[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt) › 84 # 宗鏡錄 84 English (machine translation) 84 - **Language:** English ### [84.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.1) Compiled by Chan Master Zhijue, Yanshou, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Temple. ### [84.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.2) Now, that the deluded mind is illusory and provisional is equally deduced by all the sages. Because this attachment is stubborn and solid, one must cite \[the teachings\] in detail. Furthermore, according to the sūtras and treatises, there are three kinds of provisionality: First is the provisionality of causal formation: depending on confrontation with an objective realm beforehand, the mind then arises. Second is the provisionality of continuity: the initial thought arises dependent on the realm, subsequent discriminations arise, thought-moment by thought-moment in unbroken succession, until an affair is accomplished. Third is the provisionality of relativity: as in speaking of the mind having arising in contrast to the unarisen nature of empty space; or positing an existent mind in contrast to a non-existent mind, like short relative to long, or near relative to far. These three are not real, hence they are called provisional. Therefore, mutually different characteristics do not exist in one another. As a verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "In difference there is no characteristic of difference; nor is there one in non-difference. Because there is no characteristic of difference, there is no difference between this and that." For instance, long differs from short: within long there is no characteristic of short; long has nothing to contrast with, so there is no long. Within short there is no characteristic of long; short has nothing to contrast with, so there is no short. Within long there is no characteristic of long; short has nothing to contrast with, so there is no short. Within short there is no characteristic of short; long has nothing to contrast with, so there is no long. Since neither long nor short exists, who speaks of difference? Furthermore, the Śataśāstra says: "If there were really a characteristic of long, it would either exist in the long, or exist in the short, or exist in both together; all of these are unfindable. Why? Within the long there is no characteristic of long, because it is caused by the other—because it is long caused by the short. Within the short there is also no characteristic of long, because their natures are mutually contradictory. If there were long within the short, it would not be called short. Nor is there long within both together, because both have faults. Since the characteristic of long does not exist, the characteristic of short is likewise. If there is neither long nor short, how can they be relative to one another?" Therefore, refuting difference is called "non-difference"; it does not mean there is difference or non-difference. This doubly extinguishes \[extremes\] to tally with nature. If analyzed in terms of "dual manifestation": the above merely manifested reality, which is purely nature and not difference; now both nature and characteristics are complete, hence it is called "dual manifestation." That is, because substance is one, it is not different; because characteristics are differentiated, it is not non-different. This raises both affirmations to manifest both negations. This is precisely neither one nor different, yet both one and different; refutation and illumination are unhindered, nature and characteristics interpenetrate. Long and short being so, the myriad phenomena are all likewise. If one uses the initial mind to refute these three provisionalities, a single thought is unarisen, and one gains entry into the contemplation of emptiness. Contemplation of emptiness is the root of all contemplations. From this, one next enters the contemplation of the provisional: through being unable to grasp the provisional, one enters emptiness; again, through being unable to grasp emptiness, one enters the provisional. Being neither empty nor provisional, one subsequently enters the contemplation of the middle, up to transcending contemplation. Therefore, the Śamatha-vipaśyanā broadly refutes \[it\]: examining by the four propositions, it is unfindable; deducing horizontally and vertically, there is no arising; nature and characteristics are both empty, and names and words are also tranquil. If an arising thought-moment contains these three provisionalities, one should contemplate this single thought-moment: If the mind arises from itself: the preceding thought-moment is the faculty, and the subsequent thought-moment is consciousness; does the mind arise from the faculty, or does the mind arise from consciousness? If the faculty can produce consciousness: does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness, or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness? If the faculty had consciousness, then faculty and consciousness would coexist simultaneously, and furthermore there would be no producer and produced. If the faculty lacked consciousness yet could produce consciousness, all things without consciousness cannot produce consciousness; since the faculty lacks consciousness, how could it produce consciousness? If \[one argues that\] although the faculty lacks consciousness, it possesses the nature of consciousness and thus can produce consciousness: does this nature of consciousness exist or not exist? If it exists, it is already consciousness, coexisting in the faculty; why call it a nature? If the faculty lacks the nature of consciousness, it cannot produce consciousness. Furthermore, are the nature of consciousness and consciousness one or different? If one, the nature is consciousness itself, without producer or produced. If different, it is still arising from another, not the mind arising from itself. If one says that the mind does not arise from itself, but that dust arrives to arouse the mind and thus the mind arises, citing the sūtra: "With conditions, thought arises; without conditions, thought does not arise"—if so, the dust is outside the mind and comes to arouse internal consciousness, then the mind arises from another. Now deduce this dust: does it produce mind because it is mind, or does it produce mind because it is not mind? If the dust were mind, it would not be called dust, nor would it be outside the mind, and so it would be the same as arising from self; moreover, two minds would coexist, so there would be no