御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 1.10

Fourth, concerning the capacities of those addressed: first, distinguishing the lineage-capacities; second, addressing them with the teaching. First, regarding the diversity of lineage-capacities: the one vehicle and the five lineages have long been a subject of dispute. Now we briefly set them forth. There are three differing explanations. The first says that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, and that there are definitely no śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas of fixed lineage, nor those without lineage. Fascicle 27 of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The Lion's Roar is the definitive teaching that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature.' It also says: 'All sentient beings possess a mind; all who possess a mind will attain anuttarā samyaksambodhi. Therefore, I say that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature.' Furthermore, Fascicle 37 says: 'It is for the sake of non-Buddha-nature that Buddha-nature is taught. Non-Buddha-nature refers to insentient things such as walls, tiles, and stones; that which is free from such insentient things is called Buddha-nature.' According to this sūtra passage, it is not merely principle, because the five aggregates of sentient beings are not excluded, nor is it only a partial portion, since being free from insentient things is Buddha-nature. How could one teach Buddha-nature for the sake of non-Buddha-nature? Is there Buddha-nature within Buddha-nature, just as one teaches the unconditioned apart from conditioned phenomena—is there conditioned phenomenon within the unconditioned? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'All sentient beings have three [levels of] concentration, namely superior, middling, and inferior. The superior is the Buddha-nature, the middling is the first dhyāna, and the inferior is the great earth.' The middling concentration counts the lower two concentrations, which are not merely a partial portion; thus we know that the superior concentration is likewise possessed by all, as it is part of the same text. Since it says it is 'concentration', it is not spoken solely in terms of principle, because the Śūraṅgama Samādhi is the Buddha-nature. The Lotus Sūtra says: 'For the sake of one great cause [the Buddhas] appear in the world: desiring to cause sentient beings to open the Buddha's knowledge and vision, and to cause them to attain purity,' and so forth. It also says: 'In the Buddha-lands of the ten directions, there is only the Dharma of the One Vehicle; there are not two, nor are there three, except where the Buddha uses expedients, merely using conventional names to guide sentient beings.' The Fo xing lun (Treatise on Buddha-nature) says: 'The tathatā of the two emptinesses is called the cause that should be obtained; because one should obtain the Buddha fruit, it is called the cause that should be obtained.' Therefore, we know that one who possesses the nature of principle will definitely have the practice and fruit; since the principle is possessed by all, the practice and fruit are therefore not merely for a partial portion. If one says that in the Lotus [Sūtra] the two vehicles do not undergo extinction and will all become Buddhas, and that this refers to those of unfixed lineage rather than those of fixed lineage—this is not so. If they were unfixed, they too would already have realized the Buddha's teaching from the initial turning of the wheel of Dharma. If what is taught now were the same as what was taught in the past, why would there be the earnest three requests before permitting the teaching, and why would the arrogantly proud arise, become deluded and terrified, while Śāriputra and others doubted whether the Buddha might be Māra? It was precisely because past and present were vastly different that these doubts and slanders arose. Hence the sūtra says: 'The reason it was not taught before is that the time to teach had not yet arrived; now is precisely the time to decisively teach the Great Vehicle.' Thus we know that the present teaching is not the previous teaching. It also says that there are five lineages: first, the śrāvaka lineage; second, the pratyekabuddha lineage; third, the tathāgata lineage; fourth, the indeterminate lineage; and fifth, the lineage-less. Question: 'How do we know there is a lineage-less [category]?' Answer: 'Both the four-fascicle and eight-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra Sūtras say that the icchantikas of great compassion