Sarvadarshanasangraha 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

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I bow to Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the treasure of the highest good,

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by whom alone the earth and the rest were produced, and through whom alone this [universe] possesses an author. //1

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Who has reached the other shore of the oceans of all philosophical systems,

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who has satisfied all people with aims fitting for the self,

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the son of venerable Śārṅgapāṇi, knower of all scriptures:

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daily I resort to the omniscient master Viṣṇu. //2

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By the venerable noble Mādhava, of great splendor,

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the Kaustubha jewel [churned] from the milk-ocean of the illustrious Sāyaṇa, the Compendium of All the Philosophies is composed. //3

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Having thoroughly churned the treatises of the ancients, which are exceedingly difficult to cross,

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this lord, the illustrious Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, expounds them for the delight of the good.

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Let good people listen to it with a mind from which envy is cast far away:

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for whose delight does a garland made of varied flowers not serve? //4

Now, how can the supreme Lord be declared the granter of the highest good, since that has been utterly dismissed by Cārvāka, the crest-jewel of the heterodox, who follows the doctrine of Bṛhaspati? For the activity of Cārvāka is difficult to eradicate. For commonly, all living beings,

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"As long as one lives, one should live pleasantly; there is nothing beyond the reach of death.

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When the body has been reduced to ash, whence can there be a return?"

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—adhering to this popular verse, regarding only wealth and pleasure as the aims of human existence in accordance with the treatises on statecraft and erotics, and denying any otherworldly object, are observed in fact to follow the doctrine of Cārvāka. For this very reason, that doctrine of Cārvāka has another, literally meaningful name: Lokāyata.

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In that [system], the four elements beginning with earth are the principles. From those very [elements], when transformed into the form of the body, consciousness arises, like the intoxicating power from ferment and other [ingredients]. When they are destroyed, it is destroyed of itself. So they say: "Having arisen as a mass of consciousness from these very elements, it perishes after them; there is no consciousness after death." And the self is just the body characterized by that consciousness, because there is no means of valid cognition for a self distinct from the body; for, as [they are] advocates of perception as the sole means of valid cognition, there is no epistemic validity [in inference or testimony], since inference and the like are not accepted. The pleasure arising from embracing a woman and the like is alone the aim of human existence. Nor should it be thought that, because of being mixed with pain, it is not an aim of human existence at all; for, by avoiding the pain that has come unavoidably, pure pleasure alone is to be enjoyed. Just as one who desires fish takes fish with scales and bones, and having taken as much as is to be taken, desists; or just as one who desires grain brings grain with chaff, and having taken as much as is to be taken, desists. Therefore, out of fear of pain, it is not fitting to abandon pleasure which is experienced as agreeable. Surely grain is not unplanted because deer exist! Surely cooking pots are not withheld from the fire because beggars exist! If some timid person were to abandon visible pleasure, then he would be a fool like a beast. So it has been said:

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"Pleasure arising from contact with objects is to be abandoned by men

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because it is attended by pain"—this is the reasoning of fools.

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Who indeed, sir, that seeks his own benefit, would wish to discard grains of rice

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rich with white, excellent kernels, simply because they are covered with husks?

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If it is objected: "In the absence of otherworldly pleasure, how would those advanced in learning engage in the agnihotra and other [rites] which are to be accomplished with great expenditure of wealth and bodily exertion?", that too cannot enter the category of a means of valid cognition. For the three Vedas are mere prattle of rogues, because they are corrupted by the defects of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology, and because the knowledge section is rejected by those who advocate the epistemic validity of the ritual section, and the ritual section is rejected by those who advocate the epistemic validity of the knowledge section—rogue cranes who merely imagine themselves to be knowers of the Veda; and so the agnihotra and other [rites] have the sole purpose of providing a livelihood. And so runs the popular saying:

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"The agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's triple staff, smearing oneself with ashes—

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these are the livelihood of those devoid of intellect and manly vigor, so says Bṛhaspati."

