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# 維摩經疏卷第三．第六 3.12

維摩經疏卷第三．第六 3.12

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [3.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2772.3.12)

夫說法者當如法說者。第二以理正教。於中有二。初約所說法體以教。二夫說法者無說無示下約就能說儀式以教。前中有三。初總次別。後以理返責。初云夫說法當如法說者。當如大乘實相法說法。無眾生下第二隨法別教。於中且約五陰十八界門而演說之。餘類可知。先就五陰明法離相。法無我所下就十八界明法離相。眾生起計多執二處。前五陰中句別有十。約義唯二。前之四句明人無我。後之六句明法無我。人無我中四句何別。宣說陰體以為神主。名之為我。和合之中計有定實。以此而生說為眾生。相續之中說有神性。任持不段。名為壽命。作用之中立有主宰說之為人。破相顯實故無我人眾生壽者。故勝鬘經說如來藏者。非我非眾生非壽命非人。法無眾生者。遠云。正明理無。謂於實相法中無有眾生。所無有三。一無橫計神我眾生。二於假名眾生之中無有定性。三無假名眾生之相。此等皆是虛妄分別相有理無餘門類爾。離眾生垢者破情顯理。取我之心名眾生垢。真法之中無此我心名離眾生垢。以無垢心故無眾生也。藏云。眾生者陰界入等諸物和合而生以為主宰。法者實相。實相之法本無眾生。若見有眾生。即乖於實相。故稱為垢。若悟實相。則其垢自離也。若依無垢稱經云。先云。無我。後云無眾生。所以然者。外道凡夫先計身中有我後執有眾生。以此理推無煩致。或廣如無垢稱經說也。法無有我者。遠云。正明理無。亦真法中無三種我。准前可知。離我垢者破情顯理。義同前解。此兩句中破情顯理後兩句中破相顯理也。肇云。欲明無有我。非謂有無我。又云。法無我者。執有主名之有我。然我不同。有其二種。一者分別。二者俱生。分別我見有其二種。一依邪教外道所起。二依邪思惟內道所起。此二我見體性不善。亦通隱沒無記。唯在第六識中有。俱生我見亦有二種。一在意識。性是不善。亦通有覆無記。二在末那。性唯有覆無記。此二種我悟真法時悉皆求離。故云無我也。法無壽命者。遠云。正明理無。亦真法中無三種壽。准前可知。離生死者破相顯理。若真法中有其生死故可就之說有壽命。既無生死。就何說壽也。滿云。生居命前。死居命後。中間相續連持不段。故稱名命。百年之期名之為壽。生死性空則無壽命。法無有人者。遠云。正明理無。亦真法中無三種人。准前可知。前後際段者破相顯理。有為之法前後相起。前為前際後為後際。若真法中有此二際。則可就之以說於人。真中無此。就何說人。於情為有。於理實無。翻情顯理故稱為段。非有所除也。釋論云。不忍作惡行人法。故名之為人。行因得果往來生死永無朽滅。故外道謂之為常。前際既段。無人造因。後際亦段。無人受果。前後既段。中間亦空。何有人也。無垢稱經云。法無補特伽羅。此云。數取趣與人義相似也。

