[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana) › [Exegesis of the Vedic ritual (Pūrvamīmāṃsā)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa) › [Kumārila's school](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta) › [Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala) › 4.2.p14 # Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p14 Nyāyaratnamālā 4.2.p14 - **Language:** Sanskrit ### [4.2.p14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.2.p14) etadeva bādhakasyāpi tattvam| anumānena hyetadavagataṃ rajatasya sato nākasmādatadbhāvaḥ saṃbhavatīti atadrūpasya vā tadrūpateti ubhayorapi kālayorekarūpamevedamiti sthite pūrvamevāvagataṃ rajatarūpamuttarakālaṃ vyāpnoti uttarakālāvagataścātadbhāvaḥ tatpūrvakālam| tena samānaviṣayatayā pūrvāvagatasya rajatarūpasya bhavatyuttarakālabhuvā nedaṃ rajatamityanena bādhaḥ| yatra tvanumānenaikarūpatvaṃ na kāladvaye'pi vastuno'vagataṃ tatra na bhavatyeva bādhaḥ| yathā badaraphale śyāmapratyayasya pākakālabhuvā raktapratyayena| pratyakṣeṇa tu sthāyitvāvagame tatrāpi bādhaḥ syāt| tasmānna pratyakṣeṇa sthāyitvaṃ svadhyavasānam| evaṃ niyamo'pi sarvadeśakālavyāptirūpatvānna| nanu svābhāvikatvaṃ saṃbandhasya niyamaḥ na tu kālāntarasambandhastacca vartamānameveti yuktaṃ yatpratyakṣeṇa gṛhyate| kiṃ punaridaṃ svābhāvikatvaṃ na tāvatsadātanatvaṃ kādācitkasya tadayogāt| atha svarūpanimittatvam agnerapi dhūmasaṃbandhe svarūpaṃ nimittamiti tasyāpi dhūmasaṃbandho niyataḥ syāt| nanvārdrendhanādikṛto'sya dhūmasambandho na svarūpanimittaḥ satyam ārdrendhanādinimittaṃ svarūpamiti nimittameva| na hyasita saṃbandhisvarūpe sambandho bhavati| svarūpadharmatvamiti cet sa eva doṣaḥ| agnisvarūpasyāpi dharma eva saṃyogaḥ| atha svarūpapaikānimittakaḥ sambandhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ vahnestu dhūmasaṃbandhe svarūpātirikto'pyārdrendhanādirastyeva hetuḥ dhūmasya vahnisambandhe svarūpameva nimittam na nimittāntaramastīti matamevantarhi pratyakṣagamyaṃ svābhāvikatvaṃ na hi tena nimittāntarābhāvaḥ śakyate pratyetuṃ bhāvaviṣayatvātpratyakṣasya| dṛśyādarśanāttu nimittāntarāchabhāvaḥ pratīyataiti pratyakṣagamyatvānupapattiḥ| api ca dhūmasyāgnisambandhe na svarūpameva nimittamagnyādīnāmapi nimittatvāt| tasmātsvarūpāvyabhicāra eva svabhāvikatvam| avyabhicāraśca sakalataddeśakālavyāptiriti pratyakṣagamyatvānupapattiḥ tasya vartamānaviṣayatvāt| api ca svābhāvikatā'pi vartamānasyaiva saṃnihitasya niścetuṃ śakyate nātītānāgatavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭānāṃ saṃbandhānām| santi hi bahvatho vahnidhūmasambandhasya vyaktavyaḥ kathaṃ tāsāṃ sarvāsāṃ dhūmasvarūpameva nimittamiti saṃyuktaviṣayeṇa pratyakṣeṇa gamyate| atha sambandhasāmānyasya tannimittatvam na tasya nityatvena nimittābhāvāt| idañca sakṛddarśanagamyaniyamapakṣe'pi tulyameva dūṣaṇam| tatrāpi hi saṃprayuktasyaiva hi saṃyogasya dhūmā1 bhāvanimittatā'vagamyate nātītādīnām| sa ca kālāntare naṣṭa iti pratyakṣāvagatasya saṃyogasya rūpanimittena kālāntare'numānam| tasmānna kathañcit pratyakṣaviṣayatvaṃ niyamasyeti sthitam| apare tvarthāpattigamyaṃ niyamaṃ manyante| yadetacchataśo'gnau dhūmadarśanamanagnau ca kva cidapyadarśanamidamasati dhūmasyāgninā niyame'nupapannem| aniyato hi kadā citkva cidapyagniṃ vinopalabhyeteti tadapyanupapannam| adarśanaṃ tāvadabhāvādevopapannam| na tu tāvatā sarvatrānagnau nāstīti śakyamdhyavasātuṃ pramāṇābhāvāt| darśanamātramapi tava bhāvādevopapannam| na tu tāvanmātreṇa sarvatrāgnāvastyeva dhūma iti svadhyavasānam| tasmādvaktavyaṃ niyame pramāṇam| ucyate kimatra vaktavyam, yataḥ > This very point explains the nature of a defeater as well. For it is understood through inference that when silver exists, its non-existence does not arise uncaused, nor does that which is not of that nature become of that nature. When it is settled that this \[object\] has the very same nature at both times, the silver-nature previously grasped extends to the subsequent time, and the non-silver-nature grasped at the subsequent time extends to the previous time. Because of having the same object, the silver-nature previously grasped is defeated by the cognition arising at the subsequent time: "This is not silver." But where identity of nature at both times is not cognized by inference regarding an entity, there no defeat occurs at all, as in the case of the cognition of blackness in a jujube fruit \[not being defeated\] by the cognition of redness arising at the time of ripening. If, however, permanence were grasped by perception, defeat would occur even there. Therefore, permanence cannot be firmly ascertained by perception. Likewise, restriction too \[cannot be so ascertained\], because it consists in pervading all places and times. \[Objection:\] Surely, restriction is the naturalness of the relation, not the relation at other times; and that \[naturalness\] is present right now, so it is reasonable that it is grasped by perception. \[Reply:\] What then is this 'naturalness'? First, it is not eternal existence, because that which is occasional cannot possess that. If it is said to be caused by essential nature: the essential nature of fire too is the cause in its relation to smoke, and so its relation to smoke would also be restricted. \[Objection:\] Surely its relation to smoke is produced by wet fuel and the like, not caused by essential nature. \[Reply:\] True, the essential nature is a cause \[only\] with wet fuel etc. as an accessory cause, yet it is indeed a cause. For without the essential nature of a relatum, a relation does not exist. If it is said to be a property of the essential nature, the same fault applies: contact is indeed a property of the essential nature of fire as well. If it is said that a relation is natural when it is caused solely by essential nature, and in the case of fire's relation to smoke there is indeed a cause other than its essential nature, such as wet fuel, whereas in the case of smoke's relation to fire, its essential nature alone is the cause and there is no other cause—if this is the view, then naturalness cannot be known by perception. For through it the absence of another cause cannot be cognized, since perception has existent entities as its object. And through the non-cognition of what is perceptible, the absence of another cause is cognized; hence its being graspable by perception is unfeasible. Moreover, in smoke's relation to fire, its essential nature alone is not the cause, because fire and the like are also causes. Therefore, naturalness is nothing other than non-deviation from the essential nature; and non-deviation is pervasion of all those places and times, and hence its being graspable by perception is unfeasible, because \[perception\] has the present as its object. Furthermore, even naturalness can be ascertained only for what is present and near, not for relations that are past, future, intervened, or distant. For there are many instances of the relation of fire and smoke; how could it be cognized by perception, which has an object in contact, that the essential nature of smoke alone is the cause of all of them? If it is said that it is the cause of relation in general, no, because since that is eternal, it has no cause. And this is an equal flaw even in the view that restriction is cognizable by a single observation. For in that view too, the causality of smoke-production is cognized only for that contact which is in conjunction, not for past ones and the like. And that \[contact\] is destroyed at another time; hence there would be inference at another time through the cause consisting in the nature of contact cognized by perception. Therefore, it is established that restriction cannot in any way be the object of perception. Others, however, consider restriction to be cognizable by presumption: "This observation of smoke in fire hundreds of times and its non-observation anywhere in non-fire is inexplicable if there were no restriction of smoke with fire; for if it were unrestricted, it might sometimes be observed somewhere without fire." That too is untenable. Non-observation is explained simply by absence \[in those seen places\]; but by that much, it cannot be ascertained that it does not exist everywhere in non-fire, because of the lack of a means of valid cognition. Merely observing it is also explained simply by its presence \[there\]; but by that alone, it cannot be firmly ascertained that smoke exists everywhere in fire. Therefore, a means of valid cognition for restriction must be stated. In reply, it is said: What is there to state here, since: > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.2.p13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.2.p13) - [Next: 4.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.4) - [Up: 4.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.2.p14) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.2.p14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.2.p14) · Pramāṇa