will ultimately never attain true awakening. If all sentient beings had the nature, then attaining Buddhahood would be exhaustive; how could one of great compassion ultimately not do so? Furthermore, the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says: "Sentient beings who are apart from good spiritual friends and who have heard no Dharma are matured through the wholesome roots of humans and devas." The Śīla-upadeśa Sūtra says: "Persons without lineage, because they lack the lineage, even if they generate the mind [for bodhi] and diligently practice vigor, will ultimately be unable to attain unsurpassed bodhi." The Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Yogācārabhūmi also have the same explanation. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra speaks of three kinds of patients: regarding the third, whether he encounters an excellent physician or not, he will definitely not recover. If all had the nature, how could he fail to be cured? Furthermore, of the seven persons in the Gaṅgā River, the first is perpetually submerged; each of the seven persons corresponds to one [type], and this is precisely the lineage-less. Fascicle 1 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra says that there are two kinds of icchantika: first, temporary; second, ultimate. The temporary has four [types]: first, one who exclusively practices evil; second, one who cuts off all wholesome dharmas; third, one who lacks the wholesome roots of the aids to liberation; fourth, one whose wholesome roots are incomplete. Those who are ultimately devoid of the dharma of nirvāṇa do so because they lack the cause; they lack the nature of prajñā and nirvāṇa, meaning they only seek saṃsāra and take no delight in nirvāṇa. However, some commentators say: "As for 'ultimate', first, in terms of what is severed, cutting off both the innate wholesome roots and acquired wholesome roots, thereby exhausting the causes of the three times, is called 'ultimately devoid of the dharma of nirvāṇa'; second, in terms of time, because there are dull-rooted ones who transmigrate for a long time and cannot generate faith, this is called 'ultimately devoid of the dharma of nirvāṇa'—it does not mean that throughout the future they are definitely devoid of the nature, which is called 'ultimate'." This explanation is incorrect. Those who sever the wholesome roots only sever the innate ones, not the wholesome roots of expedients. Furthermore, they merely suppress active manifestations, not that they lack seeds; how could they lack the cause? Moreover, there would then be no difference from the temporary ones who broadly sever wholesome dharmas. Furthermore, regarding the severing of wholesome roots, in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras and treatises, they are all sharp-rooted; thus 'ultimate' and 'throughout the future' differ in wording but are identical in meaning. Were it not so, 'ultimate like space' would not pervade the dharmadhātu. Moreover, Fascicle 67 of the Yogācārabhūmi contains five more objections and six replies that extensively establish the absence of lineage; this should be examined and set forth. The above concerned the absence of lineage; next, establishing the fixed lineage. Relying on Fascicle 593 of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, Suvikrāntavikrāmin requested, saying: "We only pray that the World-Honoured One, having pity on us, will fully proclaim the Tathāgata's realm and wisdom. If there are beings who are fixed in the lineage of the śrāvaka vehicle, having heard this Dharma, they will quickly be able to realize their own uncontaminated stage. Those who are fixed in the lineage of the pratyekabuddha vehicle, having heard this Dharma, will quickly attain departure in their own vehicle..." and further says: "If there are beings who, although not yet entered into the certainty of rightness and freedom from rebirth, are indeterminate in the lineage of the three vehicles, having heard this Dharma, they will quickly realize unsurpassed right and complete awakening." Since the indeterminate are spoken of separately outside of the fixed, it is clear that there are separately śrāvakas of fixed lineage. Furthermore, Yogācārabhūmi Fascicle 76 and Sandhinirmocana Fascicle 2 both speak of śrāvakas who exclusively head towards quiescence. Fascicle 40 of the Avataṃsaka speaks of pratyekabuddhas of fixed lineage, and Fascicle 1 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra does likewise. Fascicle 30 of the Nirvāṇa says: "In the sūtras, for the sake of the bhikṣus..."'

