御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 1.8

English (machine translation) 1.8

Language: English

1.8.1

Third, subsumption under [the teachings] and its central doctrine: first, we analyze the subsumption; next, we clarify the central doctrine. There are five modes of subsumption: first, subsumption under the baskets (piṭaka); second, subsumption under the divisions [of scripture] (aṅga); third, subsumption under the vehicles (yāna); fourth, subsumption under the periods [of teaching]; fifth, subsumption under the assemblies. First, regarding subsumption under the baskets: there are two kinds of baskets—first, the śrāvaka basket; second, the bodhisattva basket. The teachings for pratyekabuddhas are few and are included within the śrāvaka [basket]. This sūtra is subsumed under the bodhisattva [basket], because it is a teaching of complete letters and addresses those of great capacity. Furthermore, there are three baskets, namely the Vinaya, the Sūtra, and the Abhidharma, which respectively expound the trainings of discipline, concentration, and wisdom, based primarily on what is emphasized; otherwise, all three baskets expound all three. Now, this sūtra belongs to the Sūtra basket. Moreover, in accord with the twelve divisions, texts such as the discourse division (upadeśa) can permeate all three [baskets] and do not constitute a separate set of fascicles. Second, regarding subsumption under the divisions: the meaning of the twelve divisions is explained fully in a separate chapter; here we list their names and briefly match them with what is expounded in the sūtra. 1. Sūtra (契經): its characteristics have both general and specific [meanings]. In general, all twelve are termed sūtras; specifically, it refers to the sewn-together prose passages that briefly compile the intended meaning. This sūtra possesses both. 2. Geya (應頌, verses that reiterate): these are verses that reiterate, meaning that after the prose has spoken, verses reiterate and clarify it, as the sūtra states below: "If one sees me by form..." and so on. 3. Vyākaraṇa (記別, prophecy/exposition): this has three aspects: first, predicting that a great being will attain Buddhahood; second, explaining that a disciple has died here and been born there; third, elucidating the meanings of dharmas. The present sūtra admits of the third [meaning] of vyākaraṇa. Although [it mentions] "Śākyamuni, you will attain Buddhahood," this discusses a past Buddha's deed rather than a present prediction for another, and so is not the former; yet merely expounding [the doctrine] makes it belong to that division, so it does not necessarily require [predicting] a Buddha. 4. Gāthā (諷頌, isolated verse): this means what was not spoken before but is clarified directly in verse because it can be chanted, of which the final verse is an example. 5. Udāna (自說, spontaneous discourse): this means speaking without awaiting a request, perceiving the capacity and speaking straight away to ensure the long endurance of the Dharma, or revealing profound compassion. In this sūtra, in order to evoke reverence and longing, there is no spontaneous discourse. 6. Nidāna (緣起, circumstantial origin): this has three aspects: first, formulating a precept due to an offense; second, expounding the Dharma on account of an event; third, expounding the Dharma on account of a request. This sūtra shares in the third. 7. Avadāna (譬喻, metaphor/parable): this means using an analogy to illustrate the meaning expounded, such as the metaphor of empty space to illustrate the merit of giving. 8. Itivṛttaka (本事, stories of the past): this means, excluding oneself, speaking of the past disciples and teachings, termed itivṛttaka. The present sūtra lacks this. 9. Jātaka (本生, birth stories): this refers to the Buddha speaking of his own past lives, where he died or was born in other places, practiced the bodhisattva deeds, and so forth, as in the account of his past practice as the ascetic of forbearance. 10. Vaipulya (方廣, expansive teachings): this has two aspects: first, expounding the practice of the bodhisattva path; second, because the Dharma is extensive, vast, and exceedingly sublime. This sūtra possesses both. 11. Adbhutadharma (希法, marvelous phenomena): this refers to expounding the shared and unshared virtues of the eight assemblies, as well as other supreme, extraordinary, and wondrous phenomena, such as saying that relinquishing one's life as many times as the sands of three Ganges rivers every day does not match faith in this sūtra. 