[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana) › [Non-dualist Vedānta](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita) › [Systematic treatises](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra) › [Establishment of Brahman](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi) › 3.83 # Establishment of Brahman 3.83 Brahmasiddhi 3.83 - **Language:** Sanskrit ### [3.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.83) atha matam --- pramāṇāntaragamyataiva liṅgenādhigamyate / tena nottarakālatā / tacca pramāṇaṃ trikālamiti traividhyam / kiṃ punastat? pratyakṣam / tathā hi --- bhūtāyāṃ dṛṣṭau kasyacidbhūtaṃ pratyakṣam, bhaviṣyantyāṃ bhaviṣyat, vartamāne 'gnau vartamānamiti / etacca vārtam, nityānumeye tasyābhāvāt / api ca liṅgamapyevaṃ pramāṇāntarāpekṣatvādapramāṇaṃ syāt / atha liṅgādeva pramāṇāntarasadbhāvasya siddhernirapekṣatvam / tathā hi --- pramāṇāntarasadbhāva evedānīṃ liṅgaṃ pramāṇam / na ca tatrānyadapekṣyate / pramāṇasadbhāvadvārā prameyasiddhiriti / nāyaṃ vidhirvede daṇḍavāritaḥ / vaidikamapi vaco 'styarthaniṣṭhaṃ viśiṣṭārthapramāṇasadbhāva eva pramāṇam / tatra nirapekṣam / tatpramāṇadvārā ca viśiṣṭārthasiddhiriti samānam / > Now, if it is held: > What is cognised by the inferential mark is precisely the state of being cognisable by another means of valid cognition; > therefore, it does not occur at a later time; > and that means of valid cognition pertains to the three times, so there is a threefold nature. > What, then, is that \[other means of valid cognition\]? Perception. > For instance: > When the rain is past, someone's perception is past; when it is future, \[the perception\] is future; when the fire is present, it is present. > And this is trifling, because it does not exist in the case of what is eternally inferable. > Moreover, in this way the inferential mark too would be invalid, because it would depend on another means of valid cognition. > If \[the opponent says that\] there is independence because the existence of another means of valid cognition is established from the inferential mark itself; > for instance: > the inferential mark is now the means of valid cognition precisely for the existence of another means of valid cognition; > and there, nothing else is depended upon; > \[and\] the establishment of the object of valid cognition is by means of the existence of the means of valid cognition— > this procedure is not prevented in the Veda by any decree. > A Vedic statement too, devoted to the meaning of \[the verb\] “is”, is a means of valid cognition precisely for the existence of a means of valid cognition for a qualified object; > there it is independent; > and the establishment of the qualified object is by means of that means of valid cognition: so it is equal. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.82](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.82) - [Next: 3.84](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.84) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.83) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.83) · Pramāṇa