The Nāṣirī Generations 258.5
Tabakat-i-Nasiri 258.5
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258.5.1
In the meantime the Chingiz Khan’s envoys and the merchants had been put to death and plundered through the perfidy of Inal-Juk, the Kankuli, whose title was Gha-ir Khan, and whose title, in the MSS. of our author’s work, by mistake, is written Kadr Khan. The Chingiz Khan, before undertaking the war against the Sultan of Khwarazm to avenge that outrage, determined not to leave behind him any one likely to contemplate sedition in his territories during his absence; and, as his chief enemies, Koshluk, the Naeman, and Tuk-Tughan, the Makrit, were committing disturbances and sedition in the vicinity of his line of route, he determined to finish Koshluk first, and, accordingly, the Nu-yin, Jabah, was sent to the westward against him, with a large army of several tomans, from the frontier of Kara-Khitae, as already stated.
258.5.2
Koshluk, having committed violence and tyranny beyond measure in Khutan and Kashghar, and endeavoured to extinguish Islam therein, had nothing to expect but hostility from its people, and therefore, on hearing of the approach of a Mughal army to that frontier, he fled from Kashghar, and Jabah was allowed to take possession of it. He at once issued a proclamation that every one might follow his own faith unmolested. Every Naeman that Nishapur. On the Chingiz Khan receiving information of the Sultan's departure from the environs of Balkh, and of the sedition in, and dispersion of, the army which was along with him, he ordered 60,000 Mughal horse, from his own camp, to cross the Jihun, and despatched this army, under the standard of two notable Mughals, one of whom was the Bahadur, Sahudah by name, and the other the Nu-in, Yamah, in pursuit of the Sultan.
258.5.3
That host, in the month of Rabi'-ul-Awwal, 617 H., such a small number been sent they would have been liable to be cut off when separated, in a country too where there were men who only wanted leaders to make them fight. Even a force of 60,000, as our author states, allowing for those killed, disabled, or carried off by disease, was small enough; but, it is certain, that the Mughals, as was their custom, compelled men of the places they captured or passed through to join them, and incorporated them in their armies; and, by this means, they managed to save their own men at the cost of their recruits. We must also remember that they had to depend on the parts they overran for supplies. That they could be resisted in far greater numbers than 30,000 or even 60,000 by resolute men, the defence of Utrar, Khujand, Tirmid, Sistan, and Khwarazm, abundantly shows, as well as the determined resistance of other places mentioned by our author farther on but which no other writers have even named, much less described. When the Chingiz Khan had reached Samrkand, in Zi-Hijjah, 616 H., [end of February, A.D. 1220], and had completely invested that place, news, it is said reached him that the Sultan had crossed the Jihun by the Tirmid ferry, that the greater part of his troops were stationed in different fortresses, and the remainder dispersed in various parts.
258.5.4
The Chingiz Khan consequently held counsel with his Nu-yans, saying, that, as but very few troops remained with the Sultan, and his son, Jalal-ud-Din's advice to concentrate his forces was not complied with, it was now possible to complete his downfall before his nobles and great men, and the armies of the different parts of his empire, should have time to rally round him. It was therefore determined that three Mughal Amirs of tomans, who were among the greatest of the Mughal leaders, namely, the Nu-yan, Jabah, of the tribe of Baisut the Yamah of our author, Yafa-i, Fasiti-i and some others, with one toman [10,000 horse] as the van division, and the Bahadur, Swidae—the Sahudah of our author and others—of the Mughal tribe of Kungkurat, and the Nu-yan [the Bahadur?], Tukchar, also written Tukachar and Taghachar, with their respective tomans, should be directed to follow Jabah [Yamah] in succession in pursuit of the Sultan. They were to pursue him throughout his empire, and not to rest until they had captured him. If they came up with, and found themselves not strong enough to cope with him, they were to make it known to him, the Chingiz Khan, and not to turn aside; to Intendants with them, but hostility. They were likewise to understand that three years were sufficient to accomplish this task, and turn the Sultan's empire upside down; that he himself did not intend to remain in the countries west of the Sihun more than three years;
258.5.5
and that they were to rejoin him in his native yurat or encamping ground, in Mughalistan, by way of the Dasht or Steppe of Kibchak [along the north side of the Caspian]. They were further instructed to acquaint him in case of their being in danger, that his son, Tuli, would be at once sent after them, at the head of an army, into Khurasan, and another army against Khwarazm, under his other sons. and Jabah [Yamah], with his toman formed the van, while the others were directed to follow him in succession [at an interval of some few days probably]. They crossed the Amuyah, or Jihun, by the Panj-ab ford, at the end of Rabi'-ul-Akhir—some say in the previous crossed the river Jihun; and, in conformity with the month — 617 H. [about the latter part of June, A.D. 1220], and pushed on to Balkh, where they arrived together. They were waited on by a deputation of the chief men, received supplies, left an Intendant there, and then, according to their instructions, proceeded towards Hirat.
258.5.6
On the arrival of Jabah [Yamah] and Swfdae [Sahudah] at Hirat, they did not molest it because, when they entered that territory, the Malik of Hirat [Amin Malik, according to the Habib-us-Siyar, whose title was Yamin-ul-Mulk] sent an emissary to meet them, and to signify his submission and obedience, he, from their unexpected arrival, being in no condition to resist them; but such proceedings, on that Malik’s part, are contrary to the statements of our author and the tenour of that Malik’s life. See the account of Sultan Jalal-ud-Din’s coming to Ghaznin farther on. They were allowed to receive supplies, but were not admitted within the walls. The two leaders continued to follow each other towards Zawah; and, when Tukachar reached Hirat, he must needs refuse to believe the statement of the Malik’s submission to Jabah [Yamah] and Swidae [Sahudah], and commence hostilities. The Malik therefore, of necessity, had to defend himself [See note page 1014], and, in a conflict which ensued between the Mughals and Hiratis, Tukajar was killed, along with a great many of his force. This is a totally different person from the son-in-law of the Chingiz Khan killed before Nishabur.
258.5.7
In the meantime, the Malik of Hirat having sent messengers to the two Nu-yans in advance, complaining of Tukachar's conduct, agents from them to the Malik arrived merely in time to conduct his defeated troops to join the other two leaders. From this, it will be perceived, that it was only want of spirit, or rather want of union and concerted action, that prevented the Musalmans from exterminating this Mughal force entirely. From what has been already narrated by our author above, it will have been seen that he knew more of the actual facts of this affair than the pro-Mughal writers I have taken this from. Tukachar was killed near Fushanj, a dependency of Hirat, and not at or before Hirat itself. These forces under these three leaders were not the only troops despatched from the Chingiz Khan’s camp into Khurasan in 617 H. Arsalan Khan of Kaialik, and the Juzbi, Tulan, the Talangut [?] [see note page 1061], were despatched across the Jihun, about the same time, to invest Walwalij of Tukharistan, which was bravely defended, and defied all the efforts of the invaders for eight months. See pages 1004 — 1006.
258.5.8
When Jabah [Yamah] and Swidae [Sahudah] reached Zawah, they were in want of supplies [according to Rashid-ud-Din], and all their solicitations and threats did not induce the people to open their gates or give them any, so, being in want, they stormed it vigorously. Others, however, state, that, the gates being shut upon them, and as the Sultan was their object, they would have left Zawah unmolested, but those within began to beat their drums, and sound their clarions, and from the walls greeted their departure with shouts, jeers, and obscene language, which so exasperated the Mughals that they turned back, and attacked the place. In the space of three days they carried it by storm, massacred all the inhabitants, young and old, and levelled Zawah with the dust, after which feat they turned their faces towards Nishabur, without delay, pushing on day and night, “like the autumn blast or clouds of spring, slaughtering all who came across them, and destroying and burning all they possibly could.”