[The sūtra says:] '[The Tathāgata] speaks of the One Vehicle, the single path, the single practice, and the single object of focus.' And further: 'My disciples, upon hearing this discourse, did not understand my meaning, and proclaimed: "The Tathāgata says that from srotāpannas up to arhats, all will attain buddhahood."' If all attain buddhahood and there is no fixed lineage, then they would have understood the Buddha's meaning; why then was this discourse necessary? If so, why is it that in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra the One Vehicle alone is taught as ultimate? Answer: Just as in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha ten meanings are used to reconcile [this] with the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, there is also a reconciliation of the One Vehicle. In general, relying on the sūtras and treatises, Buddha-nature is of three kinds, śrāvakas are of four kinds, and icchantikas are of three kinds. The three kinds of Buddha-nature are: first, the nature of principle, which is tathatā; second, the nature of practice, which is untainted seeds; third, the concealed nature, which is the class of afflictive defilements. The four kinds of śrāvakas are: first, those of transformation; second, those who retreat from the bodhicitta; third, the overly arrogant; fourth, those who incline toward extinction. The three kinds of icchantikas are: first, those of great compassion; second, those who have severed good roots; third, those who lack lineage. The scriptural passages cited above by both masters contain explicit explanations. The resolution of objections and reconciliation of contradictions are investigated one by one in detail as in the separate record; those who delight in extensive debate and diligently explain the Dharma should recount them all. The third position says: That there are those with lineage and those without lineage is the Tathāgata's esoteric realm, scattered throughout the various sūtras, which the Buddha did not teach determinately. How can the previous interpretations presume to determine right and wrong? Because this is known by the power of knowing the various realms among the ten powers, only a buddha together with a buddha can realize and fully understand it. The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, fascicle seventeen, says: 'Concerning the Dharma of the three vehicles, I speak of the One Vehicle; concerning the Dharma of the One Vehicle, according to suitability I speak of three.' And further: 'Because the Tathāgata clearly sees the capacities of sentient beings, he is utterly free from falsehood; because he has severed transgressions and faults. Although he is free from falsehood, if he knows that sentient beings will obtain the benefit of the Dharma through a false teaching, according with suitability and skillful means, he will then speak it for them.' This, then, is the profound realm of the buddhas, beyond the knowledge of the two vehicles. Relying on this scriptural passage, how can ordinary worldly mortals erroneously speculate? Furthermore, fascicle thirty-four of that sūtra says: 'Good sons, for the sake of sentient beings, the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, speaks briefly within the extensive, and speaks extensively within the brief.' And up to: 'Therefore, according to the person, according to the intention, and according to the time, it is called the Tathāgata's power of knowing the various faculties. Good sons, if I were to make a fixed statement on such meanings, I could not be called a Tathāgata endowed with the power of knowing faculties.' Fascicle thirty-five says: 'Good sons, such disputes are the realm of the Buddha, not what is known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. If someone gives rise to doubt concerning this, they can still destroy immeasurable afflictions, [lofty] as Mount Sumeru. If in this matter one gives rise to a fixed view, this is called attachment.' And up to: 'Good sons, such attachment is not called good. Why is that? Because it cannot destroy the net of doubts.' Kāśyapa said again to the World-Honoured One: 'Such a person originally had no doubt; why do you say they do not destroy the net of doubts?' 'Good sons, that which has no doubt is itself doubt.' Fascicle thirty-six says: 'Good sons, although I say that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature, sentient beings do not understand such words spoken according to the Buddha's own intent. Good sons, such words cannot even be known by a bodhisattva in their final existence, much less by the two vehicles and other bodhisattvas.' Furthermore, a passage says: 'If anyone says that all sentient beings definitely have Buddha-nature, or definitely do not have Buddha-nature, such people are all called slanderers of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha.' Relying on these passages, one should attribute the merit to the Buddha and respectfully narrate it. Therefore, among the various interpretations, one may adopt or reject according to one's own inclination; because both doctrine and reasoning are equally balanced, one should not give rise to an attached mind within them, forcefully generating one-sided views and claiming they accord with the Buddha's words—this is impossible. However, one should fully recount the teachings and principles of the various traditions, desiring to let students know their foundations. Question: Principle has only one superior truth; both should not be displayed simultaneously. In explicating the treasury of teachings, one must specify a definitive conclusion. Now, merely blending the light and making indeterminate statements, what will later students have to receive and uphold? Answer: Among meanings, there are those that can be determined and those that cannot. Indeterminate meanings are open to multiple interpretations; how could one insist on requiring a fixed explanation? When even the Buddha does not make it determinate, who would dare to determine it? Question: The secret is difficult to know, truly as you have said. Sentient beings in this land delight in hearing of Buddha-nature; why did the Tathāgata not make a definitive statement? Answer: Who says they exclusively delight in hearing that it exists? Rather, sentient beings naturally fall into two classes: the first, upon hearing of Buddha-nature, rejoice and have something to rely upon, advancing vigorously; whereas if they hear of having no nature, having nothing to depend on, they cease their striving mind. The second, if they hear that one portion lacks the nature, fearing they may fall into this class, exert extra effort in practice; whereas if they hear that all possess it, relying on this Buddha-nature, they instead give rise to indolence and negligence. Because the teaching is indeterminate in response to different capacities, it is clear that one should merely be diligent, firmly gather practices and vows, and behold the golden countenance in person—then one will naturally know. The above explains the differences in lineages and faculties. As for those addressed by the sūtra: if relying on the first explanation, there is no divergent thesis. The tradition of the five natures requires critical assessment. In terms of the primary audience addressed, it is solely the Great Vehicle, for the sūtra says: 'Spoken for those who set forth on the Great Vehicle.' That is, as other sūtras say: 'For all bodhisattvas, expounding the six pāramitās, causing them to attain sarvākārajñatā.' In terms of secondary audience, it extends to all of the two vehicles as well as those without lineage, for below it lists the four assemblies and the eight classes, without exclusion. The Great Prajñāpāramitā says: 'Prajñāpāramitā can explain the stages of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.' That is, the passage on [the bodhisattva] Subikrāntasaṃpanna cited earlier also addresses the two vehicles. Below, the vast and great mind of the bodhisattva causes [beings of] the three realms and the four modes of birth all to attain nirvāṇa. Asaṅga Bodhisattva asked: Why is this vow [made]? The explanation has two parts: first, explaining the title; second, explaining the text of the sūtra. Regarding the title of the sūtra: the versions of the Qin, Wei, and Liang all have the title Vajra-prajñā. The two versions of the Tang and Zhou both have the title Vajracchedikā. The translation of the Sui dynasty, relying on that treatise, subsequently named it Vajracchedikā. The former three versions are brief; the latter three are complete. In presenting the essence to encompass the function, they merely indicate the names of the Dharma and the metaphor. In manifesting both essence and function, they additionally state the cause of cutting through. Although the extensive and the brief differ, in meaning there is no contradiction. First is the separate explanation, then the combined explanation. In Sanskrit it is *vajra*.

"Vajra" here is the most supreme among jewels. Its substances and varieties are manifold. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Śakra, Devendra, has a jewel called vajra, which cannot be seen by other sentient beings." Paramārtha's notes state: "There are six kinds of jewels, all called vajra: first, the blue-colored, which can eliminate all calamities and misfortunes; second, the yellow-colored, which can produce various things according to what a person requires; third, the red-colored, which can enable a person to travel through the air; fourth, the white-colored, which can produce water and also clarify turbid water; fifth, the space-colored, which can produce fire; sixth, the jasper-colored, which can dissipate all poisons." The above explains the substance of the metaphor. Next is to set forth its meanings and functions: first relying on various teachings, and later based on this treatise. First, as for the various teachings: fascicle twenty-four of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra extensively praises the vajra-samādhi: "It is just like a vajra: wherever it is directed, nothing fails to be shattered and destroyed, and yet that vajra itself suffers no damage or breaking." It also states: "Just as among all jewels, vajra is the most supreme." According to Bodhisattva Vasubandhu's commentary on the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, there are four meanings of the vajra-samādhi taken as a metaphor: first, it can destroy afflictions; second, it can induce remainingless merits; third, it is solid and unbreakable; fourth, its sharp utility penetrates all dharmas. Since the samādhi is like this, by analogy wisdom is also the same. Fascicle twelve of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya explains that the vajra-samādhi has four meanings: first, uninterrupted, because it is not interrupted or flawed by worldly practice; second, firm, because it can destroy all obstacles and is not destroyed by obstacles; third, of one taste, because its non-conceptual nature is purely of one taste; fourth, all-pervading, because it takes the tathatā of the common characteristic of all phenomena as its objective sphere. Vajra also has four [meanings]: first, its substance has no gaps and is not mixed with sand or stones; second, it can be known; third, it is purely of one type, neither changing nor altering; fourth, it is pervasive throughout the world, like the vajra mountains and vajra pestles. Bringing together the various texts, there are ten meanings of vajra: first, supreme; second, difficult to see; third, removing calamities; fourth, solid; fifth, fulfilling wishes; sixth, able to induce; seventh, sharp utility; eighth, uninterrupted; ninth, of one taste; tenth, all-pervading. The text and meaning of this sūtra also have ten kinds: because it is the utmost, foremost, rare dharma; because its meaning and fruition are inconceivable; because sinful karma, obstacles, and afflictions are eradicated; because it can shatter firm attachments and is not shattered by them; because it benefits sentient beings, adorns buddha-lands, and attains bodhi; because it can generate all buddhas and gather good dharmas; because it penetrates selflessness and its wisdom-vision is pure; because it is not grasped by a mind that abides in marks; because the meaning of 'suchness of all phenomena' has an unconditioned essence; because its blessings and wisdom are like space and cannot be measured. Matching and explaining in this way against the preceding ten metaphors, although these meanings are complete, they are not the intent of the basic treatise. The basic treatise has four meanings: first, subtle; second, rare; third, able to sever; fourth, similar. The first three are shared meanings: contemplating and illuminating the true mark, they are pervasive in all teachings. The last one is unshared: textual prajñā, which is solely in this treatise. First, the treatise marks: "As for 'vajra-cutter,' this name corresponds to two meanings; one should know it is as when one says 'entering the practice of right views' and 'entering the practice of wrong views.'" However, in explaining this passage, various interpretations differ. Ci'en explains: "'Corresponds to two meanings' shows that 'vajra' applies to both the antidote and that which is cured. 