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# Establishment of Brahman 2.136

Brahmasiddhi 2.136

- **Language:** Sanskrit

### [2.136](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.2.136)

idaṃ tāvadayaṃ bhedavādī praṣṭavyaḥ ---  
kathamayaṃ vyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇeṣvabhedāvabhāso 'nuvṛttavyavahāraśca? yadi sādṛśyāt, tadatyantamananviteṣvanupapannam /  
atha vyāvṛtteragrahāt ---  
ko hi guñjāpravālādīnāṃ rāgavyāvṛttimavagrahītuṃ kṣamate ---  
iti /  
tadasat /  
vyāvṛttasvabhāvasya tadagrahe grahaṇameva hi na syāt /  
atha niścayapratyakṣayorātmabhedādaniścayāt /  
tadasat, ubhayarūpavyavahāradarśanāt /  
tathā hi ---  
kālākṣyāṃ gosāmānyanibandhanaśca vyavahāro gavāntaravyāvṛttiśca dṛśyate /  
na ca gavāntaravyāvṛtteraniścaye sa yujyate /  
athaikārthakriyākāritvādatatkriyāvyāvṛttestulyatvāt /  
tadapyasāṃpratam, arthakriyāṇāmapi bhedādatatkriyāvyāvṛttestulyatvāyogāt /  
naikasādhyānyasyārthakriyā yenātatkārivyāvṛttistulyā syāt /  
vastusvabhāvaśca vyāvṛttiḥ prativastubhedānna tulyā /  
athāsvabhāvāḥ, teṣāṃ kathaṃ tulyā? athānādivāsanopādāno na vastugataviśeṣāpekṣaḥ /  
tadapyayuktam, niyamāt /  
kāsucideva hi vyaktiṣu kaścidevāvabhāsaḥ (Ms B; kaścidevābhedāvabhāsaḥ -- edition), sa vāsanāmātropādānatve na yujyate /  
tasmātprakṛtyaiva kecitkasyacidabhedāvamarśasya yogyāḥ kecinneti svabhāvaviparītā bhāvānāṃ sāmarthyātiśayā kalpayitavyāḥ /  
tathā satyevaṃ gauravātkalpanāyāḥ /  
ekasyaivāstu māhātmyaṃ yadeko 'pi nānevāvabhāsate (nāneva bhāsate -- edition), laghutvātkalpanāyāḥ /  
na tu bhinnānāṃ te sāmarthyātiśayāḥ, yadamī abhinnā iva bhāsante (ivāvabhāsante -- edition) /

> First, this proponent of difference must be asked:  
> How does this appearance of non-difference and continuous practical usage occur among differentiated unique particulars? If from similarity, that is impossible among things that are entirely disconnected.  
> Or, if from non-apprehension of differentiation:  
> 'for who is capable of apprehending the differentiation of the red color of guñjā berries, coral, and the like?'—  
> that is incorrect;  
> for if the differentiated nature is not apprehended, there would be no apprehension of it at all.  
> Or, if from non-determination due to difference of nature between ascertainment and perception,  
> that is incorrect, because linguistic and practical usage of both forms is observed.  
> To explain:  
> In the case of a black-eyed cow, linguistic and practical usage grounded in the universal 'cowness' is seen, as well as differentiation from other cows.  
> And that is not coherent if differentiation from other cows is not ascertained.  
> Or, if \[it is\] because of performing the same causal efficiency, due to the identity of exclusion from that which does not perform that action,  
> that too is improper, because even causal efficiencies are different, and so the exclusion from what does not perform that action cannot be the same.  
> The causal efficiency of another cannot be accomplished by one, such that exclusion from what does not perform it would be the same.  
> And differentiation, being the nature of an entity, is not the same because of the difference of each entity.  
> If \[exclusions\] have no real nature, how can they be the same? Or, if it is caused by beginningless impressions and does not depend on a specific property belonging to the entity,  
> that too is untenable, because of restriction.  
> For only in certain individuals does a certain appearance arise; that is not coherent if it were caused by impressions alone.  
> Therefore, it would have to be postulated that, contrary to their nature, entities have extraordinary capacities such that by their very nature some are suited for a certain apprehension of non-difference and some are not.  
> That being so, because of heaviness of postulation in that way,  
> let it be the greatness of the One alone that, though one, it appears as if manifold, because of parsimony of postulation;  
> and not those extraordinary capacities of the different \[things\], by which these appear as if non-different.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.2.136) — English, machine translation

## Commentaries (1)

- [Tattvasamīkṣā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi!tattvasamiksa.2.35) — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.2.136](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.2.136) · Pramāṇa
