[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Dark Ages](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages) › [Kashmir](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir) › [Tārīkh-i Rashīdī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi) › [Tarikh-i Rashidi of Haidar Mirza Doghlat (extract)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot) › 1 # The Rashīdī History 1: Defeat of Humayun at Kanauj. Táríkh-i Rashídí of Haidar Mírzá Doghlat (extract) 1 - **Language:** English ### Defeat of Humayun at Kanauj. ### [1.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.1) \[When all the brothers were assembled, they conferred together upon the state of affairs. The discussion was protracted, but no profitable decision was arrived at; in fact, nothing was proposed that was worthy of the occasion, for as it is said, "When Fortune's adverse, minds are perverse." Kamran Mirza was very anxious to return, but Humayun disregarded all his representations. Seven months were wasted in weary indecision, until the opportunity was lost, and Sher Khan was on the Ganges ready for war. In the midst of this confusion Kamran Mirza became very ill. The climate of Hindustan had brought on some serious disorders. When he had thus suffered for two or three months, he lost the use of his hands and feet. As no medicine or treatment relieved him, he became the more desirous of departing to Lahore. At length his maladies so increased, that he made up his mind to return thither. This departure of Kamran Mirza was the turning-point in the rise of Sher Khan and the downfall of the Chaghtai power. The Emperor greatly urged him to leave some of his officers and forces as auxiliaries, but Kamran Mirza, on the contrary, did all he could to induce all the men of Agra to go away with him, and strenuously rejected the proposal to leave his own army behind. Mir Khwaja Kalan, who was his prime minister, also exerted himself to the same purpose. Kamran Mirza sent him on in advance, and then followed in person. ### [1.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.2) While this was passing, Sher Khan advanced to the banks of the Ganges, and passed his army over. Kutb Khan, his son, marched towards Etawa and Kalpi. These territories were the iktas of Husain Sultan, who was one of the Uzbek Sultans, and Yadgar Nasir Mirza, son of Nasir Mirza, the brother of the Emperor Babar. Part of Kalpi belonged to Kamran Mirza, and he had sent to that district Iskandar Sultan as his representative. These three persons marched against Kutb Khan, who was slain in the battle, and they gained a complete victory. The Emperor now marched from Agra towards the Ganges against Sher Khan. \[The writer goes on to explain at length his reasons for leaving Kamran, and joining the Emperor.\] Although Mirza Kamran would not consent to my parting from him, I remained behind without his consent. Kamran Mirza himself, shamefully leaving only Iskandar Sultan with about 1000 men as auxiliaries, went off to Lahore, taking with him all the men of Agra he could carry with him; thus giving strength to the enemy and preparing defeat for his friends. The Imperial army reached the banks of the Ganges in the best way that it could. There it encamped and lay for about a month, the Emperor being on one side of the river, and Sher Khan on the other, facing each other. The armies may have amounted to more than 200,000 men. ### [1.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.3) Muhammad Sultan Mirza, of the house of Timur, and grandson by a daughter of Sultan Husain (of Khurasan), had come to India to wait upon the Emperor Babar, and had been received with every mark of kindness and kingly favour. After Babar's death he had several times revolted against Humayun; but being unsuccessful, he had sought forgiveness, and had been pardoned. Now having colluded with Sher Khan, he deserted. A new way was thus opened. Everybody began to desert, and the most surprising part of it was, that many of those who deserted did not go over to Sher Khan, and so could expect no favour from him. A heated feeling ran through the army, and the cry was, "Let us go and rest in our own homes." A number also of Kamran's auxiliary forces deserted and fled to Lahore. Among the equipments which were in the train of the Emperor were 700 carriages (gardun), each drawn by four pairs of bullocks, and carrying a swivel (zarb-zan), which discharged a ball (kalola), of 500 miskals weight. I myself several times saw that from the top of an eminence they unfailingly (be-khata) struck horsemen who slightly and unsuspectingly exposed themselves. And there were twenty-one carriages, each drawn by eight pairs of bullocks. Stone balls were of no use in these, but the shots were of molten brass, and weighed 5000 miskdls, and the cost of each was 200 miskdls of silver. They would strike anything that was visible at the distance of a parasang. ### [1.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.4) As the army had taken to desert, it was judged better to risk a battle than to see it go to ruin without fighting. If the result was unfavourable, in that case we could not at least be accused of having abandoned an empire like Hindustdn without striking a blow. Another consideration was, that if we passed the river, desertion would be no longer possible. We therefore crossed over. Both armies entrenched themselves. Every day skirmishes occurred between the adventurous swaggering spirits of both sides. These proceedings were put an end to by the monsoon rains, which came on and flooded the ground, rendering it unfit for a camp; To move was indispensable. Opinions were expressed that another such a deluge would sink the whole army in the abyss of despair, and it was proposed to move to a rising ground which the inundation could not reach, and which lay in front of the enemy. I went to reconnoitre, and found a place suitable for the purpose. I said that we would on the morrow try the enemy on the touchstone of experience, for he ought not to attack while we were on the march, as the arraying of an army at the time of marching is contrary to sound judgment. The morrow was the 10th of Muharram, and we must keep our forces well under control until we see if the enemy comes out of his trenches and advances against us. Then at last a regular pitched battle will be fought between us. The proper plan for us is to place the mortars (deg) and swivels (zarb-zan) in front; ### [1.