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# Establishment of Brahman 3.74

English (machine translation) 3.74

- **Language:** English

### [3.74](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.74)

On this \[the opponents\] say:  
Existence is nothing other than being cognised by a means of valid cognition.  
For instance:  
When an object is cognised by a means of valid cognition, ordinary people use the linguistic expression “it exists” (asti) with regard to it; in the opposite case, \[they use\] “it does not exist” (nāsti).  
Indeed, no other ground for distinguishing between the existent and non-existent is perceived.  
If it is argued that it is the presence or absence of causal efficacy,  
no, because those two also depend on the presence or absence of a means of valid cognition.  
For instance:  
If the linguistic and practical usage of “existent” even regarding an effect were grounded on a further effect, there would be an infinite regress.  
Therefore, in the final analysis as well, the linguistic and practical usage of “existent” comes only from a means of valid cognition, and the linguistic and practical usage of “non-existent” from its opposite.  
If so, right at the beginning, let the linguistic and practical usages of “existent” and “non-existent” be grounded on the presence and absence of a means of valid cognition.  
And thus, a statement devoted to the meaning of \[the verb\] “is” (asti) conveys an object only by depending on another means of valid cognition, because being the object of a means of valid cognition is the meaning of \[the verb\] “is”.

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## Other recensions (1)

- [English (machine translation) (mt)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt*mt.3.74) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [Brahmasiddhi](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.74) — Maṇḍana Miśra, Sanskrit

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.74](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.74) · Pramāṇa