12. Upadeśa (論義, analytical discourse): this refers to circularly investigating and verifying various scriptures, which is the mātṛkā; all definitive scriptures are called mātṛkā. Now, although this sūtra lacks an explicit text [designated as such], according to Vasubandhu's commentary, building upon what came before to raise what follows, the Buddha eliminated all doubts and requests through circular exposition, which is also an analytical discourse. Thus it encompasses ten divisions, lacking only spontaneous discourses (udāna) and stories of the past (itivṛttaka). Third, regarding subsumption under the vehicles: one may posit only the One Vehicle, as the Lotus Sūtra says: "There is only the Dharma of the One Vehicle, neither two nor three"; or posit two vehicles, as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Because there is a distinction between the higher vehicle and the lower vehicle"; or posit three vehicles, as the Lotus Sūtra says: "For those who seek the śrāvaka vehicle, he expounds the Dharma conforming to the Four Noble Truths," and so forth; down to positing five vehicles and so forth, as is fully explained in standard accounts. Now, this sūtra belongs to the One Vehicle, because the text below states: "It is spoken for those who set out in the Great Vehicle"; and the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra states: "The One Vehicle is the Great Vehicle." Among the two or three vehicles, it is subsumed under the supreme vehicle, because it is spoken for those who set out in the most supreme vehicle. Fourth, regarding subsumption under the periods: the periods of teaching established by ancient masters were variable in number and all lacked firm proof, as is extensively narrated and refuted in Dharma Master Ci'en's Fayuan [yilinzhang]. Now we set forth only the correct doctrine. The explanation states: Tripiṭaka Master Ci'en, relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, established three periods of teaching. In that sūtra, for the sake of the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, he broadly expounded that the three non-natures are all based on the parikalpita nature. Because the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata gained profound comprehension, the World-Honoured One praised his good understanding of what had been said. The Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, formerly, at one time in Vārāṇasī, in the Deer Park at Ṛṣipatana, solely for those who set out in the śrāvaka vehicle, you turned the wheel of the True Dharma characterized by the Four Noble Truths. Although it was extremely wondrous, exceedingly rare, and no devas or humans in all the world had previously been able to turn it in accordance with the Dharma, the wheel of the True Dharma turned at that time was surpassable, had room for improvement, was of provisional meaning, and was a foothold for disputes. Formerly, in the second period, World-Honoured One, solely for those who set out to practice the Great Vehicle, relying on all dharmas being without self-nature, unarisen and unceasing, fundamentally tranquil, and by nature tathatā, you turned the wheel of the True Dharma with implicit characteristics. Although it was even more wondrous and exceedingly rare, the wheel of the True Dharma turned at that time was also surpassable, had room for improvement, was still of provisional meaning, and was a foothold for disputes. Now, in the third period, World-Honoured One, universally for those who set out in all vehicles, relying on all dharmas being without self-nature, unarisen and unceasing, fundamentally tranquil, by nature nirvāṇa, and having the nature of non-nature, you have turned the wheel of the True Dharma with explicit characteristics. It is supremely wondrous and most rare. The wheel of the True Dharma turned now by the World-Honoured One is unsurpassed, leaves no room for improvement, is of truly definitive meaning, and is not a foothold for disputes." This is identical to the Nirvāṇa Sūtra's teaching to consume milk first, then teaching total cessation, and finally teaching that some may consume it and some may not; it is also identical to the three kinds of wheels of the Dharma expounded in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra—the turning, illuminating, and sustaining [wheels]. The "Belief and Understanding" chapter of the Lotus Sūtra also has a clear explanation. In terms of the overarching principle, when addressed to those of indeterminate nature, the great develops out of the small and is conferred gradually, so there can be three periods; the Saṃdhinirmocana and other scriptures speak in accordance with this. If it is purely sudden enlightenment where the great does not arise from the small, then there is no sequence of three periods before and after, nor is it a fixed system of years and months.

