Sarvadarshanasangraha 13

English (machine translation) 13

Language: English

13.2

Now, if it is asked: How is the division between base and suffix understood, as in "this part is the base, this part is the suffix"?

This objection causes no surprise to those who have drunk the waters of Patañjali, because the science of grammar is well known to be devoted to teaching the division of bases and suffixes. For the revered Patañjali, author of the Mahābhāṣya, has this opening statement: 'Now begins the instruction on words' [atha śabdānuśāsanam]. The meaning of this is: this word 'now' [atha] is employed in the sense of commencement; 'commencement' means proposal, which is to say, beginning. And by the word 'instruction on words' [śabdānuśāsana] is meant the science of grammar composed by Pāṇini. If merely 'Instruction on words' were stated, there would be doubt: 'Is instruction on words being proposed or not?' So that this might not happen, he employed the word atha; because by force of employing the word atha, excluding other senses, it is stated that it is being proposed. For by this [treatise] Vedic words such as 'śaṃ no devīr abhiṣṭaye' and, serving them, everyday words such as 'cow', 'horse', 'man', 'elephant', 'bird', etc., are taught—they are derived and correctly formed, that is, made understood as possessing the division into bases and suffixes; thus it is 'the instruction on words' [śabdānuśāsana].

13.4

On this point some raise an objection: Since the action of instructing is transitive, when both the object, which is the word, and the agent, who is the teacher, are simultaneously applicable, by force of the rule 'When both are applicable, [the genitive occurs] with the object' (Pāṇini 2.3.66), this genitive must be prescribed with the object. And since under 'And with an object' (Pāṇini 2.2.14) a compound is prohibited, the word śabdānuśāsana cannot step onto the path of valid usage. To this the following resolution is stated: In the presence of a primary nominal suffix [kṛt] where both agent and object are applicable, it is restricted by force of understanding [the rule as] a bahuvrīhi compound that the genitive case ending applies only with the object and not with the agent—as in, 'Wonderful is the milking of cows by an untrained cowherd.' But here in 'śabdānuśāsanam', since the intended sense—namely, the instruction of words and not of things—is easily conveyed even without mentioning the agent, who is the teacher, the mention of the teacher serves no purpose. Therefore, because there is no simultaneous application of both, this genitive is not governed by 'When both are applicable, with the object.' Rather, by 'In the presence of a kṛt affix, with agent and object' (Pāṇini 2.3.65), a genitive case ending occurs with an agent and an object in connection with a kṛt affix; hence it will be a genitive characterized by connection with a kṛt affix. And in that case, the compound will occur, just as in 'idmapravraścana' (chopping of firewood) or 'palāśaśātana' (stripping of palāśa leaves). Some maintain that the genitive occurs even with the agent; hence indeed it is said in the Kāśikāvṛtti: 'Some accept an option without distinction: either "the instruction of words by the teacher" or "of the teacher".' Alternatively, this is a genitive characterized as expressing residual relation [śeṣalakṣaṇā]; in that case, no objection arises at all. If it is objected that, since a genitive expressing residual relation is readily asserted everywhere, the rules prohibiting a genitive compound would become futile—

13.5

[We reply:] True; their utility in the examination of accents was shown by Hari in the Vākyapadīya. Thus the great teacher Vardhamāna says:

13.6

'Let people act as they please in everyday usages;

13.7

but in Vedic paths let the specific rule operate.'

13.8

Because Pāṇini’s rules have purpose in this way,

13.9

he states 'janikartuḥ' [Pāṇini 1.4.30] and likewise 'tatprayojakaḥ' [Pāṇini 1.4.55].

13.10

And so the sentence meaning results: 'It is to be understood that the science of grammar, having the alternative name "instruction on words", is begun.'