producer and produced. If the dust is not mind, how could it produce mind? As refuted above. If there is a productive nature within dust and therefore it produces mind: does this nature exist or not exist? If the nature exists, the nature and dust coexist, and likewise there is no producer and produced. If it does not exist, non-existence cannot produce. If mind arises because faculty and dust combine: does the combination produce mind because faculty and dust each have mind, or does the combination produce mind because they each lack mind? If they each had mind, then when combined two minds would arise, falling into "nature of another." If they each lacked it, when combined it would also not exist. Furthermore, if faculty and dust each have the nature of mind and upon combining the mind arises: one should examine this nature, whether it exists or not, as refuted before. If mind exists through faculty and dust being separate: this is arising without cause and condition; does this separation exist, or does this separation not exist? If this separation exists, it still arises from conditions; how can it be called separation? If this separation does not exist, how can non-existence produce? If one says that this separation has a productive nature: does it exist or not exist? If the nature exists, it still arises from conditions and is not called separation. If the nature does not exist, how can non-existence produce? Deductions through such four propositions reveal that mind is ultimately unarisen. This is called the contemplation of entering emptiness from the provisional. If one does not awaken, one turns to enter the provisionality of continuity to refute it. Why? Although through the provisionality of causal formation the mind's arising is unfindable under the fourfold refutation, now one manifestly sees the mind arising and ceasing thought-moment by thought-moment in unbroken succession; how could it be unarisen? Regarding these thought-moments: does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment ceases, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment does not cease, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment both ceases and does not cease, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment neither ceases nor does not cease? If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment does not cease, then a thought-moment produces a thought-moment by itself, two arisings coexist, and there is also no producer and produced. If the preceding thought-moment has a productive nature that produces the subsequent thought-moment: does this nature exist or not exist? If it exists, it is not a nature; if it does not exist, it does not produce, as refuted before. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment ceases: non-ceasing producing is called self-nature; now, producing due to cessation—when non-ceasing is viewed in contrast to cessation, is it not the nature of another? Within the cessation of the nature of another, does it arise because there is arising, or does it arise because there is no arising? If there is arising, that is arising; arising and cessation are mutually contradictory, and furthermore if arising produces arising, why speak of cessation producing? If cessation has no arising, how can non-existence produce? If cessation has a productive nature, this nature is refuted as before. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment both ceases and does not cease: what ceases already belongs to cessation, and what does not cease already belongs to non-cessation. If non-cessation combined with cessation can produce, that is production from both; both are mutually contradictory, and how can contradictory things produce? Furthermore, if each has production, there are two faults; if each has no production, combined they also do not produce. If there is a productive nature within both cessation and non-cessation: does it exist or not exist? If the nature definitely exists, why speak of cessation and non-cessation? If the nature definitely does not exist, why speak of cessation and non-cessation? This does not avoid the fault of annihilation or permanence, and falls back into the fault of both. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment neither ceases nor does not cease: does this neither-cessation-nor-non-cessation exist or not exist? If it exists, it is not causeless. If it does not exist, a causeless non-existence cannot produce. If causelessness has a productive nature, this nature is itself a cause; why call it causeless? If it does not exist, non-existence cannot produce. Deductions through such four propositions in search of the mind in the provisionality of continuity find nothing; there are no four real natures, but merely the name "mind." This word abides neither inside, outside, nor between the two; it does not eternally exist by itself. Continuity lacking nature is the refutation of nature in conventional truth, called emptiness of nature. Continuity lacking name is the refutation of the provisional in ultimate truth, called emptiness of characteristics. Nature and characteristics are both empty, extending to the formation of the eighteen emptinesses. If one cannot enter, one still posits an existent mind in contrast to a non-existent mind, and the delusion of relativity arises. This differs from the above. The provisionality of causal formation takes the two dharmas of faculty and dust combining as the cause. The provisionality of continuity vertically takes the mental faculty's before and after as continuity, vertically contemplating arising and cessation; this is distinct cessation, and distinct cessation is narrow. Now, the provisionality of relativity contrasts with universal cessation, so this meaning is broad. As for universal cessation: like the three unconditioned states, they are not altogether cessation, yet they can be unarisen. Speaking of the arising of mind in contrast to the unarisen state of empty space is precisely the provisionality of relativity. Now examine this mind: does the mind arise in contrast to the unarisen, does the mind arise in contrast to the existent, does the mind arise in contrast to both arising and unarisen, or does the mind arise in contrast to neither arising nor unarisen? If the mind arises in contrast to the unarisen: does this unarisen exist, or does this unarisen not exist? If there is an arising to be contrasted with, it is still contrasting with existence; why speak of contrasting with non-existence? Existence contrasting with existence is arising