[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt) › 71 # 宗鏡錄 71 English (machine translation) 71 - **Language:** English ### [71.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.1) Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Temple. ### [71.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.2) \[Question:\] Citta does not arise in isolation; it arises only by relying on an object. Is there any case where it arises without relying on an objective archetype? ### [71.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.3) Answer: There is. Bodhisattva Dharmapāla said: 'Mind in its arising does not necessarily have an archetype.' The correct doctrine is that regarding the mediate objective condition, its presence or absence is indefinite; without depending on an archetype, mind is still able to arise in the sphere of consciousness-only. As for the immediate nimittabhāga, if it had to depend on an external archetype to arise, Ci'en said: 'Truly, I fear this principle would contradict consciousness-only.' Regarding the eighth and sixth consciousnesses having or lacking \[archetypes\] indefinitely: when the eight consciousnesses cognize objects, the first five and the seventh definitely have archetypes. If the eighth consciousness cognizes the supporting sensory matter of another person, the receptacle realm of another world, or form produced by meditative absorption (dhyānaphala-rūpa), it then has an archetype. If it cognizes its own three realms, it is solely an immediate transformation and immediate cognition, and thus has no archetype. If the sixth consciousness cognizes the present eighteen dhātus, it may have an archetype; if it cognizes the past eighteen dhātus or cognizes phenomena lacking substance, what could serve as the archetype? Therefore, we know that whether the sixth and eighth consciousnesses rely on archetypes is indefinite. Regarding form produced by meditative absorption, there are transformations (biàn) and creations (huà). 'Transformations' means that it relies on an archetype, so there is an archetype. 'Creations' means that it is detached from an archetype. If it arises in dependence on something else, that has the meaning of transformation—relying on something else as the archetype to transform an image of its own, such as churning a long river into ghee, or transforming the great earth into gold; these all have archetypes. If it is produced by the power of meditative absorption, that has the meaning of creation—creation detached from an archetype, suddenly existing from non-existence, like flowers in empty space, creating towers, the seven jewels, and so forth; these are all created detached from archetypes by the meditative mind. One should formulate four propositions to differentiate the presence or absence of the archetype, nimittabhāga, and the three realms: 1. There is an archetype and nimittabhāga, which is a real objective realm of nature (xìngjìng): namely, the first five consciousnesses, the initial moment of distinct manovijñāna, and a small part of solitary manovijñāna. 2. There is an archetype and nimittabhāga, which is unreal: namely, the solitary shadow with an archetype (yǒuzhì dúyǐng) and the realm with substance (dàizhìjìng). 3. There is no archetype and there is a nimittabhāga, which is unreal: namely, the solitary shadow without an archetype (wúzhì dúyǐng). 4. There is no archetype and there is a nimittabhāga, which is a real objective realm of nature: namely, the eighth citta-king cognizing the three realms, and fundamental wisdom cognizing suchness. Furthermore, the Piexing chao states: 'Objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) means that because it is the locus deliberated upon by the mind, it is called the ālambana (object). It is this very objective realm that also attracts the mind to arise; because it is that which the mind relies upon, it is also called pratyaya (condition). Thus the object acting as a condition is called an objective condition. Condition is the substance; object is the function. Within the six consciousnesses, the object is itself the condition: this is a karmadhāraya compound.' Now to first establish the correct doctrine: Master Guptā does not understand the meaning of ālambanapratyaya in our Mahāyāna. In our Mahāyāna, when it is said that it 'bears its own characteristic' (dài zǐ xiāng), 'bearing' (dài) and 'its own characteristic' (zǐ xiāng) each have two meanings. 'Bearing' has two meanings: first, holding directly (xiédài), where the cognizing mind directly holds the substance of the object and cognizes it; second, transformative bearing (biàndài), where the cognizing mind transforms into a nimittabhāga and cognizes it. 'Its own characteristic' also has two meanings: first, the essential characteristic (tǐxiāng) is called characteristic; second, the apparent form (xiāngzhuàng) is called characteristic. First, regarding holding directly the essential characteristic: fundamental wisdom cognizing tathatā is cognizing by holding directly the essential characteristic, which is an objective condition; and likewise, the inner two parts cognizing each other, as well as the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga, are also holding directly the essential characteristic, termed objective conditions, meaning that the cognizing mind directly holds the inner two parts' darśana and nimitta. Second, regarding transformative bearing of the apparent form: there are two differing interpretations. First, the author of the Longxing chao says: defiled citta and caittas, as well as the darśanabhāga of undefiled subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), when cognizing objects, transform into characteristics and cognize them; without distinguishing whether there is an archetype or no archetype, all are called 'bearing' by transformative bearing, and called 'characteristic' by apparent form, serving as objective conditions. Second, the Xianyou chao says: when the darśanabhāga of the eight consciousnesses cognizes its own immediate characteristic, it is always holding directly. However, although many say this, I fear the principle is not so. If it were so, there would be three faults: 1. The fault of no distinction between holding directly and transformative bearing: cognizing by directly holding the substance of the object is called holding directly, while cognizing by transforming into a nimittabhāga is called transformative bearing. Now, if you call the nimittabhāga 'holding directly', we know there is no distinction. 2. The fault of contradiction between modern and ancient: the ancient view of holding directly slightly violated the principle, but regarding transformative bearing, there was no violation. Now saying that the nimittabhāga is holding directly, while the ancients said transformative bearing—how could they not contradict each other? 