13.11

If it be objected: 'For immediate comprehension of that meaning, let it simply be said, "Now begins grammar" [atha vyākaraṇam]; the extra syllables "Now begins the instruction on words" are stated in vain'—do not say so; for by employing the descriptive title 'śabdānuśāsana', the explanation of its purpose as conveying its status as an auxiliary of the Veda [vedāṅga] is accomplished. Otherwise, if the purpose were not stated, students would not undertake the study of grammar at all. If it is said: 'Will not their undertaking be established simply by the injunction to study: "Dharma is without cause; the Veda with its six auxiliaries is to be studied"?'—

13.12

do not say so. Even with such an injunction, if the purpose establishing its status as an auxiliary of the Veda is not stated, their undertaking would be unjustified. For tradition has it that in ancient times students, having studied the Veda, would promptly say:

13.13

'Vedic words are established for us from the Vedas, and everyday words from the world;

13.14

therefore grammar is useless.' Therefore, [only] when they considered it an auxiliary of the Veda did they undertake its study. Hence, modern students would also fail to undertake it. Lest that should happen, the purpose establishing its status as an auxiliary of the Veda must certainly be explained. If they did not undertake it even when the purpose was explained, then, devoid of the knowledge of the correct formation of everyday words, they would incur sin in sacrificial acts; they would fall away from dharma. For this very reason ritualists recite: 'One who has established the sacred fires, upon uttering an incorrect word, should perform the expiatory offering to Sarasvatī.' Therefore, for the sake of explaining the purpose that establishes its status as an auxiliary of the Veda, it is said only as 'Now begins the instruction on words', and not 'Now begins grammar.' And the correct formation of words is the purpose of the science of grammar, because its activity is directed toward that, just as heaven is the purpose of a sacrifice undertaken with heaven as its aim. Therefore, the instruction on words, known by the term 'correct formation' [saṃskāra], is the purpose of the instruction on words.

13.15

[Objection:] Surely, even so, the desired purpose is not attained, because of the absence of an expedient for it. If you should think that reciting word-for-word is the expedient, then that word-for-word recitation would indeed be a non-expedient for the understanding of words, since words are infinite because of the division into correct words and corrupt words. For thus it is recorded in scripture: Bṛhaspati spoke the comprehensive recitation of words given word-for-word to Indra for a thousand divine years, and he did not reach the end; and Bṛhaspati was the teacher, Indra the student, a thousand divine years the period of study, and yet reaching the other shore did not occur. How much less today, when he who lives long lives for a hundred years! For knowledge is made serviceable by four expedients: by study, understanding, practice, and dissemination; and of these, one's entire lifespan would be consumed by the period of study alone. Therefore, word-for-word recitation is a non-expedient for the understanding of words, so the purpose would not be achieved—if this is urged,

13.16

[we reply:] it is not so, because we do not accept that the understanding of words is to be accomplished by word-for-word recitation, and because when grammatical rules possessing general and particular forms are applied all at once, like a rain-cloud, to illustrative forms that admit the conceptual division of base and affix, one observes the instruction of many words [simultaneously]. For instance: by the single general rule, 'In the sense of an object, [the affix] aṇ [occurs]' (Pāṇini 3.2.1), when the affix aṇ is applied to any verbal root preceded by an object-word, one observes the instruction of many words, such as kumbhakāraḥ ('potter') and kāṇḍalāvaḥ ('stalk-cutter'). Likewise, by the single particular rule, 'After [a verbal root ending in] ā without a prefix, [the affix] ka [occurs]' (Pāṇini 3.2.18), when the affix ka is applied to a verbal root ending in ā, one observes the instruction of many words, such as dhānyadaḥ ('grain-giver') and dhanadaḥ ('wealth-giver'). The passage beginning 'Bṛhaspati [spoke] to Indra' is an explanatory praise whose purpose is to demonstrate the impossibility of word-for-word recitation.

13.17

[Objection:] But surely, since there are other auxiliary limbs [of the Veda] as well, why is this one alone held in such esteem? [Reply:] It is said: Grammar is the primary among the six auxiliary limbs; and an effort made in what is primary bears fruit. As it has been said:

13.18

"The wise declare grammar to be the first limb of the Vedas,

13.19

the highest austerity among austerities, proximate to that Brahman."