from self. If this unarisen does not exist, what does non-existence contrast with? If the mind arises merely by contrasting with this non-existent non-existence, all non-existent non-existences should also produce mind; non-existence viewed in contrast to existence means non-existence is arising from another. Furthermore, although the unarisen does not exist, if there is a productive nature, and through contrasting with this nature one knows there is mind: is this nature already arisen or not yet arisen? If already arisen, arising is just arising; why call it a nature? If the nature has not yet arisen, how can what has not yet arisen produce? If the mind arises in contrast to arising: arising again contrasts with arising, just as long should contrast with long; since there is no such principle, why contrast with arising to produce mind? If mind arises because of contrasting with both arising and the unarisen, like obtaining long by contrasting with short: this falls into two faults; if each exists, two arisings coexist; if each lacks it, arising is completely unfindable, as refuted before. If mind arises in contrast to neither arising nor the unarisen: the treatise says, arising from causes and conditions is still unfindable, how much more so without causes and conditions? Furthermore, does this causelessness exist or not exist? If it exists, it still contrasts with existence; if it does not exist, it still contrasts with non-existence; why call it causeless? If one says there is a nature: does the nature exist or not exist? If the nature exists, is it arisen or not arisen? If arisen, it is already arising; why call it a nature? If not arisen, how can it produce? Deductions through such four propositions in search of mind in the provisionality of relativity find nothing; no real nature arises, there is merely a name. The arising of a name, as soon as it arises, is unarisen. Furthermore, seeking aggregates, sense bases, and elements within nature and characteristics is unfindable, which is emptiness of dharmas. Seeking person, self, knower, and seer within nature and characteristics is unfindable, which is called emptiness of sentient beings, extending to the eighteen emptinesses and so forth. The Fuxing ji explains the refutation of arising from self under the provisionality of causal formation, saying: 'The preceding thought-moment is the faculty, and the subsequent thought-moment is consciousness': the faculty has no separate substance, but still refers to the immediately preceding cessation of mind as its substance. The faculty is called the producer; due to the cessation of the preceding mind, the subsequent mental consciousness is produced. Thus the Kośa says: 'Because the collection of the six consciousnesses immediately ceasing constitutes the mind.' 'Collection' means substance. At the moment of immediately preceding cessation, it serves as the substance of the mental faculty. At that time, the five consciousnesses also rely on the immediately ceasing mind as their immediate condition, and employ the five material faculties as their remote conditions, thus producing the five consciousnesses. When the five consciousnesses are immediate and discrimination arises, that is called mental consciousness. Now, the meaning of this text is not the five consciousnesses, but the sixth consciousness, which, taking existent views as mental objects, is then called consciousness. It is precisely this consciousness that is examined and interrogated against the faculty; hence it says: 'Does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness, or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness?' ### [84.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.3) The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa asks: "If the preceding thought-moment ceases, how can it produce the subsequent?" ### [84.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.4) Answer: There are two senses: first, moment-by-moment ceasing; second, moment-by-moment arising. Because these two exist, from cessation arising is attained. Fearing the arising of the nihilistic view, this must therefore be posited. Now, in order to refute it, it must therefore be interrogated. Although arising and ceasing are different, both sense-faculty and consciousness are one's own mind. Arising from faculty or arising from consciousness both belong to self-nature. Within self-nature, mutually interrogating faculty and consciousness, they cannot be found. Furthermore, mind and consciousness are both posited as 'mind' in relation to dust \[objects\]. If the faculty possesses consciousness, there are two flaws: namely, the co-occurrence of faculty and consciousness, and the co-occurrence of agent and object, which entails the fault of endless generation after generation. If there is no agent and object, the meaning of generation is not established; how could one speak of generation? Furthermore, only immediate cessation is called generating consciousness; if the faculty possesses consciousness, arising and ceasing are mutually contradictory, hence both entail error. If the faculty lacks consciousness, it is assimilated to that which lacks consciousness, \[yet is supposed to\] be able to generate consciousness. Furthermore, interrogating whether it has the nature of consciousness—this is a concessive refutation: if it is existent, it still matches existence, likewise resulting in concurrent arising; if it is non-existent, it still matches non-existence, identical to arising from insentient things. Furthermore, interrogating the nature of consciousness as one or different: if it is one, whenever one speaks of 'nature', it can only generate afterwards; since consciousness and its nature are one, there is no agent and object. If it is different, if it is different from consciousness, it is identical to external objects; if an object can generate consciousness, it is identical to other—how can it be considered self? Next, refuting other-nature: although one says that the mind does not arise from itself, but that external dust comes to stimulate the mind, dust in relation to the faculty is called 'other'. First interrogating whether this is mind, there are three flaws: first, the flaw that dust is not mind, so that mind is not called dust; second, the flaw that dust is not thought-organ, \[which\] externally matches self-arising; third, the flaw of concurrent arising. If dust is not mind, one may allow dust to generate \[mind\]; if dust is mind, it turns out that mind generates mind in the locus of mind, which is