3. The fault that transformative bearing only cognizes an archetype: could a nimittabhāga without an archetype not be a transformation of mind? Now, inferring by principle: whatever is a nimittabhāga, regardless of whether it has an archetype or no archetype, is called transformative bearing. If it does not transform into a nimittabhāga but directly adheres to the substance of the object, it is called holding directly. For this reason, the Tang Tripiṭaka Master \[Xuanzang\] used 'holding directly' to rescue the former doctrine, because ancient Mahāyāna masters only explained transformative bearing. Next, refuting the Hīnayāna meaning of objective condition based on the treatise has two parts. First, refuting the masters of the Saṃmatīya school. The author of the treatise states: 'The object cognized by the five consciousnesses means that the cognizing consciousness arises bearing its characteristic, and it has real substance, causing the cognizing consciousness to arise relying upon it. If you, masters of the Saṃmatīya school, say that the meaning of objective condition consists solely of the single meaning of being capable of generating consciousness, and do not accept that the cognizing eye-consciousness arises bearing its characteristic, then it should not be an objective condition.' The Mahāyāna inference (anumāna) states: \[Thesis:\] Your eye-consciousness's objective condition is the subject (dharmin); \[Probandum:\] It should not be the objective condition of the eye-consciousness. \[Reason:\] Because it only possesses the single meaning of being capable of generating consciousness. \[Example:\] Like the causal condition (hetupratyaya) of the eye-consciousness. And conversely, establishing an inference to refute them: \[Thesis:\] Your eye-consciousness's causal condition is the subject; \[Probandum:\] It should be the objective condition of the eye-consciousness. \[Reason:\] Because it possesses the single meaning of being capable of generating \[consciousness\]. \[Example:\] Like when the eye cognizes form. The meaning here is: if ancient Mahāyāna masters did not speak of holding directly, then when fundamental wisdom cognizes tathatā as an objective condition, the meaning would seem flawed. If the Saṃmatīya does not accept transformative bearing, then when the eye-consciousness cognizes form, the meaning of objective condition cannot be established. Next, refuting the Sautrāntika masters: the author of the treatise states: 'It is incorrect for you Sautrāntika masters to make external, aggregated, nominal form into an objective condition. Even granted that your eye-consciousness bears that gross form-characteristic and it is granted to be an ālambana, it still cannot be called a condition (pratyaya). For the nominal form you cling to lacks real substance, just as an eye-consciousness in error sees a second moon. That \[second moon\] lacks real substance and cannot generate consciousness; it is only called an ālambana, and cannot be called a pratyaya. Aggregated nominal form is just the same.' Setting up an inference to refute them: \[Thesis:\] Your aggregated gross form is the subject; \[Probandum:\] Even if it is the ālambana of the eye-consciousness, it is not a pratyaya. \[Reason:\] Because you maintain it is nominal and lacks real substance. \[Example:\] Like the second moon. The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: 'The aggregate to the five consciousnesses, Even if an object, is not a condition, Because its substance is really non-existent, Just like the second moon.' A Sautrāntika may adhere to this view: 'Although aggregated gross form is nominal, the individual subtle atoms (paramāṇu) that constitute it are truly real; each is able to act as a condition to induce and generate the five consciousnesses—why would that not be acceptable?' The author of the treatise refutes this: 'Even if the subtle atoms that constitute aggregated form and so on are granted to be conditions, they are still not objects (ālambana), because the arising of consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic of those subtle atoms, just as the arising of the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic of the visual faculty. The five faculties such as the eye can only generate the five consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness, yet the five consciousnesses cannot cognize the five faculties.' Taking the faculty as an example, an inference is established: \[Thesis:\] Your subtle atoms that constitute form and so on are the subject; \[Probandum:\] Even if they are conditions for the five consciousnesses, they are not objects. \[Reason:\] Because the arising of the five consciousnesses does not bear their characteristics. \[Example:\] Like the five faculties. The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: 'Subtle atoms to the five consciousnesses, Even if granted \[to be conditions\], are not objects, Because their nimittabhāga is non-existent, Just like the visual faculty and so on.' As for the doctrine of the masters of the eighteen schools, because they already accept bearing its characteristic, they are not refuted here. Now, for the correct interpretation: the Commentary says: 'It means if a phenomenon exists, it bears its own characteristic.' As for the phrase 'if a phenomenon exists' (yǒufǎ), there are two interpretations. First, the Xianyou chao explains: 'An existing phenomenon' means a real phenomenon with substance, excluding nominal phenomena and the substance-lacking phenomena of pervasive conceptualization (parikalpita), which are merely objects (ālambana) and do not constitute conditions (pratyaya). In order to be a condition, it must be a real phenomenon with substance, possessing efficacy and function, capable of drawing forth and generating consciousness—that is, the consummate (pariniṣpanna) and other-dependent (paratantra) natures, which are phenomena with substance. Second, the Longxing states: 'What is called an existing phenomenon' refers to the other-dependent and consummate natures; because they have substance, they are able to attract the mind and are termed conditions, not extending to what lacks substance. If it is pervasive conceptualization, because it lacks substance, there is only an object, not the substance of a condition. If it is an object, its substance extends to both existence and non-existence. ### [71.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.4) Question: Since the imaginary (parikalpita) is also devoid of substance and cannot produce citta, how can it be called an object-condition (ālambanapratyaya)? ### [71.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.5) Answer: The substanceless object is produced depending on conditions that have substance; it exists only as a false superimposition upon phenomena that have substance, and is not a condition. Between the two interpretations, the latter interpretation is correct. ### [71.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.6) Question: What fault is there in the former interpretation? ### [71.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.7) Answer: If the former interpretation takes 'an existent phenomenon' (dharmavat) as solely denoting real phenomena as the object-condition—although many former virtuous ones certainly held to this meaning, when briefly deduced and investigated now, there are three faults. First, the fault of stubbornly contradicting the commentary's text: if nominal phenomena were not possessed of substance, why did the author of the commentary use the two natures of the dependent (paratantra) and the consummate (pariniṣpanna) to delineate the substances of the hundred dharmas? For the hundred dharmas encompass both the nominal and the real. To say now that nominal phenomena are devoid of substance—how could that not be contradictory? Second, the fault of no distinction from the imaginary: since nominal phenomena of the dependent and consummate natures are said to be devoid of substance, what distinction is there between them and the substancelessness of the imaginary? The treatise states, 'The dependent and consummate are existent; the imaginary is non-existent.' How could that not be contradictory? Third, the fault that the analogy of 'an existent phenomenon' fails to hold: regarding the substance of the object-condition, when the treatise states 'an existent phenomenon', one immediately says it is purely real; but regarding the substance of the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya), when the treatise states 'an existent phenomenon', why then does it encompass the nominal? That is to say, are the life-faculty and so forth real? If, according to our present explanation, 'an existent phenomenon' generally takes both the nominal and the real among the three kinds of objects, whatever is named 'an existent phenomenon' completely serves as an object-condition. Distinguishing them within the eight consciousnesses: for the first five and the eighth, nature-objects serve as object-conditions, excluding various nominal phenomena and the imaginary. For the seventh, quality-attached objects serve as object-conditions, being purely nominal and not real, and excluding the imaginary. The sixth consciousness takes all three kinds of objects as object-conditions, encompassing both the nominal and the real, and excluding only the imaginary. Further, a formal inference is established: 'All nominal nimittabhāgas' is the subject (dharmin); 'are definitively the immediate object-conditions of the transforming citta' is the thesis (sādhya); because 'they are subsumed under the term "reflection" (chāyā) within the division of presence and absence of the dharma-āyatana' is the reason (hetu); the positive example is like the real forms produced by samādhi; the negative example is the imaginary. Or one may construct the inference thus: 'Quality-attached and isolated-reflection \[objects\]' is the subject; 'are immediate object-conditions' is the thesis; because 'they are varieties of reflections' is the reason; the positive example is like nature-objects. ### [71.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.8) Question: Real phenomena possess substance and are called object-conditions; nominal phenomena lack substance and are not object-conditions. ### [71.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.9) Answer: Nominal phenomena are of two kinds: first, nominal \[phenomena\] possessing substance, which are the various nominal phenomena within the dependent and consummate natures; second, nominal \[phenomena\] lacking substance, which are the imaginary—such as self or dharmas, sky-flowers, rabbit horns, and so forth. We only exclude those lacking substance from being object-conditions, not those possessing substance. ### [71.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.10) Question: If the imaginary is not an object, how is it that when the sixth \[consciousness\] cognizes sky-flowers and the like, it also possesses the meaning of an object-condition? Could it be that they possess substance? ### [71.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.11) Answer: It is an immediate object-condition only in relation to its own immediate nimittabhāga, not in relation to the sky-flower. If it is the sky-flower and the like, it is merely that upon the nimittabhāga one falsely clings to the understanding of a flower arising; its substance is non-existent. But as for the transformed nimittabhāga, its substance is existent and can constitute an object-condition. ### [71.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.12) Question: What scriptural teaching states that the nominal nimittabhāga of quality-attached and isolated-reflection objects can be an object-condition? ### [71.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.13) Answer: Such teachings are extremely numerous. Below, distinguishing and analyzing the object-condition in terms of the consciousnesses, the commentary says: 'The eighth exists for the seventh; the seventh does not exist for the eighth; because the remaining seven are not the archetypes (bimbas) relied upon by the eighth.' For instance, when the seventh cognizes the darśanabhāga of the eighth, is that not a quality-attached object acting as an object-condition? And further, when the commentary states: 'The sixth does not exist for the five; the remaining five exist for that \[sixth\]', that is also a quality-attached object acting as an object-condition. Moreover, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'The immediate object-condition is definitively present in the arising of all cittas; without an internal object of contemplation and reliance, it is definitely unable to arise.' The proofs are extremely numerous and cannot be cited exhaustively. ### [71.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.14) Question: Should all phenomena that possess substance be object-conditions, because they are existent phenomena? ### [71.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.15) Answer: The commentary states: 'It is bearing its own image.' It must be that when the cognizing citta cognizes an object, it bears the object's own image; this phenomenon possessing substance is then an object-condition. As for the rest that do not bear its own image, although they are existent phenomena, they do not serve as object-conditions. Just as when the eye-consciousness cognizes an object, the own-image of form that it bears—this phenomenon possessing substance is the object-condition belonging to the eye-consciousness. The rest that do not bear its own image, although they are existent phenomena, are not object-conditions of the eye-consciousness. As it is with the eye-consciousness, so it is with the other consciousnesses. 'Bearing' and 'own-image' each have two meanings. First, the two meanings of 'bearing': one is grasping-and-bearing (saṃsṛṣṭa-bhāva), in which the cognizing citta immediately cleaves to the substance of the object and cognizes it; second is transforming-and-bearing (pariṇāma-bhāva), in which the cognizing citta transforms and raises up a nimittabhāga and cognizes it. 