1.8.2

Earlier and later are spoken of merely in mutual association according to category of meaning. If it were not so, would the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* and others, being expounded first of all, be the initial period, and the *Sūtra of the Buddha's Bequeathed Teaching*, being the very last, be the third period? Question: If that is so, why does the *Lotus Sūtra* speak only of two periods, saying: 'Formerly in Vārāṇasī I turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four truths,' down to 'Now I turn again the most wondrous, unsurpassed, great wheel of the Dharma'? Answer: That [sūtra] contrasts the Great with the Small, concealing the second period and mentioning only the earlier and later; in reality, there are indeed three periods. Now, as this sūtra accords with those whose natures are suddenly aroused, no period is established in general terms. But in terms of gradual capacities, it is subsumed under the second period. For the teaching of the first period spoke only of existence; this [sūtra] does not speak only of existence, hence it is not of that period. If it were the third period, which explicitly teaches both emptiness and existence universally for those setting out upon all vehicles—this sūtra states below: 'Only for those who set out upon the supreme vehicle.' Therefore it belongs to the second period. Furthermore, Asaṅga explains: 'Not being startled, not being terrified,' and so on in terms of the three non-natures. Yet the three non-natures are the Buddha's intentional speech declaring that all phenomena are empty. Question: Although the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* speaks of three periods, its text does not state that the teaching of the second period is the Prajñāpāramitā and so forth; based on what can this be known? Answer: That very sūtra says, 'Only for those who set out to cultivate the Great Vehicle,' and this sūtra likewise says, 'The Tathāgata speaks it for those who set out upon the Great Vehicle, speaks it for those of the supreme vehicle,' and so forth; their passages are precisely identical. If it were not so, what other sūtra would there be that turns [the wheel] with covert characteristics only for those who set out to cultivate the Great Vehicle? Moreover, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* has passages in several places where, after the Tathāgata has finished speaking, the devas joyfully praise him, all saying: 'We now see the World-Honoured One turn the wheel of the Dharma for the second time,' and so forth. Question: According to the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the second period turns [the wheel] with covert characteristics; if so, is this sūtra not of definitive meaning? Furthermore, according to this sūtra, the merit of upholding, explaining, and cultivating it is measureless and inconceivable, whereas the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, taking it as non-definitive, [regards] all the merit of upholding, explaining, reciting, and chanting it as like water in an ox's footprint compared to the great ocean water, the superior and inferior being vastly apart. Since that is so, this merit should be narrow and inferior. Answer: Master Henan explains: Definitiveness of meaning is distinguished on the basis of the vehicle, not in terms of the overt and the covert. Furthermore, that [sūtra] pertains to the covert approach with respect to gradual enlightenment, whereas this [sūtra] is explicit with respect to sudden enlightenment. In addition, it fully expounds the cultivation of the five stages; how could it be merely empty? The exposition states: In the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the statement that the second period is covert, and so forth, is because it was spoken largely in a distributed manner in accordance with gradual enlightenment, largely concealing characteristics to say that all are empty. In truth and reality, Prajñā also possesses the meaning of existence. How is this known? According to the commentaries of these two treatises, the passages of the sūtra are all understood in terms of the Middle Way, apart from emptiness and apart from existence, not exclusively empty. This will be made clear below. Furthermore, according to the Tang *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra*, both cite Prajñā to prove that the three natures encompass both existence and non-existence, and are not exclusively empty. How much more so when it is said that all Buddhas are born from this sūtra, and that the ultimate dharmakāya is free from all marks—how could it not be of definitive meaning? As for the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* comparing merits and finding superior and inferior: if one mostly grasps emptiness as definitive, then the merit of upholding, explaining, and so on is inferior; but if one understands emptiness and existence as free from marks and upholds it in accord with truth, one's merit is identical to that of the *Saṃdhinirmocana*. On this point of meaning, one should examine and reflect carefully. Fifth, subsumption under assemblies: The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* was expounded relying generally upon four places and sixteen assemblies. As for the four places: first, Vulture Peak in Rājagṛha; second, Anāthapiṇḍada's park in Śrāvastī; third, the Palace of the Maṇi Jewel Repository in the Paranirmitavaśavartin Heaven; fourth, beside the White Heron Pond in the Bamboo Grove of Rājagṛha. Of its sixteen assemblies, the first five sections have no distinct names, but are designated merely by their section headings. The sixth is the Most Excellent Heavenly King Section; the seventh is the Mañjuśrī Section; the eighth is the Nāgaśrī Section; these three sections take their names from the invokers. The names of the subsequent eight sections are established according to what is signified: namely, the ninth is the Vajracchedikā Section, the tenth is the Prajñānaya Section, and the subsequent six sections take their section titles from the six perfections in this way. This sūtra is subsumed under the ninth section. Among the four places, it was spoken in Anāthapiṇḍada's park. According to the Sanskrit text, it consists of three hundred verses; in the great corpus of the sūtra, it is fascicle 577. However, the ancients said there were eight divisions of Prajñā: the Large Division, the Small Division, the *Fangguang*, the *Guangzan*, the *Daoxing*, the *Sheng tianwang*, the *Wenshu*, and the *Vajra*. Because each was a different translation and the expanded text had not yet been seen, they spoke of eight divisions. Now, this is not so. If measured by volume, the six-hundred-fascicle sūtra is just one division; if according to sections, there are sixteen. Moreover, the eight divisions were mostly retranslations: for instance, the *Fangguang* and *Guangzan* merge into the Large Division, and the *Daoxing banruo* is precisely the Small Division. Therefore, speaking of eight divisions cannot be relied upon. This [sūtra] was expounded among the various sections and places: it is indeed the key to Prajñā, the pivotal axis of the great scripture. Its phrases are interwoven, its conceits subtle and refined. It encompasses the ultimate and the conventional, gathers the practices and stages; where there is conceit, it is dispelled, and no attachment is left unpurged. It is the utmost in breaking marks and cutting off emotional attachments to cultivate the mind, the supreme means to eliminate disasters and terminate adversity, and to gather blessings. For this reason, more than twenty masters in the Western Regions composed treatises upon it, and those who propagated it in this land are beyond counting. Even if one were to exhaust kalpas in praise and crush one's body to uphold it, how could that ever repay its inconceivable power or requite its boundless grace? Subsumption has been completed above. As for explaining the central doctrine: first generally and then specifically. For now, distinguishing the central doctrine in general: Ancient worthies of this land comprehensively subsumed all teachings to establish four doctrines. First, the doctrine establishing intrinsic nature: establishing that the five aggregates, realms, and bases possess substantial reality, as in the *Vibhāṣā*, *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, Kātyāyana's treatise (*Jñānaprasthāna*), and so forth. Second, the doctrine refuting intrinsic nature: refuting all real intrinsic nature in those three categories, and stating that all phenomena possess only marks, as in the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* and so forth. Third, the doctrine refuting marks: stating that all phenomena are not only devoid of intrinsic nature, but their marks are also non-existent, as in the Prajñā [texts] and so forth. Fourth, the doctrine revealing the real: clarifying the genuine principle of all phenomena, according to what is appropriate, whether empty or existent, as in the *Avataṃsaka*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, and so forth. According to their classification, this sūtra is included under the doctrine refuting marks. However, establishing four doctrines does not exhaust the canon: for instance, the Ekavyāvahārika school holds that mundane and supramundane [things] are mere conventional designations and possess neither intrinsic nature nor marks; the Prajñaptivāda school establishes that the aggregates are real, whereas among the bases and realms...

1.8.3

Phenomena are largely provisional, rather than solely establishing natures; nor is it entirely characteristics. The Lokottaravāda states that the mundane is not real, because it is all false and deceptive; the supramundane can be real, because it is not false and deceptive. In which of the four [schools] would such classes be included? Furthermore, the twenty Hīnayāna sects differ in their tenets and vary in the phenomena they posit; how could dividing them into four schools solely by nature and characteristic serve as an exact standard? Again, there is a Dharma Master who posits three schools: first, the School of Dharmalakṣaṇa; second, the School of Refuting Characteristics; third, the School of Dharmatā. He claims that sūtras such as the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Buddhabhūmi, and treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi, are all the School of Dharmalakṣaṇa, because establishing all phenomena based on the approach of the three natures is taken as ultimate. Sūtras such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, and treatises such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Madhyamaka-śāstra, and the Śataka-śāstra, are all the School of Refuting Characteristics, because demolishing and eliminating all phenomena based on the approach of ultimate truth is taken as ultimate. Sūtras such as the Avataṃsaka, Nirvāṇa, and Laṅkāvatāra, and treatises such as the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Awakening of Faith, are all the School of Dharmatā, because harmonizing and unifying all phenomena based on the approach of the dharmatā-tathāgatagarbha is taken as ultimate. He further posits that the single flavor of principle cannot be revealed without words, yet words that reveal the principle cannot tally with reality; hence they all fall toward the extremes of emptiness, existence, and the like, from the Buddhas on high down to ordinary people, so that the verbal teachings they set forth do not differ. That the various teachings have these three distinctions [is his view]. That Dharma Master's preeminent fame was peerless across generations, his brilliant discernment surpassed the times, his learning was abundant in the five vehicles, and his principles were loftier than [those of Mount] Qiye. He moored the boat of wisdom in the ocean of Dharma, its cinnamon oars churning the waves; he wielded the sword of wisdom on the mountain of meaning, its frosty blade cleaving jade. In determining these doctrinal tenets, he could truly serve as a model. Yet where some points remain unclear, I venture to pose some questions. Why so? Although phenomena transcend speech and originally lack name and characteristic, provisional signifiers and designations are accepted as apprehending the entity of phenomena; otherwise, the sacred teachings would not be a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), indicating phenomena like the aggregates while precluding supreme natures and the like. Moreover, ordinary people are blind and lack the sun of wisdom, so their speech does not tally with phenomena and may fall into extremes. The sacred wisdom of the Buddhas directly realizes the entity of phenomena and, just as it is realized, unerringly proclaims it: when they speak of emptiness, it is definitely empty; when they speak of existence, it is likewise so, accordant and converging with the Middle Way. How could it be identical to ordinary beings? If it were not so, how could understanding arise in conformity with the teaching, producing true, supreme wisdom to attain liberation? If because speech does not tally with reality whatever utterance is made falls into emptiness, existence, and so forth, then there should be eighty-four thousand limitless schools; why only three? Furthermore, dividing into three schools lacks scriptural basis and is empty talk; how can one divide and categorize the sacred teachings by one's own intention? It is also said that Dharmalakṣaṇa preserves the paratantra and pariniṣpanna, while Refuting Characteristics refutes the three natures; phenomena are either preserved or refuted, each being ultimate joy. If one posits [some as] definitive and [others as] non-definitive, this causes teaching and principle to contradict each other, and also violates the ultimate, single real Middle Way. For by accepting that the Buddha taught three kinds of ultimates, vacillations would be manifold; how could they be verified and harmonized? Moreover, according to the Saṃdhinirmocana, the Buddha himself harmonized and explained the various teachings on emptiness as being spoken solely on the basis of parikalpita as the emptiness of all phenomena. How can it be said that in the School of Refuting Characteristics, all three natures are eliminated? The remaining points each contain many difficulties; mentioning them briefly suffices to know this, so I need not elaborate. One should know that the Yogācārabhūmi was proclaimed by the Bodhisattva of One More Birth (Maitreya) to explain all sūtras comprehensively; do not say that it only explains teachings such as the Saṃdhinirmocana. Therefore, the verse of homage in the commentary on that treatise says: / 'This treatise is sublime like a lotus, / Resembling a treasure trove and an ocean; / It fully reveals the vast meaning of the vehicles, / And skilfully explains their texts without omission.' / It also says: 'Now, what is the reason for expounding this treatise? It is that sentient beings from beginningless time have had ignorance, doubt, error, and perverse clinging regarding the Middle real characteristic of all phenomena. [...] Down to the Tathāgata appearing in the world, who, in accord with what was fitting, expediently taught various wonderful dharmas, the Middle real characteristic, causing sentient beings to know that all phenomena, being as such and as such empty, are therefore not as such and as such existent, and thus are not empty; thoroughly comprehending that all phenomena are neither empty nor existent, they depart from doubt, error, and perverse clinging, practice the cultivation that eradicates hindrances, attain the three bodhis, and realize the bliss of quiescence. After the Buddha's nirvāṇa, demonic affairs arose in turmoil, sectarian clingings competed and flourished, and many attached to the view of existence. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna realized the pramuditā-bhūmi, gathered the Mahāyāna teaching of signless emptiness, and composed the Madhyamaka-śāstra and others, thoroughly elucidating the true essentials to eliminate those views of existence. The great treatise masters such as holy Āryadeva composed the Śataka-śāstra and others, broadly expounding the great meaning. Because of this, sentient beings again attached to the view of emptiness. Bodhisattva Asaṅga, having ascended to the first bhūmi and realized the prior samādhi of Dharma, attained great supernatural powers, served the Great Merciful One (Maitreya), and requested the expounding of this treatise. There is no principle it does not exhaust, no phenomenon it does not fully encompass, no text it does not explain, no meaning it does not express, no doubt it does not dispel, no clinging it does not shatter, no practice it does not cultivate, and no fruit it does not realize. It is primarily for bodhisattvas, to enable them to gain skill in the objects, practices, and fruits of all the vehicles, diligently cultivate the Mahāyāna, realize great bodhi, and constantly and unerringly preach it broadly for sentient beings; secondarily, it is for the other vehicles, to cause them to rely on their own Dharma, cultivate their own portions of practice, and attain their own realizations of fruit. Such is a brief explanation of the reason for this treatise.' / Hence we know that it comprehensively explains all sacred teachings, eliminates the views of emptiness and existence, and gives rise to Middle practice. How could one say that the Yogācārabhūmi is solely the School of Dharmalakṣaṇa? Question: Do not the various sūtras mostly teach dharmalakṣaṇa, or mostly refute characteristics, or again harmonize them? Why should schools not be divided? Answer: Who says the various teachings lack these three meanings? It is merely saying that definitively deciding that such-and-such sūtras and treatises are subsumed under such-and-such schools is untenable, because none are void [of the others]. Therefore, it should be said that according to principle in the Mahāyāna, whatever sūtra it may be, it possesses dharmalakṣaṇa, the refutation of characteristics, and harmonization. Although there are places where one meaning is predominantly illuminated, in reality these three do not separate from each other, because clarifying the entity of phenomena, removing attachments, and achieving harmony are meanings that are omnipresent. Question: If so, why within the Mahāyāna are there the Central School and the Peripheral School, Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, signlessness and dharmalakṣaṇa, with each school distinct? Answer: This is merely due to the differing compositions of the commentators. In accordance with the intentions of the commentators, the tenets are stated differently; it is not that the Buddha's words fall into extremes so that distinct schools were established previously.

1.8.4

From this it should be stated that within the Mahāyāna, the tenets are divided into two: first, the tenet that the ultimate is entirely empty; second, the tenet that the rational is completely real. The first tenet begins with Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and extends down to Master Bhāviveka. Relying on the teaching of signlessness, they state that in the ultimate truth everything is empty, while in the conventional it exists. The verse in the *Karatalaratna* says: 'In their true nature conditioned things are empty, like illusions, because they are born from conditions; unconditioned things are devoid of reality, not arising, like sky-flowers.' Thus they do not establish the three natures, Vijñaptimātra, and so forth. The latter tenet begins with the Tathāgata Maitreya and extends down to Bodhisattva Dharmapāla. Relying on explicit teachings such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, they state that the ultimate truth is neither empty nor non-empty. In the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, Lord Maitreya's verse says: 'Unreal conceptualisation exists; the duality does not exist in this. Here there is only emptiness; in that there is also this. Therefore all phenomena are stated to be neither empty nor non-empty, because of existence, non-existence, and existence; thus it accords with the Middle Way.' Among the three natures, the parikalpita nature is non-existent, while the paratantra and pariniṣpanna are existent; hence there is the distinction of the two tenets. Question: What are the characteristics of the so-called ultimate and conventional truths? Answer: Depending on the two tenets, what is stated differs. First, according to the Ultimate Emptiness school, in the true ultimate truth everything is completely empty, while within the conventional truth there may be form, mind, cultivation, abandonment, and so forth. As the sūtra says: 'All marks whatsoever are unreal and false'—this is the conventional truth; 'If one sees that all marks are not marks, then one sees the Tathāgata'—this is the ultimate truth. 'All sentient beings among the four types of birth and the three realms' is the conventional truth; 'In reality there is no sentient being who attains extinction' is the ultimate truth. The Rationalist school states: Regarding the two truths, ultimate and conventional, there are two distinct senses: first, distinguishing the truths on the basis of persons; second, distinguishing the truths in terms of phenomena. Both kinds of two truths encompass both emptiness and existence. First, regarding the basis of persons, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says: 'What is known by superior wisdom is called the ultimate; what is known by middling wisdom is called the conventional.' What is known by the two kinds of wisdom encompasses both emptiness and existence; hence we know that both truths encompass both emptiness and existence. With respect to what is based on phenomena, phenomena have superior and inferior aspects that are mutually relative, thereby forming the ultimate and the conventional. There are four levels of this: 1. The two truths of the unreal and the real: pots, armies, forests, and the like are unreal and are the conventional; the aggregates, sense-bases, elements, and the like are real and are the ultimate. 2. The two truths of fact and principle: factual phenomena such as the aggregates are coarse and are the conventional; the principle of the Four Truths is subtle and is the ultimate. 3. The two truths of the shallow and the deep: the established Four Truths are shallow and are the conventional; the tathatā of the two emptinesses is deep and is the ultimate. 4. The two truths of signifier and signified: the tathatā of the two emptinesses endowed with expression is the conventional; the one true dharmadhātu with expression eradicated is the ultimate. In total there are five phenomena: the first, the army, forest, and so forth, is conventional and not ultimate; the last, the true dharmadhātu, is ultimate and not conventional; the three middle phenomena are both ultimate and conventional, because they are mutually relative. This is explained extensively in the ninth fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, the sixth fascicle of the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra*, and so forth. However, the first category is mutually grasped by the worldly as truly existent; being of the nature of self and phenomena, it is empty and not existent. The remaining four phenomena universally belong to the paratantra and pariniṣpanna natures; hence they are existent and not empty. Therefore it is said that the essence of the two truths encompasses both emptiness and existence; it is not as said previously, that the ultimate is entirely empty. Having understood the two truths stated by the two schools, we should next examine the grounds for emptiness and existence. The Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness says: The Great Sūtra says: 'Even if there were a phenomenon surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still declare it to be like an illusion, like a phantom.' The *Prajñāpāramitā* says: 'Form is emptiness, emptiness is form; sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness are also like this.' This sūtra also says: 'The Prajñāpāramitā is just not the Prajñāpāramitā,' up to 'there is no phenomenon that can be spoken,' and so forth. Based on these teachings, all phenomena are empty. Moreover, establishing it through reasoning, they say: If a phenomenon possessed an essence, it would naturally be able to produce itself. Since it relies on multiple conditions, we clearly know it is not existent, just like tying a handkerchief into the shape of a hare: it lacks the nature of a hare. The Rationalist says: Based on this very sūtra, the accumulation of merit is immeasurable; how could it be non-existent? It also says that the Tathāgata possesses the five eyes and so on; furthermore, one who resolves upon anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi does not assert the mark of annihilation with respect to phenomena, and so on. Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'Conditioned and unconditioned are called existent; the self and what belongs to the self are called non-existent.' It also says: 'There is no self and no maker or experiencer, yet the karma of good and evil does not perish,' and so forth. Although they are said to rely on conditions, how could the essence of an illusion or phantom be completely non-existent? This is because the Rationalist also uses illusions and phantoms as metaphors for the paratantra, and uses stars, cataracts, lamps, and illusions as metaphors for conditioned things. It also says: 'All sentient beings, I cause them to enter nirvāṇa without remainder.' If extinction were entirely empty, what need would there be to cause sky-flowers to enter into nirvāṇa? The Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness says: All these passages are based on the conventional truth; it is not that within true emptiness there are making, cultivation, and so on. The Rationalist objects: Is your conventional truth one with or different from the ultimate truth? If you say they are one, existence and emptiness are contradictory, for we never see suffering and pleasure, or cold and heat, being able to be one. If you say they are different, the two truths are fundamentally concomitant; how could one exist while the other does not? They answer: The two truths have no difference in their essence. The essence of the conventional truth exists and can have suffering, pleasure, and so on; it does not incur the fault of an identical essence. Relative to each other, under delusional attachments there is existence, while in true principle all is empty. Now, following delusional attachments, we say the conventional truth exists; speaking in terms of reality, the conventional truth is also empty. The objection is raised: Because the conventional is delusional, you cause one to abandon the conventional truth and enter true emptiness; does this not incur the fault of the mark of annihilation of all phenomena? They answer: Since the essence is already non-existent, how could it be annihilated? Hence it says one does not speak of the mark of annihilation of phenomena. This interpretation is completely different from that of the Rationalist. Question: According to the Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness, the delusional exists and the true is non-existent, and the two truths have one essence. It is not yet clear whether the two truths stated by the Rationalist are one or different. Answer: What the Rationalist states is that they are neither one nor different. Why? Because their meaning and function are distinct, they are not one; because they have no separate essence, they are not different. Just as among the five phenomena of pots, armies, forests, and so on, when viewed reciprocally it is always so. Since they are neither one nor different, turning this around, to say they are either different or one presents no obstacle whatsoever. The *Renwang Jing* says: 'Existence and non-existence are fundamentally two, / just like the two horns of an ox; / when illuminating understanding sees them, there is no duality. / The two truths are constantly not identical; / the understanding mind sees no duality, / and in seeking for duality, it cannot be found.'

1.8.5

It does not mean that the two truths are one; how could non-duality be found [otherwise]? To understanding they are constantly one; as truths they are constantly two. Penetrating this non-duality, one enters the true paramārtha. The meaning of the verse is: tathatā is the ultimate truth; paratantra and parikalpita are the conventional truth. Because they are the objects of the two wisdoms, they are called distinct truths; viewed solely in terms of true wisdom, this is called understanding. Whether different or one, neither is contradictory. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* also says: 'Therefore this is neither different nor not different from the paratantra, just as the nature of impermanence and so forth is neither seen nor not seen in this or that.' Fascicle 75 of the *Yogācārabhūmi* states: In the Mahāyāna, there is a class of people who cling mistakenly, and therefore make this statement: 'By virtue of the conventional, all things exist; by virtue of the ultimate, all things are non-existent.' One should say to them: 'What is the conventional, and what is the ultimate?' If they answer: 'If all phenomena lack self-nature, that is called the ultimate; if within phenomena that lack self-nature, self-nature can be found, that is called the conventional. Why? Because within what is non-existent, the conventional is established, and designations and words are formulated to speak of it.' One should say to them: 'What do you maintain: does the conventional of designations and words have an obtainable self-nature coming from causes, or is it merely the conventional of designations and words that is said to exist? If the conventional of designations and words comes from causes, then that the conventional of designations and words arising from causes is not existent is not reasonable.' Furthermore, one should say: 'Venerable, on what grounds are all obtainable things devoid of self-nature?' (This refutes the view that conventional existence is non-existent in the ultimate.) If they answer: 'Because of inverted states of affairs' (meaning that the mind is inverted, positing existence in empty space, like seeing sky-flowers), one should further say: 'What do you maintain: are these inverted states of affairs existent or non-existent? If you say they are existent, to say that all phenomena, by virtue of the ultimate, lack self-nature is not reasonable. If you say they are non-existent, then to say that because of inverted states of affairs all obtainable things lack self-nature is not reasonable.' (Since there is no inversion, from what could attachment arise such that one says that because of inverted states of affairs all obtainable things lack this self-nature?) The Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness says: Fascicle 2 of the *Mahābodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra* says: 'Emptiness and the nature of a bodhisattva are not two; because they are non-dual, they cannot be spoken of.' It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, within the ultimate truth, no phenomenon can be obtained. Because its nature is non-existent, it is called empty.' For this reason, stating emptiness is the utmost definitive meaning. The Rationalist says: This also is not proof. It is in reference to śūnya parikalpita being non-existent that it is non-dual with awakening; moreover, śūnyatā, the emptiness nature that is tathatā, is non-dual with awakening. It does not say that the essence of bodhi is itself empty and non-existent. If in reality all were empty, what would be empty and what would be awakened? If you say that, in accord with demolishing delusional attachments, emptiness and awakening are non-dual, and that according to the ultimate truth there is neither awakening nor emptiness, then one should distinguish the length of a hare's horn; since that is not the case, how could this be so? It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, within the ultimate truth no phenomenon can be obtained.' It does not say that within the ultimate truth of the unconditioned saṃbhoga there is also empty non-existence of phenomena. Furthermore, if the essence of the two truths were one and non-existent, there would be no ordinary and holy, no defiled and pure, no actions and karmic deeds, no human or heavenly realms, no five destinies, and thus no three evil paths. As for sentient beings to be saved through compassion, bodhisattvas would vainly undergo toil and suffering. Because of emptiness and non-existence, who would speak to whom, what Dharma would be sought? A wise person would not, in order to eliminate an illusory enemy, seek a barren woman's son to employ as an army. Furthermore, for the deluded ordinary person there may be conventional phenomena such as form and mind; the Buddhas, Tathāgatas, have already severed delusions, so how could they have a rūpakāya, pure and wondrous lands, and so forth? If you say that through the Buddha's compassionate mind, for the sake of sentient beings, he manifests bodies and lands: if sentient beings' delusions were already completely severed, the Buddhas' bodies and lands would not be established. Since the ultimate would be empty, the mind of compassion and wisdom should also be non-existent; what would serve as the root capable of saving sentient beings? Therefore, stating emptiness is an intentional teaching. Since the doctrine and reasoning are such, it incurs the fault of contradicting sacred teachings with respect to the aforementioned inference in the *Karatalaratna*, because it contradicts the meaning of non-emptiness in the Dharma teachings. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* also says: 'That especially contradicts the sūtras previously cited.'

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御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 — Classical Chinese