called concurrent arising. If a seed generates a sprout, then there is agent and object; if a seed again generates a seed, then two seeds arise concurrently—what agent and object could there be? If dust is not mind, then it is identical to the previous meaning in the faculty lacking consciousness, and interrogating the thought-organ is also like this; hence it is said to be refuted as before. That dust has the nature of consciousness can be understood by analogy with the above. Refuting arising from both: falling into self-nature and other-nature is called arising from both. Now it is refuted: if self and other each lack arising, their combination also lacks \[arising\], just as two \[grains of\] sand lack oil, and their combination also lacks it. Refuting uncaused arising is also like this. Concluding into the two emptinesses of nature and characteristics: merely lacking the attachment to nature is called emptiness of nature. Once nature is refuted, there are only the internal and external characteristics of form and mind; since they do not abide in the four propositions of non-existence, characteristics are also unobtainable, called emptiness of characteristics. That it is not within, without, or in between means: within is merely the cause, without is merely the condition, and in between is both; that which is constantly self-existent is merely uncaused. Because these attachments are absent, there are no four natures. As for these two emptinesses, although spoken of before and after, the meaning is not at different times. Further, through the two truths they are concluded into the two emptinesses: if there is grasping at nature, it is worldly but not a truth; once grasping at nature is refuted, it is called the conventional truth. Hence it is said that the conventional truth refutes nature. Once grasping at nature is refuted, there are only names, which are called conventional designation; designation is characteristic. In order to empty characteristics, one contemplates dharmatā; contemplating principle and realizing the real is called the ultimate truth refuting characteristics. Emptiness is not before and after; the two truths are simultaneous. It is only to distinguish nature and characteristics that they are spoken of sequentially. Furthermore, there are the four phases of mind: first, not yet moving; second, about to move; third, presently moving; fourth, having moved. Fu Dashi's verse says: / Acting alone, / I ask what is attached in my mind? / Examining the four phases, all are unarisen; / How could a thousand entanglements and ten thousand burdens bind me? / Explanation: The two phases of mind, not yet arisen and about to arise, belong to the future; where in the future is there a mind? The one phase of mind presently arising belongs to the present; since the present does not abide, where is there a mind? Moreover, it belongs to the time of arising: because of the unarisen and the already arisen, the time of arising is posited; since the unarisen and the already arisen are both without arising, the time of arising is also without arising, just as with the already gone, the not yet gone, and the time of going, all lack the dharma of going, as refuted in the Madhyamakaśāstra. The one phase of mind that has already arisen belongs to the past; since the past has already passed away, where is there a mind? Therefore the Diamond Sūtra says: 'The past mind cannot be obtained, the future mind cannot be obtained, and the present mind cannot be obtained.' Since the three periods of time are all empty, how could the one mind exist? Because the fundamental mind that is the locus of reliance does not even exist, how could all the myriad dharmas that are the branch-and-leaf reliers be real? Hence it is said: 'How could a thousand entanglements and ten thousand burdens bind me?' Thus one knows that by merely understanding that one thought is empty, the various dust objects are naturally broken down. Since that which is relied upon does not exist, how could the relier be produced? It is like the source being exhausted and the stream drying up, or the root being endangered and the leaves withering. Therefore Ānanda grasped at seven locations without foundation, from which we know that false doctrines are hard to sustain; the Second Patriarch sought \[mind\] directly without it arising, which proves that only by understanding emptiness does one awaken. The broad summary of patriarchs and buddhas points only to this source. Since the mind that can arise is unobtainable, the realm that is generated is also unobtainable. Because mind cannot be obtained, the self is eliminated; because the realm cannot be obtained, dharmas perish. If one can make both person and dharmas empty, the marvelous principle of the one mind is revealed. Only because mind and dust confront each other are the myriad dharmas crisscrossing; when realm and wisdom are as one, the thousand distinctions suddenly fall silent. Only in this way can one open up and awaken to the true mind of original enlightenment and spiritual wisdom, without abiding and without reliance, pervading the dharmadhātu. The Guǎng bǎilùn says: 'The sūtra says: Not the slightest dharma with self-nature can be obtained; there is only that which can construct, and that which can construct is mind and mental factors.' It also says: 'The three realms are only mind.' Sūtras such as these are limitless in number. Therefore, that all dharmas are established by the principle of consciousness-only—how could it not be certain? Grasping that all dharmas truly are only consciousness is also an inversion. Since the realm does not exist, how could consciousness exist? When the sūtra speaks of consciousness-only, it is to cause one to contemplate consciousness and abandon those external dusts. Once external dusts are abandoned, the deluded mind accordingly ceases. Because the deluded mind ceases, one realizes and meets the middle way. Hence a sūtra verse says: / Not understanding that the realm is only mind, / One generates diverse conceptualizations; / Having understood that the realm is only mind, / Conceptualizations do not arise. / If one knows that the realm is only mind, / One then abandons the characteristics of external dust; / From this, conceptualizations cease, / And one awakens to equal, true emptiness. ### [84.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.5) The Xianshi lun asks: If realm and consciousness are both dismissed, what consciousness is accomplished? ### [84.