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# Establishment of Brahman 3.32

Brahmasiddhi 3.32

- **Language:** Sanskrit

### [3.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.32)

vidhimantareṇa na kāryopadeśapratītiḥ /  
yathāvasthitaṃ vastu tadvidhasyānuvādamātratvaṃ gamyate /  
anuvādaśca pramāṇāntaraviṣaya iti tadapekṣo bhūtārtho nārtha ucyata iti sāpekṣatvādaprāmāṇyam /  
vidhyarthasya tu pramāṇāntarāviṣayatvāttanniṣṭhamanapekṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ karmavidhivākyavat /  
pramāṇāntarāviṣayaśca vidhyarthaḥ /  
na hi ‘kuru'iti śabdajñānādanyataḥ pratītiḥ /  
evaṃ ca sati tattvapratipattipare vākye yadyapi vākyārthabodhātparācīnā pravṛttiḥ, vidhiphalaṃ nāsti /  
prāmāṇyāyaiva tu vidhiniṣṭhatvameṣitavyamiti /  
atrocyate ---

> Without an injunction, there is no apprehension of instruction regarding what is to be done.  
> An entity that is already established as such is understood to be a mere reiteration of that sort.  
> And reiteration has for its sphere another means of valid cognition; hence an existent fact dependent on that is not declared to be the \[primary\] meaning, so because of dependence it lacks validity.  
> On the other hand, the meaning of an injunction is independent, being a means of valid cognition focused on that \[duty\], because it is not within the scope of any other means of valid cognition, just like sentences enjoining ritual acts.  
> And the meaning of an injunction is indeed not within the scope of any other means of valid cognition;  
> for there is no apprehension \[of it\] from anything other than the verbal cognition 'do \[this\]'.  
> And this being so, even if in a sentence intent on imparting reality, activity subsequent to understanding the sentence-meaning—the fruit of an injunction—does not exist,  
> yet intentness on an injunction must be accepted simply for the sake of validity.  
> To this, it is replied:—  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.32) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.32) · Pramāṇa
