Establishment of Brahman 4
English (machine translation) 4
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4.2
// The fourth chapter, (the chapter on Establishment)
4.3
Thus far, an effort has been made to instruct those who asserted invalidity under the pretext of validity [belonging only] to an obligation to cognize; but now, an effort is made to instruct those who assert invalidity outright.
There, the prima facie view is:
4.4
[Objection:] Since the meaning of a sentence consists of connected word-meanings,
without attaining the status of a word-meaning, it cannot be the meaning of a sentence; and if it were a word-meaning, another means of valid cognition would apply. //
4.5
First, a word such as "Brahman" or "inner controller" is not a means of valid cognition, because, requiring knowledge of the relation [between word and meaning], it is a cause of cognition only with respect to what is previously established.
Nor is a sentence [such a means], for it does not denote directly; rather, cognition of that [sentence-meaning] occurs through word-meanings, because there is no cognition regarding what is not a word-meaning.
For, through syntactic connection in the relation of qualifier and qualified, they convey a single word-meaning qualified by the other word-meanings.
There, the qualified word-meaning itself becomes the sentence-meaning.
And what is not understood through another means of valid cognition cannot be a word-meaning, because, as stated, it requires knowledge of the relation [between word and meaning].
In that case, if it is not a word-meaning, it is not the object of a sentence; the sentence would fail to convey [it] to them.
If it is a word-meaning, it would be merely reiterative because it is understood through another means of valid cognition.
There, in sentences assumed to be means of valid cognition for an object such as Brahman that is completely unperceived, would there be words denoting it, or not?
If there are not, they could not be syntactically connected with the others, nor distinguished [from them]; thus they are not their objects of valid cognition, like a clod of earth, etc.
If, on the other hand, there are, even so, with their relations [of word and meaning] ungrasped, they would not convey [it], and what is not understood cannot be a cause of cognising the qualified sentence-meaning; in that respect, just as with "let a pika be brought from the forest," [a sentence] is informative only when the meaning of the word pika is known, so it is with them as well.
Therefore, there is no cognition of an unprecedented word-meaning from an injunction; for that empowers a person to actions through injunctions and prohibitions; as for its acceptance by those learned in the three Vedas, that is due to its usefulness for muttering prayers; [and as for] the Upaniṣads, the Vedāntas—
because they are applied there.
4.6
To this it is said in reply:
4.7
When [its] being a word-meaning is established in general, an unprecedented particular
can be conveyed through unique qualities, as in ordinary worldly experience. //
4.8
Just as in ordinary worldly experience, [in the sentence] "in a particular island there are birds of such a name, having feet of emerald, beaks of ruby, and wings of gold and silver," the generality "bird," understood through another means of valid cognition, when connected with an aggregate of properties that are unique, attains a particular form that is not understood through another means of valid cognition, and is cognised by the sentence in the form of a particular not understood through another means of valid cognition—
for the object of valid cognition of every sentence is indeed only an uncomprehended particular—so too the generality "cause" or the generality "being," through connection and distinction with word-meanings such as "from which indeed these beings are born" and "not gross, not subtle, not short," attains a particular form not understood through another means of valid cognition, and becomes the object of valid cognition of the sentence.
Thus, because an unprecedented meaning is understood precisely through the syntactic connection of word-meanings established in ordinary worldly experience, there is neither failure to convey nor mere reiteration.
4.9
Or, when the nature of Brahman is established as cognised in all cognitions,
the dissolution of the manifold universe is conveyed by verbal testimony. //
4.10
In that nature in which the manifold universe has dissolved, it is not the sphere
of another means [of valid cognition]; thus this view is grounded solely in scripture. //
4.11
Alternatively, Brahman is not entirely unestablished in ordinary worldly experience, because it is cognised in all cognitions, because there is nothing to be cognised apart from Brahman, because particular cognitions follow the general form, and because Brahman is shown to be truth remaining upon the sublation of difference—
as shown by the illustrative example: "modification is a verbal handle, a name; clay alone is real."
What then is conveyed by verbal testimony? The absence of the manifold universe.
There, the word-meaning "manifold universe" is established, and negation is also established; through the connection of the two, cognition of its absence [arises].
Its being grounded solely in scripture, however, is asserted because perception and the like are contaminated by nescience; since [Brahman] is not objectified in that form wherein all difference has vanished, the vanishing of difference is cognisable [only] through scripture.
4.12
The opponent again objects:
4.13
Now, lack of a human end would entail regarding [a sentence] that terminates in an accomplished fact.
4.14
Indeed, a sentence that neither prompts a person to a means of achieving what is beneficial nor turns [one] away from a means of what is harmful, [but] merely describes an already established entity, is devoid of a human end; and because it lacks a human end, it is not a means of valid cognition, like the ravings of a madman; and such are the Vedāntas for the most part.
It is said in reply:
4.15
A means of valid cognition does not have its sole termination only in this human end. //
4.16
(For they declare indifference too to be the fruit of a means of valid cognition.)
(This half-verse ought to be present here by conjecture, but it is not seen in the manuscripts.
— editor)
4.17
Moreover, out of ignorance the individual self appears sorrowful and suffering; //
4.18
and its cessation, consciousness, is itself regarded as a human end.
When some fact is understood, for people who are curious //
4.19
and distressed, the arising of knowledge is acknowledged to be a human end.
And just as in the case of the eye and other senses, terminating in [cognising] form as it is does not lack a human end, //
4.20
and [it] does not terminate in action, so in this case [of Vedānta], by what is it ruled out?
If the knowable's being a human end is [accepted] there, here it is the same. //
4.21
Brahman, tranquil, free from old age, and the like, is itself the human end;
therefore, "that you are" is taught to the student. //
4.22
If perception and the like are held to be auxiliary to subsequent action,
here too, let [verbal testimony] be accepted as auxiliary to activity towards direct realisation. //
4.23
First of all, a means of valid cognition does not necessarily yield a human end as its fruit.
Indeed, the acquisition of the beneficial and the avoidance of the harmful are not the only fruits of a means of valid cognition; for those knowledgeable in the means of valid cognition state that indifference is also a fruit of a means of valid cognition.
Nor is conduciveness to a human end the defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition; rather, it is being the cause of a valid cognition.
Therefore, there is no invalidity [of a means of valid cognition] due to the absence of a human end.
Moreover, "I am grief-stricken", "I am in pain", "My wealth and the like are destroyed"—such is the false knowledge of the individual self, whose Self is purely Brahman; and the knowledge of reality that the Self is Brahman, which is the manifestation of pure bliss, consists in the cessation of this [false knowledge].
That is a human end essentially in its own right, because it consists in the cessation of the undesirable and the manifestation of the desirable.
And although there is a continuation of that [false knowledge] on account of latent impressions, nonetheless, for the wise person who continuously cultivates verbal knowledge, it does not remain as before, and it ceases completely.
Furthermore, the mere arising of knowledge is seen somewhere to be a human end for those perplexed by curiosity regarding an unknown matter;
for nothing else beyond the knowledge of that is sought.
Nor is there a rule that only the object of activity or withdrawal is a human end; for perception and the other [means of valid cognition] are indeed means of valid cognition; and they are not aimed at activity and withdrawal insofar as they have established entities as their objects; yet they do not abandon their conduciveness to a human end.
If it is thought:—
"The established entity known through perception and the like, such as water, is indeed a human end because of its utility; hence perception and the like are conducive to human ends even though they pertain to existing entities."—
Here too, Brahman itself, which is the object of valid cognition through verbal testimony, is a human end because of the pacification of various evils such as old age, and because it is the manifestation of supreme bliss, perfectly serene.
Precisely for this reason, through the persona of Śvetaketu, it is taught by scripture as non-different to the person who is to be instructed, with the words "That thou art"; for it is non-different from the one to be instructed.
And when cognised as different, it is not a human end.
When there is knowledge of identity with reality, because of being so, because of the pacification of all evil, and because of the state of supreme auspiciousness, the complete human end is attained.
If it is thought:—
"Perception and the like are also merely auxiliary to activity,
because activity characterised by avoidance, acquisition, and the like with respect to a cognised object has them as its root;"—
Such status as an auxiliary to activity exists here too, because activity toward direct realisation is accepted with respect to Brahman cognised from verbal testimony.
4.24
With the brilliance of reasoning blazing forth, skilful in the investigation of the reality of Vedānta,
tearing apart even the dense, beginningless darkness blocking the path to liberation,
instantly washing away even the thick mud of false reasoning of heretical schools among the worlds,
this Brahmasiddhi has been explained, uprooting all, for the sake of the supreme, unexcelled good of auspiciousness.
4.25
[Thus concludes the Brahmasiddhi, a work of Maṇḍana Miśra.]
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- English (machine translation) (mt) — English, machine translation
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- Brahmasiddhi — Maṇḍana Miśra, Sanskrit