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.6) Answer: When realm and consciousness both vanish, that is the true nature. The true nature is the amonavijñāna. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra says: 'Bodhisattva Kusumaprabha said: Arising from self to form two makes duality. One who sees the real characteristic of self does not give rise to two dharmas. If one does not abide in two dharmas, then there is no consciousness. That which has no consciousness is entering the Dharma door of non-duality.' Thus we know that seeing two dharmas, down to the slightest hair, all belongs to consciousness. When realm and consciousness are both extinguished, one then enters the principle of true emptiness. Therefore Master Zhiguang established for those of medium capacity the Mahāyāna of Dharma-characteristics, the principle of consciousness-only wherein the realm is empty and mind exists, which is not yet able to fully enter equal, true emptiness; and for those of superior capacity he explained the Mahāyāna of signlessness, distinguishing that mind and realm are both empty and equally of one taste as the truly definitive meaning. Therefore, by relying on consciousness-only one enters the ultimate gate of true emptiness; seeking apart from this is not true liberation. ### [84.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.7) The Commentary on Consciousness-Only asks: Is the inner mind of consciousness-only truly existent, or is it not truly existent? ### [84.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.8) Answer: The treatise says: 'All minds and mental factors (the subject), because they are dependent upon other \[conditions\] (the reason), are like illusory phenomena (the example), and are not truly existent (the thesis).' ### [84.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.9) Question: If so, mind and realm are entirely without difference; why then speak of consciousness-only? ### [84.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.10) Answer: In order to eliminate the grasping of outsiders and others who grasp at truly existent realms outside minds and mental factors, it is conventionally said that there is consciousness-only. The phrase 'consciousness-only' does not mean there is real consciousness. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'In order to eliminate the deluded grasping at truly existent realms outside minds and mental factors, it is said that there is consciousness-only. If one grasps that consciousness-only is truly existent, it is like grasping at external realms, which is also a grasping at dharmas. If grasping at dharmas does not arise, one then enters true emptiness.' ### [84.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.11) Question: In terms of the principle of consciousness-only, where both person and dharmas are empty, what kind of things are those currently experienced and used? ### [84.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.12) Answer: The dharmas experienced and used are merely the six dusts. Arising due to causes and conditions, they cease due to causes and conditions. Definitely, inside there is no person who can experience, and outside there is no dust that can be used. The Treatise on the Eighteen Kinds of Emptiness says: 'External emptiness is also called emptiness of the experienced. Apart from the six external sense bases, there are no other dharmas that can be experienced. If that which all sentient beings experience and use is merely the six dusts, since inside there is no person who can experience and outside there is no dharma that can be experienced, then both person and dharmas are empty; consciousness-only lacks realms, and is therefore called external emptiness. Because there is no realm, there is also no consciousness, which is internal emptiness, and so forth up to the eighteen kinds of emptiness.' ### [84.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.13) Question: If both person and dharmas are empty, and consciousness is also not established, from what do seeing and hearing currently exist? ### [84.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.14) Answer: All the various dharmas manifested as present dust entirely arrive in accordance with thought, and all arise in confrontation with conception. When thought ceases, the realm is empty; when the mind is empty, dharmas are tranquil. Hence a sūtra says: 'Conception ceased and tranquil, consciousness stopped and unconditioned.' Another sūtra says: 'All buddhas and all dharmas take form from the mind.' Another sūtra says: 'Dharmas are not firm; they stand only upon thought. For one who understands seeing as empty, there are no thoughts or conceptions whatsoever.' Thus we know that seeing and hearing are merely dependent origination, and seeing is ultimately empty, like worldly magical acts, resembling the arising and ceasing of sky flowers. Hence it is said: 'Seeing and hearing are like illusory cataracts; the three realms are like sky flowers.' For instance, the eye faculty, possessing five conditions, is able to see. Yet this 'ability to see' is merely the five conditions, because there is no seer. If one says that possessing the five conditions generates consciousness to be able to see, it is not known which condition definitely can generate consciousness. If one says that each one individually does not generate, but through combination they can generate seeing, then just as five blind people combined should form one sight—since the many blind do not see, how could combination generate it? Thus we know that it is not that a separate consciousness arises; whenever there is seeing, it is just the manifold conditions. Therefore it is called dependent origination. Hence a sūtra says: 'The eye does not see itself; it belongs to causes and conditions. Conditions are not the nature of seeing; the eye is just empty.' The eye faculty being so, the other faculties are likewise. Arising is solely dependent arising; ceasing is solely dependent ceasing. Arising and ceasing are solely conditions; both person and dharmas are tranquil. If one realizes these two emptinesses of self and dharmas, one realizes the consummate principle. Hence it is said: 'If one sees the dharma of causes and conditions, this is called seeing the Buddha.' ### [84.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.15) Question: In the realm of ordinary beings, grasping and rejecting discrimination, adverse and favorable conditions affecting thought, attraction and repulsion filling the breast—one is constantly bound by the six dusts as obstacles. How can one attain the interfusion of faculties and realms, and have all things accord with one's intent? ### [84.