'Own-image' also has two meanings: first, the image as substantive nature (dravyasvarūpa); second, the image as perceptual form (ākāra). When non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) cognizes tathatā, it cognizes by grasping and bearing the substantive nature, and this is an object-condition; also, the two internal divisions cognizing each other and the self-witnessing \[cognizing\] the darśanabhāga are grasping-and-bearing. When the darśanabhāga of defiled cittas and caittas, or of pure subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), gives rise to a darśanabhāga to cognize an object, it cognizes by transforming and bearing the perceptual form, and this is an object-condition. That is, if a phenomenon is a condition, and bears its own image, it is an object; possessing both of these meanings is called the meaning of an object-condition. Furthermore, to differentiate phenomena and discern the fruit: first citing Ci'en's interrogation, 'In what does the condition cause arising? What bears its own image?' The commentary answers, 'Citta or associated \[factors\].' This discerns the fruit of the object-condition. Taking the object as a condition is the cause; the attained cittas and caittas that arise are the fruit. 'Citta' refers to the eight consciousness-kings. 'Or associated \[factors\]' refers to the fifty-one caittas; because they are undetermined—some arising and some not arising—it says 'or'. Thus it excludes and does not establish matter (rūpa), the unassociated (viprayukta-saṃskāra), the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), and so forth, as object-conditions, for they are not mental phenomena and have no cognitive deliberation. ### [71.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.16) Question: Between the immediate and remote object-conditions, within the nimittabhāga, which is real? ### [71.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.17) Answer: Both are unreal. The Mirror of Consciousness Only states: 'Between the two divisions of nimitta and darśana, the darśanabhāga is solely real; with respect to the nimittabhāga, tathatā is real, and the remaining immediate and remote nimittas are all not real.' The commentary states: 'Because the remote object-condition and the like grasp the immediate nimitta and do not immediately attain \[the archetype\], it does not serve as an active mode (ākāra).' Because the cognizing citta of a remote object-condition does not immediately attain the archetype, the remote object is not called an active mode. For example, when the first five consciousnesses cognize the five dusts, they must rely on the five dusts transformed by the eighth \[consciousness\] as their archetype. When the five consciousnesses cognize them, they merely attain the nimittabhāga transformed by their own consciousness. Because this nimittabhāga must bear the archetype, when cognizing the nimittabhāga, it remotely cognizes the archetype; hence the remote object is not immediately attained and is not called an active mode. The nimittabhāgas of the five consciousnesses, relative to each's own consciousness, are nominal within the dependent (paratantra); subsuming the nominal into the real, there is no object outside citta, hence it is called consciousness-only. Relative to the substance of the transforming eighth consciousness, the archetype object is also not really existent; hence both immediate and remote objects are unreal. As for the meaning of object-condition, although it is common to both the Great and Small \[Vehicles\], remote and immediate are not distinguished. The immediate arises by grasping, bearing, and closely pressing against \[the object\], like tongs taking an object, or like the sun shining light: immediately illuminating and immediately holding, their substances are not separated. The remote arises by transforming, bearing, relying upon, and cleaving to a reflection: cognizing a form that resembles the archetype, separated from the immediacy of the nimittabhāga, their substances do not encompass each other, and contemplation and reliance arise internally. If one thoroughly penetrates thus, not confusing the remote and the immediate, only then will one know that there is no object outside citta and see that dharmas are citta. If one is ignorant and obscure without distinguishing them, then citta and objects appear distinctly separate. Deeply exhausting the nature of conditions, one first cleanses the dust of emotional attachments; subtly fathoming the origin of vision, one finally clarifies the Buddha's intent. Fourth, the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya): when a phenomenon has superior power and function, able to be either favorable or contrary toward other dharmas, this constitutes the meaning of a sovereign condition. The commentary explains: 'When a phenomenon exists' also means it has substance; this excludes the imaginary. 'Having superior power and function' means being a superior factor; that is, the conditioned and the unconditioned possess superior power and function. This function is not the function of giving fruit and the like, but merely the power of non-obstruction. 'Able toward other dharmas' excludes its own substance, showing it is not the same as the previous object-condition. 'Either favorable or contrary' shows that both favorable and contrary can serve as conditions. Serving as a condition for different dharmas that arise subsequently, it is not for dharmas that ceased previously. That is, among the ten causes, the first nine are favorable and the tenth is contrary; this too is because of this condition. ### [71.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.18) Question: Regarding favorable and contrary, potent and non-potent, how many kinds of sovereign conditions are there in all? ### [71.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.19) Answer: Ancient commentaries explain four kinds. As for the sovereign condition, it excludes the imaginary as a phenomenon lacking substance; it must be a phenomenon possessing substance that can serve as a sovereign condition. That is, the two natures of the dependent and consummate are both phenomena possessing substance, serving the meaning of a sovereign condition. Phenomena lacking substance—that is, self, dharmas, and the like—are completely devoid of substance; arising from false grasping, they are not sovereign conditions. First, the favorable: as water and earth are favorable sovereign conditions for green grass and the like; the practice of the six pāramitās is the favorable sovereign condition for the Buddha-fruit; the two branches of feeling and grasping are the favorable sovereign conditions for the seeds of the five fruits. Second, the contrary: as frost and hail serve as contrary sovereign conditions for green grass; also as wisdom serves as a contrary sovereign condition for delusion—namely, in a single thought-moment when wisdom arises, delusion is severed; thus one knows that a single thought-moment has two sovereign \[aspects\]: in a single thought-moment, while acting as a contrary sovereign \[condition\] toward delusion, it immediately acts as a favorable sovereign \[condition\] toward the truth of the two emptinesses. Third, the potent sovereign \[condition\], also called the immediate sovereign \[condition\]: as the five sense-faculties generate the five consciousnesses and so forth. Fourth, the non-potent sovereign \[condition\]: that is, this person's five faculties, relative to that person's five consciousnesses, are non-potent sovereign \[conditions\], also called remote sovereign \[conditions\]. As when a lamp flame is just arising, all phenomena such as the great earth do not obstruct the arising of this flame, which is called a remote sovereign \[condition\]. Taking merely the aspect of the meaning of non-obstruction, it is called a sovereign condition. ### [71.