[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana) › [Exegesis of the Vedic ritual (Pūrvamīmāṃsā)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa) › [Kumārila's school](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta) › [Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala) › 2.3.p19 # Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 2.3.p19 Nyāyaratnamālā 2.3.p19 - **Language:** Sanskrit ### [2.3.p19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.2.3.p19) ityapakramyate| yadi pramāmānyeva viṣayīkṛtya cintyeta tato viṣayasyobhayavādisiddhatvād yānyubhayoḥ pramāṇatayā prasiddhāni teṣāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ svata ityetāvat siddhāntyeta| tataśca vedasyobhayavādisiddhaprāmāṇyābhāvena vicārāviṣayatvānnāsya svataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ sādhitaṃ syāt| tatra vedaprāmāṇyānupayoginī cintā kākadantaparīkṣāvadakartavyā syāt| jñānamātraṃ tvadhikṛtya svataḥ prāmāṇye parataścāprāmāṇye sādhyamāne vedasyāpi svatastāvadviṣayatathātvarūpaṃ prāmāṇyamavagataṃ syāt kāraṇadoṣajñānāderanārthatathātvamātraṃ prāmāṇyaṃ smṛterapi tathātvapraṅgāt| satyam na tāvanmātram asmiṃstu prakaraṇe tāvanmātrameva svataḥ parato veti cintyate| pramāṇaśadbo hyadhigatatayā'nanusandhīyamānatathābhūtārthaniścāyakatvavācī tasya bhāvaḥ prāmāṇyam kaśca tasya bhāvaḥ pramāmāntarādhigatatayā'nanusandhīyamānatvaṃ tathābhāvaścarthasya jñānasya tanniścayajanakateti tritayaṃ militaṃ pramāṇabuddhiśadbayorvācakaṃ prāmāṇyam| tatra yadetadarthasyāvagatatayā'nanusandhīyamāmanatvaṃ tadyogyānupalabdhigamyatvena na jñānasvarūpād gamyate| na hi ghaṭajñānaṃ ghaṭasyānyato'navagatatāṃ pratipādayati| nāpi guṇajñānādibhistadavagatiḥ| tena na tatra svataḥ parato veti cintā yadeva tu nanvatathābhūtamityanenāyathārthatvalakṣaṇamaprāmāṇyamāśaṅkitaṃ tatparihārāyārthatathātvalakṣaṇameva prāmāṇyaṃ svata iti sādhyate yastu niścayātmakaprāmāṇyotpādanamiti granthaḥ so'pyavirūddhaḥ| tathā hi yadarthatathātvaniścāyakaṃ tadeva tadviṣayasya niścayasyotpādakaṃ bhavati yadeva hi jñeyāpekṣayā jñāpakaṃ tadeva jñānāpakṣayā janakaṃ bhavati| niścayo'pi ca pramāṇaśabdapravṛttinimittatvātpāmāṇyameva tenārthatathātvalakṣaṇaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ guṇajñānānniścīyataiti pratipādayataḥ pūrvapakṣiṇo nāsaṃgato niścayātmakaprāmāṇyotpādanaṃ tu vastusvarūpatvātsaṃvādaguṇajñānakāryatvena svadhyavasānamiti granthaḥ| yadi pūnaridameva sākṣāducyate niścayātmakaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ svato jāyataiti tathā satyaprāmāṇyamapi parato jāyata iti vaktavyam anyathā'sya pratipakṣatvameva na syāt| prāmāṇyaṃ svato jāyate'prāmāṇyaṃ parato'vagamyataiti| tasmāt svataḥ parataśca prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṃ cāvagamyataityeva prakaraṇārthaḥ| evaṃ hi nyāyo granthaśca samañjaso bhavati| > thus begins \[the text\]. If the inquiry were made taking only valid cognitions as its subject, then because the subject would be established for both disputants, the conclusion would merely establish that those which are well known to both as valid cognitions have intrinsic validity. And then, because the Veda's validity is not established for both disputants, it would not be a subject of inquiry, and its intrinsic validity would not be established. In that case, an inquiry not serving the validity of the Veda would be as useless as an examination of crow's teeth. But when intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity are established with respect to cognition as such, the validity of the Veda too, in the form of its object being as it is, would be understood intrinsically. \[Objection:\] The mere fact that an object is as it is cannot be validity, for that would entail that memory too has validity! \[Reply:\] True, it is not merely that; but in this section, it is investigated whether that alone is intrinsic or extrinsic. For the word 'pramāṇa' expresses that which ascertains an object as it actually is, not being apprehended as already known; its property is validity (prāmāṇya). And what is that property? Not being apprehended as already known by another means of valid cognition, the fact that the object is so, and the cognition's generation of certainty thereof—these three combined constitute the validity that is expressed by the words 'pramāṇa' and 'buddhi'. There, the fact that this object is not apprehended as already known is grasped by appropriate non-perception, and is not grasped from the nature of the cognition itself; for a cognition of a pot does not indicate the pot's not having been known from elsewhere. Nor is it apprehended by the cognition of excellences, etc. Therefore, with respect to that, there is no inquiry as to whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic. Rather, validity is established as intrinsic solely in the form of the object being as it is, in order to remove the invalidity defined as unfaithfulness to the object that was raised by \[the objection\] 'Now, it is not as it is'. And as for the passage, 'the generation of validity whose nature is certainty', that too is not contradictory. For what ascertains the reality of an object is itself that which generates certainty regarding that object; indeed, what is an indicator with respect to the knowable object is itself a generator with respect to the cognition. And certainty too is itself validity, since it is the cause of the application of the word 'pramāṇa'. Therefore, the passage stating, 'the generation of validity whose nature is certainty, however, being the nature of the thing, is easily determined as the effect of corroboration and the cognition of excellences', is not inconsistent for a proponent of the prima facie view who explains that validity characterized as the object being as it is is determined from the cognition of excellences. If, on the other hand, it were directly stated that validity consisting of certainty is generated intrinsically, then one would also have to say that invalidity is generated extrinsically; otherwise, there would be no opposition between the two, \[if one were to say:\] 'Validity is generated intrinsically, \[but\] invalidity is understood extrinsically.' Therefore, the meaning of this section is precisely that validity and invalidity are understood intrinsically and extrinsically. In this way, the reasoned argument and the text are consistent. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.3.p18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.2.3.p18) - [Next: 2.3.p20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.2.3.p20) - [Up: 2.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.2.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.2.3.p19) — English, machine translation ## Commentaries (1) - [Nāyakaratna](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala!ramanujacarya.2.3.6) — Rāmānujācārya, Sanskrit ## Linked texts (1) - [Nyāyamañjarī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nyaya.nyayamanjari.1.3.227) — Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.2.3.p19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.2.3.p19) · Pramāṇa