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.16) Answer: Merely see the dharmatā and realize great nirvāṇa. When not even a single dharma can be penetrated, how could there be dharmas that obstruct? Then one constantly accords with intent, and there is never a time that does not accord with intent. Therefore the Treatise on Nirvāṇa says: 'Now, saying that nirvāṇa accords with intent means that among all suffering, pleasure, good, and evil, there is none that is not principle; hence it is called according with intent.' Explanation: 'There is none that is not principle' means they are all the principle of the tathatā of the one mind. Because suffering and pleasure are experiences of the mind, and good and evil arise from the mind, there is no external dust to oppose or obstruct. If one understands the one mind, how could it not accord with intent? If a single dharma is taken before the mind, dispute is formed. A verse of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: / As long as anything is posited, / Everything is disordered; / If one sees that it is only one's own mind, / Then there is no conflict or dispute. / Therefore, when deluded, people pursue dharmas; after awakening, dharmas stem from people. For instance, the cintāmaṇi jewel, an insentient physical dharma, can still rain down treasures impartially to provide for all beings' wishes, and is therefore called 'according with intent'. How much more so for the marvelous nature of the spiritual terrace—could it fail to do so? Merely return to the one mind and attain great unhinderedness; hence it is said: 'Transforming heaven and earth, unrestrained and completely free.' ### [84.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.17) Question: The treatise says: 'Because it is only the one mind, it is called tathatā.' The real is without falsehood; the 'such' is unchanging—the serene, non-empty nature of marvelous form. Why do sūtras again say that when the mind is empty, all dharmas are empty? ### [84.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.18) Answer: Generally speaking, when "empty" is spoken of, it refers to all worldly deluded citta and defiled phenomena as being empty, because the attachments of imagining in vain have no grounding in truth. If it is the supramundane Buddhadharma and the true citta, then it is not empty, because it has grounding in truth. The Awakening of Faith says: "Tathatā has two \[aspects\]: first, truly empty, because it can definitively reveal the real; second, truly not-empty, because it has an intrinsic substance complete with untainted nature-merits." That which is spoken of as empty means that from the very beginning it is not associated with any defiled phenomena, meaning that it is free from the characteristics of distinction among all phenomena, because it is without falsely deluded citta-thoughts. One should know that the svabhāva of tathatā is without characteristics such as existence, nonexistence, oneness, or difference, up to—generally speaking—relying on all sentient beings having deluded citta with discrimination from moment to moment, none of which are associated with it; therefore it is spoken of as empty. If one is free from deluded citta, there is truly nothing that can be emptied. That which is spoken of as not-empty means that having already revealed the substance of phenomena to be empty and devoid of delusion, it is itself the true citta, eternal, constant, and unchanging, fulfilled with pure phenomena; thus it is called not-empty. The Commentary by Qingliang explains: "Not conjoining with delusion is called empty. The nature being endowed with the myriad virtues is called not-empty." When it comes to explaining the text, he says: "'If one is free from deluded citta, there is truly nothing that can be emptied' reveals that the empty treasury is manifested by way of delusion. But the not-empty treasury necessarily relies on overturning defilement to manifest as not-empty. Therefore it says, 'because it reveals the substance of phenomena to be empty and devoid of delusion, it is itself the true citta,' and so forth." For example, the originally possessed virtue of dāna is now \[obscured by\] stinginess and greed; the originally possessed virtue of śīla is now subject to the five desires; the originally possessed serene samādhi is now disordered thoughts; the originally possessed great wisdom is now folly. In this way, stinginess conceals giving, up to folly concealing wisdom. Therefore the treatise says: "Because one knows the dharmatā to be without stinginess and greed, one accords with it to cultivate the practice of dānapāramitā," and so forth; the myriad practices are all like this. Therefore the treatise says: "It originally possesses the meaning of real consciousness and knowing. It says: 'If the citta moves, it is not real consciousness and knowing.' This clarifies that the movement of the deluded citta conceals its true knowing." Hence, the emptiness of the very delusion conceals the myriad virtues that are not-empty. Therefore a sūtra verse says: "Knowing delusion to be originally real of itself, when one sees the Buddha, there is purity." Therefore the treatise says: "Because it can definitively reveal the real, it is called empty." Hence we know that the empty treasury can conceal the not-empty; since that which can conceal is empty, it reveals that the not-empty treasury is originally complete. Second, having no delusion upon the svabhāva citta is emptiness; whatever is absent constitutes the not-empty virtue. For example, being empty of stinginess and miserliness reveals the presence of dāna; being empty of deluded movement reveals the presence of nature-emptiness. Therefore it is the empty treasury that conceals the not-empty. Hence we know that the original awakening and Buddha-wisdom of all sentient beings are originally complete of themselves; it is only because they are covered by delusion that beings do not know it themselves. If one understands that delusion is empty, true awakening manifests頓-instantly, like the clouds parting to reveal a bright moon, or dust being removed to leave a mirror clear. When one sees the nature, it is therefore said to be "disclosed and obtained," not "accomplished through cultivation." On the day the three bodies are fulfilled, it is also said that they are "brought forth by the myriad practices," not that they come from the outside; all are based on the one mind being originally complete. Therefore we know that the