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.20) Question: Are the two meanings of cause-and-condition (hetupratyaya) and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) the same or different? ### [71.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.21) Answer: A former virtuous one said: 'Cause-and-condition conforms to conventional distinctions; that is, causes and conditions viewing each other reveals the meaning of self-naturelessness, which is precisely the substance of the conventional truth. Dependent origination accords with the non-differentiation of the nature; that is, mutual identity and mutual fusion reveals the meaning of equality, which precisely accords with the substance of the ultimate truth.' ### [71.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.22) Question: Defiled and pure dharmas have causes and conditions: causes are immediate and conditions are remote, establishing their two meanings. The meaning of condition has already been clarified; what is the principle of cause? Setting them forth fully and concisely, how many kinds are there in all? ### [71.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.23) Answer: The sūtras and treatises jointly establish that there are six causes and ten causes. Now, as for the six causes: First is the efficient cause (kāraṇahetu). Aside from itself, whatever else is able to act—excluding its own substance, all other phenomena that do not obstruct the arising of conditioned phenomena are collectively called efficient causes. The cause consists of all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena; it is the substance. On that substance there is the function of being able to act; being able to act is itself the cause—a karmadhāraya compound (appositional compound). Chi means to maintain, and ye means karmic function. The cause is the substance, and being able to act is the function; subsuming the function into the substance is called a karmadhāraya compound. Second is the co-arising cause (sahabhūhetu). Existing together, they are mutually effects. Mind and that which conforms to and operates along with the mind exist at the same time; the effect is simultaneous with the cause, hence it is called the co-arising cause. Those that are mutually effects are of three kinds: First, the four great elements are mutually co-arising causes and mutually virile effects (puruṣakāraphala). Second, as in the cases of the qualifying characteristic (lakṣaṇa) and the characterized phenomenon (lakṣya): the qualifying characteristic is the cause and the characterized is the effect, while the characterized is the cause and the qualifying characteristic is the effect. Third, in mental factors and the mind: the sovereign mind is the cause and the mental factors are the effect; the mental factors are the cause and the sovereign mind is the effect. Third is the homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu). That is, the cause resembles the effect, and the effect resembles the cause. For example, among the five defiled aggregates, the matter aggregate can induce the matter aggregate; the matter aggregate induces the remaining four aggregates, and the four aggregates induce the matter aggregate; though mind and matter are different, they are alike in being of a defiled nature. Fourth is the associated cause (saṃprayuktakahetu). It definitely pertains to the mind and mental factors having the same basis—that is, the sovereign mind and mental factors possess five aspects: 1. the same supporting sense-faculty; 2. the same cognitive object; 3. the same time; 4. the same substance; 5. the same mental mode (ākāra). Possessing these five aspects is called 'associated'. As for the cause of association: for instance, when mental factors induce the sovereign mind, the sovereign mind is the associated phenomenon and is the effect, hence superior; the mental factors are the cause, hence inferior—this is a tatpuruṣa compound (determinative compound). Fifth is the omnipresent cause (sarvatragahetu), which is the cause of defilement of the same stage—namely, the eleven omnipresent afflictive forces. Omnipresent is the cause; omnipresent refers to the eleven omnipresent afflictive forces; on the substance there is the function of being the cause for the omnipresent five categories—a karmadhāraya compound. Sixth is the maturation cause (vipākahetu). Tainted wholesome and unwholesome karma are the maturation cause. The cause applies to both wholesome and unwholesome, while the effect is exclusively indeterminate (avyākṛta). Maturation is itself the cause; the cause is wholesome and unwholesome karma; on the substance there is the function of maturation—a karmadhāraya compound. As for the ten causes, the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: 'Among the five sciences, the speech of the Buddhas is called the inner science (adhyātmavidyā). What is the inner science? The treatise says: It reveals the characteristics of correct cause and effect, stating that there are ten kinds of causes. One should know that the establishment of non-erroneous causes encompasses all causes, whether functioning for defilement, for purity, or for worldly indeterminate phenomena such as the cultivation of various crops. What are the ten causes? 1. The conventional designation cause (anvyavahārahetu): all phenomena have names first, hence there are notions; notions are first, hence there is speech—this is called the conventional designation cause of those phenomena. 2. The relative dependence cause (apekṣāhetu): in dependence on this, and with this as the cause, one seeks or takes up such and such matters—this is called their relative dependence cause. Just as in dependence on the hand, with the hand as the cause, there is the work of grasping and holding; in dependence on the foot, with the foot as the cause, there is the work of coming and going. 3. The leading cause (ākṣepahetu): all seeds viewed in relation to their own subsequent effects are called leading causes. 4. The supporting cause (parigrahahetu): all remaining conditions aside from seeds are called supporting causes. 5. The producing cause (janakahetu): the seeds viewed in relation to their own initial effects are called producing causes. 6. The inducing cause (abhinirvṛttihetu): the initial effect produced by the seeds viewed in relation to the subsequent effect drawn forth by the seeds is called the inducing cause. 7. The distinct determination cause (pratiniyamahetu): the distinct causes and conditions for various different classes are called distinct determination causes. 8. The co-functioning cause (sahakārihetu): from the conventional designation cause through to the distinct determination cause, all such causes collectively encompassed as one are called the co-functioning cause. 9. The contrary cause (virodhahetu): causes that can obstruct the phenomena to be produced are called contrary causes. 10. The non-contrary cause (avirodhahetu): if this obstructing cause is lacking or absent, it is called the non-contrary cause. All these causes are subsumed under two causes: 1. the generative cause (jananahetu); 2. the auxiliary cause (upāyahetu). One should know that herein the leading seeds and the producing seeds are called generative causes; all the remaining causes are called auxiliary causes. One should know that herein, if it is a generative cause, it is called the condition as direct cause (hetupratyaya); if it is an auxiliary cause, it is called the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya). As for the immediate condition (samanantarapratyaya) and the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya), they are spoken of solely in relation to all mind and mental factors. Because all those minds and mental factors are supported by the preceding arising that opens the way, and are supported by the cognitive objects, they are only then able to arise and function. Therefore, one should know that the immediate condition and the objective condition are subsumed under the supporting cause.' ### [71.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.24) Question: The establishment of the one mind already possesses causes and conditions. That which is induced by causes and conditions must have its effects. Therefore, the Lotus Sūtra says: 'Such causes, such conditions, such effects, such retributions.' How many kinds of effects are there, and based upon what is each obtained? ### [71.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.25) Answer: Discussed generally across ordinary beings and sages, there are summarily five kinds. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'The first is the maturation effect (vipākaphala), meaning that which is brought about by tainted wholesome and unwholesome phenomena—the indeterminate nature born of maturation within one's own continuity.' The commentary explains: 'Tainted wholesome' excludes untainted wholesome. 'One's own continuity' excludes other bodies and non-sentient things. If one speaks only of 'maturation', that refers to retribution within the six consciousnesses, which is not subsumed under true maturation. Now, in order to encompass both collectively, it says 'born of maturation'. However, the fundamental consciousness is also called 'born of maturation', because it is indeterminate. This stage is rather long, extending up to the vajra-like mind, penetrating all at once to the non-learners of the three vehicles. First is true maturation, which is the eighth consciousness. Second is born of maturation, which is the preceding six consciousnesses. This establishes that the fundamental consciousness is also called 'born of maturation' because it arises from its own maturation seeds. If it is the preceding six consciousnesses, because they arise from the true maturation consciousness, they are also called 'born of maturation'. They are a portion of mind and mental factors whose cognition of objects is dim, inferior, and not distinct or sharp, and because they do not perfume seeds of an understanding mind, they are of an indeterminate nature. Maturation has four aspects: 1. Maturing at a different time: 'different' means distinct, pertaining to the cause; 'maturing' means ripening, which is the effect. The different cause resides in the past, and the ripened effect is in the present; hence it is called maturation. 2. Maturing with a different nature: in the past one cultivated different causes—due to the karma of the five precepts, ten precepts, and so forth, one brings about the total and particular retribution maturation effects of devas and humans; if due to the evil karma of the ten unwholesome actions, one brings about the unwholesome total and particular retribution maturation effects of the three bad paths—these are completely of an indeterminate nature. 3. Maturing in different categories: performing different categories of karma, one undergoes different categories of rebirth, distinct across the five destinies. 4. Maturing differently from the sages: that is, the maturation effect has the functional efficacy of differentiating rebirth destinies based on the seeds of the two obstacles of conceptual discrimination; thus the sages no longer have it. Among the eight consciousnesses, only the eighth possesses the three aspects: 1. pervasive, which excludes the first five consciousnesses; 2. continuous, which excludes the sixth; 3. karmically induced, which excludes the seventh. Second is the uniformly flowing effect (niṣyandaphala): 'uniform' means equal; 'flowing' means flowing category. The uniformly flowing has two distinct forms: 1. The true uniformly flowing: taking wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate—the three natures—as causes, it induces effects of the same class; hence it is called the uniformly flowing effect. Just as the seeds of the three natures within the eighth consciousness each produce active effects of the three natures, because the effect is identical in nature with the cause: that is, mental seeds produce mental activity, material seeds produce material activity, tainted seeds produce tainted activity, and untainted seeds produce untainted activity. Being called 'uniformly flowing' has the meaning of flowing in the same category. 2. The nominal uniformly flowing: in a past life one caused another's life to be short, and in this life one's own life is also short; because it is an effect homogeneous with the prior karma of killing, it is nominally called uniformly flowing based on the length or brevity of the total retribution of the eighth consciousness brought about. In reality, it is a sovereign effect (adhipatiphala), but merely taking the killing of another causing their life to be short, and in this life one's own life being short as having a resemblance, it is nominally called uniformly flowing; in truth, wholesome and unwholesome deeds induce an indeterminate effect. Third is the sovereign effect (adhipatiphala): sovereign means prevailing and superior. Simply excluding the other four effects, all remaining obtained effects are subsumed under this effect of the sovereign condition. This sovereign effect is the most extensive, like the sovereign condition among the four conditions, or false view among the five views: it does not distinguish between tainted and untainted, conditioned and unconditioned—whatever effect is obtained that is not included among the preceding four effects is entirely subsumed under the sovereign effect. This has two kinds: 1. the sovereign effect that imparts power, such as the external container world possessing the sense of being enjoyable and beneficial; 2. the sovereign effect that does not impart power, such as another's gold, silks, wife, and children. Again, there are two kinds: 1. conforming, like the visual consciousness obtaining the condition of light; 2. contrary, like encountering the characteristic of darkness and the like. Fourth is the virile effect (puruṣakāraphala): that is, when various agents and other various implements accomplish diverse enterprises, it is called a virile effect. The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra says: 'A class of people in the present life, relying on and following all places of arts and crafts, initiate human effort—namely, scholars, farmers, merchants, traders, scribes, reckoners, diviners, and such matters. Due to this human effort, they accomplish crops, wealth, profits, and other effects—this is called the virile effect.' ### [71.