Sarvadarshanasangraha 14.33-34

14.33

nāpi sato brahmatattvasya vivartaḥ prapañcaḥ/ bādhānupalambhāt/ adhiṣṭhānāropyayoś cijjaḍayoḥ kaladhautaśuktyādivat sārūpyābhāvenāropāsaṃbhavāc ca/

Nor is the manifold world an apparent transformation of the existent principle of Brahman, because there is no perception of sublation, and because an illusory superimposition is impossible, as the substratum and the superimposed—consciousness and the insentient—lack similarity, unlike [the case of] silver and mother-of-pearl.

Nor can we say [with the Vedāntin] that the world is an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the primâ facie belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:—The subject of the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have a cause endued with the same,—thus a ring has gold for its material cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of activity;[12] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities (i.e., prakṛti, Nature). And we see that individual objects are found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's happiness is found in his wife Satyavatī, because the quality of "goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested towards them; while she causes indifference to Caitra who does not possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained, causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since the word moha is derived from the root muh, "to be confused," since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (iv. 5)—

14.34

tataś ca sukhaduḥkhamohātmakasya prapañcasya tathāvidhakāraṇam avadhāraṇīyam/ tathā ca prayogaḥ: vimataṃ bhāvajātaṃ sukhaduḥkhamohātmakakāraṇakaṃ tadanvitatvāt/ yad yenānvīyate tat tatkāraṇakaṃ yathā rucakādikaṃ suvarṇānvitaṃ suvarṇakāraṇakam/ tathā cedaṃ tasmāt tatheti/ tatra jagatkāraṇe yeyaṃ sukhātmakatā tat sattvaṃ yā duḥkhātmakatā tad rajo yā ca mohātmakatā tat tama iti triguṇātmakakāraṇasiddhiḥ/ tathā hi/ pratyekaṃ bhāvās traiguṇyavanto ’nubhūyante/ yathā maitradāreṣu satyavatyāṃ maitrasya sukham āvirasti/ taṃ prati sattvaguṇaprādurbhāvāt/ tatsapatnīnāṃ duḥkham/ tāḥ prati rajoguṇaprādurbhāvāt/ tām alabhamānasya caitrasya moho bhavati/ taṃ prati tamoguṇasamudbhavāt/ evam anyad api ghaṭādikaṃ labhyamānaṃ sukhaṃ karoti/ parair apahriyamāṇaṃ duḥkhākaroti/ udāsīnasyopekṣāviṣayatvenopatiṣṭhate/ upekṣāviṣayatvaṃ nāma mohaḥ/ muha vaicittye ity asmād dhātor mohaśabdaniṣpatteḥ/ upekṣaṇīyeṣu cittavṛttyanudayāt/ tasmāt sarvaṃ bhāvajātaṃ sukhaduḥkhamohātmakaṃ triguṇapradhānakāraṇakam avagamyate/ tathā śvetāśvataropaniṣadi śrūyate :

And hence, for the manifold world, which is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and delusion, a cause of such a nature must be determined. And so runs the formal inference: The totality of entities in dispute has a cause consisting of pleasure, pain, and delusion, because it is accompanied by them. Whatever is accompanied by something has that as its cause, just as a necklace or the like, being accompanied by gold, has gold as its cause; and this is such; therefore, it is so. There, regarding that cause of the world, that which is of the nature of pleasure is sattva; that which is of the nature of pain is rajas; and that which is of the nature of delusion is tamas; thus is established a cause consisting of the three qualities. To explain: Individual entities are experienced as possessing the three qualities. For instance, in the case of Maitra's wife, Satyavatī, pleasure arises in Maitra, because of the manifestation of the quality of sattva toward him; pain [arises] in her co-wives, because of the manifestation of the quality of rajas toward them; and delusion arises in Caitra, who cannot obtain her, because of the manifestation of the quality of tamas toward him. Similarly, another thing, like a pot, when obtained, produces pleasure; being stolen by others, it causes pain; and to an indifferent person, it presents itself as an object of indifference. Indifference indeed is delusion, since the word 'delusion' is derived from the verbal root 'muh', meaning 'distraction/unconsciousness', because in objects of indifference mental activity does not arise. Therefore, the whole host of entities is understood to consist of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and to have as its cause the primary principle endowed with the three qualities. So it is heard in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad: