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# The Memoirs of Jahāngīr (Jahāngīrnāma) 25: Defeat in the Dakhin.

Dwázda-Sála-i Jahángírí; Wáki’át Jahángírí, of the Emperor Jahángír (Elliot & Dowson, extracts) 25

- **Language:** English

### [25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.mughal.jahangir.tuzuk-i-jahangiri~en-elliot-2.25)

\[Affairs in the Dakhin were in a very unsatisfactory state, in consequence of the bad generalship and want of care of Khan-i ’azam, and a defeat had been suffered by ’Abdu-lla Khan. I summoned Khwaja Abu-l Hasan to my presence, and after inquiry, I ascertained that the disaster was attributable partly to the conceit and rashness of ’Abdu-lla Khan, and partly to discord and want of co-operation among the amirs.  
’Abdu-lla Khan and the officers who had been appointed to serve under him, marched with the army of Gujarat by way of Nasik Tirbang. This force was well equipped; its numbers were from 10,000 to 14,000, and the officers serving in it were \* It had been arranged that another force should advance from the side of Birar under the command of Raja Man Singh, Khan-Jahan, Amiru-l Umara, and other officers. These two armies were to keep up communications, and to be informed of each other’s movements, so that they might at an appointed time close in upon the enemy. If this plan had been carried out frankly and cordially without jealousy, it is very probable that under God’s grace it would have succeeded.  
’Abdu-lla Khan, having passed the Ghats, entered the country of the enemy, but made no arrangements for sending messengers to obtain intelligence of the other force, and to regulate his movements in concert, so as to place the enemy between the two armies. He trusted entirely to his own power, and thought that if he could effect the victory himself, it would be all the better. Acting upon this view, he paid no heed to Raja Man Singh when the latter wished to settle a concerted plan.  
The enemy kept a sharp watch over his movements, and sent a large force of Mahrattas (bargiyan), who skirmished with him all day, and harassed him at night with rockets and other fiery projectiles, till the main body of the enemy drew near, and he was quite unaware of their proximity, although he approached Daulatabad, a stronghold of the Dakhinis. \* \* ’Ambar the black-faced, who had placed himself in command of the enemy, continually brought up reinforcements till he had assembled a large force, and he constantly annoyed ’Abdu-lla with rockets and various kinds of fiery missiles (atash-bazi), till he reduced him to a sad condition. So, as the Imperial army had received no reinforcements, and the enemy was in great force, it was deemed expedient to retreat, and prepare for a new campaign. All the chiefs were unanimous in favour of this, and before dawn they began to fall back. The enemy pressed upon them to the boundaries of their own territory, but either side held its own. But a party of our force courted a serious encounter, and ’Ali Mardan Khan, after a valorous conflict, was left wounded in the hands of the enemy. \* \* \* After another day, when they reached the frontier of Raja Baharjiu, an adherent of the Imperial throne, the enemy retired, and ’Abdu-lla Khan proceeded to Gujarat. It seems clear, that if proper precautions had been taken, and the two forces had been kept in co-operation, the objects of the campaign would have been accomplished. On the retreat of ’Abdu-lla, the army, which marched by way of Birar, had no alternative but to retire; so it retreated and joined the camp of Prince Parwez, near Burhanpur. On receiving this information, I was greatly excited, and felt inclined to proceed thither myself to retrieve the position. But Khwaja Abu-l Hasan remonstrated \* \*, and I resolved to send Khan-khanan \* \*.  
The Dakhinis now made proposals for peace. ’Adil Khan professed amity, and promised, if the affairs of the Dakhinis were left to him, that he would restore sundry districts to the Imperial officers. I did not come to any decision on the matter, but left it to Khan-khanan.\]

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.mughal.jahangir.tuzuk-i-jahangiri~en-elliot-2.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.mughal.jahangir.tuzuk-i-jahangiri~en-elliot-2.25) · Pramāṇa