> "Now, one who expounds the Dharma should expound it in accordance with the Dharma": this is the second part, correct instruction based on principle. Herein there are two aspects: first, instructing with regard to the nature of the Dharma expounded; second, from "Now, one who expounds the Dharma has nothing to expound and nothing to indicate" onward, instructing with regard to the deportment of the speaker capable of expounding. In the first part there are three divisions: first a general statement, next a specific explanation, and finally holding him to account based on principle. First, "Now, one who expounds the Dharma should expound it in accordance with the Dharma" means that one should expound the Dharma in accordance with the Mahāyāna dharmatā. From "Dharmas are without sentient beings" onward is the second part, specific instruction following the Dharma. Therein, he expounds it provisionally in terms of the five aggregates and eighteen dhātus; the rest can be known by analogy. First, with reference to the five aggregates, he explains that dharmas are free from signs. From "Dharmas have no 'mine'" onward, with reference to the eighteen dhātus, he explains that dharmas are free from signs. When sentient beings give rise to conceptual grasping, they mostly cling to these two domains. In the preceding \[section on the\] five aggregates, there are ten distinct phrases, which in terms of meaning are only two: the first four phrases explain the non-self of persons, and the latter six phrases explain the non-self of dharmas. Among the phrases concerning the non-self of persons, what is the distinction among the four phrases? Proclaiming the essence of the aggregates to be a spiritual master is called a "self." Positing something fixed and real within their aggregation, which arises through this, is called a "sentient being." Proclaiming a spiritual nature within the continuity, sustaining it without interruption, is called "life-span." Positing an agent within functioning is called a "person." Refuting signs and revealing the real, therefore there is no self, person, sentient being, or living soul. Thus the Śrīmālā Sūtra says that the tathāgatagarbha is not a self, not a sentient being, not a living soul, and not a person. "Dharmas are without sentient beings": Huiyuan says: this directly explains that it is absent in principle. It means that within the Dharma of dharmatā, there are no sentient beings. That which is absent is threefold: first, the absence of an arbitrarily posited spiritual self as a sentient being; second, within conventionally designated sentient beings, there is no fixed intrinsic nature; third, the absence of the characteristic of a conventionally designated sentient being. All of these are false conceptual discriminations: they exist as characteristics but are absent in principle; the other categories are to be understood in the same way. "Being free from the defilement of sentient beings" refutes sentiment and reveals principle. The mind that grasps at a self is called the "defilement of sentient beings." In the true Dharma there is no such self-grasping mind; this is called being free from the defilement of sentient beings. Because of the undefiled mind, there are no sentient beings. Kuiji says: "sentient beings" are born from the aggregation of the aggregates, sense bases, elements, and other things, and are taken to be the master. "Dharma" is the dharmatā. The Dharma of dharmatā is originally without sentient beings. If one sees that there are sentient beings, this contradicts the dharmatā; hence it is called "defilement." If one awakens to the dharmatā, then that defilement is naturally shed. According to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra, it first says "without a self" and later says "without sentient beings." Why is this? Heterodox non-Buddhists and ordinary beings first conceptualize that there is a self within the body, and subsequently cling to the existence of sentient beings. Deducing it by this principle, there is no need to make it cumbersome; or it is explained at length as in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra. "Dharmas are without self": Huiyuan says: this directly explains that it is absent in principle. Likewise, within the true Dharma there are no three kinds of self; this can be known by analogy with the preceding. "Being free from the defilement of self" refutes sentiment and reveals principle, its meaning being the same as the previous explanation. In these two phrases, \[he\] refutes sentiment and reveals principle; in the latter two phrases, \[he\] refutes characteristics and reveals principle. Sengzhao says: he wishes to clarify that there is no self, not that there is non-self. Furthermore, it is said: regarding "dharmas are without self," clinging to the existence of a master is called having a self. However, the self is not of one kind; there are two kinds: first, conceptually differentiated; second, innate. The conceptually differentiated view of self has two kinds: first, that which arises relying on heterodox teachings outside \[the Buddhist path\]; second, that which arises relying on incorrect thinking within \[the Buddhist path\]. These two views of self are unwholesome in intrinsic nature, and also extend to the obscured neutral; they exist only in the sixth consciousness. The innate view of self also has two kinds: first, in the mental consciousness (manovijñāna), its nature is unwholesome and also extends to the obscured neutral; second, in the manas, its nature is solely obscured neutral. When one awakens to the true Dharma, both of these two kinds of self are sought to be abandoned; hence it is said that there is no self. "Dharmas are without life-span": Huiyuan says: this directly explains that it is absent in principle. Likewise, within the true Dharma there are no three kinds of life-span; this can be known by analogy with the preceding. "Being free from birth-and-death" refutes characteristics and reveals principle. If there were birth-and-death in the true Dharma, one could speak of life-span in relation to it. Since there is no birth-and-death, in relation to what could one speak of life-span? Daoman says: birth precedes life; death follows life. The continuity in between, linked and maintained without interruption, is therefore named "life." A term of one hundred years is named "span." Since birth-and-death are empty in nature, there is no life-span. "Dharmas are without a person": Huiyuan says: this directly explains that it is absent in principle. Likewise, within the true Dharma there are no three kinds of person; this can be known by analogy with the preceding. "Cutting off the anterior and posterior limits" refutes characteristics and reveals principle. Conditioned dharmas arise sequentially before and after; the prior is the anterior limit, and the subsequent is the posterior limit. If these two limits existed in the true Dharma, then one could speak of a person in relation to them. Within truth there are no such things; in relation to what could one speak of a person? They exist for sentiment, but are truly absent in principle. Overturning sentiment to reveal principle is therefore called "cutting off"; it does not mean there is something to be eliminated. The commentary says: because it does not endure doing evil, and practices human dharmas, it is therefore named a "person." Practicing causes and obtaining fruits, coming and going in birth-and-death without ever perishing, non-Buddhists therefore deem it to be permanent. Since the anterior limit is cut off, there is no person who creates causes; since the posterior limit is also cut off, there is no person who receives fruits. The anterior and posterior limits being cut off, the middle is also empty: how could there be a person? The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra says: "dharmas are without pudgala." Here, this translates as "one who repeatedly takes rebirth," which is similar in meaning to "person."  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2772~en-mt.3.12) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2772.3.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2772.3.12) · Pramāṇa
