[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana) › [Non-dualist Vedānta](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita) › [Systematic treatises](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra) › [Brahmasiddhi](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt) › 3.83 # Establishment of Brahman 3.83 English (machine translation) 3.83 - **Language:** English ### [3.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.83) Now, if it is held: What is cognised by the inferential mark is precisely the state of being cognisable by another means of valid cognition; therefore, it does not occur at a later time; and that means of valid cognition pertains to the three times, so there is a threefold nature. What, then, is that \[other means of valid cognition\]? Perception. For instance: When the rain is past, someone's perception is past; when it is future, \[the perception\] is future; when the fire is present, it is present. And this is trifling, because it does not exist in the case of what is eternally inferable. Moreover, in this way the inferential mark too would be invalid, because it would depend on another means of valid cognition. If \[the opponent says that\] there is independence because the existence of another means of valid cognition is established from the inferential mark itself; for instance: the inferential mark is now the means of valid cognition precisely for the existence of another means of valid cognition; and there, nothing else is depended upon; \[and\] the establishment of the object of valid cognition is by means of the existence of the means of valid cognition— this procedure is not prevented in the Veda by any decree. A Vedic statement too, devoted to the meaning of \[the verb\] “is”, is a means of valid cognition precisely for the existence of a means of valid cognition for a qualified object; there it is independent; and the establishment of the qualified object is by means of that means of valid cognition: so it is equal. - [Previous: 3.82](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.82) - [Next: 3.84](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.84) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3) ## Other recensions (1) - [English (machine translation) (mt)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt*mt.3.83) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [Brahmasiddhi](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi.3.83) — Maṇḍana Miśra, Sanskrit --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.brahmasiddhi~en-mt.3.83) · Pramāṇa