'As when one says...' below adduces an example to explain it. 'Right view' refers to the group of beings destined for correctness; 'wrong view' refers to the group of beings destined for falsehood. Practicing good or evil practices can enter into those groups, hence they are called those two practices. Or it broadly points to saying: as when one says that two persons, good and evil, practice good and evil practices; this practice enters the category of the group of right views, and this practice enters the category of the group of wrong views. Although wrong and right differ, both are called 'practices of views.' Now, the three wisdoms that can overcome and the two obstacles that are overcome—although defiled and good differ—are both called 'vajra.' As the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'A vajra is extremely firm; ten thousand things cannot break it, except the horn of a white sheep or the shell of a turtle.' The meaning is that the two obstacles, according to what is appropriate, cannot be severed by ordinary persons or the two vehicles; only when one gives rise to the great mind of bodhi can the three wisdoms then subdue or sever them. This uses that which is severed as a metaphor for vajra, like 'entering the practice of wrong views.' Furthermore, just as jade and stone are extremely hard and solid by nature, not broken by [ordinary] things, only vajra can smash them. The two obstacles are also like this: they are not destroyed by ordinary persons' conventional wisdom or the two vehicles' true knowledge, for the two vehicles do not sever the habit-energies of the obstacle of afflictions; only the three wisdoms of the Great Vehicle, like that vajra, can then subdue and sever them, and at the stage of ultimate severance, it is the wisdom cultivated by vajra [-samādhi]. Therefore, the sūtra only speaks of vajra as a metaphor for samādhi, which is this ability to sever as a metaphor for vajra, like 'entering the practice of right views.' Therefore it speaks of two meanings: first, the meaning of that which is shattered; second, the meaning of that which shatters. If it only meant that which shatters, the metaphor of the two views, wrong and right, would not correspond. However, the text of the treatise is brief and does not explicitly unpack the vajra of that which is cured; it is implicitly contained within 'able to sever' and only then becomes evident." Henan further explains: "Vajra is only a metaphor for the three wisdoms and the teaching. Why is that? The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'It is like a vajra, which is extremely firm and nothing can damage it, except turtle shells and the like.' That sūtra is also like this: it only excepts the icchantika, who cannot be made to establish the cause of bodhi. Since sheep horns and the like are used as metaphors for icchantikas, it is clear that that which is severed is not called vajra. And as for speaking of 'two meanings': first, realizing the principle of tathatā, like entering the practice of right views; second, severing all afflictions, like entering the practice of wrong views. This vajra-wisdom can shatter the two heavy obstacles and afflictions of those in the Great Vehicle who possess good roots and whose faculties are mature, but it cannot eliminate the afflictions in the bodies of those persons whose good roots are severed." There is also an explanation stating: "According to this treatise, the sentence 'vajra is hard to break' in the initial meaning-aggregate clarifies that it is not that which is severed. Although elsewhere it is said that afflictions are hard to sever just like vajra, here it says they can be severed, so it is inappropriate to use vajra as a metaphor for them—just as when it is said that icchantikas are hard to convert, scorched grain is used as a metaphor; if it were said that icchantikas could be cured, this metaphor would not be used. And as for speaking of 'two meanings correspond,' vajra can sever both hard and unhard things; this is called the two meanings." Daoyin says: "The first explanation is superior, because it accords with the text of the treatise: it takes vajra primarily as a metaphor for the wisdom that can [sever] and concurrently as a metaphor for the obstacles that are severed, thereby displaying the function of wisdom. Fascicle two of the Daśacakra Sūtra states: 'How does it shatter continuity, like afflictions that are like vajra?' Principles have many paths, so how could metaphors be fixed? Just as space is spoken of as a metaphor for buddha-nature, and is also spoken of as a metaphor for the coarse metal of the two obstacles. As in the Nyāyamukha: a doorway opens to both principle and wisdom. Adducing that obstacles are hard to sever just like vajra is done to express that wisdom's capability is extraordinary and transcendent; who needs to make someone contemplate the hardness of afflictions and give rise to contemplative practice based on that? If so, the metaphor of sheep horns and the like in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra would not correspond; how is that to be harmonized? Answer: The intent of the Mahāparinirvāṇa text is not an explanation of this sūtra. Here we merely borrow that metaphor to illustrate vajra."