13.20

Therefore, the instruction of words is the immediate purpose of the science of grammar, while preservation of the Veda and the like are [its purposes] indirectly. For this very reason, the venerable author of the Bhāṣya [Patañjali] has said: 'Preservation, adaptation, scriptural authority, economy, and the absence of doubt are the purpose.'

13.21

Exaltation also arises by virtue of using correct words. And accordingly it has been stated by Kātyāyana: 'In usage preceded by the [grammatical] treatise, there is exaltation; it is equal to the Vedic word.' It has also been said by others: 'A single word, correctly understood and properly employed, becomes the wish-yielding cow in the heavenly world.' Likewise:

13.22

"They go to heaven with desired happiness by means of speech harnessed as a chariot with good horses;

13.23

whereas those who speak with stammering and halting go on foot."

13.24

[Objection:] But surely, how is such capacity possible for word, which is insentient? If this is urged,

13.25

[we reply:] you should not think thus, because of the scriptural hearing of its equality with the Great God. Thus revelation says:

13.26

"Four are his horns; three are his feet; two are his heads; seven are his hands;

13.27

bound in three ways, the bull bellows loudly; the great god has entered mortals."

13.28

And the author of the Bhāṣya explained: 'Four horns' are the four classes of words: noun, verb, prefix, and particle. 'Three are his feet' are the three tenses—past, future, and present—which are the domain of affixes such as laṭ. 'Two are his heads' are the two forms of word: eternal and produced, by the distinction between what is manifested and what manifests. 'Seven are his hands' are the seven nominal case-endings, along with the verbal endings. 'Bound in three ways' means bound in three places: in the chest, the throat, and the head. 'The bull'—this metaphor is made through the familiar nature of a bull—because of raining down; and 'raining down' is the bestowing of fruit through action preceded by knowledge. 'Bellows loudly' means makes a sound; the verb ru means the action of sounding; here the manifold world is intended by the word 'sound'. 'The great god has entered mortals' means the great god is Word, and mortals are men subject to the condition of death—he has entered them. Thus equality with the Great God, the supreme Brahman, is said to be stated.

13.29

That the eternal, partless word called sphoṭa, the primal cause of the universe, is Brahman itself, has been stated by Hari [Bhartṛhari] in the Brahmakāṇḍa:

13.30

"Brahman is without beginning or end, the word-principle, that imperishable one;

13.31

it manifests as the nature of objects, whence proceeds the cosmic process of the universe." Thus.

13.32

[Objection:] But surely, since words are recognized as twofold by the division into noun and verb, how is fourfoldness stated? If this is asked,

13.33

[we reply:] it is not so, because another manner [of division] is well known. As it is said in the Prakīrṇaka:

13.34

"The word is divided into two by some, or into four, or even into five,

13.35

by extracting it from sentences, just like base, affix, and the like." Thus.

13.36

Helārāja explained that the word is fivefold with the karmapravacanīya (adverbial particle) as the fifth. But karmapravacanīyas are the causes that delimit a relation generated by a particular action; hence, because they reveal a particular action by way of revealing a particular relation, they are subsumed under prefixes alone. Bearing this in mind, the fourfold division of words stated by the author of the Bhāṣya is fitting: this is how it should be discerned.

13.37

[Objection:] But surely, you continually declare that word is eternal, having the nature of sphoṭa. We cannot endure that, because of the absence of a means of valid cognition for it—say some.

