[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘百法明門論開宗義決](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812) › 1.164 # 大乘百法明門論開宗義決 1.164 大乘百法明門論開宗義決 1.164 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.164](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812.1.164) 及計後際有想十六等者。此依阿含梵動品說。且初有想十六論者。以相對色有其四句。對邊無邊有其四句。對苦對樂有其四句。對想多少有其四句。四四共成十六句義。第一對色有四句者。一我此終後有色有想。二無色有想。三亦有色亦無色有想。四非有色非無色有想。第二對邊有四句者。一我此終後有邊有想。二無邊有想。三亦有邊亦無邊有想。四非有邊非無邊有想。第三對苦有四句者。一我此終後有苦有想。二有樂有想。三亦有苦亦有樂有想。四非有苦非有樂有想。第四對想有四句者。一我此終後有其一想。二有苦干想。三見境狹故有少想。四緣境寬故有無量想。是為十六有想論也　無想八者。對色有四。對邊無邊亦有四句。對色四者。一我此終後有色無想。二者無色無想。三亦有色亦無色無想。四非有色非無色無想。第二對邊有四句者。一我此終後有邊無想。二無邊無想。三亦有邊亦無邊無想。四非有邊非無邊無想。既無想故不可說為苦樂一多。故唯八句　所言俱非有八論者。對色有四。對邊無邊亦有四句。對色有四者。一我此終後有色非有想非無想。二我無色非有想非無想。三者亦有色亦無色非有想非無想。四者非有色非無色非有想非無想。第二對邊無邊有四句者。一我此終後有邊非有想非無想。二我無邊非有想非無想。三我亦有邊亦無邊非有想非無想。四我非有邊非無邊非有想非無想。既非有想非無想故。故不可說有苦有樂一想多想。故唯八句。此等皆是計我實有宗也。 > As for "and grasping sixteen \[doctrines\] of post-mortem percipience, etc.": this is explained according to the Āgama's "Brahmajāla Chapter." First, regarding the sixteen doctrines of percipience: there are four propositions with respect to form; there are four propositions with respect to finite or infinite; there are four propositions with respect to suffering or pleasure; and there are four propositions with respect to unitary or plural perception. Four times four together make the meaning of sixteen propositions. The first, with respect to form, has four propositions: (1) after my death here, I am material and percipient; (2) immaterial and percipient; (3) both material and immaterial, and percipient; (4) neither material nor immaterial, and percipient. The second, with respect to finite, has four propositions: (1) after my death here, I am finite and percipient; (2) infinite and percipient; (3) both finite and infinite, and percipient; (4) neither finite nor infinite, and percipient. The third, with respect to suffering, has four propositions: (1) after my death here, I have suffering and am percipient; (2) have pleasure and am percipient; (3) have both suffering and pleasure and am percipient; (4) have neither suffering nor pleasure and am percipient. The fourth, with respect to perception, has four propositions: (1) after my death here, I have a uniform perception; (2) have manifold perceptions; (3) because of seeing a narrow realm, have limited perception; (4) because of apprehending a vast realm, have limitless perception. These are the sixteen doctrines of percipience. As for the eight \[doctrines\] of impercipience: with respect to form there are four propositions, and with respect to finite or infinite there are also four propositions. The four with respect to form: (1) after my death here, I am material and impercipient; (2) immaterial and impercipient; (3) both material and immaterial, and impercipient; (4) neither material nor immaterial, and impercipient. The second, with respect to finite, has four propositions: (1) after my death here, I am finite and impercipient; (2) infinite and impercipient; (3) both finite and infinite, and impercipient; (4) neither finite nor infinite, and impercipient. Since there is no perception, one cannot speak of suffering, pleasure, unity, or plurality; therefore there are only eight propositions. As for the statement that "there are eight doctrines of both-neither": with respect to form there are four propositions, and with respect to finite or infinite there are also four propositions. The four with respect to form: (1) after my death here, I am material, neither percipient nor impercipient; (2) I am immaterial, neither percipient nor impercipient; (3) both material and immaterial, neither percipient nor impercipient; (4) neither material nor immaterial, neither percipient nor impercipient. The second, with respect to finite or infinite, has four propositions: (1) after my death here, I am finite, neither percipient nor impercipient; (2) I am infinite, neither percipient nor impercipient; (3) I am both finite and infinite, neither percipient nor impercipient; (4) I am neither finite nor infinite, neither percipient nor impercipient. Since it is neither percipient nor impercipient, one cannot speak of suffering, pleasure, uniform perception, or manifold perceptions; therefore there are only eight propositions. All of these belong to the doctrine of grasping at a substantially existent self. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.163](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812.1.163) - [Next: 1.165](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812.1.165) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812~en-mt.1.164) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812.1.164](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2812.1.164) · Pramāṇa