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.26) Question: Among the eight consciousnesses, how does each consciousness individually possess the four effects? ### [71.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.27) Answer: Ancient commentaries explain: for example, visual consciousness arising from seed into active manifestation is a uniformly flowing effect. Taking the eye faculty as its support, it is called a sovereign effect. Visual consciousness's attention alerting the mind is a virile effect; or visual consciousness being able to cognize real matter and so forth is also a virile effect. Because the eye faculty is the direct nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, it is also a maturation effect. The four consciousnesses of the ear and so forth are all analogous to this. If it is the sixth consciousness, seed producing active manifestation is a uniformly flowing effect. The preceding thought-moment of the mental faculty being able to induce it, or being able to induce the preceding five consciousnesses, makes it a sovereign effect. Moreover, its function of cognizing internal and external objects across the three times is called a virile effect. Being able to create future total and particular retributions is called a maturation effect; it is called a maturation effect with respect to being a cause for maturation. If it is the seventh consciousness, seed producing active manifestation is a uniformly flowing effect. The preceding thought-moment of the seventh providing the support for the subsequent thought-moment is a sovereign effect. Internally being able to cognize the darśanabhāga of the eighth as self is a virile effect. Because it can provide the support for the true maturation consciousness, it is called a maturation effect. If it is the eighth consciousness, seed producing active manifestation is called uniformly flowing. Providing the support for the seventh, it is a sovereign effect. Being able to cognize the three kinds of objects and holding seeds and receiving perfuming are called virile effects. Its own substance being true maturation constitutes \[the maturation effect\]. Fifth is the effect of dissociation (visaṃyogaphala): obtained only by sages, not by ordinary beings. Treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra and the Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra all state: 'Because worldlings extinguish defilements through conventional wisdom, it is not ultimate, and hence not subsumed under this effect.' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'The effect of dissociation means that the untainted path severs obstacles and realizes untainted phenomena.' When fundamental wisdom unites with tathatā, it is subsumed under the effect of dissociation. When subsequent wisdom cognizes tathatā, it is subsumed under the virile effect. ### [71.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.28) Question: How many effects can the six causes induce? ### [71.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.29) Answer: The six causes collectively induce five effects. The efficient cause induces the sovereign effect; the two causes of association and co-arising obtain the virile effect; the two causes of homogeneity and omnipresence obtain the uniformly flowing effect; the maturation cause induces the maturation effect. The fifth, the effect of dissociation, takes unconditioned cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha) as its substance; its substance is untainted, and that which is realized by the path able to sever \[defilements\] is called the effect of dissociation. ### [71.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.30) Question: What is the difference between the two causes of association and co-arising? ### [71.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.31) Answer: Association pertains solely to the mind and mental factors. Co-arising applies to both matter and mind. In obtaining the virile effect, in relation to the two kinds of causes, each has human-like power and function regarding the effect obtained; their name is the same, but their substance is distinct. ### [71.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.32) Question: What is the difference between the two causes of homogeneity and omnipresence? ### [71.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71.33) Answer: The similar \[cause\] pervades the three natures and applies to both the defiled and undefiled; the omnipresent \[cause\] is distinguished by being exclusively defiled. The fruits attained by these two kinds of causes are both similar to their causes, and thus are called fruits of equal outflow. Now, the four conditions, six causes, ten causes, and five fruits encompass the entire path of both the ordinary and the holy, and are able to establish the portals of the teachings. If these are lacking, then not a single dharma is complete; if one is ignorant of them, one will ultimately remain an outsider. Regarding the four conditions: the cause condition directly produces its own fruit in the realm of the conditioned; the immediate \[condition\] carries the meaning of opening and guiding, through which all existents are produced; the object-condition is established only through mindful reliance, and is posited in terms of both proximate and remote \[aspects\]; and the prevailing \[condition\] possesses superior power and does not obstruct other conditions. Regarding the six causes: the acting cause accomplishes karmic function; the co-existent cause is mutually simultaneous; the similar cause is similar from beginning to end; the associated cause definitely shares a single object; the omnipresent cause is identical in its defiled class; and the maturation cause matures the subsequent fruit. Regarding the ten causes: the discursive cause is the portal that guides all dharmas; the dependent cause discerns the affairs of manifest functional activity; the pulling cause causes its own fruit to be achieved; the receptive cause can gather all conditions; the generative cause enables all kinds to be born; the initiating cause causes all fruits to be accomplished; the determinant cause makes categories distinct; the co-working cause unifies substances into oneness; the contradictory cause can initiate the portal of obstruction; and the non-contradictory cause complies with the principle of conditioned arising. Regarding the five fruits: the maturation fruit is where the cause arises and the fruit ripens, being completed at a different time; the equal outflow \[fruit\] has a nature identical between cause and fruit, without confusion of classes; the prevailing \[fruit\] has superior functional power and can assist other conditions; the person-operated \[fruit\] is accomplished through effort and action, being able to obtain wealth and profit; and the disconnection \[fruit\] severs