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.5) and the gunners, nearly 5000 in number, must be stationed with the guns. If he does come out to attack us, there is no time or place more suitable than this for battle. If he does not come out of his entrenchments, we must remain drawn up till about mid-day, and then return to our position. Next day we must act just in the same way. Then the baggage must move to the new position, and we must follow and occupy the place. This scheme of mine met with general approbation. On the 10th Muharram, 948 H., we mounted to carry the plan into effect, and formed our array. As had been determined, the carriages (gardun) and mortars (deg) and small guns (topakchiyan) were placed in the centre. The command of the guns was given to Muhammad Khán Rúmi, the sons of Ustád 'Ali Kuli, Ustád Ahmad Rúmi, and Husain Khalifa. They placed the carriages and mortars (deg) in their proper positions, and stretched chains between them. In other divisions there were amírs of no repute, men who were amírs only in name. They had got possession of the country, but they had not a tincture of prudence or knowledge, or energy or emulation, or nobility of mind or generosity—qualities from which nobility draws its name. The Emperor had posted the author of this work upon his left, so that his right flank should be on the Emperor's left. In the same position he had placed a force of chosen troops. On my left, all my retainers were stationed. ### [1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.6) I had 400 chosen men, inured to warfare and familiar with battle, fifty of whom were mounted on horses accoutred with armour. Between me and the river (Júí-bár) there was a force of twenty-seven amírs, all of whom carried the túgh banner. In this position, also, were the other components of the left wing, and they must be judged of by the others. On the day of battle, when Sher Khán, having formed his divisions, marched out, of all these twenty-seven túgh banners not one was to be seen, for the great nobles had hidden them in the apprehension that the enemy might advance upon them. The soldiership and bravery of the amírs may be conceived from this exhibition of courage. Sher Khán came out in five divisions of 1000 men each, and in advance of him (peshtar i o) were 3000 men. I estimated the whole as being less than 15,000, but I calculated the Chaghatai force as about 40,000, all mounted on tipchak horses, and clad in iron armour. They surged like the waves of the sea, but the courage of the amirs and officers of the army was such as I have described. When Sher Khan's army came out of its entrenchments, two divisions (jauk), which seemed to be equal to four divisions, drew up in that place, and three divisions advanced against their opponents. On our side I was leading the centre, to take up the position which I had selected; ### [1.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.7) but when we reached the ground, we were unable to occupy it: for every amir and wazir in the Chaghatai army, whether he be rich or poor, has his ghulams. An amir of note with his 100 retainers and followers has 500 servants and ghulams, who in the day of battle render no assistance to their master and have no control over themselves. So in whatever place there was a conflict, the ghulams were entirely ungovernable. When they lost their masters, they were seized with panic, and blindly rushed about in terror. In short it was impossible to hold our ground. They so pressed upon us in the rear, that they drove the centre upon the chains stretched between the chariots, and they and the soldiers dashed each other upon them. Those who were behind so pressed upon those who were in front, that they broke through the chains. The men who were posted by the chains were driven beyond it, and the few who remained behind were broken, so that all formation was destroyed. ### [1.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.8) Such was the state of the centre. On the right Sher Khan advanced in battle array; but before an arrow was discharged, the camp followers fled like chaff before the wind, and breaking the line they all pressed towards the centre. The ghulams whom the commanders had sent to the front rushed to the lines of chariots, the whole array was broken, and the mir was separated from his men, and the men from the mir. While the centre was thus thrown into disorder, all the fugitives from the right bore down upon it. So before the enemy had discharged an arrow, the whole army was scattered and defeated. I had estimated the Chaghatai army as numbering 40,000 men, excluding the camp followers (ghulám) and workmen (shágird-pesha). They fled before 10,000 men, and Sher Khan gained a victory, and the Chaghatais were defeated in this battle-field where not a man, either friend or foe, was wounded. Not a gun was fired, and the chariots (gardun) were useless. ### [1.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1.9) When the Chaghatais took to flight, the distance between their position and the Ganges might be nearly a parasang. All the amirs and braves (bahádurán) fled for safety to the river, without a man of them having received a wound. The enemy pursued them, and the Chaghatais, having no time to throw off their armour and coats, plunged into the river. The breadth of the river might be about five bowshots. Many illustrious amirs were drowned, and each one remained or went on at his will. When we came out of the river, His Majesty, who at mid-day had 17,000 workmen in attendance upon his Court, was mounted upon a horse which had been given to him by Tardi Beg, and had nothing on his head or feet. "Permanence is from God, and dominion is from God." Out of 1000 retainers, eight persons came out of the river; the rest had perished in the water. The total loss may be estimated from this fact. When we reached Agra, we made no tarry, but, broken and dispirited, in a state heart-rending to relate, we went on to Lahore. On the new moon of Rabi'u-l awwal, 947 H., the princes, amirs, and people had drawn together at Lahore. The throng was so great that it was difficult to move about, and still more difficult to find a lodging. Every one acted as his fears or his interests led him. --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.kashmir.tarikh-i-rashidi~en-elliot.1) · Pramāṇa