[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733) › 1.8.5 # 御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 1.8.5 御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 1.8.5 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.8.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.1.8.5) 非謂二諦一非二何可得。 於解常自一。 於諦常自二。 通達此無二。 入真第一義。 頌意。 真如為勝義諦。 依他遍計為世俗諦。 二智境故名為諦異。 唯約真智。 即稱解。 或異或一。 皆無有違。 唯識亦云。 故此與依他非異非不異。 如無常等性非不見此彼。 瑜伽七十五云。 於大乘中。 或有一類惡取。 故作如是言。 由世俗故一切皆有。 由勝義故一切皆無。 應告彼言。 何者世俗。 何者勝義。 彼若。 答言。 若一切法皆無自性。 是名勝義。 若於諸法無自性中。 自性可得。 是名世俗。 何以故。 無所有中。 建立世俗。 假名言而起說故。 應告彼云。 汝何所欲名言世俗為從因有自性可得為唯名言世俗說有若名言世俗。 從因有者名言世俗。 從因而生非是有。 不應道理。 又應告言。 長老何緣諸可得者。 此無自性（此難俗有勝義即無）彼若答言顛倒事故（謂心顛倒於天謂有如見空花）復應告言。 汝何所欲此顛倒事為有為無若言有者說一切法由義故。 皆無自性。 不應道理。 若言無者顛倒事故。 諸可得者。 此無自性不應道理（既無顛倒從何起執而言顛倒事故諸可得者此自性）勝空者曰。 大菩薩藏經第二卷云。 空與菩薩性無有二。 由無二故。 不可言說。 又云。 遠離取執勝義諦中。 無法可得。 由性無故。 說名為空由此說空為極了義。 應理者曰。 此亦非證為依瞬若遍計無故與覺無二。 又瞬若多空性真如與覺無二。 不言菩提體即空無若實皆空何空何覺。 若云隨破妄情空覺無二。 據勝義諦無覺無空。 即應分別兔角長短此既不爾。 彼云何然。 又云。 遠離取執勝義諦中無法可得。 不言非報勝義諦中亦空無法。 又若二諦體性是一而非有者。 應無凡聖染淨作業人天五趣即無三惡。 悲所度生。 菩薩徒自行於勤苦。 以空無故。 誰為誰說何法何求不應智者為除幻敵求石女兒用為軍旅。 又凡夫妄倒。 可有世俗色心等法。 諸佛如來妄倒已斷。 何有色身淨妙土等。 若言以佛悲心。 為眾生故。 示現身土。 眾生妄倒。 若已斷盡。 諸佛身土。 無不立者。 勝義既空。 悲智之心。 亦應非有。 誰為能度眾生之本。 故言空者是密意說。 教理既然。 故與前說掌珍比量。 作聖教相違過。 以違法教。 不空義故。 唯識亦云。 彼特違害。 前所引經。 > It does not mean that the two truths are one; how could non-duality be found \[otherwise\]? To understanding they are constantly one; as truths they are constantly two. Penetrating this non-duality, one enters the true paramārtha. The meaning of the verse is: tathatā is the ultimate truth; paratantra and parikalpita are the conventional truth. Because they are the objects of the two wisdoms, they are called distinct truths; viewed solely in terms of true wisdom, this is called understanding. Whether different or one, neither is contradictory. The \*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi\* also says: 'Therefore this is neither different nor not different from the paratantra, just as the nature of impermanence and so forth is neither seen nor not seen in this or that.' Fascicle 75 of the \*Yogācārabhūmi\* states: In the Mahāyāna, there is a class of people who cling mistakenly, and therefore make this statement: 'By virtue of the conventional, all things exist; by virtue of the ultimate, all things are non-existent.' One should say to them: 'What is the conventional, and what is the ultimate?' If they answer: 'If all phenomena lack self-nature, that is called the ultimate; if within phenomena that lack self-nature, self-nature can be found, that is called the conventional. Why? Because within what is non-existent, the conventional is established, and designations and words are formulated to speak of it.' One should say to them: 'What do you maintain: does the conventional of designations and words have an obtainable self-nature coming from causes, or is it merely the conventional of designations and words that is said to exist? If the conventional of designations and words comes from causes, then that the conventional of designations and words arising from causes is not existent is not reasonable.' Furthermore, one should say: 'Venerable, on what grounds are all obtainable things devoid of self-nature?' (This refutes the view that conventional existence is non-existent in the ultimate.) If they answer: 'Because of inverted states of affairs' (meaning that the mind is inverted, positing existence in empty space, like seeing sky-flowers), one should further say: 'What do you maintain: are these inverted states of affairs existent or non-existent? If you say they are existent, to say that all phenomena, by virtue of the ultimate, lack self-nature is not reasonable. If you say they are non-existent, then to say that because of inverted states of affairs all obtainable things lack self-nature is not reasonable.' (Since there is no inversion, from what could attachment arise such that one says that because of inverted states of affairs all obtainable things lack this self-nature?) The Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness says: Fascicle 2 of the \*Mahābodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra\* says: 'Emptiness and the nature of a bodhisattva are not two; because they are non-dual, they cannot be spoken of.' It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, within the ultimate truth, no phenomenon can be obtained. Because its nature is non-existent, it is called empty.' For this reason, stating emptiness is the utmost definitive meaning. The Rationalist says: This also is not proof. It is in reference to śūnya parikalpita being non-existent that it is non-dual with awakening; moreover, śūnyatā, the emptiness nature that is tathatā, is non-dual with awakening. It does not say that the essence of bodhi is itself empty and non-existent. If in reality all were empty, what would be empty and what would be awakened? If you say that, in accord with demolishing delusional attachments, emptiness and awakening are non-dual, and that according to the ultimate truth there is neither awakening nor emptiness, then one should distinguish the length of a hare's horn; since that is not the case, how could this be so? It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, within the ultimate truth no phenomenon can be obtained.' It does not say that within the ultimate truth of the unconditioned saṃbhoga there is also empty non-existence of phenomena. Furthermore, if the essence of the two truths were one and non-existent, there would be no ordinary and holy, no defiled and pure, no actions and karmic deeds, no human or heavenly realms, no five destinies, and thus no three evil paths. As for sentient beings to be saved through compassion, bodhisattvas would vainly undergo toil and suffering. Because of emptiness and non-existence, who would speak to whom, what Dharma would be sought? A wise person would not, in order to eliminate an illusory enemy, seek a barren woman's son to employ as an army. Furthermore, for the deluded ordinary person there may be conventional phenomena such as form and mind; the Buddhas, Tathāgatas, have already severed delusions, so how could they have a rūpakāya, pure and wondrous lands, and so forth? If you say that through the Buddha's compassionate mind, for the sake of sentient beings, he manifests bodies and lands: if sentient beings' delusions were already completely severed, the Buddhas' bodies and lands would not be established. Since the ultimate would be empty, the mind of compassion and wisdom should also be non-existent; what would serve as the root capable of saving sentient beings? Therefore, stating emptiness is an intentional teaching. Since the doctrine and reasoning are such, it incurs the fault of contradicting sacred teachings with respect to the aforementioned inference in the \*Karatalaratna\*, because it contradicts the meaning of non-emptiness in the Dharma teachings. The \*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi\* also says: 'That especially contradicts the sūtras previously cited.' > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.8.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.1.8.4) - [Next: 1.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.1.9) - [Up: 1.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.1.8) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733~en-mt.1.8.5) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [成唯識論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.trimsika!vijnaptimatratasiddhi*zh-xuanzang.8.149) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.1.8.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.1.8.5) · Pramāṇa