obstructions and realizes the real, transcending all defiled bondages. In summary, the causes and conditions described above yield the five fruits, which all return to the eighth consciousness of true maturation. This portal of the maturation fruit matures at a different time: if a single thought of goodness arises, it is like planting a sweet seed in fertile soil; if a single thought of evil is born, it is like planting a bitter seed in barren land. When the conditions and seasons of water and earth converge, sprouts emerge and leaves unfold in sequence; blossoms burst forth, fruits mature, and they gradually ripen. The same applies to the maturation of these defiled and pure seeds. If one creates a good cause, one plants the seed of bliss in the human and heavenly realms; or if one initiates evil deeds, one takes birth in the bad fields of the four lower destinies. If neither good nor bad causes are initiated, there will ultimately be no retribution of suffering or bliss; without planting coarse or fine seeds, how could flowers and fruits ever grow? Thus we know that causes and fruits correspond to one another, definitively determined by the transformations of consciousness alone. They are like images appearing in a mirror, or shadows following a form. There is no shadow that does not follow its form, and no mirror that does not reveal an image. Likewise, there is no action that does not receive retribution, and no fruit that does not repay its cause. The nature of dharmas is inherently so; it is known to all the world. Only for one who does not act is it hard for karmic fruits to bind them; if one simply understands the source of the one mind, all these conditions suddenly cease. Therefore, when one understands the principle of consciousness-only, there is nowhere to apply the mind, and one will never falsely initiate the karmic fruits of the three realms. Because things are definitively determined by the transformations of consciousness, only those who fear karma can believe and accept this. As the Qianding lu states: In the past, when Duke Han Huang served in the Grand Secretariat, he once summoned an official clerk, who failed to arrive on time. Angry, he was about to flog him. The clerk said, 'I belong to another office, so I could not come immediately.' Duke Jin asked, 'As a clerk under the Prime Minister, to whom else could you belong?' The clerk replied, 'Unfortunately, I am also assigned to the subterranean bureaucracy.' Duke Jin, considering him dishonest, angrily asked, 'Since you belong to the subterranean administration, what are you in charge of?' The clerk said, 'I am in charge of the food and rations for officials of the third rank and above.' Duke Jin said, 'If so, what will I eat tomorrow?' The clerk replied, 'Though this is a minor matter, it cannot be openly spoken. I beg to write it down on paper, to serve as proof after the fact.' It was done accordingly, and the clerk was detained. Early the next morning, there was suddenly an imperial summons. After Duke Jin's audience, it happened that the Grand Provisioner presented food: a bowl of rice porridge and pastries. His Majesty bestowed half of it upon Duke Jin. Duke Jin found it delicious, and the Emperor bestowed the rest upon him. After retiring, he had abdominal distension and returned to his private residence, where he called a physician to examine him. The physician said, 'This is caused by food blockage; it is appropriate to take a little tangerine-peel decoction, and by nightfall you may drink thin rice gruel.' The next morning his illness was cured. Remembering the former clerk's words, he summoned him and looked at what he had written, which said: 'Tomorrow morning, the Prime Minister will eat only one serving and a half of pastries and porridge, one bowl of tangerine-peel decoction, and one cup of thin rice gruel.' It was entirely as he had said. The Duke firmly questioned him further: 'Does the food of the human world always have a register?' He replied: 'For the third rank and above, it is allotted daily; for the fifth rank and above with executive power, it is allotted every ten days; without executive power, monthly; for all from the sixth rank to the single commission, quarterly; for those who do not draw an official salary, it is allotted annually.' Therefore we know that eating and drinking have their allotments; abundance and scarcity have no error. What are called jade delicacies and brocade robes, quail-feather rags and coarse greens, mat doors and golden mansions, a team of a thousand horses and a single gourd-cup—all are created by an initial single thought. The moment the traces of mind appear, karmic retribution cannot be escaped. Taking past good and evil as causes, present suffering and bliss as fruits, there is not the slightest discrepancy; who can escape it? It is like an echo responding to a sound, or a shadow following a form: this is an inevitable principle. None can escape it unless they awaken to the Way and are shielded by the power of concentration. If one abides within the worldly illusion, how could anyone be freed? Therefore a verse from a sūtra says: 'Even after hundreds of thousands of kalpas, / The karma that was done is not forgotten; / When causes and conditions converge, / The retribution is returned to oneself.' Hence the Caiming lun states: 'The poor have not even land enough to insert an awl, / Yet Dao Yi possessed fields exceeding ten thousand qing; / The starving lack even a single picul of stored grain, / Yet Li Heng owned trees named a thousand slaves.' Thus the Shiji records that Sun Shu'ao, Prime Minister of Chu, gave his utmost loyalty to the state, yet when he died, his son was so poor he had not enough land to insert an awl. The Hanshu says that Dao Yi served as a Secretarial Imperial Clerk, did not pursue virtuous conduct, made farming his business, and owned ten thousand qing of fields and a thousand slaves. The Weizhi says that Hua Xin served in office cleanly and poorly, without even a picul of grain stored at home. The Jinshu says that Li Heng planted a thousand tangerine trees, which were called 'a thousand tree-slaves.' Moreover, not only are poverty and wealth definitively determined by the transformations of consciousness, but lifespan is also the same. Because of the causes of compassion or killing previously performed by the mind, one definitively receives the subsequent retribution of a long or short lifespan, which is not directly dependent on the good or evil deeds of the present life. Hence it is said: 'Those without propriety must perish, yet why did Zhi alone live long? Practicing goodness brings fortune, yet why did Tuo meet an early death?' As Zhuangzi says, the Robber Zhi led nine thousand followers, rampaging across the world and terrorizing the feudal lords, yet lived to an advanced age. The commentary to the Lunyu says that Xiang Tuo was teacher to Confucius at the age of seven, yet died prematurely. _First 33 of 36 passages. [Read on](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71)_ ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.71.1) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.71) · Pramāṇa