emptiness that is not empty contains in its substance the myriad virtues; the existence that is non-existence accords in its principle with the perfect source. Emptiness and existence complete each other, free from all obstructions. If there is existence apart from emptiness, that existence is eternalism; if there is emptiness apart from existence, that emptiness becomes annihilationism. Now existence and nonexistence proceed together, not deviating from the single purport. Therefore knowledge can penetrate existence, and wisdom can contemplate emptiness. If one penetrates existence without knowing emptiness, one loses the eye of wisdom; if one contemplates emptiness without illuminating existence, one loses the citta of knowledge. The bodhisattva does not exhaust the conditioned, nor does he dwell in the unconditioned. Exhausting existence leaves the work of knowledge unaccomplished; dwelling in nonexistence leaves the citta of wisdom unillumined. Therefore the Ocean of Meanings says: "If emptiness were different from existence, then purity would not be called pure, because of being confused about emptiness. If existence were different from emptiness, then defilement would not be called defilement, because of clinging to existence. Now, existence being entirely empty is only then called the defiled part; emptiness being entirely existent is only then called the pure part. Due to the non-obstruction of emptiness and existence, defilement and purity are unimpeded." If emptiness is existence, existence is emptiness, and so forth, up to all phenomena being mutually identical. Since they are mutually identical, ultimately no phenomena such as oneness, difference, emptiness, or existence manifest outside the citta. Even if they manifest, all are the nimittabhāga of one's own citta; this is not like ordinary people and the Lesser \[Vehicle\] who do not know, grasping and clinging to existence, or abandoning and sinking into emptiness. If one enters this gate of the middle way of the one mind, one can accomplish the path of skillful means of the myriad practices. As the Sūtra of the Dharma Gate of Great Adornment says: "Mañjuśrī said: 'There are two kinds of skillful means: first, not abandoning saṃsāra; second, not dwelling in nirvāṇa. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, the gate of emptiness; second, the gate of wrong views. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, the gate of signlessness; second, the gate of vitarka and vicāra on signs. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, the gate of wishlessness; second, the gate of wishing for rebirth. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, the gate of non-action; second, the gate of practices that plant good roots. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, the gate of non-arising; second, the gate of manifesting arising.'" Hence, when one awakens to the source, the contrary and the compliant converge together; when one penetrates the substance, good and evil are both transformed. ### [84.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.19) Question: A treatise says: "Speaking of wisdom and the locus of wisdom, both are named prajñā." The locus of wisdom is the cognitive object; how can it constitute prajñā? ### [84.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.20) Answer: There are two kinds of prajñā: first, real, eternally abiding prajñā; second, contemplative, functional prajñā. As for real prajñā, its nature pervades all places; serene yet ever illuminating, it is solely the one true citta, without division into subject and object. Thus it is not like the inert objects of the world being that which is illuminated, nor is it like the deluded citta of the biased and lesser being that which is illuminated, nor is it like provisionally established tathatā being that which is illuminated. Now, with a single substance underlying and connecting throughout, citta and citta illuminate each other, because there are no cognitive objects outside the citta, nor is there any citta outside cognitive objects, for citta is the citta of objects, and objects are the objects of citta. Blended and fused in this way, how could it not be prajñā? Therefore it is said: "Because form is boundless, prajñā is boundless." Hence we know that apart from form there is no citta, and apart from citta there is no form. As the Prajñā Sūtra says: "Furthermore, Yūrnaya, a bodhisattva-mahāsattva should practice like this: form is not an object of cognition (ālambana). Why is that? All phenomena are without an object of cognition, because not even a slight phenomenon can be grasped. If that were graspable, this would be an object of cognition. In this way, Yūrnaya, it is not by form that one practices form, up to: it is not by vijñāna that one practices vijñāna. Yūrnaya, because all phenomena do not practice, it is not seen by form, nor is it seen by vijñāna, up to: it is neither known by vijñāna, nor can it be seen. If from form up to vijñāna it is neither known nor seen, this is called prajñāpāramitā." Also, the Mañjuśrī-prajñā Sūtra says: "Mañjuśrī addressed the Buddha, saying: 'World-Honoured One, when cultivating prajñāpāramitā, one does not see phenomena as that in which one should dwell or in which one should not dwell; nor does one see any characteristic of objects that can be accepted or rejected. Why is that? Because like all tathāgatas, one does not see the characteristic of objects of any phenomena, up to not seeing the realm of the Buddhas, let alone grasping the realms of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, or ordinary persons. One does not grasp the characteristic of the conceivable, nor does one grasp the characteristic of the inconceivable. One does not see phenomena as having various characteristics; one's own realization of the empty Dharma is inconceivable. Such bodhisattva-mahāsattvas have all already made offerings to immeasurable hundreds of thousands of myriads of koṭis of Buddhas and planted all roots of goodness; only then are they able to be without alarm and without fear with respect to this very deep prajñāpāramitā.' It also says: 'Furthermore, when cultivating prajñāpāramitā, one does not see the characteristics of ordinary persons, one does not see the characteristics of Buddha-dharma, and one does not see phenomena as having determinate characteristics. This is cultivating prajñāpāramitā.'" ### [84.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.21) Question: If both the mundane and supramundane are solely the one mind, why are the true and the deluded, and the internal and the external, further distinguished? ### [84.