[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814) › 3.31 # 大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.31 大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.31 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.3.31) 論。眾生亦爾至則無不覺　釋曰。此法合也。本覺真如如正方所。根本不覺似能迷心。業等動念是如邪方。如離正東無別邪西。故言若離。覺性即無不覺。問為此本覺體自不覺為別無明名為不覺。此第有義。無別不覺。覺體自迷說為不覺。豈別無明異於本覺。如睡與寤體性無差。若互無者。常無寤睡。由無別故寤睡更起。若各別者則於一人亦睡亦寤。不應正理。覺不覺性當知亦然。若覺不覺互無性者。既無起妄亦無返迷。由覺不覺體無別故。自迷流轉。自悟歸源。若各別者。則一眾生半迷半悟。不應道理。由無別故。是故論言念無自相不離本覺。由此經說闇與明合。有義。此說理深乖返。覺名應互失故。起染歸源應無定故。覺與不覺性各異故。如苦與樂性不同故。若斷無明。覺便斷故。說無明緣動性。因緣同體理不聞故。覺體便應自能動故。風與海水喻不齊故。故前所說理必不成。應說二義。其體非一。斷滅無明顯法身故。自性淨心因無明動。能動所動體非一故。能熏香臭與所熏法能熏所熏亦非一故。真妄本來性非染淨。由別緣熏成染淨故。不相離故名不離覺。非覺不覺定同一體。故下論說。若如來藏體有妄法而使證參永息妄者。則無是處。由新經說燈破闇喻。有義。二說理皆不成。定一定異外道見故。無明非壞非不可壞。由與本覺非一異故。此所舉喻水相風相隨轉微塵非一異故。各取一邊皆當所難。合二說者義方具足。前所引文依一義。故覺不覺非一非異。 > \[Treatise:\] Sentient beings are also like this: \[they go astray relying on awakening; if they were separated from the nature of awakening, there would be no non-awakening.\] \[Commentary:\] This is the application of the simile to the dharma. Original awakening and tathatā are like the true direction; fundamental non-awakening is like the mind that can be deluded; the active thoughts of karma and so forth are like the erroneous directions. Just as apart from true east there is no separate erroneous west, it says: "if they were separated from the nature of awakening, there would be no non-awakening." Question: Does the substance of this original awakening itself become non-awakened, or is there a separate avidyā called non-awakening? In this, the first opinion holds: There is no separate non-awakening; the substance of awakening itself being deluded is spoken of as non-awakening. How could there be a separate avidyā distinct from original awakening? Just as sleeping and waking have no difference in essential nature: if they mutually negated each other, there would constantly be neither waking nor sleeping; because they are not separate, waking and sleeping arise alternately. If they were each separate, then in a single person there would be both sleeping and waking at once, which does not accord with correct reasoning. The natures of awakening and non-awakening should be known to be likewise. If awakening and non-awakening were devoid of mutual nature, there would neither be the arising of delusion nor the return from delusion. Because awakening and non-awakening have no difference in substance, one is deluded by oneself and transmigrates, and awakens by oneself and returns to the source. If they were each separate, then a single sentient being would be half-deluded and half-awakened, which does not accord with reason. Because they are not separate, the treatise says that "thoughts have no self-characteristic and are not separated from original awakening." For this reason, the sūtra says that darkness and light unite. A second opinion holds: This explanation deeply contradicts reason. The names of awakening would mutually be lost; the arising of defilement and return to the source would be indeterminate; the natures of awakening and non-awakening are each distinct, just as suffering and pleasure are not identical in nature. If avidyā were severed, awakening would then be severed; it speaks of the active nature conditioned by avidyā, and that cause and condition share the same substance is unheard of in reason; the substance of awakening would then have to be capable of moving by itself; the similes of wind and ocean water would not match. Therefore, the preceding explanation definitely cannot be established. One should speak of two meanings: their substances are not one. Severing avidyā reveals the dharmakāya; the naturally pure mind is moved by avidyā, and that which moves and that which is moved are not one in substance; perfuming fragrance or foulness and the dharmas that are perfumed—the perfumer and the perfumed—are also not one; truth and delusion are originally neither defiled nor pure by nature, but become defiled or pure due to distinct conditioning perfumings. Because they are not separated, it is said that it "is not separated from awakening"; it is not that awakening and non-awakening are definitely of one single substance. Hence the treatise below says: "If within the substance of the tathāgatagarbha there were false dharmas, causing one who realizes them to permanently cease delusion, there would be no such thing." This is because the new sūtra speaks of the simile of a lamp destroying darkness. A third opinion holds: Neither of the two explanations can be established, because positing definite oneness or definite difference is the view of non-Buddhists. Avidyā is neither destructible nor indestructible, because it is neither one with nor different from original awakening. In the similes cited here—the characteristics of water and the characteristics of wind, or the subtle dust following transformations—they are neither one nor different. Grasping either extreme will meet with refutation. Only by combining the two explanations is the meaning complete. The previously cited texts rely on one aspect; therefore, awakening and non-awakening are neither one nor different. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.3.30) - [Next: 3.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.3.32) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814~en-mt.3.31) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [大乘起信論略述](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2813.1.107) — Classical Chinese - [大乘起信論別記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1845.1.87) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.3.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.3.31) · Pramāṇa