Although these two objects are [both] used to metaphorically illustrate what is remedied in contrast to what obstructs, this does not mean that the obstacles to nirvāṇa are compared to the diamond. The above explanation of 'vajra' applies generally to both what cuts and what is cut; below, the treatise specifically explains it strictly in terms of what can cut, finding four senses, as listed previously. The treatise states: '"Subtle" means because it is the cause of wisdom; "firm" means because it cannot be destroyed.' (Because the Sui dynasty observed an avoidance taboo on the character *jian* [firm], it was translated as 'subtle', adopting the sense of 'firmly compacted'.) 'The cause of wisdom' refers to the seed; 'cannot be destroyed' refers to actualized wisdom: wisdom transcends delusion and eliminates it, and since light and darkness cannot coexist, it cannot be destroyed. Another explanation is: wisdom can realize suchness, being the nature of a revelatory cause (*vyañjaka-hetu*), and is therefore called 'the cause of wisdom'. Because it has no gaps and is not admixed with worldly conduct, it is called 'subtle and compacted'. Furthermore, because it is subtle and wondrous, and not a coarse objective support of the two vehicles and the like, it is also called 'subtle and compacted'. The statement that it 'cannot be destroyed' demonstrates that the obstacles to be remedied are by nature firm and hard to break. If one follows this explanation, the four senses in the treatise apply generally to both what can cut and what is cut. The treatise further states: '"What cuts" means what is cut by hearing, contemplation, and cultivation in the prajñāpāramitā, cutting just as the cutting edge of a diamond cuts.' This means that wisdom is like a diamond, which can cut the two obstacles; jade, stone, and the like are called the 'cutting edges'. That is, it cites what is cut to reveal what can cut. If one takes the two obstacles to be compared to the diamond, this cites what can cut to reveal what is cut: it is just like a diamond, meaning that the obstacles cut by hearing, contemplation, and cultivation are cut just like the cutting edge of a diamond. However, in accord with the intent of the treatise, it is explaining the title 'The Vajra-Cutter Prajñā': because it first presents 'Vajra-Cutter', it later concludes, 'this is called the Vajra-Cutter'. In the commentary it is also like this: first it explains 'vajra', and afterwards it explains 'cutter'. This follows the Western Regions' word order. If one says 'the cutter diamond' (*nengduan jingang*), that follows the word order of this land; neither is contradictory. In general, the signifier teachings, the signified principle and wisdom, and the obstacles to be cut are all compared to a diamond. The treatise explains the fourth sense, stating: 'Furthermore, it is like the drawn form of a vajra: broad at the beginning and the end, but narrow in the middle. Likewise, in the prajñāpāramitā, the narrow refers to the pure mind ground; the broad at the beginning and end refers to the ground of practice based on faith and the Tathāgata ground. This demonstrates the uncommon meaning.' The exposition says: According to the teaching of this sūtra, the written-word prajñā is explained broadly at the beginning and end, while in the middle it is narrow. Unlike other sūtras, this is called the uncommon meaning. Therefore, this sūtra alone is called 'Vajra', and it is also unlike other sections. Hence, it is just like a drawn vajra spirit: broad at the shoulders and hips, but narrow at the waist. Because it possesses movement, the metaphor encourages advancement. It is also like a drawn vajra pestle: broad at the two ends and narrow at the middle waist. Because it is extremely firm and supreme, it causes one to know the profound and wondrous. Question: Why is it that the ground of practice based on faith and the Buddha ground are explained broadly, while the pure mind [ground] is abbreviated? Answer: The intent of this sūtra is to cause beings to generate the mind, cultivate the practice, and keep the Buddha lineage unbroken; it speaks broadly of the fruition's virtues to encourage them to take joy and delight [in it] so that they are able to generate the mind. Since prior to the grounds when first cultivating there is regression, it broadly shows the aspects of practice to cause them to enter and advance. From the first ground onward, because they realize it for themselves and do not regress, there is no need for extensive exposition; hence it is broad at the beginning and end, and abbreviated in the middle. Furthermore, by inheriting and continuing the Buddha lineage from the rank of ordinary beings, the Buddha fruition is thereby born and the unbroken meaning is established; what lies between can be understood, so why bother with extensive exposition? Hence the text and meaning of the sūtra differ in broadness and narrowness. Although commentators explain the 'Tathāgata ground' as being included within the ten grounds, the sūtra does not clarify the aspects of practice of the ten grounds, but refers back to the Buddha fruition: all its virtues are called the 'Tathāgata ground'. Therefore it is explained this way, as will be understood below. Question: The *Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* says: 'In the prajñāpāramitā, there is not a single dharma that can serve as a metaphor.' Why now do you say that wisdom is compared to a diamond? Answer: That is to reveal that the supremacy of wisdom surpasses all myriad dharmas, so there is nothing that can be completely compared to it. This [vajra] comparison is made based on a small portion: because their meaning and function are similar, it is compared to a diamond. All wise persons understand through metaphors. Dharmas rely on metaphors for clarification; their underlying reasons are made evident: by citing the side that has already been seen, one proves the side that has not yet been seen, bringing them together in one place so that their meaning is made equal. All correct statements of this kind are called metaphors. That is, using the manifest part to reveal the unmanifest part. *Prajñā* is the Sanskrit sound, translated here as wisdom (*zhihui*). There are five kinds in total. Written-word [wisdom] is the signifier teaching. Contemplative [wisdom] is the essence of discernment. Real-mark [wisdom] is the sphere of true nature, namely the two truths of emptiness and existence, the three non-natures, and so forth. Concomitant [wisdom] is the nature of the four associated aggregates, the nature of the accompanying five aggregates, as appropriate—namely, the two kinds of morality: of absorption (*dhyāna-saṃvara*) and of the path (*anāsrava-saṃvara*). However, because this name *prajñā* is broad and pervasive, in principle it covers all five kinds. In terms of supremacy, it takes only the real-mark and contemplative [wisdoms], as explained in our doctrinal school. These two—wisdom (*zhi*) and discernment (*hui*)—are distinct at first and unified later. Regarding their distinct aspects: in full Sanskrit pronunciation, it should be called *prajñā*, translated here as discernment (*hui*); in Sanskrit it is *jñāna*, translated here as wisdom (*zhi*). Although their essence is identical—both being the mental factor of discernment among the object-determining factors—their meaning and function differ, and so they receive different names, because selecting dharmas and making decisive judgments are two different things. This accords with the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and so on. The character *jña* pervades the two meanings of cause and wisdom. These two characters *zhi* and *hui* are bound: the two syllables *pra* and *na* are their conditions; with *pra* assisting *jñā* it is discernment (*hui*), and with *na* assisting *jñā* it is wisdom (*zhi*). For this reason, in the ten perfections across various sūtras, wisdom (*zhi*) and discernment (*hui*) are distinguished as two. The *Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* states: 'The bodhisattva is endowed with *prajñā* and endowed with *jñāna*.' It also states: 'Attaining the gate of *jñāna*, one is able to enter into whether sentient beings' faculties are sharp or dull; attaining the gate of *prajñā*, one distinguishes the meanings of phrases.' Regarding their shared aspect: because their essence is identical, where there is wisdom one may speak of discernment, and where there is discernment one may speak of wisdom; in all cases there is no contradiction. Thus the sixth [perfection] is called the perfection of wisdom (*zhidu*), and so forth. Question: The title names prajñā; why then does it explain giving in the practice? Answer: In terms of the earlier leading to the later, it is subsumed under the perfection of giving (*dāna-pāramitā*); in terms of the later purifying the earlier, it is subsumed under the perfection of wisdom. Citing either one, they are actually similar in principle. Moreover, the formulation of the name is based on supremacy, while the cultivation of practice proceeds from the beginning; thus the two loci of giving and wisdom are cited separately. *Pāram* is translated here as 'the other shore'. Dharmas are of four kinds: principle, teaching, practice, and fruition. Taking only the fruition, bodhi and nirvāṇa are regarded as the other shore. Teaching and principle pervade cause and fruition; practice lies solely in the cause. Thus, unarisen suffering and origin are regarded as the river; currently arisen origin and suffering are regarded as this shore; the six perfections are the raft, and the practitioner as a nominal entity of the five aggregates is what is ferried across. *Itā* has the meaning of 'leaving' and the meaning of 'arriving': by cultivating giving and so forth, one leaves saṃsāra and arrives at the other shore. In the ninth fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratā-śāstra*, it requires being embraced by seven kinds of supremacy before a *pāramitā* can be established: first, supremacy of abiding—

namely, requiring abiding in the bodhisattva gotra; second, supremacy of basis and rectification, namely, requiring reliance upon the mind of great bodhi; third, supremacy of intention, namely, requiring compassionate pity for all sentient beings; fourth, supremacy of activity, namely, requiring full execution of all activities; fifth, supremacy of skillful means, namely, requiring being embraced by non-conceptual wisdom; sixth, supremacy of dedication, namely, requiring dedication to unexcelled bodhi; seventh, supremacy of purification, namely, requiring not being admixed with the two obstacles. If one is not embraced by these seven, the practice of giving and so forth by the recipient is not 'reaching the other shore'. From this, giving and so on in relation to pāramitā should each be analyzed by the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*). In the second fascicle of the *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, there are twelve kinds of supremacy; therefore all attain the name 'reaching the other shore'. In the eleventh fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*, there are five meanings. In the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, there are five causes and conditions. How these subsume one another is distinguished in a separate chapter. 'Sūtra': in Sanskrit it is *sūtra*; *xiuhoulu* is an error. Correctly it is *sūtram*, which designates four meanings: clothing, thread, mat, and warp—just like the word *go*, or *saindhava*, and so forth. Let it take the sense of 'warp' (*jing*), and also the sense of 'thread' (*xian*). Why? The *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* states: 'Just as various flowers placed on a table will be blown away and scattered by the wind, but if held firmly with a thread they will not be scattered and lost.' Sentient beings' faculties and dispositions are like the table; the doctrines taught by the Buddha are like the flowers. If not linked and held together, the strange winds of wrong views and delusions would blow them away and scatter them. Now the compilers linked and joined the Buddha's words together like thread piercing flowers, like a warp holding the weft. The *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra* says: 'By means of the sacred teaching, stringing together and holding the doctrines that should be expounded and the sentient beings to be transformed.' These can correspond respectively to the two meanings of thread and warp. However, the character *jing* shares its name with the secular scriptures and proclamations of this land. According to secular explanations here, *jing* means constancy (*chang*), model (*fa*), and passage (*jing*). Therefore, now it is not altered: 'constancy' models and fixes right and wrong as law, and 'passage' penetrates the principles of things as warp; Buddhist teachings share this, and there is no error. In the Hīnayāna treatises, the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* gives five meanings, such as 'welling spring', as is commonly explained. Although 'sūtra' pertains to the teaching, according to the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, when explaining the essence of a sūtra, it universally takes what is signified; hence, spoken generally, 'sūtra' pervades both teaching and principle. *Prajñāpāramitā* also pervades principle and teaching. Because of this, when cross-referenced with 'sūtra', there are four alternatives in total. That is, *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā* is itself the sūtra: a karmadhāraya compound; or [a sūtra of the Prajñāpāramitā:] a tatpuruṣa compound, to be interpreted as appropriate.