13.38

To this it is said: perception itself is the means of valid cognition here. For the apprehension of a single word distinct from the various letters, as in '"cow" is a single word', is common to all people. Indeed, in the absence of a subverting cognition, the experience of a word cannot be said to be false. Moreover, through the impossibility of explaining the apprehension of word-meaning otherwise, sphoṭa must be accepted. Nor does the claim that that cognition arises from the phonemes alone stand examination, since it does not bear analysis: do the phonemes generate the cognition of meaning collectively or individually? Not the first, for phonemes, being momentary, cannot form a collection. Not the last, because the cognition of meaning cannot arise from individual phonemes. Nor is there any alternative other than being combined or separated. Therefore, since the expressive capacity of phonemes is untenable, that by whose power the apprehension of meaning takes place is the sphoṭa. Those who know this declare: 'The eternal word, distinct from phonemes, manifested by phonemes, and expressive of meaning, is sphoṭa.' For this very reason they explain the meaning of the word 'sphoṭa' in two ways: it is sphoṭa because it is split open, that is, manifested by phonemes, hence manifested by phonemes; or it is sphoṭa because meaning bursts forth, that is, becomes manifest from it, hence expressive of meaning. And so it was said by the revered Patañjali in the Mahābhāṣya: 'Now, what is the word in "cow"? That through the utterance of which there arises the cognition of objects possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns—that is the word.' And Kaiyaṭa explained this in a continuous exposition ending with: 'Grammarians hold that the expressive word is distinct from the phonemes. Because, if phonemes were expressive, the utterance of the second and subsequent phonemes would be purposeless, and so on; thus sphoṭa, distinct from them, manifested by articulated sounds and expressive [of meaning], has been established at length in the Vākyapadīya.'

13.39

Now, [an opponent might say:] even for sphoṭa, expressiveness of meaning is untenable, since it does not bear analysis. Does the sphoṭa convey the meaning when manifested, or when unmanifested? Not the latter, for that would entail the production of the effect in the form of cognition of all word-meanings [simultaneously], since, by accepting the eternity of sphoṭa, the independent cause would be ever-present and there could be no delay of the effect. If, to avoid this fault, it is maintained that the sphoṭa conveys meaning when manifested, even so, do the manifesting phonemes manifest it individually or collectively? On either alternative, the very faults stated by you regarding the position that phonemes are expressive must be averted regarding the position that phonemes are manifestative of sphoṭa. As was said by Bhaṭṭācārya in the Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika:

13.40

'He for whom the partless sphoṭa is manifested by cognitions of phonemes

13.41

is not freed even from a single objection.'

13.42

Since the designation 'word' (pada) is prescribed only for phonemes ending in an inflection by Pāṇini as 'what ends in sup and tiṅ is a word' and by Gautama as 'those ending in an inflection are a word', the cognition of a word will occur only regarding phonemes, by virtue of the assistance of the apprehension of linguistic convention. If it is objected: 'Then in this word sara there are as many phonemes as there are in rasa; thus in vana and nava, nadī and dīnā, rāma and māra, rājā and jārā, and so on, there would be no apprehension of a difference in meaning,'

13.43

no, for a distinction can be made through a difference in order. As was said by the follower of Tutāta:

13.44

'As many, of such kind, and whichever phonemes

13.45

have a recognized capacity in conveying a given meaning, they make it known in just that manner.'

13.46

Therefore, by the maxim that 'a fault which is common to both sides is not to be raised against one alone', since the expressive capacity of phonemes is tenable, the assumption of an additional sphoṭa is unjustified—if this is argued,

13.47

then all this is like clutching at grass-stalks, because the alternatives are untenable. Is the support of the cognition of a word merely phonemes, or a collection of phonemes? Not the first, for in a series of phonemes distinct from one another, a single ground cannot be found, just as a cognition of a garland cannot occur regarding flowers without a string; thus the apprehension 'this is one word' is untenable. Nor the second, because phonemes that have been uttered and perished cannot form a collection. For the designation 'collection' applies to those things that are experienced as many by standing together in a single place—as the designation 'collection' applies to dhava, khadira, palāśa, and other trees experienced as standing together in a single place, or as in the case of elephants, men, horses, and the like. And those phonemes are not experienced in that way, because they perish as soon as they arise. Even on the view of manifestation, manifestation occurs only sequentially, since a collection is impossible. Nor can a fictional collection be imagined in the phonemes, because it would entail mutual dependence: once expressiveness of a single meaning is established, the cognition of wordhood in phonemes arises on that condition; and once that is established, expressiveness of a single meaning is established. Therefore, because the expressive capacity of phonemes is impossible, sphoṭa must be accepted.

13.48

If it is objected: 'Even on the view that phonemes manifest sphoṭa, by the progression of the previously stated dilemma, morning breaks over the toll-booth,'

13.49

then this is merely building castles in the air, because there is an asymmetry. To explain: the first articulated sound, though manifesting, manifests the sphoṭa obscurely; through the sequence of subsequent manifesting sounds, it becomes clear, clearer, and clearest. Just as one's Vedic study when recited once is not grasped, but through repetition there is a clear ascertainment; or just as the real nature of a jewel does not shine clearly in the initial cognition, but in the final mental state is manifested as it truly is.

13.50

'When the seed has been deposited by articulated sounds, along with the final sound,

13.51

in the intellect whose maturation comes from repetition, the word is determined,'

13.52

as stated by the authoritative teachers. Therefore, based on everyday usage such as 'we understand the meaning from this word', and because the expressiveness of meaning by phonemes is untenable, as stated by the revered Bhartṛhari in the first book, the partless principle of the word known as sphoṭa, expressive of meaning, must be accepted. All of this was explained in the chapter on Universal, which is devoted to demonstrating that the universal of Being, characterized as ultimate consciousness, is itself the meaning of all words.

13.53

[The opponent replies:] If Being alone is the meaning of all words, then all words would be synonyms; and thus nowhere would the simultaneous employment of three or four words be possible—what great cleverness of the venerable one! As has been said:

13.54

"For the simultaneous use of synonyms is indeed not admitted,

13.55

Because they express an object successively, not together." Thus [it has been said].

13.56

If it is objected: "Therefore, this view cannot withstand critical examination,"

13.57

[we reply:] this is akin to ruminating on the sky. Just as a crystal jewel [appears diverse] through the difference of tinting substances like blue, red, and yellow, so, through the difference of related entities, Being is established as being perceived without difference from their nature; hence the distinctive linguistic usage based on distinctions such as 'cowness', in the form of 'cow-being', is properly explained. And so there is the statement of an authority:

13.58

"Just as a pure substance, crystal, when joined severally

13.59

With blue, red, yellow, and the like, is perceived as having their color." Thus [it is said].

13.60

So too it has been stated by Hari:

13.61

"Being itself, differentiated in cows and other things through the difference of related entities,

13.62

Is called the universal; upon it all words are established.

13.63

They declare it to be the meaning of a nominal stem and the meaning of a verbal root;

13.64

It is eternal, it is the great Self; affixes such as -tva and -tal designate it." Thus [it is said].

13.65

Being alone, which is differentiated in cows, horses, and the like by the related substrates—its difference being merely imagined—is the great universal, the [true] universal. A subordinate universal such as cowness is not ultimately different from it. Cow-being alone is cowness; no other recurrent [entity] appears. In the same way, one should say horse-being is horseness, and so forth. And thus, upon that very Being, the universal differentiated by distinctions such as cow, all words like 'cow' are established as expressive [terms]. And it is well known that the meaning of a nominal stem is Being. On the view that a verbal root expresses being (bhāva), since being is just Being (sattā), the meaning of a verbal root is indeed Being. Even on the view that a verbal root expresses action,

13.66

"Others call action a universal that resides in manifold individual instances,"

13.67

since in the chapter on action (Kriyāsamuddeśa) action is established as having the nature of a universal, the meaning of a verbal root is indeed Being. Because the affixes -tva, -tal, and so forth are prescribed in the sense of being by [the rule] "tasya bhāvas tvatalau" (Pāṇini 5.1.119), it is appropriate that they designate Being. And that Being is eternal because it lacks origination and destruction. Because the entire phenomenal world is its illusory transformation (vivarta), and because it is devoid of limitation by space, time, and entity, that Being is designated as the great Self—this is the meaning of the two verses.

13.68

Even on the view of the proponent of substance as word-meaning, the principle whose nature is consciousness is established in the chapter on relations (Saṃbandhasamuddeśa) as the meaning of all words:

13.69

"The real entity is ascertained through unreal forms;

13.70

Through words, which are unreal extrinsic conditions, the real alone is denoted.

13.71

Just as Devadatta's house, [pointed out] by an unstable mark [such as a crow],

13.72

Is grasped, [yet] through the word 'house', [the house] is denoted in its pure state alone." Thus [it is said].

13.73

By the author of the commentary (Patañjali) too, on the occasion of explaining the vārttika "siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe", through the passage "substance is indeed eternal", it was determined that the principle of Brahman, delimited by unreal extrinsic conditions and denoted by the word 'substance', is the meaning of all words.

13.74

In the view of Vājapyāyana, who holds that the universal is the word-meaning, words such as 'cow' denote a universal inhering in distinct substances. When that [universal] is grasped, substance is understood through its relation to it. Words such as 'white' declare a universal inhering in a quality; the cognition of the quality occurs through its relation to that [universal], and [the cognition] of the substance through the relation to that which is related [to the quality]. In the case of proper names, from their origin up to their destruction, despite differences in states such as infancy, boyhood, and youth, a universal such as 'Devadatta-ness' must be accepted, established by the force of the recognition 'this is that very same person'. In actions also, a universal is perceived; that alone is denoted by the verbal root, because a recurrent cognition appears in [instances like] 'he cooks' and the like. In the view of Vyāḍi, who holds that substance is the word-meaning, the individual alone appears as the primary denotation of a word, while the universal serves only as an indirect indicator; thus there is no scope for flaws such as infinity [of individual instances]. Both views are acceptable to the teacher Pāṇini. For, having accepted the universal as the word-meaning, there is usage such as "jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām" (Pāṇini 1.2.58); and having accepted substance as the word-meaning, [there is usage] such as "sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau" (Pāṇini 1.2.64). Because grammar serves all assemblies, there is no contradiction in accepting both views. Therefore, it is established that the non-dual, real, supreme principle of Brahman is the meaning of all words. Thus it has been said:

13.75

"Therefore, through the division of capacities, the one real entity whose self is Being,

13.76

Appears in multiform aspect when denoted by words." Thus [it is said].

13.77

The nature of the real was also stated by Hari in the chapter on relations (Saṃbandhasamuddeśa):

13.78

"Where the seer, the seen, and the seeing are unconceptualized,

13.79

The knowers of the end of the three Vedas declare the reality of that entity alone." Thus [it is said].

13.80

In the chapter on substance (Dravyasamuddeśa) as well:

13.81

"Just as gold in an earring is real when modifications disappear,

13.82

That wherein modifications disappear, they call the supreme source." Thus [it is said].

13.83

To establish the admitted non-duality, the non-difference of the expressed and the expressive was shown:

13.84

"That [substance] is the expressed of all words, and from the word it is not distinct;

13.85

Even though they are non-distinct, the relation between them is like that of the individual self and the supreme Self." Thus [it is said].

13.86

Because empirical usage, with its abundance of distinctions imagined by various extrinsic conditions, is imagined by nescience alone, the principle of Brahman, whose diversity of forms is superimposed by fixed forms, is the object of all words. And while there is ultimate non-difference, by force of concealment, in the state of empirical usage, the high and low phenomenal world appears as an illusory transformation, like the dream state—this is the meaning of the verse. Thus say those skilled in the Vedānta doctrine:

13.87

"Just as this phenomenal world of dreams is an expansion of illusion within me,

13.88

So too the waking phenomenal world is an expansion of illusion within me." Thus [it is said].

13.89

Thus, when the supreme, unchanging Brahman, consisting of being-consciousness-bliss and non-different from the inner self, is understood, upon the cessation of beginningless nescience, the highest good, characterized as abiding as that Brahman-Self, will be accomplished.

Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit