[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana) › [General works and doxographies](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all) › [Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt) › 12 # Sarvadarshanasangraha 12 English (machine translation) 12 - **Language:** English ### [12.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.1) Now \[an objection is raised\]: You loudly proclaim that the desired religious merit (dharma) is attained through the performance of dharma. In that case, what is the definition of dharma, and what is its means of valid cognition (pramāṇa)? ### [12.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.2) It is answered: Listen attentively! The reply to this question was set forth in the earlier Mīmāṃsā by the sage Jaimini. That Mīmāṃsā consists of twelve chapters (dvādaśalakṣaṇī). There, in the first chapter, the epistemic validity (prāmāṇya) of the body of Vedic texts consisting of injunctions, explanatory passages, mantras, traditional texts, and proper names \[is established\]. In the second, the subject matter consists of the introductory remarks, the distinctions among sacrificial actions, the means \[for distinguishing them\], exceptions, and the distinctions of performance. In the third, there is the examination of the conflict of direct Vedic statement, inferential sign, syntactical unity, and so forth; the actions taught independently of a specific rite; the subordinate rites that aid many primary rites, such as the preliminary sacrifices; and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth, the examination of whether the primary rite is the impeller or the secondary rite is the impeller; the results of things like the spoon made of parṇa wood; and the lowest auxiliary rites within the Rājasūya, such as the game of dice. In the fifth, the examination of sequence based on direct statement and the like, its specific varieties, increase, non-increase, and relative strength. In the sixth, the investigation of the qualified aspirant (adhikārin), his duties, the substitute for a substance, the omission of an object, expiation, sacrificial sessions, gifts, and the sacrificial fires. In the seventh, the investigation of extended application (atideśa) by direct statement, extended application of remaining items, of names, and of inferential signs. In the eighth, the investigation of the extended application of distinct, indistinct, and strong inferential signs, and its exceptions. In the ninth, the commencement of the investigation of adaptation (ūha), the adaptation of chants, the adaptation of mantras, and incidental considerations arising from them. In the tenth, the investigation of the grounds for annulment (bādha), the loss of the intermediary function, amplification, cause of annulment, unity of effect, combination, chanting of the Sāman hymns, miscellaneous matters, and the meaning of the negative particle. In the eleventh, the considerations of the introduction to unified performance (tantra), combined application (āvāpa), elaboration of tantra, and elaboration of āvāpa. In the twelfth, the investigation of secondary application (prasaṅga), the determination of the central agent, combination, and alternative option. ### [12.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.3) There, the first topical section (adhikaraṇa), 'Now, therefore, the inquiry into dharma,' is devoted to establishing the undertaking of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. And critical investigators state that an adhikaraṇa has five members; and those five members consist of the subject matter, doubt, the prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa), the conclusive doctrine (siddhānta), and the systematic connection (saṃgati). ### [12.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.4) Here, the topical section is examined in accordance with the Teacher's view. The sentence 'One's Vedic recitation is to be studied' is the subject of inquiry. The doubt is: Should this treatise on dharma composed by Jaimini—beginning with 'Dharma is an object marked by Vedic injunction' and ending with 'And because it is seen in the sacrificial gift'—not be undertaken, or should it be undertaken? Between the injunction of Vedic study having an unseen purpose and having a seen purpose, the prima facie view holds that it is not to be undertaken, because it is impossible for the injunction of Vedic study to have a seen fruit characterized by the comprehension of meaning. An interlocutor who says that the injunction of study is for the sake of comprehending meaning must be asked: Is study, being utterly unobtained \[by other means\], enjoined \[as an originative injunction\], or is it restricted \[as a restrictive injunction\], like threshing, when alternative means are possible? First, it cannot be the former, because by the inference, 'The Vedic study under dispute is a cause of comprehending meaning, because it is study, just like the study of the Mahābhārata,' it is obtained independently of an injunction. If it is then said: Let it be the second alternative; just as, since husked rice can be produced by splitting with fingernails or the like, threshing, being one alternative, is restricted by an injunction as necessarily to be performed, so too, since knowledge of meaning can arise from reading a written text, study, being one alternative, is restricted by the injunction— ### [12.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.5) this is not satisfactory, because there is a dissimilarity between the example and the case in point. Only with husked rice produced through threshing, when preparing the dough, sacrificial cake, and so forth, do the New- and Full-Moon sacrifices produce the ultimate unseen potency by way of the intermediate unseen potency, and not otherwise. Therefore, the unseen potency is the cause for the restriction of threshing. In the present case, since the execution of the rite is accomplished through the comprehension of meaning arising either from reading a written text or arising from study, there is no cause whatever for restricting study. Therefore, the treatise of inquiry, which is a cause for the comprehension of meaning, does not possess the status of being enjoined by an injunction. ### [12.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.6) If it is asked, 'What, then, is the recourse for the injunction heard in the Veda?', you may be satisfied \[with the view that\] it is an injunction solely for grasping the syllables, having heaven as its fruit. For even an unstated heaven can be postulated on the principle of the Viśvajit sacrifice. Just as in the Viśvajit sacrifice, by establishing an unstated qualified person on the basis that 'That \[fruit is\] heaven, because it is non-distinct with respect to all persons,' heaven was rationally determined as the fruit specifying him, so let it be in Vedic study as well. It has been said: ### [12.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.7) "For since the seen \[result\] is obtained even without an injunction, it does not have that as its purpose; ### [12.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.8) Rather, by the force of the injunction, heaven is to be postulated, as in the Viśvajit and other \[sacrifices\]." ### [12.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.9) And when this is the case, the Smṛti rule 'Having studied the Veda, one should take the ceremonial bath' is respected. For here, non-intervention between Vedic study and the ceremonial return home is understood. In your view, however, even when the Veda has been studied, one must reside at the teacher's house to investigate dharma. That being so, non-intervention would be subverted. Therefore, since the treatise of inquiry lacks the status of being enjoined by an injunction, since heaven is accomplished merely by recitation, and on account of the rule concerning the ceremonial return home, the treatise inquiring into dharma is not to be undertaken: such is the summary of the prima facie view. ### [12.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.10) The established conclusion, however, is: let there not be the status of an injunction of the unobtained, since it is obtained from elsewhere; yet the position that it is a restrictive injunction cannot be set aside even by one wielding the thunderbolt! To explain: in 'One's Vedic recitation is to be studied,' the gerundive suffix -tavya conveys the verbal efficient force, another term for instigation, which is to be actualized by the human efficient force consisting of human activity. That human efficient force requires an object to be actualized. Study, which is expressed in the very same word, does not satisfy the requirement as the object to be actualized, because the meaning of the word 'study'—the operation of speech and mind consisting in the capability of independent recitation, which involves hardship—cannot possibly be an object to be actualized. Nor is the recitation expressed in the same sentence \[the object to be actualized\], because the meaning of the word 'recitation,' namely the collection of phonemes, is eternal and all-pervading, so that the four fruits of action, beginning with origination, are impossible for it. Therefore, comprehension, obtained through semantic capability, stands as the object to be actualized. By the principle that 'One who is desirous, capable, and learned is qualified,' the injunctions of the New- and Full-Moon sacrifices, requiring the comprehension of their own subject matter, employ the Vedic recitation toward the knowledge of their own meaning. And the injunction of Vedic study makes known that the Vedic recitation has been sanctified by study to the exclusion of reading a written text and the like. And thus, just as the ultimate unseen potency generated by the New- and Full-Moon sacrifices postulates the intermediate unseen potency generated by threshing and the like, so the collection of unseen potencies generated by all the sacrifices will postulate the unseen potency generated by the restriction of study, which is the means to the knowledge of the sacrifices. If the unseen effect of the restriction were not accepted, the hearing of the injunction would result in futility. Nor is the postulation of a fruit by the principle of the Viśvajit plausible, because when there is a seen fruit, namely the comprehension of meaning, the postulation of another fruit is improper. ### [12.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.11) It has been said: ### [12.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.12) "When a seen fruit is obtainable, no unseen fruit is to be postulated; ### [12.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.13) And because the injunction is for the purpose of restriction, there will be no meaninglessness." ### [12.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.14) Objection: Even if the comprehension of meaning does not arise for one who recites the Veda alone, the comprehension of meaning is possible for a person who studies the Veda along with its auxiliary disciplines; therefore, the treatise of inquiry is futile—if this is urged, ### [12.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.15) that is incongruous, because even if mere understanding is possible, definitive ascertainment depends on inquiry. For example, in 'He places the smeared pebbles,' this ascertainment that it is with clarified butter alone and not with oil or the like cannot be obtained by grammar, Vedic citation, or etymology. Through the treatise of inquiry, however, the ascertainment of the meaning is obtained by virtue of the supplementary passage: 'Clarified butter, verily, is brilliance.' Therefore, the status of being enjoined by an injunction is established for the treatise of inquiry. Nor should it be thought that the text 'Having studied the Veda, one should take the ceremonial bath,' which aims at departing from the teacher's house and prevents intervening delay, would be contradicted; for just as in 'Having bathed, he eats,' there is only the apprehension of sequence and identity of agent, and no apprehension of immediate adjacency between study and the ceremonial return home. Therefore, solely by the force of the injunction, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā treatise, consisting of a thousand topical sections, must indeed be undertaken. ### [12.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.16) And this topical section is connected to the treatise as an introductory consideration. So it has been said: ### [12.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.17) "They declare an introductory consideration to be an inquiry for the sake of accomplishing what is under discussion." ### [12.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.18) This very topic is now set forth following the doctrine of the Guru (Prabhākara). In the text, "One should initiate an eight-year-old Brahmin; one should teach him," teaching appears as the object of the injunction. And an injunction requires an eligible agent. If it is asked: who is the eligible agent here? \[The answer is:\] only one who desires the status of a teacher. For, according to Pāṇini's rule "saṃmānana…" and so on, when the status of a teacher is understood, the Ātmanepada ending is prescribed for the verbal root nī. The eligible agent in initiation is the very one in teaching as well, since they have a single purpose. For this very reason, it has been stated by the sage Manu: ### [12.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.19) "Having initiated a student, however, the twice-born who teaches him the Veda, ### [12.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.20) along with its limbs and esoteric teachings—him they call a teacher." Thus. ### [12.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.21) And therefore, teaching having the teacher as its agent cannot be accomplished without study having the student as its agent; thus the performance of study will be accomplished solely through the impulsion of the injunction to teach. For the activity of the promoter cannot be accomplished without the activity of the prompted. If it is objected, "Then the status of an injunction for the text 'one must study' is not established," \[we reply:\] let it not be established, what is the loss to us? For if an independent injunction of study is admitted, there is an absence of purpose, since the injunctive sentence can be explained even as a constant reiteration. Therefore, the prima facie view and the conclusive view set forth earlier relying on the injunction of study are to be demonstrated in another manner: ### [12.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.22) The prima facie view is that the treatise of inquiry is not to be undertaken because it lacks the status of an injunction; the conclusive view is that it is to be undertaken because it possesses the status of an injunction. In that regard, one who asserts the status of an injunction must state: does the injunction of teaching impel also the student's understanding of meaning, or mere recitation? Not the first, because teaching is accomplished even without understanding of meaning. Nor the second, because in mere recitation the object and purpose of an inquiry are impossible. A doubtful meaning that has appeared prima facie becomes the object of the treatise of inquiry; that being so, where there is no comprehension of meaning at all, what talk of doubt? Any hope for the result of inquiry, namely determination, is far away indeed. And likewise, what is not a doubtful purpose is not within the scope of a sensible person's undertaking. Just as a pot situated in the midst of clear light, in contact with a sense organ accompanied by the mind \[is undisputed\], by this principle, due to the impossibility of an object and purpose, the treatise of inquiry is not to be undertaken: this is the prima facie view. ### [12.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.23) \[Reply:\] Let understanding of meaning not be impelled by the injunction of teaching; nevertheless, for a person studying the Veda along with its limbs, who has grasped the relation of words and word-meanings, the understanding of meaning in the sacred tradition comes about naturally, just as in human compositions. ### [12.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.24) If it is objected: "Just as in 'Eat poison', although a meaning is cognized, it is not intended, because the prohibition of eating, 'Do not eat in his house,' is the object of the mother's sentence's intention; likewise, if the meaning of the sacred tradition is unintended, the former fault of the absence of an object and so forth would arise!"—if this is said, ### [12.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.25) do not say so, because there can be a disparity between the example and the exemplified. Since the sentence about eating poison is composed by a trustworthy person, if the primary meaning were accepted, contradiction would occur, and so \[that\] intention is not adopted. But in the unauthored Veda, why should the cognized meaning not be intended? And when the Vedic meaning is intended, whatever a person doubts in it will all be the object of the treatise of inquiry; its purpose is the determination thereof. Therefore, since the meaning comprehended through study impelled by the injunction of teaching is fit for inquiry, the treatise of inquiry must be undertaken because it possesses the status of an injunction: this is the summary of the conclusive view. ### [12.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.26) \[Opponent:\] Let this be so; but how is authorlessness asserted of the Veda, since there is an absence of a means of valid cognition establishing that? Now, if you should think: "The Vedas are unauthored, because while there is unbrokenness of tradition, their author is unremembered, like the self"—this is weak, because the qualifier is unproven; for those who assert that the Veda has an author maintain the interruption of tradition at a cosmic dissolution. Moreover, what is this so-called 'having an author unremembered': is it having an author not cognized by a means of valid cognition, or having an author not within the scope of memory? Not the first alternative, because the cognition of the Supreme Lord as author is accepted. Nor the second, because it cannot endure division. For instance: is non-remembering by a single person intended, or by all? Not the first, because there is deviation in isolated stanzas such as 'He who is righteous in conduct, who has overcome conceit and wrath...'. Nor the second, because non-remembering by all is impossible to know for one who is not omniscient. And because there is a means of valid cognition for having an author: 'Vedic sentences are authored, because they are sentences, like the sentences of Kālidāsa and others'; 'Vedic sentences are composed by a trustworthy person, because while being a means of valid cognition, they are sentences, like the sentences of Manu and others.' If it is objected: ### [12.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.27) "Every study of the Veda is preceded by study under a teacher, ### [12.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.28) because of the generality of Vedic study, like present-day study"— ### [12.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.29) if it is argued that this inference is capable as a counter-proof, \[we reply:\] ### [12.30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.30) that too is not able to enter the category of a means of valid cognition, ### [12.31](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.31) because it shares the same condition as a fallacy: ### [12.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.32) "Every study of the Mahābhārata is preceded by study under a teacher, / because it is study of the Mahābhārata, like present-day study." / If it is objected that there Vyāsa is remembered as the author, ### [12.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.33) in such passages as: ### [12.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.34) "For who other than the lotus-eyed one could be the maker of the Mahābhārata?"— ### [12.35](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.35) if this is said, ### [12.36](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.36) that is worthless; for in the Puruṣasūkta: "From it the verses and chants were born; the meters were born from it, the sacrificial formulas were produced from it," having an author is set forth for the Veda. Furthermore, sound is non-eternal, because while possessing a universal, it is graspable by the external sense organs of people like us, like a pot. ### [12.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.37) If it is objected: "Is not this inference sublated by the means of valid cognition consisting in recognition: 'This is that very sound g'?"— ### [12.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.38) that is completely trivial; for, as in the case of cut hair growing again or crushed jasmine flowers, recognition has a universal as its object and therefore lacks sublating power. ### [12.39](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.39) If it is objected: "Is it not the case that for the bodiless Supreme Lord, due to the absence of vocal places such as the palate, utterance of phonemes is impossible; how then could the Veda be composed by him?"— ### [12.40](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.40) that is not sound. For even though naturally bodiless, the assumption of an illusory form is possible for him in order to favor devotees. Therefore, the assertion that the Veda is unauthored is not proper: if this is said— ### [12.41](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.41) To this the answer is stated: What is this author-dependence that you wish to prove? Is it merely having arisen from a person, as in the case of the Veda being recited day after day by people like us? Or is it having been composed to illuminate a meaning after apprehending it through another means of valid cognition, as in the case of a literary composition composed by people like us? On the first \[view\], there is no dispute. On the latter, is its proof established on the strength of inference or on the strength of scriptural tradition? Not the first, because it is inconclusive in the case of statements like those in the Mālatīmādhava. If you specify, 'provided that it is a means of valid cognition'—even that does not achieve clarity in the mind of a wise person. For a Vedic sentence is indeed a sentence that makes known an object that is beyond the scope of any other means of valid cognition. When it is sought to prove that it makes known an object within the scope of another means of valid cognition, there is the consequence of a contradiction, like saying, 'My mother is a barren woman.' ### [12.42](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.42) Moreover, even granting the Supreme Lord's assumption of a play-body, the perception of supersensible objects does not hold together, because there is no means for apprehending objects remote in space, time, or intrinsic nature. Nor should it be considered that his very eyes and other senses are capable of producing such a cognition, for an assumption must be adopted only in accordance with what is observed. That has been stated by the venerable teachers when refuting an omniscient being: ### [12.43](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.43) "Even where an excellence is observed, it does not overstep its own sphere; ### [12.44](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.44) it may occur in the sight of what is distant or minute, but the ear does not function with regard to color." ### [12.45](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.45) Precisely for this reason, its proof cannot be established on the strength of scriptural tradition. Just as, even while Pāṇini’s rule 'proclaimed by him' is awake \[and active\], names such as Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittirīya are accounted for as referring to the initiators of the tradition of study, so too here it is accounted for simply as referring to the initiator of the tradition. ### [12.46](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.46) Nor is the non-eternality of sound established on the strength of inference, because of contradiction with recognition. Nor is it appropriate \[to claim\] that this \[recognition\], even when oneness does not exist, is grounded in a universal. Is its being grounded in a universal maintained because of the advent of a powerful defeater, or because deviation is observed somewhere? In that regard, with respect to imagining it because of observing deviation somewhere, it has been stated by the proponents of intrinsic epistemic validity: ### [12.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.47) "For one who through delusion would imagine a defeater, even though unknown, ### [12.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.48) he, becoming full of doubt, perishes in all worldly transactions." ### [12.49](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.49) If it is objected: Surely this recognition has for its object a universal such as 'g-ness', not individual instances such as the letter 'g', because a difference among them is perceived in each person; otherwise, there would be no distinction such as 'Somaśarman recited'— ### [12.50](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.50) that too possesses no elegance, for since there is no means of valid cognition for a difference among the individual instances of the letter 'g', there is no means of valid cognition for assuming that it has a universal such as 'g-ness' as its object. Just as, to one who does not know cowness, that single \[universal\] appears as if in different places, as if small, as if large, as if long, or as if short, under the influence of the adjuncts of individual instances that differ in place, size, and shape, so too, to one who does not know the individual letter 'g', even though it is one, it appears connected with various properties on account of differences in the manifesting agents. By this, \[the argument\] that difference is established through the superimposition of contradictory properties is answered. For therein, is the superimposition of contradictory properties intended to establish difference as natural, or as apparent? On the first \[view\], it is unestablished; otherwise, if natural difference were accepted, the cognition would be 'Caitra pronounced ten g's', but not 'ten times the letter g'. On the second \[view\], however, natural difference is not established. For natural oneness is not destroyed by a difference of extraneous adjuncts; let there not be a natural difference even of space due to differences of adjuncts such as pots. There, the differentiated verbal usage is caused by sound. That has been said by the teachers: ### [12.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.51) "The purpose that belongs to a universal will be obtained from the phoneme itself; ### [12.52](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.52) and what is to be obtained from the individual is from the sounds; therefore the cognition of 'g-ness' and the like is useless." ### [12.53](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.53) And likewise: ### [12.54](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.54) "When recognition awake and unimpeded regarding sound exists, ### [12.55](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.55) it alone refutes all inferences of non-eternality." ### [12.56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.56) By this is rejected that which was stated by Vāgīśvara in the Mānamanohara: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a specific quality perceptible by a sense-organ, like the visual form of the eye'; for it is unestablished with respect to one who holds that sound is a substance, and because it entails proving what is already established with regard to the aspect of phonetic sound, and because it is sublated by the extrinsic condition of non-audibility. Udayana, however, demonstrating through an extensive treatise the perceptibility of absence even when its locus is not perceptible, proved perception to be a means of valid cognition for the non-eternality of sound, as the cause for engaging in the linguistic usage 'the uproar has ceased, the sound has arisen.' He too resembles a ghost to whom a blood offering has been given, by the reasoning that explains the relation of contradictory properties as conditioned by an extrinsic adjunct. That consequence of constant perception or non-perception in the case of eternality stated by the author of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa is also refuted, because it is accepted that its apprehension is conditioned by phonetic sound. As for the inference of the absence of being an object to be manifested by specific manifesting agents due to being connected with the sense-organ simultaneously, that is inconclusive with respect to the self. So enough of excessive dispute. And therefore, because the Veda is authorless, having the sprout of every stain of doubt discarded, its epistemic validity regarding dharma is self-established; this is well-settled. ### [12.57](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.57) This may be so: ### [12.58](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.58) "The Sāṅkhyas resort to epistemic validity and epistemic invalidity as intrinsic; ### [12.59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.59) the Naiyāyikas \[hold\] both to be extrinsic; the Buddhists \[hold\] the latter to be intrinsic, ### [12.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.60) and the first to be extrinsic. The followers of the Veda say ### [12.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.61) that epistemic validity is intrinsic, and epistemic invalidity is extrinsic." ### [12.62](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.62) Seeing such dispute among disputants, how is it taken as already established and accepted that epistemic validity regarding dharma is intrinsic? ### [12.63](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.63) Moreover, what indeed is this so-called intrinsic epistemic validity? Is it the arising of epistemic validity from itself alone? Or is it being produced by the cognition that is its locus? Or is it being produced by the causal complex of the cognition that is its locus? Or is it residing in a particular cognition produced by the causal complex of cognition in general? Or is it residing in a particular cognition produced solely by the causal complex of cognition in general? ### [12.64](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.64) There, the first is faulty, because the relation of cause and effect has difference as co-occurring locus, and so is impossible in a single entity. ### [12.65](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.65) Nor is the second \[tenable\], because cognition, which is a quality, would entail being a substance by being the inherent cause with respect to epistemic validity. ### [12.66](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.66) Nor is the third \[alternative admissible\], because if epistemic validity is an extrinsic condition or a universal, its origination is impossible. The absolute absence of sublation in a cognition that is not a locus of memoryhood is the extrinsic condition of epistemic validity. And its origination is impossible, because absolute absence is accepted to be eternal. For this very reason, the origination of a universal is also not admissible. ### [12.67](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.67) Nor is the fourth \[alternative admissible\]. For invalid cognition is indeed a specific form of cognition. And into the causal totality of a specific form, the causal totality of the general form enters, just as the causal totality of a tree \[enters\] into the causal totality of a Dalbergia sissoo. Otherwise, the unwanted consequence would follow that it arises causelessly. Therefore, since invalidity, which is accepted to be extrinsic, would reside in that which is produced by the causal totality of cognition in general, the unwanted consequence of over-extension would result. ### [12.68](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.68) We examine the fifth alternative: Does 'being produced merely by the causal totality of cognition' mean being produced by the causal totality of cognition assisted by the absence of defects, or being produced by the causal totality of cognition unassisted by the absence of defects? ### [12.69](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.69) The first is not \[admissible\], because 'being produced by the causal totality of cognition assisted by the absence of defects' is accepted precisely as extrinsic epistemic validity by the proponents of extrinsic epistemic validity. ### [12.70](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.70) Nor is the second \[admissible\]. When it is established that the causal totality is assisted by being assisted by the absence of defects, the causality of the absence of defects is firmly sealed as if with cement, because it is established by indispensable positive and negative concomitance. If it be said that an absence cannot be a cause at all, ### [12.71](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.71) then it must be stated: Does an absence have the nature of being an effect, or not? If it does not, then, since the destruction of a pot would not arise, the unwanted consequence would follow that a pot is eternal. If it does, what fault is there in its being a cause? Thus this is a rope with nooses at both ends. As has been stated by Udayana: ### [12.72](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.72) "Just as a positive entity is held to be a cause, so an absence is held \[to be a cause\], possessing the nature of an effect." ### [12.73](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.73) And thus runs the formal inference: Epistemic validity under dispute is dependent upon a cause other than the causes of cognition, because, while being an effect, it resides in a specific form thereof, like invalidity. ### [12.74](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.74) Epistemic validity is known extrinsically, because in an unpracticed state it is subject to doubt, like invalidity. ### [12.75](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.75) Therefore, since there are means of valid cognition for \[epistemic validity's\] being extrinsic in both origination and ascertainment, to say that epistemic validity is intrinsically established is like a rotten pumpkin—if this be said, \[we reply:\] ### [12.76](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.76) All this is like striking the empty sky with one's fist, because valid cognition's being intrinsic can be defined as: being produced by the causal totality of cognition while not being produced by any cause other than that. ### [12.77](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.77) And there is an inference here: ### [12.78](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.78) Valid cognition under dispute, while being produced by the causal totality of cognition, is not produced by anything other than that; ### [12.79](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.79) because it is not a locus of invalid cognition; ### [12.80](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.80) like the valid cognition of a pot, etc. ### [12.81](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.81) Nor should it be suspected that Udayana's inference establishes extrinsic validity; ### [12.82](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.82) for it is seized by the eclipse of the counter-probans: ### [12.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.83) "Valid cognition is not produced by anything other than the causes of cognition distinct from defects; ### [12.84](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.84) because it is a cognition; ### [12.85](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.85) like an invalid cognition." And also because, when the origination of valid cognition is possible from the mere causal totality of cognition, assuming the causality of an excellence or an absence of defects other than that would entail the unwanted consequence of conceptual heaviness. Now, if it be objected that since a defect is the cause of invalid cognition, the absence thereof must inevitably be the cause of valid cognition— ### [12.86](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.86) no; for the absence of defects is superfluously disposed by its being an obstructor of invalid cognition. ### [12.87](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.87) "Therefore, from excellences \[comes\] the absence of defects; from their absence, ### [12.88](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.88) comes the non-existence of both kinds of invalidity; thus the general rule remains unrepealed." ### [12.89](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.89) Likewise, the ascertainment of valid cognition also arises precisely from the causal totality that makes the cognition known. And it cannot properly be said that the unwanted consequence of the non-arising of doubt is an invalidating factor, because, even though the full cause of the appearance is present, that \[doubt\] is accounted for by the co-presence of an obstructor such as a defect. Moreover, is your inference intrinsically a means of valid cognition, or not? In the first \[case\], there is inconsistency. In the second \[case\], its epistemic validity too is extrinsic, and so on for that one as well, leading to the wretched state of an infinite regress. ### [12.90](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.90) As for what was stated in this regard by Udayana in the Kusumāñjali, showing that instant and widespread activity does not depend on the determination of epistemic validity: ### [12.91](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.91) "For activity depends on desire. Abundance of that \[activity\] is abundance of desire. And desire is the cognition of being an instrument to what is desired. That \[cognition\] is the experience of the inferential sign consisting in belonging to the class of what is desired. That too is the contact of sense organ and object. But the apprehension of epistemic validity is of no use anywhere." ### [12.92](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.92) Even that seems like holding gold under one's armpit in front of a thief while stripping bare all one's limbs! For only the cognition of being an instrument to what is desired, when understood as a means of valid cognition, produces desire; hence the utility of apprehending epistemic validity is quite evident right here. Furthermore, if unhesitating activity could arise from doubt in any case, then, since it could be so everywhere, the determination of epistemic validity would become useless. As it has been said: "The very reality of the undetermined is hard to obtain." If its reality were easily obtained, epistemic validity would be bidden farewell with an offering of water. Enough of over-elaboration! For it has been said: ### [12.93](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.93) "Therefore, the epistemic validity of an awareness, obtained through its conveying the real, ### [12.94](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.94) is set aside by the cognition of a defect arising from the cause of the object's being otherwise." ### [12.95](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.95) Therefore, when epistemic validity in regard to dharma is established intrinsically, in the Veda—which consists of injunctions such as "Desiring heaven, one should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma," explanatory passages, mantras, and designations—in "one should sacrifice" (yajeta), the suffix -ta denotes creative contemplation colored by the meaning of the verbal base: such is the established conclusion of the respected Bhāṭṭa masters, who uphold the theory of connection of the expressed (abhihitānvayavāda) and accept that linguistic signification is grasped in that which is already established; whereas "the impulsion refers to the sacrifice": such is the established conclusion of the revered Prabhākara masters, who uphold the theory of expression of the connected (anvitābhidhānavāda) and follow linguistic signification as grasped in what is to be done. Thus all is clear. ### [12.96](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12.96) Thus ends the system of Jaimini in the Compendium of All the Philosophies. ## Translations (1) - [The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-cowell.12.p1) — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English ## Linked texts (1) - [Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha.12.1) — Mādhava, Sanskrit --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha~en-mt.12) · Pramāṇa