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84.22) Answer: True and false, inner and outer, are distinguished only in terms of worldly words. Therefore, citta is neither inner nor outer, yet inner and outer are citta. The substance is neither true nor false, yet true and false are the substance. Relying on the inner, the outer is established, thereby forming antidotes; provisionally using the false, the true is revealed—this is not without reason. The Sūtra on the Expedients for Progressing Toward the Mahāyāna says: 'The meaning of citta has two kinds of characteristics: the first is the internal characteristic of citta, and the second is the external characteristic of citta. The internal characteristic is twofold again: first, the true; second, the false. That which is called "the true" refers to the fundamental characteristic of the substance of citta: such-like and undifferentiated, pure and perfect, unimpeded and unhindered, subtle, secret, and difficult to see; because it pervades all places and is constantly imperishable, establishing and generating all dharmas. That which is called "the false" refers to the arising of thoughts and discrimination, perception, objectifying cogitation, recollection, and such matters; although continuous and capable of producing all various objects, inside it is illusory and untrue, devoid of reality and invisible. That which is called "the external characteristic of citta" refers to all dharmas, various objects, and so forth: wherever there is thought, objects appear before one. Hence one knows that there is an internal citta and distinctions within the internal citta. Thus one should know that internal conceptualization serves as the cause and the substance, while external conceptualization serves as the effect and the function. Based on such meanings, therefore I say that all dharmas are called citta. Furthermore, one should know that the external characteristics of citta are like the various objects seen in a dream: they are made solely by mental imagination, with no real external matters. All objects are likewise so, because they are all seen in the dream of the consciousness of avidyā and made by conceptualization. Furthermore, one should know that because the internal citta does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, all objects seen and cognized also do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment in accordance with citta. This is the so-called: "Because citta arises, various dharmas arise; because citta ceases, various dharmas cease." Yet the characteristics of arising and ceasing have only names and are truly unobtainable. For citta does not go out to objects, nor do objects come into citta; like an image in a mirror, there is neither coming nor going. Therefore, seeking determined characteristics of arising and ceasing among all dharmas is completely unobtainable. This means that all dharmas are ultimately devoid of substance, originally constantly empty, and truly neither arise nor cease. When all dharmas are thus truly unarisen and unceasing, there are no differentiated characteristics of any objects; tranquil and of a single flavor, it is called tathatā, the supreme truth, the intrinsically pure citta. That intrinsically pure citta is clear and perfect, because it is devoid of conceptual characteristics. Being devoid of conceptual characteristics, it is nowhere absent in all places; being nowhere absent, it is able to support and establish all dharmas.' Hence a verse in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: 'Just as gold and the color of gold / Have no difference in their nature, / So it is with dharmas and non-dharmas: / Their essential nature has no difference.' It also says: 'The equality of kṣetras does not conflict with the equality of sentient beings; the equality of sentient beings does not conflict with the equality of kṣetras. The equality of all sentient beings does not conflict with the equality of all dharmas; the equality of all dharmas does not conflict with the equality of all sentient beings. The equality of the limit of detachment from desire does not conflict with the equality of the stable abiding of all sentient beings; the equality of the stable abiding of all sentient beings does not conflict with the equality of the limit of detachment from desire. The past does not conflict with the future; the future does not conflict with the past. The past and future do not conflict with the present; the present does not conflict with the past and future. The equality of the world does not conflict with the equality of the Buddha; the equality of the Buddha does not conflict with the equality of the world. Bodhisattva practice does not conflict with all-knowledge; all-knowledge does not conflict with bodhisattva practice.' Explanation: How are kṣetras and sentient beings equal? Because they each lack substance, none of them is established \[as real\]. If viewed within their own class, it is like kṣetras viewed with kṣetras being equal; if viewed across different classes, it is like kṣetras viewed with sentient beings being equal. By the principle of a single naturelessness, extending to citta and objects, self and other, sameness and difference, high and low, the ten directions and the three times—all are entirely equal. Furthermore, phenomenon and phenomenon do not conflict; principle and principle do not conflict. That phenomenon and phenomenon do not conflict has briefly three causes: first, the interpenetration of the dharmatā; second, the approach of mutual dependency through dependent origination—these two are the meaning of the non-obstruction of phenomena and phenomena. Third, speaking directly of the same single condition, which penetrates both phenomena and principle: just as observing a single leaf fall, one knows that throughout the world it is the same autumn. Because unruined phenomena and unchanging nature both share the same single dependent origination. That principle and principle do not conflict also has two approaches: first, the naturelessness of kṣetras is identical to the naturelessness of sentient beings; second, because principle is identical, there is nothing to identify with and nothing to conflict with. _First 22 of 25 passages. [Read on](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84)_ ## Linked texts (1) - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.84.1) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016~en-mt.84) · Pramāṇa