The Nāṣirī Generations 257.7
Tabakat-i-Nasiri 257.7
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257.7.1
When the news of the Chingiz Khan's outbreak became spread abroad, and reached the Altun Khan, he imagined that, perhaps, that army of 300,000 horse, which were holding that pass and the high road, had been overthrown, and put to the sword; and the heart of the Altun Khan. is meant—that of Salu-ling-kfw?—which, according to Hafiz Abru, "having once been passed, the country of Khitae may be considered as subdued." I must here also briefly relate what other more modern writers, who wrote however under Mughal influence, state; because our author's account contains much that no others have related, and he was contemporary with the Chingiz Khan, knew many of the actors in these events, and was not influenced by the patronage of Mughal sovereigns.
257.7.2
Now that the Chingiz Khan, through the submission of the Yiddi-kut of the I-ghurs, had reduced, nominally, or partially, at least, all the tribes between the Gur Khan's dominions on the west, and Khita, or Northern China, on the east, and most of the Mughal tribes, and had become exceedingly prosperous, and his forces countless, he resolved to make an attempt upon the territory of the Altan Khan of Khita, Madai-Shu-o-shu—the "Ninkiassu" of some European writers—to whom, for many ages, his forefathers had been tributary. He wanted a plea, like the wolf in the fable, and found one as easily, and certainly more justly, than another descendant of Yafis has lately manufactured one against the 'Usmanli Turks: only the Chingiz Khan acted openly, not perfidiously, or hypocritically: so, what had happened seven and four generations before respectively, he now adopted as an excuse for invading the Altan Khan's dominions. The Altan Khans of by-gone times had put to death two chiefs' sons of the Nairun Mughals, as already related in the account of the Turks, namely Hamangha, or Haman-ka, and Ukin-Barka.
257.7.3
Oriental writers differ considerably in their accounts of these events. It appears that the Chingiz Khan continually conferred with his chiefs and tributaries on the injuries and wrongs their forefathers had sustained at the hands of the Khita-is, by reason of which the Mughal people were looked upon with scorn by other nations, their neighbours. He recalled to them the prediction [the imposture of Tab Tingri, previously referred to] that they were always to be victorious over their enemies. On this, the Khwajah Ja'far—the very same as mentioned by our author—a Musalman of sagacity, as he is called, who had long been in the Chingiz Khan's service—as being a more respectable agent, probably, than a barbarian Mughal—was despatched to the court of the Altan Khan, to intimate to that monarch his accession to the sovereignty of the Mughal tribes, and calling upon him to render alliance, and pay tribute to his former vassals, the Mughals, in which case he might continue as heretofore to rule over Khita! The Altan Khan treated the messenger and his demands with utter contempt, and sent him away.
257.7.4
The author of the Mongols Proper, who disdains all who wrote in Persian (while his information is derived from translations from them), with the exception, I suppose, of the "great Raschid," as mere "second-rate authorities," "muddy streams," &c., &c., turns this Musalman, whose name plainly indicates his religion, and who was not a Mughal, into "Jafar Khodsha," and adds that he was "one of the principal Mongols"! Then occurred the tent and fast scene related by our author, but in much greater detail. More particulars respecting the impostures of the Mughal ruler will be found farther on. After this, in the eighth month of 607 H. [March, 1211 A. D.], the Mughal troops and of the whole of the inhabitants of the country of Tamghaj, became much afflicted. When the news of that disaster, plunder, devastation. cities, which submitted without resistance and furnished supplies to the invaders, were spared, but that all others were destroyed. He then turned his face towards the Altan Khan's capital, and metropolis of Khitae, which, in the Tarikh-i-Jahan-gir, Habib-us-Siyar, &c., is named Chingdu or Chingtu, where the Altan Khan then was. This must be our author's city of Tamghaj, that is to say, the chief city of the country of Tamghaj.
257.7.5
When the Altan Khan became aware of the advance of the Mughal host, he marched with his army, reinforced by the forces of Sharjah — a numerous host — and took up a position to guard one of the strong entrances leading into his empire, detaching a considerable body of troops in advance to watch the frontiers and harass the Mughals if opportunity occurred. This could have been of little effect with the Mughals within the Great Wall, and, evidently, is the same circumstance as our author refers to; but he says, more probably, that the Altan Khan sent 300,000 horse to guard the entrance into his territory. The sovereigns of Khitae did not usually accompany their armies, and Hafiz Abru also says that he was not present. Our author also mentions the same Ja'fir; and the latter's return, by a secret route, evidently refers to the route by the Great Wall, betrayed by Ala-kush, Tigin Kuri.
