also emerge from sentient beings' inconceivable karma, causes, and conditions." Mañjuśrī said: "All phenomena likewise exist from inconceivable karma, causes, and conditions. I have no effort or capacity in this matter. Why is that? All phenomena belong to causes and conditions and have no master; they are accomplished in accordance with thought. If one can understand this, what one does is not difficult."' Explanation: If one understands that all phenomena belong to causes and conditions, all lack intrinsic nature, and are merely produced from citta, then in whatever is done, how could one rely on effort? By the principle of non-nature and the gate of naturally suchness, rolling up and expanding according to conditions, one is self-mastered and unhindered. A verse of the *Avataṃsakasūtra* says: / 'Contemplating according to their mind-nature, / Searching thoroughly to the end, it cannot be found. / All phenomena without remainder / All enter into Suchness without substantial nature.' / Another verse says: / 'Just like the original nature of tathatā, / Wherein not a single dharma has ever existed, / Not attaining an intrinsic nature is the true nature: / With such action one dedicates [merit].' / The *Avataṃsaśāstra* says: 'All sentient beings are confused about fundamental wisdom and therefore have worldly dharmas of suffering and pleasure; because wisdom has no nature of its own, according with conditions without awareness, karma of suffering and pleasure arises. Because wisdom has no nature of its own, being entangled by suffering, they are only then able to awaken for themselves to the fundamental absence of nature: many conditions lack nature, and all phenomena are naturally quiescent. When not aware of suffering, because of the absence of nature, they altogether do not know for themselves whether there is a nature or no nature. Just as a person falls because of the ground and rises because of the ground, all sentient beings fall because of the fundamental wisdom of their own minds, and likewise rise because of it.'

7.4.4

Furthermore, because the substance of wisdom has no nature, it merely manifests according to conditions—like an echo in the sky, producing sound in response to objects. Wisdom without nature merely makes distinctions in response to conditions; because of distinction, delusion and desire arise in succession. Furthermore, the Madhyamakaśāstra, refuting the verse that there should be no Tathāgata, says: / “Those with deep and thick wrong views / will say there is no Tathāgata. / The Tathāgata is of the characteristic of quietude; / to distinguish [him] as existent is also wrong. / In this way, within the emptiness of nature, / thinking [of him] is also inadmissible. / After the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa, / one discriminates between existence and non-existence.” / Next, a verse sweeping it all away says: / “The Tathāgata transcends conceptual proliferation, / yet people produce conceptual proliferation. / Conceptual proliferation destroys the wisdom eye; / none of them see the Buddha.” / The commentary on the treatise explains: “Conceptual proliferation is called recollection, discriminating this and that, and so forth.” In this Chapter on the Tathāgata, in the beginning, middle, and end, a determinate nature of the Tathāgata cannot be found, and even up to the fivefold search and the four lemmas, none are correct. Therefore the verse says: / “The Tathāgata has no nature; / that is the nature of the world. / The Tathāgata has no nature; / the world also has no nature.” / By the meaning of the single emptiness of nature of the Tathāgata, one knows that all worldly phenomena are entirely without nature, identical with the meaning of the Tathāgata. In the Huayan yanyi, it quotes a verse from the Lotus Sūtra: / “Although the Buddhas of future ages / preach hundreds of thousands of millions / of countless approaches to the Dharma, / in truth it is for the sake of the One Vehicle. / The Buddhas, the two-footed honoured ones, / know that phenomena are eternally without nature. / The Buddha-seed arises from conditions; / therefore they preach the One Vehicle. / These phenomena abide in the Dharma-position; / the worldly characteristics are eternally abiding. / Having known this at the place of awakening, / the Guide preaches by expedient means.” / Now, only two lines are cited to reveal that all phenomena are without nature, establishing the meaning of the single nature. However, the various commentaries differ regarding the three verses above. Now we directly interpret the sūtra text. The first verse clarifies that the Buddha opens up the provisional and ultimately returns to the one real; hence it says: “in truth it is for the sake of the One Vehicle.” The next verse explains the reason for preaching the One Vehicle: because there is only one nature. That is to say, if there were two natures, there might be room for two vehicles; since there is only one nature, therefore the One Vehicle is preached. “Knowing that phenomena are eternally without nature”: “knowing” means knowing by realization; “phenomena” means the phenomena realized and known, which are all phenomena such as form and mind. “Eternally without nature” is the principle that is realized; it means awakening to all phenomena according to the principle of no nature. What is “no nature”? It means that form, mind, and the like, from the very beginning, have nature and characteristics that are empty and tranquil—neither self nor other, neither combined nor separated, serenely ever tranquil; hence it is called “no nature”. And as for saying “eternally”, it means they are originally non-existent, not made non-existent by deduction; hence it is said to be “eternally without nature”. “The Buddha-seed arises from conditions”: there are two meanings. First, in terms of the causal seed: the causal seed is the direct-cause Buddha-nature. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: “Buddha-nature is the seed of the middle way of supreme bodhi.” This seed is the aforementioned principle of eternal non-nature. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: “Buddha-nature is the emptiness of the ultimate truth.” “No nature” is the meaning of emptiness. “Conditions” are the six pāramitās and myriad practices, which are the conditioning-cause Buddha-nature, giving rise to that direct cause so that Buddhahood is attained. “Therefore they preach the One Vehicle”: only by using Buddha-nature to give rise to Buddha-nature, with no other nature remaining, is the One Vehicle preached—preaching in accord with principle. That which is identical in substance is called “nature”; that which is mutually similar is called “seed”. Therefore Guanzhong said: “Just as rice naturally generates rice and does not generate other grains—this belongs to nature. The sprouts, stalks, flowers, and grains are of a kind without distinction—this belongs to seed.” Second, the resultant seed-nature: Guanzhong said: “The Buddha-reward is only the Buddha; its principle is without discrepancy—this is the meaning of nature. Preaching the Dharma to liberate people is in every kind similar—this is the meaning of seed.” The resultant seed-nature arises conditioned by true principle; hence it is said to be “from conditions”. Therefore, in explaining this verse, it is said: “Buddhas arise conditioned by principle; since principle is not dual, therefore the One Vehicle is preached.” The meaning is that by realizing principle one accomplishes Buddhahood, and in accord with principle one preaches the One. Here, the verse “knowing that phenomena are eternally without nature” is entirely identical to what is said in the “Chapter on the Manifestation of the Tathāgata” in the Huayan Sūtra: “When the Tathāgata accomplished true awakening, within his body he universally saw all sentient beings accomplishing true awakening, up to universally seeing all sentient beings entering nirvāṇa, all identical in one nature—namely, having no nature—up to, because of knowing that all phenomena are entirely without nature, he attained all-knowledge, and with great compassion continuous, he rescued and liberated sentient beings.” This means knowing that they have no nature, because the Buddha-nature is identical. In accordance with the sūtra text, because of knowing that there is no nature, when one attains [it], all attain [it]—how much more so should one preach the One Vehicle to liberate them! The subsequent verse says: “These phenomena abide in the Dharma-position,” etc., re-explaining the previous verse. “These phenomena” refers to the previously known phenomena. The reason they are eternally without nature is that they abide in the correct position of tathatā. Because conditions have no nature, conditioned arising is itself the real. Because it is itself the real, it is said to have “no nature”. “Dharma-position” refers to the correct position of tathatā. Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says that dharmatā, dharmadhātu, the abiding of phenomena, and the position of phenomena are all alternate names for tathatā. Worldly phenomena are identical with tathatā, and therefore are all eternally abiding. That is to say, because of diverging from the eternal principle, the impermanence of the three realms is formed; if one understands the reality of impermanence, then impermanence itself becomes eternal. Thus the two principles of permanence and impermanence are not one-sided. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra compares them to two birds flying and roosting together. Now, at the place of awakening, he realized and knew that all worldly impermanence is identical with the principle of true permanence—just like a mirror hung in a high hall reflecting all myriad images; they are two yet not two, beyond verbal expression. By the power of expedient means, they are provisionally expressed in words. Even the One Vehicle is a provisional expression, how much more so two or three! Thus the principle of the One Vehicle is supreme, with no principle surpassing it; the source of non-nature is unmatched by any school. It can indeed be called the backbone of the mirror of the source, the guide of the ancestral teachings. Therefore the Sandhinirmocanasūtra says: “All phenomena are without self-nature, unarisen and unceasing, originally quiet, by self-nature nirvāṇa.” The Śreṣṭhīdevaputraparipṛcchāsūtra says: “If a phenomenon is non-existent, it is not autonomous; if it is not autonomous, it is devoid of desire; if it is devoid of desire, it is the true nature; if it is the true nature, it is called having no nature.”

7.5

Record of the Mirror of the Source, Fascicle Seven

Linked texts (1)

宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese