[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733) › 2.205 # 御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.205 御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.205 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.205](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.205) 經。若世界實有者則是一合相　演曰。雙釋所由。論云若世界是實有者。即為有摶取者。於中為並說。若世界若微塵界故。有二種摶取。謂一摶取及差別摶取。眾生類眾生世界有者。此為一摶取。微塵有者。此為差別摶取。以取微塵聚集故。演曰。四蘊無形執為是實。冥然一故但名一摶。微塵眾多執為一摶。實有差別故名差別摶取。一及差別此中總名為一合相。經言世界似唯名身其一合相即兼微塵。是故雙破。問。執彼五蘊為一合相有何過耶。答。便同外道數勝論等執器身等積微所成而是實有。亦同小乘心心所實皆是法執。是故為過。彼論第三破界實有故。論云若實有一世界。如來則不說三千大千世界。問。彼以世界喻真法身。今說界無有何所以。答。法身無相總界亦無法喻相似。又界若實有可喻塵異。今既非實便成與塵非一非異。 > Sūtra: 'If a world were real, it would be a unitary composite.' The Exposition states: This dually explains the reason. The treatise states: 'If a world were real, then there would be an grasping of a lump. Therein it is stated concurrently, whether of the world or of the realm of fine dust. Therefore there are two kinds of grasping of a lump: unitary grasping of a lump and differentiated grasping of a lump. If the species of sentient beings and the world of sentient beings exist, this is the unitary grasping of a lump. If fine dust exists, this is differentiated grasping of a lump, because one grasps an aggregation of fine dust.' The Exposition states: Clinging to the four formless aggregates as real, obscurely regarding them as one, is called merely unitary grasping of a lump. Clinging to the manifold particles of dust as a single lump, having real differentiations, is called differentiated grasping of a lump. The unitary and the differentiated are together called a 'unitary composite' here. When the sūtra says 'world', it seems to be only the name-body, but its 'unitary composite' also subsumes fine dust. Therefore it refutes both. Question: What fault is there in clinging to those five aggregates as a unitary composite? Answer: One would then be the same as non-Buddhists such as the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas, who cling to the receptacle and the body as being formed of accumulated particles and being real; one would also be the same as the Hīnayāna, for whom mind and mental factors are real—these are all dharmagrāha. Therefore it is a fault. The third part of that treatise refutes the reality of the realm. Hence the treatise states: 'If a single world were real, the Tathāgata would not have spoken of a three-thousand great-thousand world.' Question: That treatise uses the world to illustrate the true dharmakāya; why does it now say the realm does not exist? Answer: The dharmakāya is markless, and the general realm also lacks reality; the metaphor and the Dharma are similar. Moreover, if the realm were real, it could illustrate difference from dust. Now since it is not real, it becomes neither one nor different from the dust. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.204](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.204) - [Next: 2.206](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.206) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733~en-mt.2.205) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (3) - [金剛經纂要刊定記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1702.7.68) — Classical Chinese - [金剛般若波羅蜜經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.vajracchedika!vajracchedikaprajnaparamitasastra-t1510b*zh-dharmagupta.3.91) — Classical Chinese - [金剛般若論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.vajracchedika!vajracchedikaprajnaparamitasastra*zh-dharmagupta.2.32) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.205](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.205) · Pramāṇa