257.7.6
To return to the accounts of writers who wrote a century or more after our author. The force detached from the Altan Khan's main army, commanded by the Amirs of Khitajah, was so far successful that, information having reached it that the Mughals, after capturing one of the cities in the vicinity, were then engaged, unsuspicious of the near approach of enemies, in dividing the spoil in their camp, the Khita-i leaders thought this an excellent opportunity, and determined to endeavour to surprise them. They came upon the Mughals when cooking their food, but the Chingiz Khan was speedily on the alert, and his troops, dropping their cookery, were soon mounted, and they speedily put the Khita-is to the rout.
257.7.7
The main army of the Altan Khan, which had advanced to meet the Mughals, when within a few marches of them, was found to be so much fatigued that it was deemed advisable to halt to give it some rest. Its camp was fortified by a deep trench in front, and the waggons or carts of the army were placed on either flank. Hearing, however, that the Mughals were advancing in search of them, they foolishly left this secure position, and, despising the Mughals whom they had so often coerced in former times, sallied forth to meet them. The battle was obstinate and bloody, but ended without any decisive result; for, although the Khita-is lost nearly 30,000 men, the Mughals lost even more. The Chingiz Khan thought it advisable to retire with his spoils towards his own borders, and the Khita-is did not deem it advisable to follow, as they were much worn out with long marches and their exertions in the late battle.
257.7.8
Hafiz Abru says it was one of the Chingiz Khan's most famous battles, that the Khita-is were nearly annihilated, and that it took place towards the end of 607 H. [about the end of May, 1211 A.D.], while some writers leave it out entirely. If the Khita-is were nearly annihilated, it is strange the Mughals should have retired. The Habib-us-Siyar also says the Khita-is were overthrown, and that the Altan Khan fled in dismay to his capital. Fearing for the safety of that city, if the war continued, the Altan Khan now summoned his minister and his two principal generals, to deliberate on the and slaughter, reached that [great] army which was guarding the high road, through panic, on account of the state of dominions was in a disturbed and disaffected state, and that disloyalty and sedition prevailed, so much so that the Altan Khan's son, through these disaffections, withdrew from Ching-du, and went and joined his father, and that intelligence of the forsaken condition of that capital conveyed to him through the governor of Jurjah, who tendered his allegiance to him, induced the Chingiz Khan to invade Khita a second time.
257.7.9
Another account is that the Altan Khan had given orders to ravage some parts of Kara-Khitae [i.e. north-west of, and beyond the Great Wall], on which the people sent agents to the Chingiz Khan at Kara-Kuram, and sought his protection, and the Khan of one of the disaffected parts, having gained possession of one of the fortresses guarding one of the entrances through the Great Wall, offered to admit the Mughals thereby. This statement is confused, and refers to the first, not the second expedition, as I have shown. However, it is farther stated that the Chingiz Khan thought the time propitious, and determined on invading the Altan Khan's dominions again, and that he proposed that his I-ghur and Karlugh allies should take a part in the expedition; but, being unable, through sickness—caused by the wound perhaps, referred to previously—to proceed himself, the command was given to Samukah, the Saljiut, his oldest Nu-yan.
257.7.10
The Chinese authors tell us that the Chingiz Khan, having retired from Khitae, after the accommodation with the Altan Khan, and, having received his daughter in marriage, in 1211 A.D., set out, accompanied by Juji, to conquer Kibchak—an error for Kam-Kunchak previously referred to—in order to reduce several tribes which had been subject to the Wang Khan, who had nought to do with "Kipchak," that the tribes inhabiting Jatah [European Getes] submitted, and that, leaving half his forces with Juji, who defeated the Komans, Walaks, Bulghars, and Hungarians, the Chingiz Khan retired to Kara-Kuram. Now this is wholly incorrect, and caused apparently through mistaking Kam-Kunchak for The Chingiz Khan never entered Kibchak, and Juji was not sent into Kibchak until several years after—he never went against either Walaks, Bulghars, or Hungarians—as will be seen farther on; and it is quite certain that the Awang Khan had nothing to do with their country.