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For this reason, pain arising from thorns and the like is alone hell; the king known in the world is the supreme Lord; the dissolution of the body is liberation. And under the doctrine that the body is the self, the co-reference in such expressions as "I am stout," "I am thin," "I am dark," is accounted for. The usage "my body" is metaphorical, like [the phrase] "the head of Rāhu." All of this has been summarized:

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The pleasure arising from embracing a woman is alone the aim of man; / the pain arising from suffering from thorns and the like is called hell. //1

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Pain produced by the torment of thorns and the like is called hell; //1

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The king recognized in the world is the supreme Lord; no other is taught. / Destruction of the body is liberation; liberation is not accepted as resulting from knowledge. //2

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Liberation is just the destruction of the body; liberation is not accepted as resulting from knowledge; //2

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Here the elements are four: earth, water, fire, and air. / From the four elements alone consciousness arises, //3

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Consciousness arises indeed from the four elements; //3

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just like intoxicating power from substances such as ferment combined together. / From the co-reference in "I am stout," "I am thin," //4

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Because of the co-reference in "I am fat" [and] "I am thin," //4

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and because of its connection with stoutness and the like, the body alone is the self, and none other. / The statement "this body is mine" can only be metaphorical. //5

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The utterance "This is my body" must be metaphorical. //5

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Let this be so. This wishful thinking might hold if there were no epistemic validity to inference and the rest. And there is epistemic validity. Otherwise, how could the action of prudent people toward fire immediately after the perception of smoke be explained? Or the action of those seeking fruits on the riverbank immediately upon hearing the statement, "There are fruits on the riverbank"?

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This is mere building of castles in the air. For an inferential sign possessed of pervasion and presence in the subject of inference is accepted as conveying knowledge by those who advocate the epistemic validity of inference. And pervasion is a relation devoid of both kinds of extrinsic condition. And that [relation] does not function as an operative factor through its mere existence, like the eye and other organs, but rather by being known. What, indeed, could be the means of knowing it? First, it cannot be perception. And is that [perception] held to be external or internal? Not the first: for, since it causes cognition only of an object with which it is in contact, even though its operation is possible with respect to the present, it is impossible with respect to past and future, and thus pervasion, which encompasses all cases, is impossible to know. Nor should it be thought that cognition of pervasion has a universal as its object, for that would entail the absence of invariable concomitance between the two individual instances. Nor is it the latter: for, since the internal organ is dependent upon the external senses, it cannot operate independently with respect to an external object. So it has been said:

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"The mind is dependent on the external senses with respect to the objects specified for the eye and the rest."

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Nor is inference the means of cognizing pervasion, because the miserable consequence of an infinite regress would result: "there too it must be so, and there too." Nor is verbal testimony its means, because according to the doctrine of Kaṇāda it is subsumed within inference alone; or, if it is not subsumed, it is not swift-footed enough to leap over the fault stated earlier, since it depends on the apprehension of an inferential sign in the form of the linguistic usage of elders; and also because there is no faith in the mere statement that "there is an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire," as there is in Manu and the like. Furthermore, if a person who has not been instructed in invariable concomitance does not infer another object upon perceiving an object, the very talk of inference for oneself would be reduced to a mere memory; what then to say of inference for another? Comparison and the rest, however, are dismissed from afar, since they convey relations such as that between a name and its bearer, and cannot possibly convey a relation that is free of extrinsic conditions.

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Moreover, the absence of an extrinsic condition is also difficult to ascertain. Since it is impossible to establish that extrinsic conditions are necessarily perceptible, even if the absence of perceptible things is perceptible, the absence of imperceptible things is imperceptible; thus, when an inference or the like is required [to know it], the stated fault is not escaped. Furthermore, its definition must be accepted as: "possessing co-pervasion with the probandum while not pervading the probans." So it has been said:

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"That which does not pervade the probans and possesses co-pervasion with the probandum is called an extrinsic condition;

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when non-eternity is to be proved of sound, to be produced by an agent, potness, and inaudibility—

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to exclude these, three qualifications are employed here respectively;

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therefore, this [definition] is blameless, as stated by the teachers beginning with 'Having assembled...'"

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In that case, because the ascertainment of a negation is preceded by the ascertainment of an affirmation, the cognition of pervasion—which is of the nature of a relation qualified by the absence of an extrinsic condition—arises only when the cognition of the extrinsic condition has occurred, and the cognition of the extrinsic condition depends upon the cognition of pervasion; thus the fault of mutual dependence, like a thunderbolt blow, sticks firmly as cement. Therefore, because invariable concomitance is difficult to comprehend, there is no scope for inference and the rest. The purposeful activity directed toward fire and the like immediately following the cognition of smoke and the like is explained either as having perception as its root or as an illusion. The occasional attainment of the fruit, however, is accidental, just like [the effects of] gems, mantras, and herbs. Therefore, what is to be proved by that—unseen merit and demerit, and the like—does not exist either.

Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit