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# 大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.12

大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.12

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [4.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.4.12)

論。不相應義至緣相故　釋曰。謂後三染及本無明名不相應者。亦有三義。依王數者。此後三染雖是動心。而且微細與彼不覺未曾別異。若麁事識與不覺異。即動心為王不覺為數。今此動心相由細故。與彼不覺常無別異。故云不覺生。三種相與彼不覺不相捨離。由此便無王數之別。故言即心不覺常無別異。此即顯無體等義也。既無體等王數之別。何有同知同緣之義。故言不同知相緣相。此即顯無知等緣等。翻前相應顯不相應義。非謂有體等而知緣不同也。若爾何故瑜伽論說阿賴耶識王數相應。答。此約微細圓融道理。心與不覺和合似一不可分別。未別異故無染心所名不相應。彼約麁淺安立道理說有無記。遍行王數心法俱故得成相應。各依一義不相違也。依心境者。謂此動心即體不覺。非境相應。然後不覺。不覺即在動心上故。故云即心覺也。不同知相緣相者。簡前相應故。便有貪等同知同緣。若爾本識不應現境。便與諸教極相乖返。答。雖但現境而不取也。以能現故說能緣境。非謂能現能執取。若不爾者何異事識。是故不與境相應也。

> Treatise: "The meaning of 'non-conjoined' is \[...\] \[because it does not have identical\] characteristics of perception and condition." Commentary: That the latter three defilements and fundamental avidyā are called "non-conjoined" also has three meanings. Regarding that based on primary mind and mental factors: although these latter three defilements are the moving mind, they are subtle and have never been distinct from non-awakening. If it were the coarse phenomenal consciousness, it would be distinct from non-awakening: the moving mind would be the primary mind and non-awakening would be the mental factor. Now, because this characteristic of the moving mind is subtle, it is constantly without distinction from non-awakening. Therefore it says that arising from non-awakening, the three kinds of characteristics are never separated from that non-awakening. Thereby there is no distinction between primary mind and mental factors; hence it says, "the mind itself is non-awakening and constantly without distinction." This reveals the absence of the meaning of equality of substance. Since there is no distinction of primary mind and mental factors with equality of substance, how could there be the meaning of identical perception and identical condition? Therefore it says, "not having identical characteristics of perception and condition." This reveals the absence of equality of perception and equality of condition. It inverts the previous "conjoined" to reveal the meaning of "non-conjoined"; it does not mean that there is equality of substance while perception and condition are different. If so, why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that the ālayavijñāna is conjoined with primary mind and mental factors? Answer: This is said in terms of the subtle, completely harmonious principle: the mind and non-awakening are harmoniously blended as if one, indivisible. Because they are not yet distinct, there are no defiled cetasikas, and thus it is called non-conjoined. That \[text\] speaks in terms of the coarse, superficial, established principle: it says that there are indeterminate, omnipresent mental factors of primary mind and cetasika existing together, and thus it constitutes conjunction. Each relies on one meaning and they do not contradict each other. Regarding that based on mind and object: this moving mind is itself in substance non-awakening; it is not that it conjoins with an object and only then becomes non-awakening, for non-awakening is located right on the moving mind. Therefore it says, "the mind itself is \[non-\]awakening." "Not having identical characteristics of perception and condition": this is to distinguish it from the previous "conjoined", in which there are greed and so on that have identical perception and identical condition. If so, the fundamental consciousness should not manifest objects, which would extremely contradict the various teachings. Answer: Although it merely manifests objects, it does not grasp them. Because it can manifest them, it is said to be able to condition objects; it does not mean that being able to manifest implies being able to grasp. If it were not so, how would it differ from phenomenal consciousness? Therefore, it does not conjoin with objects.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814~en-mt.4.12) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (2)

- [大乘起信論略述](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2813.1.163) — Classical Chinese
- [大乘起信論別記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1845.1.148) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.4.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2814.4.12) · Pramāṇa
